Wage setting, social pacts and the Euro: a new role for the state by Hassel, Anke
www.ssoar.info
Wage setting, social pacts and the Euro: a new role
for the state
Hassel, Anke
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hassel, A. (2006). Wage setting, social pacts and the Euro: a new role for the state. (Changing Welfare States).
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-272097
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
European monetary integration has posed tremendous challenges to
governments since it removed the tool of currency depreciation 
previously used for dealing with economic imbalances. As a consequence,
governments of member states of the Eurozone have turned to wage setting
in order to achieve economic adjustment. In search of ways to adjust wage
expectations to economic realities, governments have periodically
intervened into wage setting systems in Western Europe over the last 25
years. During the process of European monetary integration wage setting
institutions in most countries have generally remained centralized or become
so; relations between governments and social partners have intensified
rather than loosened. Wage Setting, Social Pacts and the Euro: A New Role
for the State explains the reasons for this continued quest for social
partnership in Western Europe. It highlights the economic and political
benefits of negotiated wage restraint in a context of stricter monetary
policies and increasing economic openness.
Anke Hassel is professor of public policy at the Hertie School of Governance
in Berlin, Germany. Prior to that she was professor of sociology at the
International University Bremen, senior researcher at the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies and spent a year in the planning division
of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour.
www.aup.nl
Amsterdam University Press
A
n
k
e H
assel
W
age Setting, Social P
acts and the E
uro
A m s t e r d a m  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s
Wage Setting, 
Social Pacts and 
the Euro
A New Role for the State
Anke Hassel
c
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
isbn-13      978 90 5356 919 1
isbn-10      90 5356 919 7
cover anke hassel  24-08-2006  16:50  Pagina 1
wage setting, social pacts and the euro
Wages.indd   1 28-8-2006   15:43:06
CHANGING WELFARE STATES
Processes of socio-economic change − individualising society and globalising eco-
nomics and politics − cause large problems for modern welfare states. Welfare 
states, organised on the level of nation-states and built on one or the other form 
of national solidarity, are increasingly confronted with − for instance − ﬁ scal prob-
lems, costs control diﬃ  culties, and the unintended use of welfare programs. Such 
problems – generally speaking – raise the issue of sustainability because they tend 
to undermine the legitimacy of the programs of the welfare state and in the end in-
duce the necessity of change, be it the complete abolishment of programs, retrench-
ment of programs, or attempts to preserve programs by modernising them.
 Th is series of studies on welfare states focuses on the changing institutions and 
programs of modern welfare states. Th ese changes are the product of external 
pressures on welfare states, for example because of the economic and political 
consequences of globalisation or individualisation, or result from the internal, po-
litical or institutional dynamics of welfare arrangements.
 By studying the development of welfare state arrangements in diﬀ erent countries, 
in diﬀ erent institutional contexts, or by comparing developments between countries 
or diﬀ erent types of welfare states, this series hopes to enlarge the body of knowl-
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“Statutory or voluntary, it [incomes policy] may not
have many positive virtues; but the alternative –
leaving it all to the slow-acting and uncertain treatment
of tight fiscal and monetary policies – is even less appealing.”
the economist, 11 february 1978
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 Preface
Th is book project has lasted for a period of eight years. It started in sum-
mer 1998 when the German Social Democratic Party, spd, announced it 
would set up an Alliance for Jobs with the unions and employers’ orga-
nizations in case of a change of government. Becoming interested in the 
renewal of corporatist decision making, I prepared a small comparative 
study on social pacts in Europe that became the foundation for this book.
 By the time this book is published, the German attempt to strike a so-
cial pact – the Alliance for Jobs – will have been dead for at least four 
years and another change of government has taken place. The new cor-
poratist phase has contributed more to the demise of social partnership 
in Germany than to its renewal. Thankfully, I did not start a project on 
the effectiveness of this new mode of governance. Rather, my attention 
was grabbed by the underlying motivation of governments to enter such 
pacts including soft forms of incomes policy in an era when these types 
of policies had generally been written off. Though this is a new variation 
on an old theme, I hope that the readers will take new insights from it for 
studying the political economy of wage bargaining in Europe.
 Writing this book met a couple of profound challenges, of which I 
would like to mention two. One was my ten-month stint to Manila, capi-
tal of the Philippines, in 2000-2001. Writing about the finer details of 
European monetary integration and wage regulation on a beach on the 
tropical island of Boracay overlooking turquoise sea or being stuck in a 
city of extreme social inequality was a challenge. Erich Kästner writes in 
the foreword of the famous German children book The flying classroom: 
“It is understandably very difficult to write a Christmas story in the warm-
est days of summer. One cannot just sit down and write ‘it is freezing cold, 
the snow is pouring down…’ when one feels like a joint of roasting meat… 
waiting for a heat stroke” (Kästner, 1998 [1933]: 10; my translation). Some 
similar problems arise when you think about the nitty-gritty of Europe-
an wage increases for well paid skilled workers while living in a country 
where the vast majority of the population lives on one dollar per day.
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The other challenge has been changing jobs three times in three years. My 
interest in governments’ motivations when dealing with trade unions led 
to me spending a year in the planning division of the Ministry of Econom-
ics and Labour to observe policy decisions in the making. This was fol-
lowed by appointments at the International University Bremen and finally 
at the Hertie School of Governance – all institutions I am very grateful to 
have been, and to remain, associated with. But with every new workplace, 
it takes time to adjust to new perspectives.
 This book would not have been produced without the generous support 
of all these institutions. Most important of all has been the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. I owe an enormous debt to 
Wolfgang Streeck, who has been so tolerant towards and supportive of a 
project with which he disagreed in many ways. In the course of revising 
the book I have taken up many of his suggestions and understand many 
of his concerns, in particular the danger of using technical language and 
explanations for a deeply political process. Special thanks go to Jelle Vis-
ser, who encouraged me to offer the manuscript to Amsterdam University 
Press and who helped a great deal when I revised it. Moreover, he did not 
even blink an eye when I confessed that I had lost his notes on the manu-
script at Budapest airport.
 Th anks also to the Sociology Department of the Ruhr-University Bo-
chum that accepted the manuscript as a habilitation thesis. In particular to 
Rolf G. Heinze who managed the process smoothly, but also to the depart-
ment staﬀ , Barbara Oetelshofen and Mechthild Bauernschmidt, as well as 
the faculty members who served on the habilitation committee. Th e two 
other reviewers of the thesis, Ulrich Widmaier and Klaus Armingeon, have 
provided extremely valuable comments on how to improve the arguments. 
Th anks also to the Science Center Berlin (wzb) for hosting me for eight 
months and the Volkswagen Stiftung that ﬁ nanced a one-year exchange to 
the planning division of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour.
 My colleagues at Cologne and elsewhere have been crucial for discuss-
ing my work and this project, by inviting me to present my work, by shar-
ing their time, their political and academic perspectives and thoughts 
and/or even their office space with me: Sabina Avdagic, Lucio Baccaro, 
Pablo Beramendi, Tom Cusack, Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Werner Eichhorst, 
Henrik Enderlein, Maria Funder, Steffen Ganghof, Peter Hall, Bob Hancké, 
Martin Höpner, Sven Jochem, John Kelly, Bernhard Kittel, Philip Manow, 
David Marsden, Philippe Pochet, Martin Rhodes, Fritz W. Scharpf, Wolf-
gang Schröder, Thorsten Schulten, Nico Siegel, David Soskice, Christine 
Trampusch, Sig Vitols and Stephen Wood.
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 Precious insights into the thinking and working of government adminis-
trations I gained from Henri Cordes, Britta-Maria Loskamp, Kirsten Neu-
Brandenburg, Stefan Proﬁ t and from countless discussions with Oliver 
Villwock at the Ministry of Labour and Economics, which have deeply in-
formed and thereby changed my understanding of political bureaucracies.
 The prize for the best research assistants in the world should go to 
Sebastian Gröbel and Moira Nelson; followed – in no particular order 
– by Yorck Großkraumbach, Nele Kampffmeyer, Marina Krestinina, Lena 
Riedel, Irina Shames and Malgosia Skorek.
 Finally, I have to thank my family. I thank Lucas for not taking the slight-
est interest in any of our work and pointing out to us the really important 
things in life. And Hugh for never stopping to support whatever I was do-
ing and for hanging in there with me in all the emotional and intellectual 
turmoil I went through. It is not lost on me.
PREFACE
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1 The Political Economy of Adjustment in Europe
Western European economies have undergone a major adjustment pro-
cess over the last 25 years. They have had to adjust to the challenges of the 
effects of the oil shocks of the mid-1970s, to major effects of the process 
of European monetary and economic integration, to structural burdens of 
highly developed welfare states and decreasing labour market participa-
tion rates, and to an ever increasing degree of international penetration of 
markets, especially financial markets.
 While processes of economic internationalization and financial liber-
alization have affected all advanced countries, Western European coun-
tries have faced a particular challenge. European economic integration 
processes have increasingly taken away economic policy tools, such as 
national competition law and national subsidies for certain industries and 
companies and employment protection in nationalized industries, which 
traditionally played an important role in Western European economic 
policy-making. In addition, European monetary union has progressively 
ruled out external adjustment via the exchange rate to compensate for 
losses in national competitiveness. Monetary integration in Western Eu-
rope has also meant universal adherence to the German model of restric-
tive monetary policy, which was the role model for the European mone-
tary system. Moreover, convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact have tightened fiscal policy. The fundamentally liberalizing nature of 
European economic integration has robbed national governments of im-
portant ways of cushioning and mediating necessary economic restruc-
turing.
 The external constraints on economic policy-making have crept into 
Western Europe on a gradual basis. Capital controls were lifted during 
the 1970s. The volume of international financial transactions increased 
dramatically between the 1970s and the late 1990s. Monetary integration 
started immediately after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system with 
the currency snake in 1973. It became an effective exchange rate mecha-
nism for a small number of European countries with the setting-up of the 
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European Monetary System (ems) in 1978. Devaluations still took place 
until the 1980s but were increasingly discouraged and avoided. After the 
ems crisis in 1992, major devaluations were virtually ruled out. The Maas-
tricht Treaty not only laid down the fight against inflation as a precon-
dition for monetary union, but also put an end to further expansion of 
public expenditure by introducing ceilings for public debt and deficits. 
European governments chose to adopt the policy of financial restrictive-
ness and public austerity at different speeds and in different ways. Coun-
tries with previously high inflation and high unemployment, such as Italy 
and Ireland, joined the monetary club at an early stage, while most of 
the Scandinavian countries were more reluctant. They had opted for a 
strategy of competitive devaluation combined with real wage restraint as 
a temporary adjustment tool. In most cases, the adoption of the German 
role model required a major shift in economic policy-making. Inflation 
and devaluation had become the accepted means of adjustment to balance 
of payment difficulties. But from the early 1990s onwards, European gov-
ernments had tied their hands tightly in favour of a restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policy, liberalized markets and strict competition policy.
 One of the major consequences of monetary and economic integration 
of the European Union member states has been that it has shifted the bur-
den of adjustment to economic imbalances and economic shocks increas-
ingly and unilaterally onto the labour market. To the extent that external 
adjustment via the exchange rate is not available any more, that previously 
sheltered economic sectors are now open to international competition 
and that currencies are traded on international finance markets, changes 
in the competitiveness of national economies and regions have to be com-
pensated for by the adjustment of real labour costs and, in many cases, 
of real wages. Tightening external economic conditions has required an 
increase in wage flexibility or the capacity for wage restraint in order to 
maintain current levels of employment.
 While restrictive monetary policies and tighter fiscal policies were 
adopted almost universally in Western Europe,1 the approaches towards 
wage flexibility remained contested. Whereas restrictive monetary poli-
cies were designed to discipline price and wage setters by highlighting the 
negative externalities of excessive price and wage increases, the condi-
tions under which this policy would be most effective were still an open 
question.2 European labour markets were highly regulated and wage bar-
gaining institutions in many countries were centralized. Different views 
prevailed over the most beneficial relationship between monetary policy 
and wage bargaining institutions.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADJUSTMENT IN EUROPE
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 For most economists, labour and product markets produce the best 
results when governed by the rational expectations of workers and firms 
under competitive conditions. The credible threat of restrictive monetary 
policy can cause all economic actors to expect low price and wage in-
creases, thereby controlling inflationary tendencies automatically. Com-
petitive labour markets allow for the adjustment of imbalances between 
sectors and firms. Unregulated labour markets with decentralized wage 
formation procedures would therefore always outperform solutions of 
institutionalized wage formation because centralized forms of wage set-
ting carry the costs of large and oligopolistic price and wage setters and 
frequently entail the intrusion of public policy into a private market do-
main. Two developments helped to strengthen this view throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Firstly, in economic theory, the dissemination of the role 
of rational expectations as the main guiding formula in macroeconomics 
separated monetary policy from the real economy. Economists empha-
sized the role of monetary policy for fighting inflation without being held 
responsible for welfare effects. Secondly, experiments of government in-
tervention in wage bargaining as a response to the high inflation period 
of the mid-1970s failed utterly in many European countries. These experi-
ences showed that governments were failing the markets, not vice versa.
 During the 1970s and 1980s, a body of principles on macroeconomic 
policy-making spread throughout the Western world, which was based 
on the assumption of the neutrality of monetary policy for economic ef-
fects. On the basis of rational expectations, it was argued that monetary 
policies would only have price effects but not welfare effects. Non-com-
petitive markets for goods and labour caused welfare effects – in par-
ticular unemployment. The theory of the neutrality of monetary policy 
introduced a clear distinction between the world of monetary and fiscal 
policies dealing with prices and the world of real economic activities. Pre-
vious beliefs about a trade-off between changes in prices and unemploy-
ment (the Phillips curve) were shattered. In the long run, the consensus 
in macroeconomics was that there was no relationship between inflation 
and unemployment. As a consequence, monetary policies – aimed at sta-
bilizing prices – would not have an effect on the real economy. Conse-
quently, disequilibria within the real economy such as unemployment had 
to be dealt with by improving the competitive conditions in the markets 
for goods and labour.
 Hence, by the beginning of the 1980s, government economic advisors 
tended to recommend the deregulation of labour markets and the intro-
duction of more market mechanisms into wage formation. For instance, 
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the council of economic advisors in Germany argued from the mid-1980s 
in favour of deregulation of the German labour market (Sachverständi-
genrat 1987). The oecd jobs study introduced a range of measurements to 
combat labour market rigidities and judged the performance of countries 
on the extent that they tackled these rigidities (Armingeon 2003; oecd 
1994 a and b). For most economists, labour market rigidities rather than 
restrictive macroeconomic policies were at the heart of the continuously 
low performance of European labour markets.
 Incomes policies, on the other hand, were a popular, but not very suc-
cessful, tool of economic policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Incomes 
policies were only rarely recommended to governments by economists 
who accepted the given state of the economy as being dominated by large-
scale price and wage setters.3 The increase in labour market regulation and 
wage formation throughout the 20th century stemmed from the traumatic 
experience of the Great Depression for economic policy-makers. Regula-
tion and economic planning were the lessons learned from low growth, 
low demand and economic volatility. In addition, war efforts had led to 
a further integration of the labour movement into policy-making. In all 
industrialized countries, the 1930s were followed by a period of increasing 
institutionalization of centralized wage bargaining, usually encouraged by 
government support. A new deal was struck on the labour market, with 
trade unions being accepted as responsible bargaining partners for em-
ployers and governments alike. The approach of regulated wage forma-
tion was carried over to the post-war period and was in place throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s. In the immediate post-war period, wage growth was 
moderate and capital stock was built up. However, already by the 1960s, 
European economies were in a very different position compared to the 
inter-war period. Rather than a lack of demand, governments faced the 
problem of tight labour markets and inflationary pressures. Governments 
experimented mostly unsuccessfully with different forms of incomes poli-
cies as guidelines to wage and price developments. Although the experi-
ences of the 1960s were not seen as successful at the time, governments 
turned to various policies to influence the wage setting behaviour of firms 
and trade unions (incomes policies) during the 1970s when the post-war 
model was put to the test. Again it failed in many countries. In the uk, It-
aly, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark, governments were frustrated 
about the lack of commitment shown by unions towards cooperating in 
economic management.
 Moreover, the us administration made a clear shift in its policy of eco-
nomic adjustment in 1978/79, preferring to pursue a new trend towards a 
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political economy based on deregulation, rather than defend the principle 
that wages should be not just factually but also rightly taken out of com-
petition (Streeck 1992: 108). The Federal Reserve responded to the second 
oil price shock with drastic increases in interest rates and – given the 
internationalized nature of financial markets – forced the industrialized 
world to follow the policy of high interest rates.
 Nevertheless, despite the turn in theoretical thinking, previous experi-
ences and the us role model, the recommendations by economists came 
to no avail. The majority of Western European governments did not leave 
wages to the market. Quite the opposite; incomes policies – as an ac-
tive intervention of governments in wage formation – were practised by 
a number of European governments in one form or other throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, albeit in different forms compared to the 1960s and 
1970s. The turnaround of French economic policy in 1982 was accom-
panied by a four-month price and wage freeze imposed by the govern-
ment, rather than left to the market to sort out the consequences of the 
high wage increases induced by the government only a couple of months 
earlier (Hall 1986; Levy 2000). Wage freezes were also either imposed or 
threatened in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Portu-
gal (Hassel 2003). Governments pleaded frequently for voluntary wage 
restraint. Tripartite wage agreements with governments that were also 
involved at the bargaining table and as a signatory party to wage agree-
ments were to be found in the majority of the eu member states through-
out the 1980s and 1990s.4 In Belgium and Finland, the traditional role of 
governments bargaining over centralized wage agreements continued. In 
Spain and Portugal, traditional government-led incomes policies were 
temporarily abandoned but then resumed and reorganized in the run-up 
to emu. In the Netherlands and Denmark, previous conflictual incomes 
policies of the 1970s were turned into tacit understandings between gov-
ernments and the social partners of voluntary wage restraint and decen-
tralization.
 In Ireland and Italy, new central agreements led to a reorganization 
of the relations between governments and social partners and sought a 
more coordinated rather than deregulatory approach. This included the 
transformation of wage bargaining institutions at a more central level 
(O’Donnell and O’Reardon 2000; Perez 2000a and b). In Sweden – the 
country in which employers were most determined to abandon corpo-
ratist involvement in the 1980s – a number of government commissions 
sought to install new pay formulas and introduce the methods of an in-
comes policy.
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 In Austria and Germany, the two countries where monetarism struck 
first, adjustment took place in 1974 and was from thereon enshrined as 
“institutionalized monetarism” (Streeck 1994). The conduct of wage bar-
gaining was enshrined to serve monetary stability and national competi-
tiveness in close interaction with public policies. The burden of German 
unification, however, led to new adjustment pressures and an increased 
role for governments in wage bargaining from the mid-1990s onwards. It 
was only in the United Kingdom that monetarism was accompanied by a 
deliberate government policy to decentralize labour market institutions 
and leave wages to the market. Strict monetary policy, fiscal austerity and 
market clearance of the labour market were the explicit policy of the Brit-
ish government for more than two decades.
 In many countries, the re-emergence of cooperation between govern-
ments and trade unions took the form of social pacts. Governments in 
Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy signed explicit tri-
partite agreements containing clauses on wage formation. Tripartite sum-
mits were held in France, Belgium and Sweden. Even in countries where 
governments were outspokenly hostile towards trade unions during the 
early 1980s, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, corporatist 
approaches, rather than attempts to deregulate the labour market, re-
emerged in the later part of the 1980s. Again, the United Kingdom is the 
only example where the government broke drastically and ultimately with 
all traditions of coming to negotiated solutions with organized labour. 
The British example is, however, very untypical of the rest of Europe, in-
cluding in particular the Irish experience, where the most centralized ar-
rangement of wage setting evolved throughout the latter half of the 1980s 
and the 1990s.
On an aggregate level, comparative studies have pointed out that corpo-
ratism has been extremely stable in most European countries (Ferner and 
Hyman 1998b). Only in Sweden and Denmark was wage bargaining decen-
tralized to a lower level. In both cases, this process was driven by employ-
ers rather than by governments. Decentralization here took the form of 
moving from the national to the sectoral level of bargaining rather than to 
the plant level.5 In countries where stable relationships between govern-
ments and the social partners existed, they generally remained (Ferner 
and Hyman 1998b; Traxler 1997).
 With the exception of the British government and the Swedish employ-
ers’ association in the early 1980s, in no West European country were cor-
poratist institutions or forms of policy-making actively dismantled during 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADJUSTMENT IN EUROPE
Wages.indd   20 28-8-2006   15:43:08

the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, in Austria – still the most corporatist 
country in Western Europe – the chamber system has remained intact un-
til today and has only recently come under limited attack from the right-
wing coalition partner, the fpö. In Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and France, patterns of an institutionalized interaction between the gov-
ernment and the social partners remained intact throughout the period. 
No major institution that embodied corporatist policy-making, such as 
the Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) in Germany, 
the Socio-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, ser) or the La-
bour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, star) in the Netherlands, or 
the National Labour Council (Nationale Arbeidsraad) in Belgium, was 
dismantled.
 Government intervention into wage bargaining was not part of a so-
cial democratic strategy; in fact, it was not explicitly tied to any political 
faction. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, conservative and liberal par-
ties dominated most governments in Western Europe. If deregulation 
of the labour market was associated with partisanship, we should have 
seen a clearer tendency towards decentralization. Instead the opposite 
occurred: centralized agreements on incomes policies were often struck 
between conservative governments and trade unions. For instance, in 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, a new approach towards 
a more organized form of wage bargaining was only possible after the 
stalemate that had developed between left-wing governments and trade 
unions over wages had been broken by conservative governments. These 
governments were often firmly committed to following the new mac-
roeconomic policy paradigm of conservative monetary policy and the 
liberalization of labour markets. In practice, however, conservative eco-
nomic policy-making often went hand-in-hand with new corporatist ne-
gotiations on incomes policies.
 Even more puzzling is that the return to corporatism seems unrelated 
to the level and evolution of trade union strength in these countries. In 
general, trade union strength was in decline throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. Trade unions were unable to gain substantial new membership in 
any of the countries studied (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). However, suc-
cessful examples of the new corporatism can be found not only in coun-
tries with weak and declining trade unions such as the Netherlands, but 
also in countries with strong and thriving trade unions such as Finland. 
Even countries with strong but fragmented trade unions such as Ireland 
and Italy experienced successful forms of tripartite concertation. The no-
tion that working-class strength or even working-class defence against 
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the spread of neo-liberal policy-making could be at the heart of the rein-
vention of corporatist practices seems inadequate at first glance.
 Faced with increasingly hard external economic constraints, most 
Western European governments turned towards negotiations on income 
policies with their social partners and not towards the market. Income 
policies of some sort not only persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
but they also emerged in places where they had not been found previously 
and where they certainly had not been expected.6 Wage bargaining insti-
tutions continued to matter and were even strengthened by governments 
rather than weakened. This is not only in contrast to economic thinking 
but also in contrast to the experiences in the non-European countries of 
the oecd where labour market regulation and collective bargaining cov-
erage continuously declined.
 Why have European governments continued and sometimes increased 
their intervention in wage formation processes, while at the same time 
committing themselves to strict monetary conservatism? Why have they 
not relied on the rational expectations of economic actors that monetary 
restriction will automatically dampen wage demands? Why did govern-
ments engage in negotiations with trade unions at a time when their le-
gitimacy and membership strength were increasingly undermined?
 The limits of neo-corporatist analysis
Neo-corporatist approaches have explained the interaction between gov-
ernments and interest groups by pointing to the mutual gains of a close-
knit division of labour between them. Public policy can try to ensure 
that interest groups articulate and position their interests in a more pub-
licly desirable way by inviting them to influence public policies. Interest 
groups can restrain from upsetting government policies and thereby gain 
access to the formulation of other policies. Governments can offer orga-
nizational security to interest groups by granting representational mo-
nopolies or state funding. Centralized and monopolistic interest groups 
are more suited to neo-corporatist exchanges than pluralist ones. Over 
time, interdependence and mutual interpenetration of public policy and 
associational governance increase and reproduce distinct neo-corporatist 
patterns of policy-making.7
 In the past wage bargaining was traditionally at the heart of neo-corpo-
ratist arrangements.8 In particular the ability of centralized trade unions 
and wage bargaining institutions to restrain wages enabled national eco-
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nomic policy-makers to adjust their policies accordingly. Policy options 
available to governments depended to a considerable extent on the ability 
to restrain wages at will. Countries where trade unions were able to offer 
governments wage restraint adopted a different strategy of economic pol-
icy than others (Scharpf 1991). In exchange, governments tried to ensure 
high levels of employment by pursuing expansionary economic policies. 
Moreover, trade unions gained access to a variety of political decision-
making procedures.
 However, the neo-corporatist literature has been unable to anticipate 
the continuity and re-emergence of political exchanges. Most of the schol-
ars were taken by surprise by the developments of the 1980s and 1990s 
(Schmitter and Grote 1997). Authors expected the erosion of the decision-
making capacity of corporatist arrangements and a general decline in the 
regulation of labour markets. This was mainly because they assumed that 
corporatist institutions had become inadequate under a more interna-
tionalized and liberalized market environment.
 There were different reasonings behind the scepticism (Wallerstein 
and Golden 1997; Wallerstein, Golden et al. 1997): From the employers’ 
perspective, it was thought that more flexible production systems would 
require greater differentiation of pay and a stronger connection between 
individual performance and rewards (Katz 1993; Streeck 1993; Iversen 
1996; Pontusson and Swenson 1996). This would give companies a greater 
interest in locally designed pay systems rather than central wage agree-
ments. Since the centralization of wage bargaining systems has distribu-
tive consequences as well, distributive struggles would be unleashed once 
centralization lost its dampening effect on labour costs (Iversen 1999). 
Centralized wage bargaining institutions strongly correlate with a low 
degree of wage dispersion. Low wage dispersion, however, is becoming 
increasingly dysfunctional for companies when dealing in an internation-
ally constrained open economy. Companies would force employers’ as-
sociations to push for decentralization or would opt out of the bargaining 
arrangements.
 From the trade unions’ perspective, the fragmentation of trade union 
membership was expected to reduce the capacity of trade unions to act 
collectively. New groups on the labour market would undermine the dom-
inant position of blue-collar workers. Less cohesion on the side of labour 
would reduce the ability of peak associations to achieve industrial peace 
or wage moderation in centralized bargaining systems. Central wage bar-
gaining institutions would become increasingly dysfunctional (Calmfors 
1993; Moene, Wallerstein et al. 1993; Lange, Wallerstein et al. 1995).
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 The main reason for scepticism, however, was based on the – often im-
plicit – assumption that corporatist arrangements were embedded in the 
sovereign economic policy capacity of governments to offer some sort of 
expansionist policies in exchange for trade union concessions. “As much 
as these systems may otherwise have differed, under the rules of corporat-
ist bargaining a state that cannot with any reasonable prospect of success 
promise to apply its fiscal and monetary policy tools to alleviate unem-
ployment cannot possibly hope to gain concessions from unions or to 
influence settlements between unions and employers by, for example, of-
fering to improve the terms of the bargain through a corresponding eco-
nomic policy” (Streeck 1992: 109).
 That the capacity for expansionary economic policy was a precondi-
tion for political exchanges was also assumed by the political economy 
literature on the politics of growth (Lange and Garrett 1985). Strong trade 
unions were cooperating with left-wing governments in order to sustain 
full employment and induce investments (Cameron 1984; Lange and Gar-
rett 1985; Alvarez, Garrett et al. 1991). The mutually beneficial strategic 
interaction between left-wing governments and trade unions was based 
on the assumption that strong trade unions would be willing to exercise 
wage restraint only under the condition that the government would en-
sure high investments and economic growth. Where unions were weak 
and labour markets decentralized, a conservative government, based on 
liberal market principles, would best provide economic performance. In 
countries without such ‘congruent’ regimes (strong labour/left-wing gov-
ernment or weak labour/right-wing government), either union militancy 
or inefficient ‘adjustment policies’ would dampen investment and growth 
(Lange and Garrett 1985). It follows that one should not expect an un-
derstanding between governments and trade unions on voluntary wage 
restraint if the required union trust in a government policy of economic 
growth no longer exists. External constraints arising from increasing in-
ternational interdependence of national economies and the deflationary 
bias of the international economy should thereby rule out trade union 
cooperation.
 Europeanization itself was also seen as contributing to the expected 
demise of national corporatism (Streeck 1992: 110; Streeck and Schmitter 
1991). European economic integration meant the loss of national sover-
eignty over economic policy-making per se, since decision-making rights 
were transferred to the European level. Interdependence did not allow 
national deviation from the path of monetary austerity for very long, as 
the French example showed. Moreover, the lack of institutional regula-
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tion at the European level was a promise that was made by governments 
to business so they would give up the request for national protection. In 
the context of European integration, governments were neither able nor 
willing to concede to trade union concerns.
 In addition, it was argued that granting concessions to trade unions in 
exchange for voluntary wage restraint was superfluous in the new inter-
national economy. Cooperation between social democratic governments 
and trade unions on wage restraint was only necessary in the context of 
a Keynesian economic policy (Scharpf 1991). Only in a Keynesian eco-
nomic environment would governments make themselves dependent on 
the goodwill of trade unions to engage in voluntary wage restraint. If, 
however, the government switched towards a monetarist strategy, wage 
restraint would no longer be based on the encompassing structure of the 
trade union organization or the wage bargaining institutions. In a mon-
etarist context, excessive wage settlements are immediately punished by 
unemployment. Unemployment, unlike inflation, is experienced not as 
a collective evil but as an individual risk to every single worker. Trade 
unions have to respond to the increasing economic insecurity and will 
lower their wage claims accordingly.
 Therefore, there should be no need for negotiated wage restraint under 
the condition of monetarism, but wage restraint should follow automati-
cally. This argument was the most direct application of the ‘rational ex-
pectation’ approach of economics in the political sciences. Rational actors 
would recognize the economic constraints and internalize their likely ef-
fects. The previously-held view on the importance of organizational and 
institutional structures that mediate individuals’ concerns and the behav-
iour of collective actors would become irrelevant once economic insecu-
rity increased and the mere threat of unemployment was signalled clearly 
enough.
 According to the neo-corporatist literature, under the condition of lib-
eralized markets, the dominance of restrictive monetary policies and of 
increasing economic and monetary integration were detrimental to cor-
poratism. Exchanges between the government and trade unions were less 
likely to come about and more likely to decline due to the lack of compen-
sation and sovereignty. Nor were these exchanges really necessary, due to 
the immediate disciplinary device of restrictive monetary policies. Even 
among the non-economists, the neo-corporatist sociologists and political 
scientists, the general expectation was a policy shift towards the deregula-
tion of labour markets after the American and British model.
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 The approach of this book
This book makes two claims, one with regard to our understanding of the 
interaction between governments and trade unions and one with respect 
to the substance of the issue. The first claim of this book is the need to 
move on from the classic understanding of neo-corporatism as the ef-
fects of the organization of wage bargaining on policy-making towards an 
interactive approach between policy-making and institutions by taking 
a stronger problem-driven approach (Baccaro 2003; Molina and Rhodes 
2002). To be fair, there have been previous approaches to corporatism as 
forms of governance that have emphasized the process of policy-making 
rather than the organizational structures of interest associations.9 These 
approaches have seen the interaction between governments and interest 
associations as a mode of governance of complex societies. However, these 
approaches have remained largely conceptual and have not provided an 
explanatory framework for why corporatist exchanges have changed over 
time. The original aim was to produce a general theory about the relation-
ship between the state and private actors that was based on exchanges.10 
Therefore the focus of these studies was less on the underlying problem 
that gave rise to this interaction.
 The aim of this book is to argue that a comprehensive understanding of 
the evolution of the interaction between governments and social partners 
must entail an assessment of the problem that governments are address-
ing when dealing with associations. The book tries to combine the no-
tion of governance with an understanding of problems that governments 
are attempting to solve when negotiating over wages. Therefore the book 
makes a number of references to the body of political economy literature11 
on the changing conditions of wage formation in internationalized econo-
mies. The argument wants neither to diminish nor to overcome the exist-
ing literature on neo-corporatism. It rather adds to our knowledge by em-
phasizing that organizational structures and established institutions offer 
opportunities for actors to pursue their interests, while with the changes 
in problems and in the perception of problems actors adapt by adjusting 
institutions or setting up new ones.
 At the heart of the problem is the incorporation of trade unions into 
the political systems of Western Europe that occurred in the context of 
accommodating the employment and wage expectations of workers in the 
Keynesian welfare state. In advanced Western democracies there was an 
increasingly influential view among the population – also nurtured by 
the socialist countries where unemployed had ‘disappeared’ – that gov-
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ernments were responsible for high and stable employment rates. Survey 
data, for instance, shows that in the Western world more than 26 per cent 
of the population held the view that governments are definitely respon-
sible for providing jobs. In Western Europe, this view was shared by 36 per 
cent of the population (Armingeon 2001, table 4).12
 Underlying the interaction between governments and trade unions 
on wage formation issues are the wage expectations of trade unions. The 
relationship between governments and social partners varies with the 
institutional context. In the post-war period, the accommodation of la-
bour into the Keynesian welfare state occurred both through trade union 
organizations becoming incorporated into corporatist institutions and 
through governments and social partners negotiating on wage formation. 
The institutional design left deep traces on both the capacity of wage bar-
gaining actors to respond to the new economic situation and the opportu-
nities for governments to negotiate with trade unions on wages. However, 
in this book it is not assumed that the institutional design determines this 
interaction completely.
 When moving towards a hard currency regime, governments interfere 
in wage bargaining in order to adjust trade unions’ wage expectations. 
Trade unions are usually in control of wage developments and have an 
interest in securing real wage increases for their members. Depending on 
their expectation of the government’s economic policy, trade unions will 
set their wage preferences accordingly. Moreover, depending on their 
organizational structures, trade unions will tend to combine real wage 
increases and employment protection as they see fit. Governments in-
teract with trade unions to bring the wage expectations of workers into 
line with government needs. On both sides, the actual degrees of wage 
demands or restraint are not fixed but dependent on a range of other 
factors that cannot easily be determined ex ante. Employment and the in-
flationary effects of wage settlements are not easily recognized since the 
competitive position of a country depends on external factors and mon-
etary policy decisions. Productivity increases vary the room for manoeu-
vre in wage bargaining. The structure of the labour market determines 
the threat of unemployment for the individual. The extent to which wage 
settlements are seen as appropriate is therefore subject to interpretation 
on both sides.
 Both sides are also conditioned in their attempts to frame wage expec-
tations by organizational constraints. Governments are constrained by 
weak majorities or coalition partners. They have to consider the impact 
of their policies on their relationship with trade unions and employers’ 
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organizations. Moreover, they have to take into account reputational and 
electoral effects. Trade unions, for their part, have to consider the poten-
tial political competition or wage competition of individual affiliates and 
the discontent of workers with their standards of living. While the im-
mediate preferences of both sides can be assumed ex ante (governments 
prefer wage restraint; unions prefer real wage increases and employment 
security), the pursuit of these preferences depends on a number of factors 
that lie beyond the pure organizational and institutional environment.
 What is more, the capacity of institutions does not simply evolve; it 
may also decline. As with other institutional arrangements, tasks evolve 
over time and capacities degrade. Actors have and develop diverging views 
about external constraints and the purpose of the institutions themselves 
creating a need for political adaptation. Even highly centralized wage 
bargaining arrangements were not at all times and under all conditions 
geared up to the task of evenly mediating between wage expectations 
and distributive equality on the one hand, and economic constraints on 
the other. The pressure on governments to react to balance of payment 
deficits, soaring inflation rates and devaluation pressure has prompted 
numerous interferences with wage bargaining institutions. Rather than 
relying on the institutions to produce the required results, governments 
try to push wage bargainers to restrain wages.
 Wage bargaining institutions were put to a severe test in the period of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The post-war commitment of governments 
to strive for full employment encountered the cracking of the interna-
tional economic order aggravated by the oil shock. In most countries, col-
lective bargaining institutions were not up to the test. Full employment, 
high rates of economic growth and rapid company restructuring made it 
more difficult for wage bargainers to respond to economic downturns. 
High wage expectations could not be contained by trade unions and social 
unrest pressured their leaders to ensure real wage gains.
 This book argues that the dynamic of government-union relations is 
rooted in the mismatch of wage bargaining outcomes and government 
economic policy. Therefore it tries to identify the mechanisms that better 
determine the responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions. It is par-
ticularly important to understand the capacity of national institutions to 
deliver wage restraint and how this has changed over time. For instance, 
why were the Scandinavian wage bargaining institutions responsive to 
economic constraints in the context of a soft currency policy but not in 
the context of a hard currency policy? Why were the Dutch trade unions 
willing to engage in extreme wage restraint during the 1950s, but devel-
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oped strong wage pressures during the 1960s? Which mechanisms keep 
wage pressures in check and which produce high real wage expectations?
 It transpires that the divergent reactions of wage bargaining actors and 
governments to the crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent challenges of 
monetary internationalization can only be explained when the gradual 
decline in the responsive capacity of wage bargaining institutions in many 
Western European countries is taken into account. For instance, quite in-
dependently from the organizational structures of the wage bargaining 
system, wage indexation systems which fixed workers’ expectations on 
real wage increases had been introduced in a number of countries (often 
in the 1930s) (Braun 1976). This tended to increase the mismatch in those 
countries much more vividly than in countries where the notion of real 
wage protection never existed, but rather where wage increases were al-
ways seen as a function of competitiveness.
 For the reasons outlined above, this book therefore focuses on the re-
lationship between governments and trade unions as the key variable for 
their interaction. In contrast to recent trends in the political economy 
literature to highlight the role of business and employers’ organizations as 
key actors, it assumes that government policies vis-à-vis wage bargaining 
primarily address the expectations of workers.13 Companies and employ-
ers obviously participate in wage bargaining and often have powerful veto 
positions, but the dynamic of the interaction takes place around the issue 
of the legitimate role of organized labour in economic policy-making.
 With regard to the substantive issue, this book makes the claim that the 
internationalization of financial markets and the subsequent shift in eco-
nomic policy has not rendered obsolete a negotiated approach between 
governments and trade unions in Western Europe mainly for three sets of 
reasons. Firstly, it argues that even under the condition of international-
ized markets the conduct of wage formation is based on the organiza-
tion of the labour market. Depending on the institutions that govern the 
labour market, wage bargainers have different incentives to internalize 
negative employment effects or not. While restrictive monetary policy 
will discipline the wage bargaining behaviour in the long run, a complete 
market-driven approach in a labour market that is dominated by power-
ful trade unions that are, however, insufficiently responsive might lead to 
high costs in terms of employment losses.
The institutions that govern labour markets also include the capacity of 
the social partners to control wage formation in the labour market. In de-
centralized collective bargaining institutions, there is no single collective 
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actor in a position to set the going rate for wage increases. Instead, wage 
formation is based on local labour market conditions. Therefore, there is 
no direct access for centralized decisions on wage formation. In highly 
coordinated or centralized bargaining systems, these opportunities are 
more accessible since one single actor or a small number of actors have at 
least some control over how wages will develop. The Western European 
countries in this book have wage bargaining systems that are sufficiently 
coordinated for governments to possess the capacity to influence wage 
bargaining behaviour. There is therefore an incentive for governments to 
use centralized wage bargaining structures in order to exert a higher de-
gree of control over wages.
 Secondly, the economic costs of high unemployment have political 
implications. The post-war consensus in Western societies entailed the 
notion that governments are held responsible for the employment perfor-
mance of their economies. Governments can only turn a blind eye to the 
performance of wage bargaining institutions if they reject their respon-
sibility for employment performance. In the Western European context, 
the economic performance of a government is, however, still judged on 
its employment record. If governments see their involvement with the 
social partners on wage bargaining as a potentially useful tool to ease the 
friction between a tight monetary context and employment performance, 
they still have an incentive to bargain over wages.
 Thirdly, the interaction between governments and the social partners 
is based not only on the institutions that govern the labour market, but 
also on the political linkages that tie trade unions to political parties. The 
choice of governments to push for further labour market deregulation in 
order to make institutions more responsive to market pressures or to ne-
gotiate with social partners depends on the political relationship between 
parties and unions; in particular on the parallels between the structure of 
the party system and the trade union system. In general terms, in com-
petitive majoritarian political systems, trade unions have less of a political 
rooting than in consensus-based political systems. In the former case, a 
decision in favour of deregulation might be easier, while in the latter ne-
gotiations might be unavoidable.
Hence, as a starting point, this book tries to integrate the reasoning in 
the political economy literature about the interaction between monetary 
policy and wage formation. It is assumed that incomes policies in the form 
of the involvement of governments in wage formation are still perceived 
as having the potential to make a positive contribution to a government’s 
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performance on employment. As long as the disciplinary force of mon-
etary policy is not directly translated into the automatic adjustment of 
wages in a highly decentralized context, governments have the scope and 
the incentive to engage in wage bargaining procedures.
 Since the developments in different European countries over the last 
two decades diverge, the book seeks explanations for differing outcomes. 
Given the fact that the explanatory model is based on the interaction of 
the role of monetary policy, wage bargaining institutions and the politi-
cal costs of unemployment for governments, the variance in these factors 
is used to explain different government behaviour. It is argued that gov-
ernments prefer to seek negotiations with trade unions on wages if the 
monetary regime does not have the credibility that it will punish excessive 
wage settlements, if the government is politically dependent on the social 
partners and if the wage bargaining institutions are not responsive.
 Finally, it should be pointed out what this book does not try to do. It does 
not give an account of the role of the welfare state and ﬁ scal policy in the 
interaction between governments and trade unions. Th e expansion of the 
welfare state has been an important tool for accommodating trade union 
wage demands; it has also increasingly sheltered unions from the pressure 
of the markets and thereby impacted on the wage-employment trade-oﬀ . 
Similarly, expansive ﬁ scal policy has been employed by governments to 
improve their employment record and thereby to alter trade unions’ wage 
bargaining behaviour. However, for the sake of clarity and brevity neither 
social policy nor ﬁ scal policy has been addressed systematically here.14
 The book also does not try to give a comprehensive account of the 
evolution of corporatism and social pacts in Western Europe. Its focus 
is much narrower, centred on the interests of the government when ne-
gotiating with trade unions over wages. Recent literature on social pacts 
generally has a wider focus across different policy fields.15 At the core of 
my argument is not concertation per se, but the specific mechanism of in-
teraction between governments and trade unions when it comes to wages 
and wage bargaining institutions in the context of emu.16
 Lastly, this book does not attempt to contribute to the broad literature 
on the impact of labour market institutions on economic and employ-
ment performance.17 While I draw many insights and concepts from this 
literature, I only use it to put forward an argument that focuses on the 
relationship between governments and trade unions. To the extent that 
the impact of wage bargaining institutions is of importance for this rela-
tionship, they will be discussed and considered accordingly. The overall 
aim and focus is, however, of a different nature.
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 Methodological issues
In comparative research, the standard approach is to investigate the ef-
fects of institutions on economic or political performance that can be 
quantified on a metric scale. In this case, however, the focus of the studies 
is government behaviour, which cannot easily be translated into perfor-
mance indicators. The aim of the book is therefore not to test the effects 
of the corporatist responses of governments to economic crises, but to ex-
plain their behaviour per se. The dependent variable is a behavioural vari-
able of the interaction between governments and wage bargaining actors 
– in particular trade unions. This variable interacts with the institutional 
design of each case, and is therefore difficult to operationalize.
 I try to tackle this problem in a number of ways. Although this is a book 
covering 13 countries, I have limited the number of cases so that substan-
tial material about the countries could be used.18 In particular, in chapter 7 
I present empirical material on the interaction between wage bargaining 
institutions and government intervention. The narrative presentations on 
the country cases help to compensate for the limits of the quantitative 
analysis. The case studies not only illustrate the political processes that 
took place and that could only be hinted at in the preceding chapters, but 
they also underline the causal connections between the independent and 
dependent variables.
Secondly, the statistical tools I have used are basic in order not to take 
out too much information from crude variables (see below). Thirdly, I 
have also aimed to define the dependent variable in a narrow way. While 
governments and trade unions have negotiated over a number of issues 
including social policy and other economic policies, this book focuses 
exclusively on governments’ policy towards wages.
The comparative method
This is a comparative study of 13 Western European states, namely the pre-
2004 member states of the European Union, with the exception of Luxem-
bourg and Greece. Both countries were left out for pragmatic reasons of 
data availability. The book attempts to build a bridge between quantita-
tive studies that try to maximize the number of cases and the case study 
approach that empirically investigates fewer cases in a detailed manner. 
The design of the book aims to draw benefits from both approaches: it 
aims at including enough cases to make some basic statistical operations 
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possible, while limiting the number of cases so that statistical relation-
ships can be traced in selected illustrations.
 The choice of cases was based on two contextual variables. Firstly, the 
focus on Western Europe allowed the study to build on a shared under-
standing of the role of labour in industrialized societies after World War 
ii that was unique to Western Europe. In no other part of the world has 
organized labour been able to exert such a high degree of influence over 
public policy, with the exception of the smaller states of the former British 
Empire – New Zealand, Australia and Canada – where different economic 
circumstances have applied.19 Secondly, Western European countries par-
ticularly were confronted with the challenges of European monetary inte-
gration, even though not all countries joined emu. The ems and prepara-
tion for emu restricted government policy in particular ways. Compared 
to other oecd countries that had flexible exchange rates and autonomy 
over their fiscal policy, European governments were especially hard hit 
by the tightness of the economic policy framework they had chosen for 
themselves.
 By holding eu membership constant, it was possible to choose similar 
cases with respect to post-war traditions and types of economic challeng-
es. By including as many as 13 Western European member states, dissimi-
lar eu members were compared as well. At the same time, the choice of 
countries and the treatment of the empirical material explicitly reflect the 
fact that the member countries of the eu are increasingly interdependent 
and cannot be seen as discrete cases.20 Within the European economic 
context, some countries play dominant roles due to their economic and 
political power and thereby affect the room for makeover of other coun-
tries. These interdependencies are usually not taken into account system-
atically, especially not in pooled time-series analysis. In effect, the choice 
of countries reflects a combined approach of a similar country versus dis-
similar country design.
Data and data analysis
The book is based on a large database comprising the historical statistics 
of the oecd, existing databases on political institutions and wage bargain-
ing institutions, and my own measurements of the extent of government 
negotiations. Most data was collected for the period between 1970 and 
1999 on an annual basis.
 The data was employed, however, using rather simple statistical tools. 
In most cases, only bivariate scatterplots and correlations based on aver-
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aged data across decades were produced. In some cases, compared means 
tests and cross-tabulations were employed to take advantage of annu-
al data points. The main reason for not employing more sophisticated 
methods of pooled time-series analysis concerned the crude nature of the 
dependent variable that did not allow for systematic testing in a more 
elaborate statistical way.21 Government intervention in wage bargaining 
procedures is only a very loose proxy for the behaviour of governments 
towards wage bargaining actors, a behaviour that cannot reasonably be 
assumed to be based on a metric scale. A degree of government interven-
tion is a rough relative measure, but not sufficiently differentiated to be 
sensibly employed in regression equations. Simple linear regression equa-
tions were only used in the wage equations found in Chapter 6.
 The data was accompanied by material on the country cases. Case 
studies in the extensive literature on industrial relations and social pacts 
in individual countries were supplemented with newspaper articles and 
documents. Particular aspects of country studies were chosen selectively, 
mainly in order to illustrate specific mechanisms that have previously 
been identified with the data. Therefore, the aim of the case studies was 
not to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of each case, but to trace 
the process by which the independent variables identified in the statistical 
section relate to the dependent variable.
The plan of the book
Figure 1.1 summarizes the structure of the book. Chapter 2 – which is not 
found in the figure – addresses the theoretical issues as they are discussed 
in the current political economy literature. It explains from a theoretical 
point of view why government involvement can be explained as it fac-
es the interaction of monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions. 
Chapter 3 introduces the measure of government intervention in wage 
bargaining as the political answer to accommodating trade union pow-
er. It establishes the dependent variable for the remainder of the book. 
Chapters 4 to 6 present the three contextual factors that can explain the 
variation in government behaviour during the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 
7 brings the issue of Chapter 6 forward by looking at the interaction be-
tween the responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions and government 
intervention. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the different themes that are 
laid out in the chapters and makes some tentative remarks about how the 
dynamic relationship between governments and wage bargaining institu-
tions might move ahead under emu.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADJUSTMENT IN EUROPE
Wages.indd   34 28-8-2006   15:43:10

 Conclusion
In the preceding sections I have argued in favour of an alternative ap-
proach to the classic corporatist theory that is entirely based on the or-
ganization of the labour market. The theoretical shift is motivated by the 
necessity to move from a linear view of corporatism, which interprets 
institutional efficiency as a product of the centralization of the organi-
zational structures of interest associations, to an interactive approach, 
which includes processes of adjustment to a new economic and political 
environment, institutional mismatches and feedback processes. A linear 
assumption about the effects of the organization of the labour market on 
economic performance and political behaviour has left us too often with 
rather crude reasons for the expected decline in corporatist decision-
making under the influence of internationalization and harsher economic 
constraints. Moreover, it cannot account for new forms of corporatist 
policy-making where organizational structures of the associations do not 
support such behaviour.
 When setting out to study the relationship between governments and 
trade unions in Western European countries, we must begin by estab-
lishing the theoretical assumptions that prompt governments to engage 
in regulation of the labour market rather than leave it to market forces. 
Governments do not wish to intervene in wage bargaining in order to 
increase their political power or expand their policy fields. In general, 
governments in market economies do not see the formation of wages as 
a public policy issue. Rather, governments engage in wage bargaining be-
cause the present organization of the labour market produces outcomes 
that do not respond to the economic situation or to their economic policy. 
But they choose to intervene in rather than deregulate labour markets 
because they either need or want to protect the existing trade union or-
ganizations and institutions that regulate the labour market. Corporatist 
policy responses are part of the political compromise of including orga-
nized labour in the political systems of Western democracies. This basic 
political commitment in favour of strong wage bargaining organizations 
has become enshrined and institutionalized in a whole range of social and 
labour market institutions that are not easily dismantled or changed.
 Beyond the political commitment by governments towards organized 
labour and the institutional forms this has taken, the responsiveness of 
wage bargaining institutions to changing economic conditions plays a 
central role in the analysis. The responsiveness of wage bargaining insti-
tutions is, however, shaped by a number of factors that mediate the effects 
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of the centralization of wage bargaining institutions. Therefore I argue 
that the centralization of wage bargaining institutions as such is not a suf-
ficient factor to explain the changing behaviour of governments towards 
wage bargaining.
 The approach taken in this book consequently does not negate the im-
portance of institutional design. The degree of efficiency of institutions 
has an important impact on the behaviour of political actors towards 
them. The failure of institutions to deliver the outcomes political actors 
need influences the attitude of those actors towards the institutions. Ac-
tors in turn intervene in the workings of these institutions and thereby in-
fluence the institutions themselves. Institutions are not seen as coherent 
and closed systems of rules and norms. Rather, they are open for external 
influences and adjustment to apparent mismatches. Institutional settings 
can produce outcomes that are satisfactory for all actors involved and thus 
create a situation of equilibrium. These periods of equilibrium, however, 
are short and frequently disturbed by external events and the subsequent 
reorientation of actors. There is a continuous process of adjustment and 
recalibrating of actors’ interests and interaction that is at the heart of 
wage setting and labour market regulation in general.
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2 Governments and Wages – A Theoretical Framework
Economically speaking, it is not obvious why governments have started 
to use intervention into wage formation processes as a tool in economic 
policy-making. In the neo-classical world of economic policy, monetary 
and fiscal policies are the two main instruments a government can and 
should employ in order to strengthen economic stabilization during the 
business cycle. Wages and, in particular, the assumptions about the rigid-
ity of wages have been important factors when assessing the potential 
of fiscal and monetary policies respectively. The Keynesian revolution 
in economic thought held out the prospect of full employment secured 
through the creation of aggregate demand by public authorities, rather 
than through reduction of costs by private enterprises under the pressure 
of competition. The Keynesian scenario was based on the assumption that 
nominal wages were rigid and could not easily be adjusted to economic 
imbalances. But even under Keynesian assumptions, the classic instru-
ments of governments were traditionally confined to monetary and fis-
cal policy. Moreover, monetary and fiscal policies were legitimate policy 
fields over which governments had complete control.22 Wage bargaining 
was either in the realm of independent associations or left to the market. 
Nevertheless, in practice, governments since World War ii have employed 
policies on wages as an important tool in economic policy.
 This chapter lays out a theoretical explanation for this apparent con-
tradiction. The argument centres on the following assumption, which is 
the main guiding hypothesis on which this book is based: the incentive for 
government intervention into wage bargaining arises when it appeared to 
the government that intervention could potentially reduce the political 
and economic costs of a perceived necessary disinflationary policy. Thus 
governments have tried to avoid the negative consequences of the interac-
tion of a non-accommodating monetary policy and non-responsive wage 
bargaining institutions, which can potentially carry high costs in terms of 
unemployment, loss of real output and interference with growth. A more 
effective disinflationary policy – as pursued by governments – has aimed 
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at clearly indicating to wage bargaining actors that harmful effects of ex-
cessive wage increases will be punished.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section traces the his-
tory of the relationship between government economic policy and wag-
es, and concludes that, in terms of previous experiences and economic 
theory, there is little or no reason for governments to intervene in wage 
bargaining. Section two develops a general hypothesis about the incen-
tives for governments to employ incomes policies, based on established 
arguments in the political economy literature about the relationship be-
tween wage bargaining institutions and monetary policies. This includes 
a comparison of incomes policies pursued in the 1960s and 1970s with 
those more recently pursued by governments under monetarist condi-
tions. The third section lays out the factors that influence the govern-
ment’s decision whether or not to negotiate with trade unions, focus-
ing on monetary regimes, political institutions and the responsiveness 
of wage bargaining institutions. Several conclusions are outlined in the 
fourth and final section.
 Policies on wages
Before World War ii, governments generally had no policy on wages. The 
liberal world economic order of the 19th century was based on the flex-
ibility of wages and prices. The role of the government was to protect 
the market mechanisms that could ensure flexible adjustment of labour 
markets to the requirements of the gold standard (Simmons 1994). Wage 
and price freezes that were decreed by governments were only used in 
very specific situations such as during the war economy. It was only in the 
1950s that governments started to play an increasingly influential role in 
wage bargaining. A crucial reason was that the economic, social and polit-
ical landscape had changed so fundamentally in many advanced countries 
that a tolerable degree of price stability could not be achieved by reducing 
demand, since the potential costs of demand reduction in terms of unem-
ployment, loss of real output and growth had grown to a level that would 
not have been supported by the electorate and the public as a whole.
 Economically, the European post-war economies did not resemble the 
inter-war situation. In the first decade after the war, wage growth was 
moderate and capital stocks were built up. After demobilization and re-
covery, “the main difficulty of the post-war economies was not slack de-
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mand, relative overproduction or insufficient investment, but an ungov-
ernable tendency of demand to outrun the economy’s capacity to meet it 
without inflation and price rises” (Postan 1967, 17). Rather than stimulat-
ing demand further, governments soon faced the task of reducing infla-
tionary pressure.
 Socially and politically, the fundaments of economic policy had changed 
drastically. During World War ii, economic mobilization and the gover-
nance of the war economy required the collaboration of trade union lead-
ers, who in many countries came to be co-opted into positions of quasi-
public authority. Soldiers were promised a better life in a fairer society 
upon their return from the battlefields. In many countries, the traditional 
elite were replaced in the aftermath of war by liberal or socialist govern-
ments. The democratic capitalism of the golden age after World War ii 
entailed the legal recognition of trade unions, an increase in welfare pro-
visions and a promise of economic policy-making in favour of the work-
ing people. Full employment had become the priority for all governments 
(Streeck and Hassel 2003).
 The relationship between unemployment and inflation became one 
of the core policy issues in economic policy-making, and wage bargain-
ing processes were the most important factor influencing this relation-
ship. Western governments in the post-war period faced a situation that 
was perceived as a trilemma of domestic objectives, of full employment, 
price stability and free collective bargaining, in which any pair could be 
achieved only by sacrificing the third goal. The trade-off between employ-
ment and price stability – the Phillips curve – thus depended on the con-
duct of collective bargaining. Accordingly, high employment levels could 
be achieved by governments letting money supply grow, stimulating de-
mand and consequently allowing prices to rise. Under the given institu-
tional design of a regulated labour market and free collective bargaining, 
a decrease in unemployment would lead to an increase in inflationary 
pressure (Ulman and Flanagan 1971: 2-4; Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983). 
Policy-makers came to believe that price stability could only be achieved 
at the unacceptable price of increasing unemployment. The obvious solu-
tion to the trilemma was the active involvement of governments in the 
wage formation process. Governments thought they could protect em-
ployment by securing a moderation of real wages through voluntary wage 
restraint instead of through disinflation. As Braun observed: “An incomes 
policy is often presented as a means of improving the trade-off between 
unemployment and price stability” (Braun 1975: 2).
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The rationale of incomes policies
Incomes policies were initially pursued in combination with expansionist 
demand management. Expansionist demand management combined with 
simultaneous wage restraint, it was believed, would prevent real wages 
from rising, stimulate an increase in employment and protect profitability 
and competitiveness from declining. This is the Scandinavian scenario 
as described in the Lange and Garrett article on the ‘Politics of Growth’ 
(Lange and Garrett 1985). Working in cooperation, the social-democratic 
government and the centralized trade unions used a combination of wage 
restraint and fiscal expansion in order to promote economic growth.
 During the first two decades after the war, governments regularly em-
ployed incomes policies in almost all advanced economies in order to 
deal with increasing inflationary pressures of the time. Incomes policies 
were used to urge trade union leadership to assume a more moderate at-
titude towards wage bargaining. When wage bargaining systems were not 
sufficiently centralized or coordinated to take into account the effects of 
their wage settlements, governments tried to compensate for this defect 
by striving to influence wage bargaining behaviour through either giv-
ing tax incentives for wage restraint or imposing wage freezes. Assuming 
a Phillips curve type of trade-off between price stability and unemploy-
ment, governments hoped to steer the curve in favour of employment by 
maintaining price stability. If governments had to choose, most observers 
were convinced that they would prefer inflation above unemployment: 
“Clearly, no Member country would be willing to accept high levels of 
unemployment in order to hold its prices in check”, the oecd pointed out 
in a report on the problem in 1962 (oecd 1962, 25).
 Under these conditions, the use of restrictive monetary policies for 
stabilizing prices was not only seen as politically unacceptable, but also, 
for a number of reasons, practically impossible. Monetary policy had not 
helped to avoid the Depression in the 1930s; and as a result its reputation 
was severely under attack. The result was that governments had no dis-
ciplinary device vis-à-vis trade unions when negotiating over wages, but 
instead relied completely on the use of persuasion and the possibility of a 
statutory imposition of wage settlements and price freezes.
 At the same time, the statutory imposition of wages and prices was 
much harder for governments to pursue since these policies lacked politi-
cal legitimacy. First of all, trade unions had fought hard for the right to 
free collective bargaining and were not prepared to surrender this right 
to government-imposed incomes policies. But even in practical terms, a 
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statutory incomes policy immediately raised the question of distributive 
equality in societies and was politically contested. As Shonfield points out 
when observing the debate on incomes policies during the 1960s:
Th ere was a curious unrealism about the fervent expectations which 
suddenly came to be attached to the pursuit of an incomes policy in 
a variety of Western countries during the 1960s. It was talked of by 
practical hard-headed men as if it oﬀ ered an immediate short cut to an 
ideal economic world of steady price and uninterrupted growth. It was 
alleged by some to be the precondition for eﬀ ective economic planning 
(Shonﬁ eld 1965: 217).
Indeed, there was a certain enthusiasm for incomes policy as the new 
economic policy device. In the United States, the newly elected Presi-
dent Kennedy issued his ‘guideposts for non-inflationary wage and price 
behaviour’ in order to pre-empt inflationary pressure in the course of ex-
pansionary fiscal and monetary policies that the Kennedy government 
had planned. The newly-founded oecd published a whole range of largely 
favourable reports on the conduct of incomes policy in its member coun-
tries during the 1960s (oecd 1962, Suppanz and Robinson 1972; De Wolff 
1965). In contrast to the war-time direct wage controls, incomes policy 
was defined here thus: that “the authorities should have a view about the 
kind of evolution of incomes which is consistent with their economic 
objectives, and in particular with prices stability; that they should seek 
to promote public agreement on the principles which should guide the 
growth of incomes; and that they should try to induce people voluntarily 
to follow this guidance.”
 The oecd discovered that “in this broad sense, it appears that many 
Member countries are trying to evolve incomes policy” (oecd 1962, 
23). In general, it was hoped that wage increases in line with productiv-
ity increases would enable non-inflationary economic growth and could 
potentially avoid major exchange rate adjustments between countries. 
Economists were working on a tax-based incomes policy that aimed at 
introducing an economic base for the concept.23
 According to Shonﬁ eld, the lack of realism on the part of policy-makers 
stemmed from the misguided assumption that union leaders would per-
ceive the division of wealth as basically fair. One only had to agree on the 
way in which the annual increment of national production was to be dis-
tributed (Shonﬁ eld 1965: 217). Th is was based on the belief that economic 
growth could be taken for granted and that a highly competitive economy 
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existed where one had to treat capital well: “Labour is really asked to give 
its consent to a particular type of social order. Th ere is no reason why it 
should do so – or for that matter why the owners of capital should posi-
tively assent to any alternative proposed. All this is another way of saying 
that a practical approach to a more rational wages policy must be delibera-
tive and extensively political. It seems unlikely that people in a democratic 
society will accept a policy of wage restraint unless the composition of all 
other domestic incomes which aﬀ ect costs, however remotely, is brought 
under close and expert scrutiny” (Shonfield 1965: 218-9).
 The failure of incomes policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s was due 
to a range of factors that were not all linked to the political problems that 
were raised by Shonfield in the mid-1960s.24 International price levels had 
started to rise from mid-1968 onwards. The us economy had induced a 
growing demand for imported manufactures and incurred large budget 
deficits. This coincided with an increase in raw material prices. Moreover, 
most economies operated under full employment from the mid-1960s on-
wards and labour markets were tight. Thirdly, the conduct of collective 
bargaining in many countries had instituted an expectation that workers 
would be protected against real wage losses. An increase in price rises was 
automatically translated into wage rises despite the tradition of incomes 
policy. And fourthly, the labour protests of 1968 had consisted of unrest 
on the shop floor against centralized wage bargaining and had shifted the 
bargaining power from the central level to the local level. In many cases, 
national union officials were not able to implement the agreements they 
had settled at a national level. The years between the late 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s were “an exceptionally unpropitious period for incomes policy” 
(Braun 1975: 14; see also Soskice 1978).
 In other words, the first generation of incomes policies had helped to 
increase the profitability and competitiveness of companies, but it had 
not helped to lower the real wage expectations of the workforce. On the 
contrary, real wage protection was the basis on which incomes policy in 
many countries rested and real wage expectations were high due to full 
employment and increasing levels of social spending.
The shift in economic policy-making
It was only after the first oil shock in 1973 that governments started to se-
riously use disinflationary policies against the imminent stagflation of the 
1970s, combined with a new generation of incomes policies. The context 
of government intervention had thus changed. Under the condition of 
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restrictive monetary policies, governments can always leave the effects of 
wage bargaining on employment to the market and rely on monetary au-
thorities to achieve low inflation expectations. Rather than being depen-
dent on trade union support in wage bargaining, governments regained 
monetary policy as an instrument if wages got out of control. On the other 
hand, monetarist adjustment could potentially carry high costs in terms 
of employment if trade unions were not responsive to monetarist policies. 
Restrictive monetary policies combined with aggressive wage bargaining 
could lead to exceptionally high increases in unemployment. Rising un-
employment would eventually discipline trade union wage demands, but 
it was worth avoiding.
 The 1977 McCracken report produced by the oecd already recognized 
this change of discourse on the responsibility of governments for securing 
both real wages and employment (oecd 1977). When assessing the role 
of incomes policy, the report states that it supports the idea that govern-
ments should regularly discuss the general evolution of prices and wages 
with trade unions and employers. It suggests that if governments are go-
ing to take this line, they must at the same time be prepared to indicate 
to those responsible for wage and price determination what kind of be-
haviour on their part would be consistent with the monetary and fiscal 
policies they intend to follow. The report then states:
Th is idea is not new. What is new is the context within such discus-
sions takes place after a major inﬂ ationary recession. Five years ago, it 
was understandable that representatives of business and labour might 
take it for granted that governments had it in their power to ensure 
high levels of sales and employment. Th ey may well have felt that the 
warnings against the dire consequences of irresponsible behaviour on 
their part need not be taken seriously. All this has now changed (oecd 
1977, 215).25
In other words, during the incomes policy of the 1960s, governments faced 
two distinct issues. On the one hand, they openly had to adopt a policy 
position on distributive issues when engaging in incomes policy since this 
tended to take the form of strict wage guidelines and was discussed in a 
political forum. At the same time, governments had no disciplinary device 
vis-à-vis trade unions that would indicate to the unions the consequences 
of a failure of incomes policy. Moreover, when incomes policies failed, 
governments were nevertheless held responsible for ensuring high levels 
of employment via expansionist economic policies.
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 After the first oil shock, this situation changed. The effects of the reces-
sion and the vulnerability of the world economy had become apparent to 
all economic and political actors. Financial liberalization had reduced the 
effectiveness of monetary expansion and started to penalize high infla-
tion. Although the use of restrictive monetary policy varied widely within 
the oecd between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, a trend was set in mo-
tion that would eventually spread. The new incomes policy that had start-
ed to operate from the 1980s onwards would ease the way for introducing 
tight monetary policy, rather than serve as a means to avoid it, while at the 
same time it would be based on a new understanding of economic policy.
 In addition to the changing economic environment, the new under-
standing of economic policy had been theoretically and argumentatively 
prepared by a shift in macroeconomic theory. Rational expectations were 
introduced into economic modelling. The theory recognized that people’s 
expectations are highly responsive to policy and hence that expectations 
matter for assessing the impact of monetary and fiscal policy. In two major 
contributions, Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) explained how a slop-
ing short-term Phillips curve would transmute, once expectations begin 
to adjust, into a vertical (or even backwards-bending) Phillips curve. The 
vertical Phillips curve showed that there could be any level of inflation at 
a given (natural) level of unemployment. If governments wanted to lower 
unemployment, they had to raise money wages above the rate of real wage 
expectation:
Th ere is always a temporary trade-oﬀ  between inﬂ ation and unemploy-
ment; there is no permanent trade-oﬀ . Th e temporary trade-oﬀ  comes 
not from inﬂ ation per se, but from unanticipated inﬂ ation, which gen-
erally means from a rising rate of inﬂ ation. Th e widespread belief that 
there is a permanent trade-oﬀ  is a sophisticated version of the confu-
sion between ‘high’ and ‘rising’ that we all recognize in simpler forms. 
A rising rate of inﬂ ation may reduce unemployment, a high rate will 
not. (Friedman 1968: 11)26
Therefore, rising inflation rates or surprise inflation might still create sur-
plus employment, but a steady rate of rising prices would not. A vertical 
Phillips curve also implies that there is a natural rate of unemployment 
that cannot be reduced by means of an expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy.
 The policy implications of this newly accepted line of arguments have 
been particularly important for monetary policy. The role of monetary 
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policies was downplayed in the first two decades after World War ii main-
ly due to the dismissive assessment made by Keynes when addressing the 
role of monetary policy during the Great Depression. Monetary policy 
was seen as a largely ineffective tool of economic policy. Post-war mon-
etary policies therefore focused on the provision of cheap money. A most 
telling illustration is the article by John Hicks, in which he argues that in 
the early post-war period the previous gold standard was replaced by a la-
bour standard in which “monetary policy adjusts to the equilibrium level 
of money wages so as to make it conform to the actual level” rather than 
the other way round (Hicks 1955: 391).
 In the mid-1970s, however, this view had reversed again. If there is no 
trade-oﬀ  between unemployment and inﬂ ation, the best monetary policy 
for central banks to adopt is to pick an inﬂ ation target and to stick to it. 
If there are long-term negative eﬀ ects on employment and growth, these 
were not due to monetary policies themselves, but to rigidities in the mar-
ket. Monetary policies should aim to keep the growth of aggregate demand 
stable in order to prevent ﬂ uctuations. Using the arguments derived from 
the rational expectation revolution governments’ approaches towards eco-
nomic policy had thereby changed towards focusing on the eﬀ ectiveness of 
disinﬂ ationary policies rather than on the need to control wages.
 The effect of this change of assessment for the relative importance of 
economic policy by governments is a shift in emphasis. Since the mid-
1970s, economic advice on the persisting problem of inflationary pressure 
has been that, rather than use incomes policies to dampen wage demands, 
governments should improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. If re-
strictive monetary policy is more effective, its negative externalities on 
the real economy might be reduced. The emphasis has been placed in the 
main on the credibility of the policy. It is thereby assumed that a disin-
flation policy will have lower short-run costs if the general policy of the 
monetary authority is effective.
 At first glance, the rational expectation assumptions imply that an in-
creased emphasis on monetary policy should reduce the role of wage bar-
gaining institutions in general, as has also been argued by Fritz Scharpf 
(Scharpf 1991). If monetary policy can fight inflation effectively by disci-
plining wage bargaining actors through a reduction in demand, the role 
of wage bargaining institutions should become less important. It should 
also curb the inclination of governments to intervene in wage bargain-
ing processes too. The question therefore arises as to why governments 
nevertheless intervene in wage formation processes, even when monetary 
policy shifts towards a more restrictive regime.
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 Monetary and wage bargaining regimes in the political economy 
literature
The answer to this question, and the basis of my assumption that gov-
ernments aim to reduce the costs of disinflationary monetary policies by 
intervening in wage setting processes, derives from the interaction be-
tween wage bargaining institutions and monetary policy. This interaction 
is a well-established part of the political economy literature, and will be 
outlined below.27
Since the arguments of the literature are complex, I summarize the con-
clusion of the literature review upfront. The literature has so far concen-
trated on establishing the effects of wage bargaining institutions on eco-
nomic performance and has established a negative impact of a mismatch 
of restrictive monetary policies and decentralized wage bargaining insti-
tutions on outcomes (in particular Iversen 1999; Hall and Franzese 1998; 
Adolph 2004). It argues that a disinflationary policy is more effective in 
countries that have somewhat coordinated wage bargaining institutions 
rather than decentralized bargaining systems.28
 However, despite being driven by equilibrium assumptions, the litera-
ture has not taken into account that an institutional environment that is 
not responsive to restrictive monetary policy will give governments the 
incentive to increase the effectiveness of monetary policies and to adjust 
their bargaining institutions to their economic policy approach.29
 If the main mechanism of disinflationary policies is the enforcement of 
the effectiveness of a restrictive monetary regime – as has been empha-
sized in the macroeconomic literature – it makes sense for a government 
to foster the effectiveness of their monetary regimes by making their wage 
bargaining institutions more receptive to the change in the monetary re-
gime. Government intervention is therefore an adjustment policy adopted 
by governments in order to promote the responsiveness of wage bargain-
ing institutions towards monetary regimes. In the following sections, I 
will lay out this argument step by step, starting with the assumptions of 
the effect of monetary regimes and moving to the institutional founda-
tions of wage bargaining.
Monetary regimes and central banks
According to the assumptions of rational expectation, the most important 
tool of achieving an effective monetary policy is the credibility of mon-
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etary agencies.30 If the monetary agency can credibly commit to a restric-
tive monetary policy, the expectation of economic actors with regard to 
inflation will be low. If the expectation of inflation is low among economic 
agents, there is little need to push up wages. It is only under the condition 
of insecurity about the inflation target of the government that economic 
actors have an incentive to increase wages and, with them, prices, and 
thereby reinforce inflationary pressures.
 To clarify, it was argued that uncertainty about the conduct of mon-
etary policy tends to provide wage bargaining actors with the incentive 
to anticipate safeguards for higher inflation and thereby provide higher 
wage settlements than necessary. If wage earners cannot be sure about 
the level of inflation due to an erratic monetary policy, their interest will 
likely err on the side of higher settlements. If they can, however, be as-
sured by monetary authorities that prices will remain stable, their fear 
about losses in real wages and real returns will be reduced and they can 
settle for lower increases than they would otherwise have done.
 Credibility can be achieved in a number of ways. One way is to an-
nounce a clear monetary policy with regard to the money supply. Since 
the money supply is seen as the single most important factor that de-
termines inflation, a rule-based monetary policy centred on the money 
supply can reinforce the expectations of low inflation. Governments that 
publicly adhere to a certain policy rule on restrictive monetary policy and 
are prepared to implement the rule should be able to lower inflation with-
out creating adverse effects on the economy.
 The second – and in the literature seen as the most promising – way of 
achieving a higher degree of credibility for monetary policy is the inde-
pendence of central banks.31 The argument is that, in a political environ-
ment, politicians have an incentive to produce surprise inflation in order 
to boost employment for short-term electoral reasons. Because wage bar-
gaining actors know about the electoral pressures and the electoral gains 
of surprise expansionary policies in the political business cycle, they will 
nevertheless push for higher wage settlements in order to guard against 
higher inflation. When governments can institutionalize an anti-infla-
tionary monetary decision rule by delegating the policy-making power 
to an independent agency, they can automatically increase the credibility 
of their policy and have an anti-inflationary effect without any costs. As 
Grilli et al. pointed out: “…having an independent central bank is almost 
like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in terms 
of macroeconomic performance” (quoted in Iversen 1999: 21).
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A third way of increasing the credibility of monetary policy is by peg-
ging the currency to a non-inflationary anchor currency (Iversen and 
Thygesen 1998). If a currency is pegged and capital mobility is high, the 
monetary authority – whether independent or not – has to follow the 
policy of the authority of the non-inflationary currency in order to keep 
the pressure from the exchange rate. If a devaluation of the currency is 
ruled out, the monetary policy of the country that pegged its currency 
automatically increases its credibility vis-à-vis domestic economic ac-
tors.
 In whatever way the credibility of the monetary policy is enhanced, the 
degree of credibility of a monetary regime is nonetheless always based on 
passing on information and influencing other people’s expectations. The 
credibility of a policy needs to be assured by making it understood to the 
relevant actors. As Hall and Franzese point out:
If credible signals are sent from the bank, and the relevant economic 
actors are able to coordinate their behavior in the light of them, nomi-
nal wage-price settlements will be lower than they would otherwise be, 
and the bank can pursue the monetary policy it has announced without 
dampening the economy. On the other hand, if these signals do not 
inspire appropriate wage-price behavior, either because they lack cred-
ibility or because the relevant actors cannot coordinate on appropriate 
behavior, the monetary policy announced by the bank will occur in a 
context of relatively excessive nominal wages and prices, thereby damp-
ening the economy and generating unemployment (Hall and Franzese 
1998: 507).
Putting the emphasis on the credibility of monetary policy in order to 
dampen wage expectations therefore raises the question of the mecha-
nism that ensures that the policy is understood and taken into account 
by economic actors. The effects of monetary policy thus depend on the 
presence of an institutional arrangement that provides actors with a basis 
for making a credible commitment and for monitoring each other’s be-
haviour (Hall and Franzese 1998: 508). In the political economy literature, 
this transmission belt of the credibility of a central bank has been the 
wage bargaining system – the main forum where wages are set in most 
advanced economies.
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Wage bargaining institutions as the transmission belt of credible 
monetary policies
A substantial literature has argued that the organization of the labour 
market and, in particular, the wage bargaining institutions have an effect 
on wage bargaining behaviour and thus on economic performance.32 Put 
very generally, specific properties of wage bargaining institutions provide 
incentives for wage bargaining actors to consider the effects of their wage 
settlements. The most important property of the bargaining system is the 
degree of centralization of decision-making on wage demands of trade 
unions. In decentralized settings, local bargaining units do not have to 
take into account the externalities of their behaviour for others. If a small 
bargaining unit negotiates over a wage agreement, it only considers the 
interests of its own members and ignores the effects of the resulting price 
increase on other groups of workers. Other externalities can be the loss of 
employment and the consequences following from this (Flanagan 1999).
 In contrast, where centralization is high, the leadership of a trade union 
has to make sure that the eﬀ ect of a wage agreement is not harmful to its 
membership; it internalizes negative externalities. Th e most important ef-
fect of centralization is therefore the moderation of wage demands. Th e 
leadership of trade unions in centralized settings is careful not to drive 
wage demands too high since this might aﬀ ect the employment of other 
groups of workers. Th erefore, they tend not to employ their full bargaining 
potential and thereby to have a comparatively positive eﬀ ect on perfor-
mance.33 Th is argument assumes a linear negative relationship between the 
centralization of bargaining and the level of unemployment and real wages. 
More centralized collective bargaining systems produce lower unemploy-
ment rates, ceteris paribus. A similar eﬀ ect can be achieved when labour 
market institutions are completely decentralized and wage bargaining units 
operate under conditions of perfect competition. Th e result is a hump-
shaped relationship with highly decentralized and highly centralized wage 
bargaining institutions having the best results (Calmfors and Driﬃ  l 1988).
 When it comes to the interaction of wage bargaining institutions and 
credible monetary policies, the situation is as follows. For wage bargain-
ing actors it is important how the policy of the central bank aﬀ ects the 
perceived costs of wage increases. It is only in centralized wage bargaining 
systems that the union leadership contemplates the trade-oﬀ  between real 
wages and unemployment. In decentralized wage bargaining institutions, 
the union will not react to monetary policy for three main reasons (Hall 
and Franzese 1998). First, in decentralized bargaining situations, local 
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unions aim at protecting themselves from real wage losses by seeking in-
ﬂ ation increments on top of the real wage they desire, because they cannot 
anticipate the outcomes of other wage settlements. Second, in decentral-
ized settings bargaining units do not take into account the eﬀ ects of their 
settlements on other bargaining units. Th ird, none of the decentralized 
bargaining units will be held responsible for disinﬂ ationary policies by the 
monetary authorities if their settlements turn out to be inﬂ ationary.
 In centralized bargaining arrangements, however, the trade union lead-
ership will assume a trade-off of unemployment against real wages. The 
policy of the central bank becomes important because it can affect the 
trade-off and act as a deterrent to high wage increases (Calmfors 2001: 
333). If the unions anticipate that wage increases which threaten the cen-
tral bank’s goal of price stability will trigger a more restrictive monetary 
policy, and therefore negatively affect employment too, they will have an 
extra incentive to restrain wages that they would not have had otherwise. 
Centralized trade unions and bargaining institutions should therefore be 
particularly responsive to the monetary policy regime.
 When unions are very centralized however, this effect should decline, 
because highly centralized wage bargaining institutions have to internal-
ize other negative externalities and an anticipated monetary policy reac-
tion might not make much of a difference (Calmfors 2001: 334; Corricelli, 
Cukierman et al. 2000). Therefore, the strongest effect of interaction 
between monetary policy and wage bargaining institution’s should take 
place when bargaining is centralized at an intermediate level.
 Empirical studies support these assumptions. Hall and Franzese (1998) 
found that higher central bank independence increases the level of unem-
ployment when wage bargaining is decentralized. Cukierman and Lippi 
(1999) found that higher central bank independence reduces unemploy-
ment with intermediate centralization, but increases it with decentral-
ization. This effect, however, decreases at higher levels of centralization. 
Bernhard Kittel (2000) reports that labour cost increases are inversely 
related to monetary restrictiveness, but positively related to higher lev-
els of centralization of wage bargaining and union density. Iversen (1998 
and 1999) and Traxler, Blaschke et al. (2001) report a positive impact of 
an intermediate level of centralization when it interacts with restrictive 
monetary policy.34 Since the number of observations of different combi-
nations of wage bargaining institutions and monetary policy is very small, 
the interaction effect, however, is not really robust (Calmfors 2001: 334).
 In any case, the theoretical and empirical political economy literature 
gives some reason to believe that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
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indeed depends on the institutional arrangements of wage bargaining. 
Restrictive monetary policy is no free lunch, as some economists have 
claimed it to be, but is contingent on institutional preconditions. Different 
institutions react differently to a change towards tighter monetary policy. 
The link between monetary policy and wage bargaining is the sharing and 
passing on of information about the credibility of tight monetary policies. 
It is only in coordinated or centralized wage bargaining systems that bar-
gaining actors are receptive to this information and will, moreover, take it 
into account when engaging in wage bargaining.
The rationale for government intervention in wage bargaining and 
incomes policy under restrictive monetary regimes
If the conduct of wage bargaining can make a contribution to the process 
of lowering inflationary pressures and pre-empting restrictive monetary 
policies on its own, then the government may try to influence the bar-
gaining behaviour of trade unions.35 By reducing the wage claims of trade 
unions, governments can use incomes policies in order to achieve a trade-
off between higher employment and lower real wages. Incomes policies 
that focus on the effect of employment are therefore not immediately dis-
tinguishable from other institutional effects of wage bargaining systems 
such as centralization of bargaining.
 If wage bargaining institutions are relevant for conveying the cred-
ibility of monetary authorities and the likely impact of a tight monetary 
response to wage bargaining actors, the same argument can be made 
for the role of the government in wage negotiations. If high levels of 
credibility of monetary restrictiveness work best where bargaining ac-
tors are responsive towards the effects of their wage settlement on eco-
nomic performance, governments still have an incentive to influence 
trade unions towards voluntary wage restraint. Therefore, even without 
the assumptions of the Phillips curve, governments face the dilemma 
between the negative effects of disinflationary policies on employment, 
on the one hand, and the wage expectations of workers, on the other. 
If wage bargaining institutions cannot adjust the wage expectations of 
workers to the economic situation, but trade unions and employers are 
nevertheless important bargaining actors on the labour market, gov-
ernments might be tempted to increase the effectiveness of their dis-
inflationary policies and ease the frictions between the expectations of 
workers and the economic reality by negotiating with the social partners 
directly.
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 Moreover, the shift of attention towards the credibility of monetary 
policies as the main policy tool for ensuring low inflation might lead to 
particularly restrictive monetary policies, especially during the period 
of transition from an accommodating monetary regime to a tighter one. 
Since the main mechanism for ensuring low inflation is the expectation 
of ordinary people that the monetary authority will guarantee low infla-
tion no matter what, monetary authorities have an incentive to prioritize 
price stability above all else, even if they are officially committed towards 
economic growth and employment as well. The importance of the cred-
ibility of monetary authorities has only been recognized in the literature 
and in policy-making in the last two decades. In many countries, central 
banks have only recently gained a higher level of independence from gov-
ernments. In those countries in particular, there needs to be a conscious 
process of redirecting the expectations of wage bargaining units towards 
a new policy framework.
 But the capacity of governments to negotiate with trade unions over 
wages also varies, depending on the organization of the labour market. 
In very decentralized wage bargaining systems, the capability of govern-
ments to meaningfully influence wage bargaining behaviour is restricted. 
Local bargaining units might not be impressed by the government’s ef-
forts and may not be able to overcome their local competition. Govern-
ments might choose to further deregulate the labour market rather than 
seek interventionist solutions. In highly centralized bargaining arrange-
ments, bargaining units might be sufficiently responsive to changes in the 
economic environment anyway. Therefore, governments are most likely 
to intervene in the wage bargaining process where bargaining units are 
sufficiently organized but not highly centralized.
 The argument here – in line with arguments that have been made about 
the importance of wage bargaining institutions under credible conser-
vative monetary authorities by Streeck (1994), Hall and Franzese (1998), 
Iversen (1999) and Traxler, Blaschke et al. (2001) – is therefore that the 
credibility of monetary policies needs institutional mechanisms to con-
vey collective expectations to wage bargaining units. Centralized wage 
bargaining institutions can be the conveyors that internalize the effects 
of a credible conservative monetary institution and thereby dampen the 
negative real effects of disinflation. Another mechanism can be the inter-
vention by governments to persuade wage bargaining actors to settle for 
lower wage claims, in order to pre-empt these expected negative effects. 
In this way government intervention can try to avoid the potential nega-
tive impact of disinflationary policies on the real economy by closing the 
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gap between the wage expectations of workers and the expected restric-
tive monetary policies of the monetary authorities.
A summary of the argument is given in figure 2.1. Rather than let cred-
ible monetary policies take effect by themselves, governments have an 
incentive to use restrictive monetary policies and interventionist wage 
policies in tandem if wage bargaining institutions are not in themselves 
sufficiently responsive. Credible monetary policies ensure low inflation; 
negotiating wage restraint can help to smooth the negative effects of oth-
erwise harsh disinflationary measures.
The credibility of the government: from political exchange to imposing 
a new policy paradigm36
In the neo-corporatist literature, the political relationship between trade 
unions and governments has been predominantly described by the notion 
of political exchange (Pizzorno 1978). While governments had to respect 
free collective bargaining, union compliance with the need of national 
economic policy was a matter of political exchange (Streeck and Ken-
Figure 2.1 Negotiated wage restraint: policies of government intervention
Government control over key 
decisions on monetary policy 
(Central Bank Independence; 
exchange rate)
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worthy 2005: 9). Political exchanges were based on the conversion of in-
dustrial into political power, which trade unions could trade for a wide 
variety of concessions from governments, such as industrial, regional and 
educational policy programmes, thus wielding extensive power over pub-
lic policy (Headey 1970; Lehmbruch 1984; Schmitter 1977). The concept 
assumed the existence of centralized unions that command strong bar-
gaining power. It assumed economic situations where the outcomes of 
collective bargaining are decisive for macroeconomic performance, es-
pecially with respect to monetary stability and employment, and where 
the political survival of the government depends on such performance 
(Streeck and Hassel 2003).
 The onset of tight monetary policy has changed the nature of the ex-
change between the government and trade unions on incomes policy. In 
contrast to the assumptions of the Keynesian version of incomes policy, 
there is no master plan with which governments intend to tackle the cri-
sis, but an incremental adjustment to external constraints. Furthermore, 
governments have a deliberate choice between negotiating an incomes 
policy or letting a conservative (or non-accommodating or restrictive) 
monetarist policy take its course in order to reduce wage pressures. Dur-
ing the exchanges of the 1970s, for instance, monetary policy was an un-
derdeveloped tool. Finally, trade unions are in principle aware of the fact 
that the room for real wage increases is tightly constrained by hard cur-
rency policies.
 Government intervention in the context of tight monetary policy is not 
based on an economic policy in which the pay-offs are clearly defined. 
During the 1970s, left-wing governments committed themselves to high 
spending in order to maintain employment levels if trade unions exerted 
wage restraint. In that context, government intervention in wage setting 
went hand in hand with higher public expenditure as a result of a politi-
cal exchange (Lange and Garrett 1985). This strategy was not only seen as 
viable but also regarded by some observers as superior in terms of eco-
nomic growth (Cameron 1984; Lange and Garrett 1985).
 However, fiscal expansion has become equally constrained as monetary 
accommodation. Open economies, rising levels of public debt and rising 
costs of public debts due to high interest rates have restricted the ability 
of governments to offer fiscal expansion in exchange for wage restraint. 
Since the turnaround in economic policy by the French government in 
1983, public-spending commitments have been discredited as economic 
policy and there has been no ‘labour-friendly’ demand strategy presented 
for resolving the crisis.
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 Also, since the early 1980s, all governments have understood the mon-
etarist alternative for controlling wage pressure. Rather than being de-
pendent on union approaches in wage bargaining, governments can turn 
to other instruments if wages get out of control. Conversely, monetar-
ist adjustment without the cooperation of trade unions can potentially 
carry high costs in terms of employment if trade unions are not respon-
sive to monetarist policies (Scharpf 1991). Restrictive monetary policies 
combined with aggressive wage bargaining can lead to exceptionally high 
increases in unemployment, as can be seen in the case of the United King-
dom in the early 1980s. In most countries, high and/or rising unemploy-
ment is not only politically unpopular, but also fiscally expensive.
 While governments have a choice on how to approach wage bargain-
ing, trade unions face the fact that the pressures will increase either way. 
Trade unions can either commit themselves to voluntary restraint or they 
will have to face the consequence of higher employment losses if they do 
not. Since there is no longer a Keynesian scenario in which inflationary 
wage pressures can be accommodated by monetary policy, the scope for 
wage increases has diminished. Higher employment losses will eventually 
drive wage increases down. If unions opt for a negotiated incomes policy, 
they can try to bargain over a price for wage restraint.
 From the trade unions’ perspective, the crucial question remains the 
extent to which the government or the central bank will actually punish 
the wage bargainers for wage agreements that they see as excessive. If 
the government has a very clear line on tight monetary and fiscal policy, 
trade unions have to expect an impact of wage bargaining on employment 
via tighter monetary policy. If, however, welfare provisions in the form of 
unemployment programmes and early retirement schemes take care of 
the unemployed, the impact is likely to be less severe. Trade union vulner-
ability to the effects of high wage settlements therefore depends on both 
a tight macroeconomic policy and the provision of welfare.
 The politics of new incomes policy under tight monetary control there-
fore hinge on the resolve of the government to display its commitment to 
a non-accommodating policy rather than on the willingness of the gov-
ernment to compensate trade unions for wage restraint. In the past, not 
only had central banks accommodated inflationary wage settlements, but 
fiscal and social policies also took care of the negative effects of wage 
increases. Expansive fiscal policies counteracted the negative impact of 
tight monetary policy when employed for disinflation. Moreover, welfare 
programmes and employment schemes protected the trade unions and 
their members from the hardship of the market.
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 The disciplinary force that stems from a tight monetary policy vis-à-vis 
the trade unions is therefore contingent on the position of the govern-
ment vis-à-vis other policy fields – independent from monetary policy 
itself. Wider government policies are therefore an important contextual 
factor for the effectiveness of monetary policy. If governments are will-
ing to accommodate the negative effects of a tight monetary policy rather 
than pass them on to the labour market, trade unions will not be affected 
in their bargaining strategies. On the other hand, if governments are pre-
pared to pass on the effects and do not accommodate further pressures by 
means of social policies, trade unions can be expected to adjust to the new 
situation more rapidly. Governments are expected to be more likely to 
intervene in wage bargaining when they cannot credibly make a commit-
ment to a non-accommodating position. In other words, the more clearly 
the government can display its pursuit of a non-accommodating policy, 
the less likely it is to intervene in bargaining processes.
 As in the case of the reputation of the central bank, it is argued here 
that the new politics of government intervention rest on the credibility of 
the government to convey a new policy paradigm to wage bargaining ac-
tors. The crucial issue is that strategic behaviour does not depend on the 
compensation that is offered in exchange for wage restraint, as is implied 
in the traditional notion of political exchanges. The strategic approach 
by the government concerns the limitation of the bargaining scope of the 
wage bargaining actors. Unlike the wage bargains under accommodating 
economic policies, incomes policy in the 1980s and 1990s did not offer a 
compensation for wage restraint in the form of a political exchange. Gov-
ernments intervene in wage bargaining processes in order to change the 
rules of the game of the bargaining procedures themselves, by introducing 
the new economic framework. It is therefore expected that, in those po-
litical institutional contexts where the government cannot display its new 
commitment by itself, governments are more likely to intervene. The key 
explanatory variable for the politics of incomes policy under tight mon-
etary conditions is therefore the ability of governments to display their 
own commitment to non-accommodation.
 This does not mean that there is no compensation for trade unions 
when agreeing to voluntary wage restraint, but the compensation is not 
vital to the interaction between governments and trade unions. While 
governments might concede tax reforms, delays in social policy retrench-
ment or the installation of new committees on labour relations, the capac-
ity for compensation does not determine the approach by the government 
vis-à-vis wage bargaining.
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 Th e implications of this line of argumentation are twofold. First, the new 
type of incomes policy should be expected to be less statutory and thereby 
avoid many of the problems of political legitimacy that Shonﬁ eld raised al-
ready in the mid-1960s and that manifested themselves in many countries 
in the strike waves of the late 1960s. Governments are concerned to ensure 
that the trade unions understand the externalities of their wage bargaining 
behaviour. Within the context of a tight monetary framework, governments 
will refrain from using intervention as an immediate tool to ﬁ ght inﬂ ation 
as they did before. Inﬂ ation is fought by monetary policy, but if incomes 
policy can help the wage bargaining actor to adjust to the new framework, 
it can lower the transition costs with regard to employment. Being under 
less immediate pressure to achieve wage moderation for ﬁ ghting inﬂ ation 
per se, governments can use their inﬂ uence more indirectly.
 Secondly, incomes policy should not be based on the support of the 
relationship between friendly governments and trade unions, but on 
a clearly defined division of labour in a framework of economic poli-
cy set by governments and of wage bargaining performed by the social 
partners. Wage bargaining institutions continue to mediate the effects 
of tight economic policy on the labour market; by intervening in wage 
formation procedures, governments aim to push wage bargainers into 
accepting responsibility for these effects and into internalizing govern-
ment economic policy choice as a fixed parameter in wage bargaining 
procedures.
 Explaining policy choices
Despite the shift in economic policy approaches after 1980, most govern-
ments in Western Europe did not abandon their attempts to influence 
decisions by wage bargaining actors, but continued to negotiate over 
wages. Yet in the period from 1980 to 1999, governments displayed vary-
ing degrees of activity when engaging in negotiations with trade unions 
and employers. Why did some countries actively pursue a new type of 
incomes policy, while others either rejected any cooperation with trade 
unions or kept it to a strict minimum? This section briefly outlines a 
set of factors that influenced the behaviour of governments. The factors 
are: the type of monetary regime; a country’s political regime; and the 
responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions. A full theoretical expla-
nation of these factors can be found in the relevant substantive Chapters 
4 to 6.
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 The monetary regime and wage bargaining institutions are directly 
linked to the theoretical assumptions found in the political economy liter-
ature. Since the interaction between the monetary regime and wage bar-
gaining institutions determines the effect on economic performance, both 
factors individually are also likely to influence the government’s decision 
to negotiate on wages. The third factor refers to national political institu-
tions and their effects on the propensity of government to negotiate over 
wages. As will become clear in the more detailed operationalization of 
the factors in subsequent chapters, the monetary regime and the political 
regime are characteristics of countries that are fixed in the short run and 
do not vary much over time. For the period of the 1980s and 1990s, these 
factors can therefore be seen as given by the political actors and thus out 
of their reach. The responsiveness of the wage bargaining institutions, 
however, varies over time and is also the aim of government intervention. 
Government behaviour is therefore prompted by the responsiveness on 
the one hand, while wage bargaining responsiveness also interacts with 
government behaviour on the other.
The monetary regime – central bank independence
The monetary regime determines the context in which the government’s 
economic policy takes place. In general, a restrictive monetary regime 
will narrow the room to manoeuvre of any government on economic pol-
icy. Fiscal expansion that leads to public deficits and public debts will be 
more severely punished under a restrictive monetary regime than under 
a monetary regime that is subject to government control. To the extent 
that negotiated wage restraint has traditionally been embedded in a more 
accommodating economic policy, a restrictive monetary regime curtails 
these options considerably.
 Moreover, a restrictive monetary regime disciplines wage bargaining 
actors directly and will control inflationary pressure no matter what. In 
coordinated wage bargaining systems, the restrictive monetary regime 
will contribute to the responsiveness of wage bargaining actors. However, 
the monetary regime in itself will also enhance the governments’ commit-
ment to economic stringency and reduce its propensity to negotiate with 
trade unions.
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Political institutions – consensus democracy
The process of disinflationary adjustment under non-responsive wage 
bargainers can carry with it high economic and political costs. Govern-
ments that enjoy a stable parliamentary majority and are not dependent 
on coalition partners may be sufficiently secure to commit themselves to a 
strict line on economic policy without being tempted to negotiate a wage 
restraint with trade unions. Governments that are built around many co-
alition partners in complex political systems, on the other hand, often 
have short life spans and are unlikely to take risks. Thus the nature of the 
political system, in particular the distinction between majoritarian and 
consensus-based political institutions, can give governments the incen-
tive to rely either on their own parliamentary strength or negotiate with 
trade unions respectively by determining the capacity of governments to 
hold out without union support. Unstable and consensus-seeking govern-
ments can also try to strengthen their position through finding an agree-
ment with trade unions on the conduct of economic policy in general 
and on a negotiated wage restraint in particular. The broader the social 
support for economic adjustment, the less painful the experience might 
be for a generally weak or divided government.
 Moreover, in political systems that produce multi-coalition govern-
ments, trade unions often have a higher number of access points to the 
government and can use the competitive nature of political unionism to 
lobby for their interests in a way that again prompts governments to ne-
gotiate with trade unions rather than confront them with restrictive eco-
nomic policy.
The responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions
Th e responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions describes the capacity 
for wage bargaining actors to adjust and is therefore the basis for govern-
ments to worry about wage formation. If wage bargaining institutions re-
spond to changing economic developments, there is little reason for gov-
ernments to engage in negotiations with trade unions on wage adjustment. 
Coordination and adjustment take place tacitly and indirectly. In some 
cases, responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions is strongly embedded 
in the political system itself and direct intervention might be unnecessary. 
However, the lack of responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions will 
provide an incentive for governments to negotiate over wages in order to 
bring wage formation in line with the demands of the economic situation.
EXPLAINING POLICY CHOICES
Wages.indd   59 28-8-2006   15:43:13

 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, it presented a hypothesis of 
why governments intervene in wage bargaining processes even under the 
conditions of tight monetary policies. This hypothesis counteracts the ex-
pectations found in the neo-corporatist literature that political exchanges 
are based on the capacity of governments to compensate trade unions for 
wage restraint with expansive fiscal and monetary policies. As has been 
argued here, this is not necessarily the case because governments seek 
cooperation even when they pursue tight economic policies. They do so 
because the effectiveness of disinflationary policy, similar to expansionist 
economic policy, varies with the organization of the labour market. Both 
expansionist and contractionist demand policies by governments are me-
diated by the responses of wage bargaining institutions towards them.
 This chapter has fleshed out the different contexts of incomes policies 
when employed under expansionary or contractionary economic policy 
conditions. When governments use intervention in wage bargaining in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of disinflationary economic policy, 
they have alternative disciplinary devices vis-à-vis trade unions that they 
do not have under expansionary policy conditions. The difference in con-
text has implications for the form of the intervention as well as for the 
politics on which it is based.
 Secondly, the chapter has laid out the factors that determine whether 
or not a government chooses to engage in negotiated wage restraint with 
trade unions. In the following chapters, these implications will be spelt 
out in more detail and the differences between national cases will be made 
apparent. Chapter 4 will discuss the role of monetary policy and the in-
dependence of central banks, while Chapter 5 will address the political 
institutions that determine the approach taken by governments and the 
role of partisanship. Chapter 6 will deal with the responsiveness of wage 
bargaining institutions as the main institutional precondition. In order 
to give the argument an empirical base, Chapter 3 presents a measure-
ment of government intervention in wage bargaining processes that will 
be used throughout the remainder of the book.
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3 Policy Options and Institutions:
 How Governments Respond
Politically, the origins of negotiations between governments and trade 
unions lie in the new balance of class power that emerged in the settlement 
that followed World War ii.37 The promotion of Keynesian welfare state 
policies guaranteed trade unions the right to free collective bargaining 
while committing governments to ensure high employment levels. Com-
bining full employment with secure and free collective bargaining rights 
raised the welfare expectations of workers and in turn created demand 
for institutional and political tools for adjusting these expectations to en-
able balanced economic growth. Collective bargaining institutions medi-
ated between the welfare expectations of workers on the one hand and 
the transformation of the economic environment on the other. Operating 
within the framework of these institutions trade unions gradually adjust-
ed their wage bargaining behaviour – often pushed by governments.
 Chapter 2 discussed the relationship between monetary policy and 
wage bargaining institutions and the incentives of the government to in-
fluence this relationship. It argued that, even under restrictive monetary 
policies, wage bargaining institutions retain a functional role to the extent 
that the government remains able to influence the performance of these 
institutions. This chapter looks at the choices open to governments from 
the perspective of their institutional environment. The neo-corporatism 
literature38 has introduced a sharp dichotomy between the institutional 
endowments of political economies with respect to the relationship be-
tween governments and trade unions. Depending on the form and type of 
trade union organizations, the relationships of trade unions with govern-
ments have taken markedly different developments.
 Starting from this dichotomy between corporatist versus non-corpo-
ratist countries, this chapter argues that patterns of negotiations between 
governments and trade unions are situated between the institutional ac-
commodation39 of trade union demands, as in the corporatist case, and the 
market-based or liberal form of addressing trade union wage demands, as 
in the pluralist case. In other words, negotiations are an expression of 
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attempts to reconcile conflicting institutional settings which, on the one 
hand, only insufficiently respond to the government’s economic needs 
but, on the other hand, embody a commitment by the government to a 
political approach that makes a more liberal response by the government 
neither acceptable nor feasible.
 Th is chapter aims to move on from a research perspective that derives 
the notion of accommodation primarily from the organizational structures 
of trade union organizations and wage bargaining systems to a more dy-
namic view of the interaction of institutions and policy responses. In order 
to do so, it introduces a measure for the negotiated response, which will 
hereafter be referred to as government intervention.40 Th is measure will 
then be used in the remainder of the book as the key dependent variable.
 Secondly, it will show empirically that the behaviour of governments 
towards wage bargaining in Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s 
is not systematically related to the institutions of wage bargaining sys-
tems or the corporatist traditions of individual countries. In other words, 
whether a government tries to negotiate with trade unions on wages or 
not is not solely determined by the corporatist or non-corporatist tradi-
tion of the country. In the first section, I will discuss the different concep-
tual backgrounds of the institutional accommodation of trade unions in 
terms of corporatism and wage bargaining centralization and government 
intervention as a form of political accommodation of trade unions. In the 
second section, I will introduce the operationalization of the variables. 
The third section contrasts the relationship between the institutional em-
bedding of trade unions and government behaviour towards wage bar-
gaining. The final section comprises the conclusions.
 Policy options towards the redistributional power of trade unions: 
market responses and negotiations
Adopting a stylized view of the post-war situation, there were two insti-
tutional configurations that influenced how governments responded to 
the question of how to accommodate the redistributional power of labour 
in the framework of the post-war Keynesian welfare state – the corporat-
ist and the pluralist setting. Corporatism or pluralism were not policy 
approaches chosen by governments, but were fundamental structures of 
government-trade union relations based on the organization of the labour 
market, in particular on the organizational structures of trade unions.
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Corporatist settings comprised the institutional integration of trade 
union organizations into the political system and on the labour market. 
Centralized trade union organizations, able to monopolize the conduct of 
collective bargaining, gained exclusive access to political decision-making 
and collective bargaining rights. In turn, they were willing to accept the 
responsibility for moderate wage demands. Incorporation and centraliza-
tion of trade union structures took place in the inter-war or immediate 
post-war years, often with heavy involvement by governments. At other 
times, centralization and the autonomous regulation of wage bargaining 
by the social partners were aimed at keeping the government at bay. Once 
centralized structures and monopolies were set up, they functioned as an 
integrative force, since trade unions had to mediate competing interests 
between groups of workers internally rather than pursue local wage gains.
 The pluralist setting was based on a trade union structure that was 
organized in a decentralized way, with weak organizational control over 
wage bargaining procedures and wage formation outcomes. Where trade 
unions and wage bargaining structures had their roots in early industri-
alized economies, they were decentralized and often dominated by tra-
ditional craft unions that did not have close relationships with the po-
litical arena (Streeck and Hassel 2003). In these cases, the institutional 
accommodation of trade unions was more superficial and fragile since 
trade union structures and public policy-making were largely incompat-
ible even though, in many cases, benevolent governments tried to set up 
consultation procedures that included trade union participation.41
 In the immediate post-war period, these two basic settings endowed 
political actors with a set of responses to mismatches between the eco-
nomic environment and the role of trade unions in wage formation: an 
institutional response, a market response and a negotiated response. The 
institutional response represents the reliance of political actors on the ca-
pacity of existing corporatist institutions to adjust to a changing environ-
ment. Economic imbalances were addressed by political actors working to 
realign wage bargaining actors’ behaviour to fit within the imperatives of 
existing bargaining institutions. This is accomplished by indirectly adjust-
ing the otherwise stable institutional set-up of centralized wage bargain-
ing, for instance by stabilizing wage bargaining actors or giving support to 
moderate wage claims through social policy expansion. It was built upon 
the pre-existing set of corporatist wage bargaining institutions.
 The market response broke with the post-war consensus of political in-
tegration of trade unions. It rejected the legitimate claim of trade unions 
to organize the labour market and thereby exert a political influence over 
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economic policy-making. This response included policies towards the 
deregulation of the labour market, the curtailing of rights of regulation 
by trade unions and the political exclusion of trade unions. The market 
response was based on the pluralist tradition of arm’s length relations 
between public policy-making and trade unions.
 The mismatch between the expectations of employees and the eco-
nomic environment of firms introduced a third type of response that 
was, in some cases, able to reply to shifting needs in a way that the two 
previous responses could not. The negotiated response was the attempt 
of governments to negotiate with trade unions over wage restraint in a 
variety of institutional settings. Where institutions were not conducive 
to accommodating trade union wage demands due to a fragmented wage 
bargaining structure, as was frequently the case in pluralist countries, and 
where governments were nevertheless committed to the consensus of the 
Keynesian welfare state that guaranteed trade unions a high degree of in-
fluence over wage bargaining procedures, governments tried to influence 
the wage bargaining behaviour of the unions.
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the argument. The two ends of the bottom line are 
the ideal types of government-union relations that are embodied in the 
neo-corporatist literature. Corporatist institutions at one end take care of 
adjusting trade union wage expectations to the economic reality. Pluralist 
settings at the other end do not presuppose a positive role of coordinated 
labour market institutions and see the decentralization and deregulation 
of the labour market as the policy baseline of governments. Negotiations 
occur when institutions fail to deliver the required economic outcomes 
but governments are nevertheless committed to a powerful and institu-
tionally embedded role for trade unions on the labour market. They are 
therefore not an ideal type of political response that corresponds to either 
a corporatist or a pluralist approach; instead, they reflect responses that, 
on the one hand, seek to reconcile the conflicting aims of institutional ac-
commodation and acceptance of the political role of trade unions while, 
on the other hand, actively addressing an economic imbalance that is 
based on a maladjustment of wage bargaining behaviour by trade unions. 
In other words, negotiations reflect tensions between the politically ac-
cepted role of trade unions and their inadequate behaviour in wage bar-
gaining procedures.
 In practice, the two responses of negotiation on the one hand and ne-
gotiated accommodation and deregulation on the other were not mutually 
exclusive, but often overlapped, just as corporatism and pluralism tend to 
overlap. After World War ii all advanced countries started with a pro-
POLICY OPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND
Wages.indd   64 28-8-2006   15:43:13

cess that attempted to incorporate trade unions into the political decision-
making process while simultaneously introducing a much higher degree 
of government intervention in the economy than ever before (Streeck and 
Hassel 2003). Deliberate attempts by governments to incorporate trade 
unions often took the form of consultation on wages and economic policy 
within the framework of tripartite economic and social councils. More in-
direct incorporation addressed the organizational status of trade unions. 
Trade unions received legal entitlements for the protection of their organi-
zations, which in some cases granted them monopoly representation and 
the guarantee that they alone should control wage formation procedures.
 At the same time, government intervention extended over the whole 
period between 1945 and 1970, with only its form and policy goals varying. 
In the first three decades after the war, there was no laissez-faire approach 
by governments, but purposeful economic policy that included a strategy 
towards prices and wages. All governments in advanced industrialized 
countries at one point or another either decreed wage and price freezes 
or had discussions with unions and employers about the appropriate wage 
policy. While the influence of trade unions over economic policy-making 
was seen as a legitimate political process, the management of wages was 
seen as a legitimate tool of economic policy-making.
 In contrast to the institutional setting that is described by corporatism, 
the approach to negotiate the accommodation of trade unions describes 
the government policy towards wage bargaining. Negotiated accommo-
Figure 3.1  Institutional settings and policy options
Negotiated Response
Market Response  (labour 
market deregulation and 
trade union exclusion/ 
pluralism)
Institutional Response 
(corporatism)
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dation is not based on the institutionally mediated cooperation between 
governments and trade unions, but on the attempt of governments to 
push trade unions towards a more responsible position in wage bargain-
ing than they would otherwise have adopted (Headey 1970). It is there-
fore the result of a mismatch of the interplay between institutions and the 
needs of the government in economic policy-making. The need for ne-
gotiated accommodation, in other words, arises when the institutionally 
produced outcomes do not square with the aspirations of the government. 
Negotiations are aimed at mending the frictions in the interplay between 
economic policy and wage bargaining behaviour.
Conceptualization of the corporatist institutions and negotiated policy 
response towards trade unions’ redistributional power in the neo-
corporatist literature
Corporatism and the centralization of trade union organizations and wage 
bargaining institutions can be regarded as characteristics of the institu-
tional approach to the challenge of containing the new role of labour in 
the post-war order. The expanding regulative and integrative task of the 
modern state requires prior aggregation of opinion, which only singular, 
hierarchically ordered representative monopolies are able to provide, as 
Schmitter has described it. In his conceptualization, corporatist interac-
tion as an “osmotic process whereby the modern state and modern inter-
est associations seek each other out leads, on the one hand, to even fur-
ther extensions of public guarantees and equilibration and, on the other, 
to even further concentration and hierarchic control within these private 
governments” (Schmitter 1979: 27). The interaction between the state and 
private associations is thereby founded primarily on the capacity of the 
associations to deliver the control over their constituencies and the rep-
resentation of group interests.
 Based on these assumptions, the literature on neo-corporatism focused 
on the role of organizational structures and institutions as a precondition 
for virtuous interaction between associations and the state. The organi-
zational structure of trade unions and employers’ associations was at the 
centre of attention, in particular the question of whether they conformed 
to a corporatist pattern or not and what the effects of a more fragmented 
and pluralist structure of interest associations were.
 In some parts of the literature, however, corporatism has been con-
ceptualized both as a form of policy formation and as a form of inter-
est intermediation. With regard to policy formation, designated interest 
POLICY OPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND
Wages.indd   66 28-8-2006   15:43:14

associations are incorporated within the process of authoritative deci-
sion-making and implementation. As such, they are officially recognized 
by the state not merely as interest intermediaries but as co-responsible 
‘partners’ in governance and guidance (Schmitter 1981: 295). Interest in-
termediation, on the other hand, describes the mode of arranging the po-
litical process based on a system of centralized and concentrated interest 
groups. The two forms of corporatism are not synonymous: corporatist 
policy formation can take place when corporatist interest mediation is 
not present. However, corporatist theory argues that corporatist bargain-
ing is more susceptible to collapse under the stress of exogenous shocks 
if “unprotected by firmly rooted institutions” (Katzenstein 1985: 89). The 
centralization of interest associations thus gives rise to a number of other 
characteristics of corporatism, including a tendency towards corporatist 
policy formation. As Philippe Schmitter points out:
Th ere is, nevertheless, considerable evidence of an elective aﬃ  nity, if 
not a strong element of historical causality, between the corporatiza-
tion of interest intermediation and the emergence of ‘concerted’ forms 
of policy making. It is not an accident that virtually all the authors 
using diﬀ erent deﬁ nitions of corporatism agree on the countries and 
policy arenas they chose as exemplars for theory building or cases for 
hypothesis testing (Schmitter 1981: 296).
The elective affinity between corporatist interest mediation and policy 
formation rests on the incentives that a corporatist structure of interest 
intermediation presents to governments. Corporatist interest intermedi-
ation would lead to a political process which included the major interest 
associations as important social actors and by which they acquired a stake 
in the policy formation even if they were dissatisfied with its outcome. 
Interest groups would participate in the formulation and implementa-
tion of policies that go beyond their specific sectoral interests to include 
such broad political objectives as full employment, economic stability and 
growth as well as the modernization of industry (Katzenstein 1985: 92).
 The whole process would generally be embraced by an ideology of so-
cial partnership that is shared by business and trade unions alike and is 
expressed in national politics. Corporatism contributes directly to the 
cooperative and non-conflictual behaviour of trade unions and business, 
and therefore manifests itself in low levels of industrial conflict. Hibbs 
found that strike levels were greatly reduced in those countries that were 
later classified as the smaller corporatist countries in Europe, namely 
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Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Hibbs 1977). In a num-
ber of studies, therefore, the level of industrial conflict has been used as 
an indicator of corporatism (Cusack 1995).
 In general, the different types of conceptualization of corporatism as 
the specific relations between civil society and the state produced very 
similar lists of countries that were described as corporatist. Comparisons 
of corporatist typologies showed a great deal of overlapping (see, for ex-
ample, Crouch 1993b; Kenworthy 2003; Wilensky 1976; Wilensky 2002). 
The distinction between the organizational bases and the policy approach 
of concertation mattered only at the level of conceptualization and the 
reasoning why these interactions would occur. At the empirical level – 
with a few exceptions such as Switzerland and Belgium – both approaches 
of neo-corporatist analysis came to similar conclusions.
 In these approaches, corporatism is more pronounced in small states 
than in big states and is – for historical reasons – characteristic of conti-
nental Europe. In continental Europe, a set of ‘ancient associations’, which 
were inherited from guild privileges and other involuntary associations, 
were transformed into bodies of corporatist interest mediation with the 
growth of capitalist market societies and civil liberalism. Depending on the 
extent of the spread of liberalism, intermediate organizations were some-
times completely abolished; in other cases where the period of liberalism 
was short and incomplete, the remnants of interest associations were trans-
formed from medieval corporations into modern interest associations. In 
small countries in particular, the challenges of the inter-war years led to a 
more cooperative form of intermediation between the state and interest or-
ganizations. Under the condition of the rapid expansion of the global econ-
omy, this form of cooperation within small states was reinforced. Th e social 
and political cohesion of small states with a historical legacy of strong so-
cial organization supported the evolution of corporatist intermediation.
 Among the big states in Western Europe, Germany has the strongest 
corporatist structure. As Katzenstein puts in: “West Germany’s corporat-
ism derives as much from openness, dependence and a sense of vulner-
ability brought about by the diminished size of the Bonn Republic after 
1945 as from the implantation of its political parties in fresh democratic 
soil” (Katzenstein 1985: 201). For the other large industrial states, corpo-
ratism is not a useful way of responding to the risks and opportunities of 
the international economy. Since large countries generally have a longer 
time span in which they can adjust their economies and a more heteroge-
neous mix of industries stemming from size, corporatism is naturally less 
developed in large states.
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Policies on wage bargaining
Government policy towards wage bargaining has been a core focus of 
neo-corporatist conceptualization because it cuts across the boundaries 
of public policy-making and the regulatory responsibility of associations 
in the labour market. Wage bargaining is not a policy domain of public 
policy. In contrast to monetary and fiscal policy, wage formation is not 
seen as a part of public policy but rather as a private activity on the la-
bour market that is governed by private associations. Decision-making 
on wages is therefore not based on public force but on the strength of the 
associational actors themselves, while it is always constrained by mac-
roeconomic policy decisions and monetary policy in particular. In the 
area of industrial relations, public policy generally only has direct inter-
ventionist power under very special circumstances. For example, public 
policy provides a legal framework of substantive and procedural rules. 
This includes basic standards in the labour market, such as a minimum 
period of paid holidays or a maximum working week. In addition, public 
policy also prescribes procedural rules, as in the cases of early retirement 
and redundancies.
 Despite the vast literature on neo-corporatist policy-making, the con-
ceptual tools for distinguishing and identifying the political forms for ac-
commodating trade union wage bargaining positions have remained un-
derdeveloped in the literature. There are a few political science studies 
on incomes policy that have attempted a conceptualization, notably by 
Headey (1970), Armingeon (1982 and 1983) and Marks (1986).
 In the neo-corporatist literature, most concepts of political exchanges 
(Marin 1990; Crouch 1993b) or of modes of governance (Lehmbruch 1984) 
have generally remained within the framework of the pre-eminence of 
political and economic institutions. The notion of political exchanges as-
sumes that unions are paid by governments for their cooperation (Streeck 
and Kenworthy 2005). Incomes policies, on the other hand, are govern-
ment attempts to give incentives and other reasons to trade unions to 
restrain wages. They can be part of a political exchange, but the two pro-
cesses are not synonymous.42 Approaches that focus on political exchange 
therefore tend to overlook the broader nature of incomes policy. For in-
stance, Crouch has used the concept of political exchange as a function of 
centralized trade union organizations and trade union strength (Crouch 
1993b). On the other hand, the generalized political exchange as concep-
tualized by Bernd Marin has abandoned the primacy of the structural and 
institutional preconditions, while remaining vague about the substantive 
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mechanisms that encourage political exchange in weakly institutionalized 
settings (Marin 1990 and 1991).
 Similarly, in the new literature on social pacts, attention has been 
drawn to the fact that corporatism has to be seen as a “variable and con-
stantly evolving phenomenon” if we are to understand the interaction 
between governments and the social partners without having the benefit 
of clear conceptual guidance on how to proceed (Molina and Rhodes 
2002: 322). While it has become empirically obvious that the relation-
ship between the state and associations have been developing in ways 
that were not theoretically in line with corporatist theorizing (Schmit-
ter and Grote 1997), the literature has tended to dwell on the substan-
tive issues, such as reform of the regulations of the labour market, in 
order to gain theoretical insights from the cases. For instance, recent 
contributions on social pacts in Western Europe by Fajertag and Pochet 
(2000), Regini (2000) and Rhodes (1998 and 2001a), with the exception 
of Baccaro (2003), have tended to pass over a theoretical explanation for 
these changes in order to assess thoroughly the substance of the reform 
changes.
 A more policy-based approach that systematically includes the sub-
stantive issues and seeks to explain the diversity of developments in the 
relationship between governments and associations has therefore not re-
ceived much attention in the literature. The sheer institutional variety 
has tended to obfuscate the distinction between governmental policy on 
wages and the institutional accommodation of trade unions. For a long 
time, institutions and policies were seen as complementary: countries 
with corporatist institutions tended to employ policies of negotiations, 
while pluralist countries tended to deregulate. The tensions between in-
stitutions that did not comply with the needs of governments and policies 
that did not fit in with the institutional set-up were not fundamentally 
addressed.
 In sum, institutional and negotiated forms of accommodation are inter-
related but distinct responses to the issue of labour inclusion in modern 
economies. Negotiated accommodation responds to the imperfection and 
mismatches of institutional outcomes. In order to assess the dynamism 
of the evolution of corporatist interaction between governments and in-
terest associations, it is also useful to distinguish these two approaches 
empirically.
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 The operationalization of variables
In order to test the assumptions of the preceding chapter, we need a mea-
sure of the government intervention in wage bargaining. Here we face the 
problem that the corporatist literature is vast while, in contrast, the de-
veloped measures of corporatism tend not to be time-sensitive, but based 
on the structural properties of wage bargaining institutions. The litera-
ture has produced numerous national corporatism indices derived from 
diverse information such as bargaining structures, centralization of trade 
union organization, union density etc. These indices measure what has 
been conceived of as the precondition for corporatist interaction, but not 
the degree of the interaction itself. Measures of such corporatist interac-
tion or government-trade union negotiations, on the other hand, hardly 
exist.43 This section presents a proxy for measuring corporatist responses 
that is both time-sensitive and comparative.
 It takes the perspective of government intervention rather than coop-
eration between governments and trade unions as the starting point for 
tracing a stronger or weaker degree of corporatist response. Government 
intervention in the wage bargaining process – although often disliked by 
the social partners and often only used by governments as an instrument 
of last resort – can be seen as a powerful indicator of the willingness of a 
government to engage in a negotiated adjustment process rather than in a 
process of deregulation and decentralization.
Measuring government intervention
The measurement of government intervention needs to be independent 
from the institutional design of the corporatist tradition of countries. It 
also has to be time-sensitive and comparative. In contrast to the vast num-
ber of studies and different measures of the degree of centralization and 
coordination of wage bargaining institutions, there is very little recent 
work on government intervention in general, and there is no recent mea-
sure of the degree of government intervention in particular. Even during 
the 1960s and 1970s, when incomes policies were prevalent throughout 
the industrialized world, there were descriptive comparative studies on 
wage freezes and incomes policies, but only a few quantitative measures 
of the degree of government intervention.44
 Accordingly, the means available to governments to influence wages 
will vary. The policies are obviously situated in an institutional context of 
wage bargaining institutions and the general economic policy tools of the 
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government. Centralized wage bargaining institutions enable centralized 
negotiations with trade unions to take place and ensure that pay norms 
are implemented, while decentralized wage bargaining institutions may 
preclude this outcome. Particular legal or constitutional settings might 
forestall active government involvement or might encourage it. In the 
past, there have been four distinct approaches that governments have 
used:
– Tax-based incomes policy. Tax-based incomes policies were designed 
by economists during the 1970s in order to offer permanent tax incen-
tives for wage restraint. The government thereby introduced tax-relief 
for low wage settlements.
– Setting of minimum wages. Where governments are in control of set-
ting minimum wages, the rate of increase of the minimum wage might 
provide a guideline for wage bargaining; in particular if wage bargain-
ing institutions are otherwise weak.
– General negotiations with trade unions on wages. Governments can 
opt to pressurize unions or negotiate with them candidly on wages, 
with the results being implemented in wage agreements. Negotiations 
can include rewards for wage restraint in the form of tax relief, working 
time incentives or other institutional rewards. Trade unions are never-
theless free to accept and implement these settlements.
– Setting wage norms for the private sector. In some cases, governments 
can also set wages directly either in the form of wage freezes or the 
statutory imposition of wage increases. A statutory wage policy will 
override wage settlements.
There are two main problems with measuring government intervention. 
The most obvious is that, empirically, the involvement of governments in 
wage bargaining interacts greatly with the wage bargaining institutions 
and corporatist traditions in general. In many countries, wage bargaining 
institutions have developed in the shadow of the state. In some cases, state 
regulation has enabled trade unions to pursue strategies of bargaining co-
ordination and centralization by granting them monopolies of member-
ship. Monopolies over membership enable trade unions to centralize their 
wage bargaining structures. These have been established by legal means 
in Germany and Austria. The active involvement of the state in the con-
duct of wage bargaining in these two countries, however, is low.
 Depending on the historical evolution of the relationship between wage 
bargaining institutions and the state, the interaction can take many dif-
ferent forms that are not easily categorized in a hierarchical measure. For 
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instance, centralization of wage bargaining arrangements has sometimes 
occurred in order to exclude the state from the domain of collective bar-
gaining. Th e Swedish Agreement of Saltsjöbaden of 1938 was an active mea-
sure adopted by the social partners to pre-empt government intervention in 
the wage bargaining system (Fulcher 1991). Th is pattern has continued until 
today, with wage bargaining behaviour on the part of the social partners 
becoming more responsive when government intervention is looming.
 The Wassenaar Agreement enacted in the Netherlands in 1982 is an 
important turning point in Dutch wage bargaining that was prompted by 
the radical shift in the manner in which the new government related to 
unions (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The agreement in itself and the pro-
cess leading up to it were not characterized by government intervention, 
but rather by an indirect threat by the government to radically alter its 
attitude towards the unions if wage bargaining outcomes did not change. 
Compared to the interaction between governments and wage bargaining 
of the late 1970s, the degree of government intervention in 1982 was lower 
than before. The major change in the Dutch bargaining procedure was 
the lack of government intervention rather than increased involvement 
by the government. Therefore, government intervention does not neces-
sarily have to take place in order to be effective. As in the case of Sweden, 
the Dutch experience shows that it is often the threat of intervention that 
influences wage bargaining behaviour.
 In other countries, centralization and coordination of wage bargaining 
has traditionally taken place under the active involvement of the state. 
In Finland, for instance, the government has traditionally participated in 
wage bargaining. In Portugal and Spain, the incorporation of trade unions 
into the political systems via economic councils was an important part 
of the transition to democracy. Here, government involvement was part 
of the normal wage bargaining procedure and was not a specifically de-
signed incomes policy.
 Also, in countries with decentralized bargaining systems, processes of 
decentralization were often state-induced. In the uk, the Thatcher gov-
ernment enacted legislation that decreased the capacity of trade unions 
to coordinate their bargaining activities. In France, the Auroux Laws that 
were introduced in 1982 were meant to strengthen bargaining activities by 
giving trade unions the right to bargain at plant level. They led to a further 
increase in wage bargaining at plant level at the expense of the sectoral 
level and thereby increased decentralization. In general, therefore, gov-
ernment intervention in wage bargaining systems has to be judged against 
the backdrop of existing wage bargaining institutions.
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 The other measuring problem is that government intervention in wage 
bargaining has several dimensions that are not easily collapsed into one 
measure. The most important distinction here is the scope of the interven-
tion with regard to the impact on wages vis-à-vis the process of interven-
tion itself. In some cases, such as Belgium, governments have persistently 
intervened in the wage bargaining process by legislating upper limits to 
wage agreements. This is a rather severe measure of government inter-
vention, comparatively speaking. Since wages in Belgium are generally 
indexed to changes in prices and the potential scope of wage bargaining 
only applies to the increases above indexation, the scope of the interven-
tion is however relatively small. In other cases, such as the United King-
dom from 1975 to 1978, governments appeared to be fairly reluctant to 
intervene directly and instead pleaded with the unions to restrain wages 
voluntarily; the scope of the intervention, however was large since it im-
plied an initial substantial decrease in real wages.
 Moreover, not every measure developed by the state falls into the cat-
egory of government intervention in wage bargaining. Governments have 
developed a number of measures that extend the effects of wage bargain-
ing and agreements beyond the constituencies of the social partners. Erga 
omnes clauses apply wage agreements to segments of the labour market 
that do not participate in wage bargaining.45 Giving workers the entitle-
ment to a union wage even if the employer is not part of the wage bargain-
ing system can also increase the coverage rate. These provisions strength-
en the self-regulation of the wage bargaining institutions and should, 
strictly speaking, not be regarded as active involvement of the state in 
wage bargaining processes.
 The only existing quantitative measure of the role of governments in 
wage bargaining, the government involvement index, was developed by 
Miriam Golden, Peter Lange and Michael Wallerstein (Golden, Lange 
and Wallerstein 2002). The score ranges from 1 to 15. The lowest score 
indicates that the government is entirely uninvolved in the wage forma-
tion process; the highest score measures the imposition of a wage freeze 
by the government with a prohibition on supplementary bargaining (ta-
ble 3.1).
 The Golden-Lange-Wallerstein government involvement index runs 
into some of the problems mentioned above. Conceptualized as an index 
with an ordinal scale, not every step of the index measures an increase 
in government involvement in wage bargaining. The extension of agree-
ments could be seen as an indicator of governments restraining from 
intervention rather than engaging in it. The establishment of a minimum 
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wage by the government, on the other hand, is in some cases, such as 
France, a powerful tool used by governments to control overall wage de-
velopment. (See for annual data table A1.) The setting of the minimum 
wage, which is ranked on position 2 in the index, is in any case a more 
interventionist measure than providing the social partners with eco-
nomic forecasts. Equally, the provision of sanctions is a higher degree 
of intervention in the freedom of the social partners than the distinction 
between arbitration and tripartism.
Table 3.1 Index of government involvement in wage setting by Miriam Golden, Michael 
Wallerstein and Peter Lange, and government intervention index
Government Involvement Index Government Intervention Index
 1 Government uninvolved in wage setting.
 2 Government establishes minimum 
wage(s).
 3 Government extends collective 
agreements.
 4 Government provides economic forecasts 
to bargaining partners.
 5 Government recommends wage 
guidelines or norms.
 6 Government and unions negotiate wage 
guidelines.
 7 Government imposes wage controls in 
selected industries.
 8 Government imposes cost of living 
adjustment.
 9 Formal tripartite agreement for national 
wage schedule without sanctions.
10 Formal tripartite agreement for national 
wage schedule with sanctions.
11 Government arbitrator imposes wage 
schedules without sanctions on unions.
12 Government arbitrator imposes national 
wage schedule with sanctions.
13 Government imposes national wage 
schedule with sanctions.
14 Formal tripartite agreement for national 
wage schedule with supplementary local 
bargaining prohibited.
15 Government imposes wage freeze and 
prohibits supplementary local bargaining.
1 No role of government in wage setting.
2 Government inﬂ uences bargaining by 
providing an institutional framework 
of consultation (includes the German 
concerted action or the Parity Commission 
in Austria).
3 Government determines wage bargaining 
outcomes indirectly (includes the minimum 
wage setting by the French government 
and the Wassenaar Agreement in the 
Netherlands).
4 Government participates in wage 
bargaining (as in Finland and Spain until 
1987).
5 Government negotiates social pact or 
imposes private sector wage settlements 
(direct legislative measures such as in 
Belgium). 
Source: for the government involvement index, Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002).
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In order to deal with these problems of ranking different degrees of gov-
ernment involvement, a number of caveats are in order concerning the 
measurements of government intervention in wage formation. Firstly, it 
is assumed that governments generally prefer not to take part in wage ne-
gotiations directly. For good political reasons, no government has sought 
a direct role in wage formation procedures. Even in countries where gov-
ernments have in the past been very active towards wage bargaining, such 
as in Denmark and Finland, governments have frequently withdrawn 
from wage bargaining procedures if the circumstances allowed them to 
do so. Governments prefer indirect measures to direct involvement. As 
a consequence, the direct participation of governments in wage bargain-
ing processes, both in the form of participating in negotiations or in the 
form of issuing guidelines and imposing pay freezes, can be recognized as 
strong political interference and should not be regarded as traditional be-
haviour in these countries. Secondly, assessing government behaviour on 
an annual basis requires a broader set of categories at the expense of more 
detailed information. Similarly, the active behaviour of governments can 
take different forms that are entirely related to their institutional environ-
ment and not significant in themselves. And, thirdly, one should not try 
to assign too much of a statistical status to these crude assessments, but 
rather see them as a reflection of a particular position adopted by govern-
ments in their relations to wage bargaining processes that compare coun-
tries and change over time, without being applied in too strict a way.
Due to the conceptual and methodological difficulties associated with 
measuring government intervention in wage bargaining I have developed 
an alternative index that uses substantial parts of the Golden, Lange and 
Wallerstein data but tries to combine a number of variables and provides 
a broader categorization of cases. Using broader categories obviously im-
plies a loss of differentiation in the data, but this seems justified since the 
data does not appear to allow a great deal of differentiation anyway. The 
government intervention index is scored from 1 to 5, with the lowest score 
indicating no involvement and the highest score the imposition of a wage 
settlement on the private sector. The three categories in between classify 
the increasing intensity with which governments try to influence the bar-
gaining behaviour of trade unions. The categories are sufficiently broad to 
summarize cases that are only formally distinct but substantially similar. 
Overall, the government intervention index correlates sufficiently highly 
with the government involvement index by Golden, Lange and Waller-
stein (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.69).
POLICY OPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND
Wages.indd   76 28-8-2006   15:43:15

 A particularly difficult aspect of operationalization is the degree of 
consultation between governments and social partners over wage settle-
ments. In many countries, there are standing tripartite committees, such 
as economic and social councils, in which consultation over wage and 
price developments takes place. However, the presence of consultation 
committees in itself is not a sufficient indication that governments ac-
tively intervene in wage bargaining. Only when governments proceed to 
act against trade unions by suggesting an incomes policy or indeed by 
bargaining over one, should this be considered a measure of government 
intervention. The differentiation between governments determining and 
influencing bargaining outcomes aims to distinguish cases where govern-
ments in principle have tried to determine wage expectations through 
tripartite consultation, as in the German Concerted Action (which is in 
category 2), from those cases where governments have tried hard to in-
fluence lower wage settlements without being directly involved, such as 
during the Wassenaar Agreement (category 3).46
 Table 3.2 illustrates the changing degree of government intervention in 
wage bargaining over a period of three decades. (See for annual data table 
A.1.) Longitudinal data is averaged across the decades, which are in turn 
demarcated by unique economic environments: the 1970s is marked by 
Table 3.2  Government intervention in wage bargaining in Western Europe, 1970-99
1970s 1980s 1990s Δ 1970s-90s
Austria 2.0 1.0 1.0  -1.0
Belgium 1.4 3.8 4.6  +3.2
Denmark 5.0 3.2 2.2  -2.8
Finland 3.8 3.2 3.1  -0.7
France 2.0 3.0 2.4  +0.4
Germany 1.7 1.0 1.1  -0.6
Ireland 3.0 1.9 4.0  +1.0
Italy 1.0 2.4 3.8  +2.8
Netherlands 3.6 2.3 2.2  -1.4
Portugal - 4.0 3.7  -0.3*
Spain - 3.6 2.0  -1.6*
Sweden 2.0 2.2 2.9  +0.9
United Kingdom 3.4 1.0 1.0  -2.4
Mean 2.6 2.5 (2.3)* 2.6 (2.6)*  -0.19
Note: * Change from 1980s to 1990s; in brackets without Portugal and Spain.
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the two oil crises and stagflation, the 1980s is a period of economic recov-
ery and universal shift towards stricter monetary policies, and the 1990s 
is the period of the run-up towards monetary integration.47
 A first glance at the data points of the government intervention index 
supports the classification of countries that will be discussed in more de-
tailed in Chapter 6. In a comparative perspective, the index highlights the 
variety of responses by governments in different countries and at different 
points in time. The following remarks will illustrate the measurements 
and contrast them briefly with country-specific developments.
The development of government intervention
When comparing the evolution of government intervention, there has not 
been a secular decline in negotiated wage restraint across Europe, but 
rather divergent trends in the pattern of government intervention across 
countries. The clearest decline of government intervention in wage bar-
gaining has not taken place in Britain, as might be expected, but in Den-
mark. Denmark ranked highest in terms of government intervention in 
wage formation during the 1970s because of its strong arbitration system 
that gave the government an indirect opportunity to set wages. Moreover, 
from 1975 onwards, the Danish government imposed wage settlements 
that included sanctions. Britain, in contrast, had a lower level of govern-
ment intervention because the government only imposed wage freezes 
three times during the 1970s: in 1973, 1978 and 1979. The attempts to ne-
gotiate an incomes policy in 1971 and 1975 were of a voluntary nature. 
However, unlike Denmark, where the state still plays an important role 
today, the British government has declined since 1979 to interfere with 
wage bargaining.
 Falling levels of government intervention can also be observed in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Austria. In Austria, the role of the 
Parity Commission has clearly diminished over the years, whereas in Ger-
many, the Concerted Action was abandoned in 1977. The government 
had used the Concerted Action to discuss wage guidelines with the social 
partners informally. Thereafter, any attempt to influence the social part-
ners to exercise wage restraint only re-emerged once, in the framework of 
the Alliance for Jobs in 1999. In the Netherlands, the conflictual rounds of 
negotiating an incomes policy during the 1970s were replaced by two im-
portant agreements by the social partners in 1982 and 1993, both of which 
were negotiated in the shadow of government intervention, but without 
active government involvement.
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 The countries with a strong increase in government intervention in 
wage bargaining were Belgium, Italy and Ireland; countries with a mi-
nor increase in government intervention were France and Sweden. In 
Belgium, the government did not involve itself in wage bargaining until 
1974, although parliament frequently implemented the inter-professional 
agreements that the social partners concluded. In the latter half of the 
1970s, the government encouraged wage restraint but did not massively 
intervene in the labour market. However, since 1981 the Belgian govern-
ment has tried persistently to control all wage bargaining by imposing 
legislated wage guidelines on the social partners. A similar evolution can 
be found in Italy. Here, the government played a minimalist role in wage 
bargaining until 1984 when for the first time it was part of a tripartite 
agreement on the Scala mobile. Since then, the intervention of the Ital-
ian government has steadily increased. In 1992 and 1993, tripartite agree-
ments incorporated wage norms and abolished wage indexation. These 
were subsequently followed by another social pact on growth and employ-
ment in 1998. In Ireland, the government had sponsored national wage 
bargaining during the 1970s, but abandoned this role during the first half 
of the 1980s. Since 1987, however, the state has participated in tripartite 
wage bargaining negotiations.
 In France and Sweden, governments increased their role in wage bar-
gaining but on a more moderate scale. In France, government tried to re-
organize wage bargaining throughout the 1980s. But the most important 
source of influence by the French government has been its role in set-
ting the minimum wage. By controlling minimum wages in an otherwise 
weakly regulated labour market, the French government has gained a 
high degree of control over wage developments. In Sweden, the govern-
ment became more active in wage negotiations during the 1990s, but 
remained hesitant to embrace the idea of intervention. It was only in the 
late 1990s that the Swedish government really started to pressurize wage 
bargaining actors into adopting a new scheme of arbitration under gov-
ernment control.
 Finally, the cases of Spain and Portugal show high degrees of govern-
ment control over wage bargaining during the transition years. In Spain, 
government participation in wage bargaining had ceased in the mid-1980s 
due to rising conflict with the unions. Cooperation with the social part-
ners re-emerged, however, in the 1990s through the reorganization of 
wage bargaining structures. In Portugal, the state battled with the unions 
over wages throughout the period, and only recently has it found a modus 
of adjusting Portuguese wages to the requirements of emu.
THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
Wages.indd   79 28-8-2006   15:43:15

 The variety of trends over time also indicates, as assumed above, that 
government intervention cannot be seen as a traditional instrument for 
achieving wage restraint that state governments frequently rely on. Gov-
ernments certainly use established and traditional instruments in policy-
making more easily than new instruments. The legal and historical avail-
ability of government intervention in wage bargaining thereby facilitates 
the decision by governments to intervene. On the other hand, the drastic 
changes in the behaviour of governments over time show that the avail-
ability of intervention is only one factor among others that influence gov-
ernment choices. At least in the domain of wage bargaining, governments 
are able to break with traditional policy approaches more frequently than 
the popular assumptions about path dependent behaviour would have us 
believe (Pierson 2000). Major policy shifts by governments on the role 
and conduct of wage bargaining have taken place in the majority of the 
countries covered in this book. This implies that national cases move 
from high to low degrees of government involvement in wage bargaining, 
primarily because governments do not want to intervene if the situation 
does not require adjustment. They move from low degrees of interven-
tion to higher degrees if the external environment and internal factors 
give cause to intervene in order to adjust to economic imbalances. There 
is only scarce evidence that governments tend to opt for a more or less 
interventionist approach on principle.
Measuring corporatism and wage bargaining institutions
Measurements of corporatism that rely on the structure of interest me-
diation as the driving force behind corporatism and focus on the organi-
zational centralization and associational monopoly of trade unions place 
those countries in the category of corporatism where governments have 
enabled trade unions to take comprehensive control over wage forma-
tion. Table 3.3 presents the combined index on societal corporatism by 
Schmitter, which ranks the countries according to their degree of societal 
corporatism. In the corporatism ranking, Austria ranks highest together 
with the Scandinavian countries. Germany and the Low Countries rank 
in the middle, while France, Ireland, Italy and Britain are at the bottom. 
Peter Katzenstein analysed democratic corporatism in small European 
states and constructs a similar measure. He distinguished between liberal 
corporatism, which is dominated by business interests, and social corpo-
ratism, in which labour is the stronger force. Austria and the Scandina-
vian countries are classified as countries with social corporatism, while 
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Belgium, the Netherlands and, to some degree, Sweden follow a pattern of 
liberal corporatism (Katzenstein 1985: 125).
 Another measure of the institutional accommodation of trade unions 
is the centralization of wage bargaining institutions or of trade union 
organizations themselves. Corporatism and centralization are closely re-
lated since, as argued above, the centralized nature of trade unions origi-
nally gave rise to the incorporation of labour. Measures on wage bargain-
ing centralization and coordination are abundant and relatively similar 
to each other. Table 3.3 shows the data of the Kenworthy coordination 
index and the Iversen centralization index. The Iversen centralization 
index concentrates exclusively on the degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining systems.48 Since wage bargaining centralization is closely re-
lated to the degree of corporatism, the Iversen index captures an in-
termediate measure of wage bargaining institutions and corporatism. In 
contrast, the Kenworthy index integrates government intervention in its 
measurement and can therefore be seen as not completely independent 
from the government intervention index. However, the Kenworthy index 
has more data points available than the Iversen index.49 In table 3.3 I have 
supplemented the Kenworthy index with missing data on Portugal and 
Spain.
Below I will compare these measures of corporatism, wage bargaining 
centralization and wage bargaining coordination with the government in-
tervention index in order to illustrate the interaction between institutions 
and policies.
 The relationship between institutional and political 
accommodation
In this section, I will explore the relationship between institutions and the 
policy responses by governments. Table 3.4 displays the Pearson correla-
tion coefficients of government intervention, wage bargaining coordina-
tion, the wage bargaining centralization index and the Schmitter corpo-
ratism index. Correlating the measure of government intervention with 
institutional measure has two aims. First, it aims to underpin the theo-
retical and empirical reasoning that underlie the measure of government 
intervention. Second, it aims to show that the policy of governments on 
wages is not predetermined by the institutional accommodation of trade 
unions.
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As expected, the strongest correlation exists between the degree of gov-
ernment intervention and wage bargaining coordination. In general, 
a high degree of government intervention should contribute to wage 
bargaining coordination, since governments then foster organizational 
structures of wage bargaining that are conducive to centralization. When 
governments invite the social partners to participate in a tripartite fo-
rum to discuss wage developments and this forum recommends wage 
guidelines, it is likely that these guidelines will prompt them to transfer 
wage bargaining to a national level. An example of this process is Ireland, 
where wage bargaining was decentralized in 1980. When the government 
and social partners started to negotiate a tripartite agreement in 1987, it 
automatically meant that the main level of bargaining over wages was the 
national level.
 This is not necessarily always the case, however. There are several ex-
amples where governments have tried to intervene in wage bargaining 
processes by negotiating over wage guidelines or by having tripartite sum-
mits without having a lasting effect of centralizing wage bargaining. This 
was particularly true in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and in France 
during the 1980s and 1990s.
Table 3.4 Pearson correlation coeﬃ  cients of wage bargaining, corporatism and 
government intervention, 1970-99 (1980-99)
Wage bargaining 
coordination
Corporatism Bargaining 
centralization
Government 
intervention
Wage bargaining 
coordination
1.000 -0.521**
(-0.439**)
0.680**
(-0.696**)
0.487**
(0.464**)
Corporatism 1.000 0.796**
(0.655**)
0.054
(0.019)
Bargaining 
centralization
1.000 0.191**
(0.072)
Government 
intervention
1.000
** Correlation is signiﬁ cant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is signiﬁ cant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Note:  Measure on corporatism is time invariant; the Iversen index and the wage bargaining 
coordination index are based on annual observations. The Iversen index, however, only 
goes up to 1993. 
Sources: Iversen (1999); Schmitter (1981); Kenworthy (2001a); own calculations.
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 The effect also works the other way round: governments have a higher 
incentive to intervene in wage formation processes in situations where 
they can be assured that wage bargaining actors are capable of implement-
ing agreements. When bargaining is decentralized to a local or plant level, 
the problem arises that the national trade union confederation, which is 
the negotiating partner for the government, might not be in the position 
to assure that wage guidelines will be implemented. If this is the case, 
the incentive for governments to negotiate with them is rather low and 
such negotiations might even have damaging effects. When bargaining 
is coordinated, the bargaining authority lies with the regional or national 
leadership of a sectoral or general trade union which, at the same time, 
might be in a position to negotiate with the government over wage guide-
lines. In this case, government can be assured that the wage guideline that 
is negotiated with the trade unions will be implemented at the local level. 
A higher degree of bargaining coordination can therefore increase the 
incentive for the government to negotiate with the social partners.
 When looking at the average degree of government intervention across 
countries over time, two different trends emerge (figure 3.2). The year 
1975 was a peak in terms of centralization of wage bargaining and govern-
ment intervention in wages. Low points were reached in the early and 
late 1980s. As could be expected, the degree of government intervention 
is more volatile than the degree of wage bargaining coordination. Institu-
tional development of wage bargaining institutions is a long-term process 
that tends to change slowly over time. Government intervention in wage 
bargaining is, in many cases, an ad hoc decision made by the government 
in response to a looming crisis. But apart from the peak in the mid-1970s, 
the subsequent development is not closely correlated. Interestingly, and 
in contrast to expectations, wage bargaining institutions tended to decen-
tralize throughout the 1980s and re-centralize in the 1990s. On average, 
the degree of centralization of wage bargaining in Western Europe was at 
the same level in 1999 as it was in 1970.
 Government intervention, on the other hand, had two further peaks: in 
1985 and in the early 1990s. In 1985, the peak can be attributed to govern-
ment intervention in Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark the government 
imposed a wage settlement on the unions, whereas in Sweden centralized 
bargaining was reintroduced with the help of a tripartite forum. In the 
early 1990s, a number of countries saw the re-emergence of government 
intervention, again focused on the Scandinavian countries. In 1990, the 
Finnish government stepped up its negotiations with the trade unions, 
followed by Sweden in 1991 and Italy in 1992.
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 Further, the data shows the weak correlation of the government inter-
vention index with bargaining centralization as measured by Iversen. The 
argument on which the Iversen index rests is based on the capacity of 
trade unions to internalize negative externalities in wage bargaining and 
so to exercise wage restraint. If one assumes, firstly, that government in-
tervention emerges when and where wage bargaining institutions are not 
responsive to their external economic environment and, secondly, that 
the responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions is correlated with their 
degree of centralization and coordination, we should find a negative rela-
tionship between the degree of government intervention and the degree 
of wage bargaining coordination. Where wage bargaining is highly coor-
dinated or centralized, governments should see less need to intervene in 
wage formation processes since the social partners are taking care of the 
externalities of their wage agreements themselves. Where wage bargaining 
is decentralized, the need for governments to intervene should be higher, 
since wage bargaining outcomes are less responsive to the economic re-
quirements of governments. The weak positive correlation between gov-
ernment intervention and bargaining centralization might therefore re-
Figure 3.2 Bargaining coordination and government
intervention in 13 EU member states, 1970-99
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Figure 3.2 Bargaining coordination and government intervention in 13 EU member 
states, 1970-99
Source: as explained in text and appendix.
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flect the contradictory effect of a higher degree of responsiveness due to 
centralization on the one hand and a stronger incentive to negotiate with 
centralized organizations on the other.
 There is no correlation in table 3.4 between the degree of corporat-
ism as measured by Schmitter and the level of government intervention.50 
I have used the Schmitter index on corporatism because it relies more 
than other measures of corporatism on the structural prerequisites for 
the institutional accommodation of trade unions, namely the centraliza-
tion of trade union organizations. While the measure of corporatism – as 
expected – correlates positively with the degree of both wage bargain-
ing centralization and coordination, it does not predict the behaviour of 
the government vis-à-vis the social partners during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Corporatist interaction, while still an important policy mechanism, has 
become detached from the institutional base on which it used to rest.
 Negotiated responses by government intervention in wage bargaining 
processes have been used in both corporatist and non-corporatist coun-
tries. Governments in countries where the labour market is highly regulat-
ed are not per se more likely or unlikely to intervene in wage formation pro-
cesses. For instance, among the Scandinavian countries, which are usually 
grouped together as highly corporatist, the relationship between govern-
ment intervention and wage bargaining varied considerably. Th e Swedish 
government has been much more reluctant to engage in direct negotiations 
with the social partners over wages, and looming threats of intervention 
have often prompted reactions by the social partners to prevent an in-
creased role of the state. In contrast, in Denmark and Finland, government 
participation has been much more accepted and widely used. In Finland, 
government has been involved in wage bargaining regularly since the late 
1960s as a participating actor. In Denmark, governments have frequently 
intervened when either the social partners could not settle an agreement 
or the government was not satisﬁ ed with a potential agreement.
 The Netherlands and Belgium have long been seen to be similar coun-
tries in terms of their industrial relations systems (Katzenstein 1985). Yet 
in both countries governments behaved very differently with regard to the 
possibility of intervention. In the Netherlands, the government switched 
from intervening directly in the 1970s towards an indirect position of sim-
ply threatening to intervene. Unions, anticipating intervention due to past 
actions of the government, responded with wage restraint. In this way, the 
government shifted from a Danish to a Swedish approach. In Belgium, 
the government has persistently intervened without a response from the 
social partners.
POLICY OPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND
Wages.indd   86 28-8-2006   15:43:17

 Countries which have been considered unsuitable for a corporatist 
labour market have equally shown remarkably different behaviour, even 
when they were seen to be rather similar in other ways. Italy and France 
have shared a history of politically fragmented unions, contestation and 
labour exclusion from World War ii until the late 1960s. Since the mid-
1970s, however, the behaviour of the Italian government has become more 
directly interventionist and more cooperative towards the trade unions. 
In France, on the other hand, labour exclusion has continued and the gov-
ernment has by now indirectly taken over wage setting without finding a 
closer cooperative relationship with the unions.
 Lastly, the cases of Ireland and the United Kingdom show that the de-
gree of centralization of wage bargaining structures is not a sufficient 
predictor of the level of government intervention. Both countries have a 
shared history of fragmented wage bargaining structures and a mixture of 
craft and general trade unions. Trade unionism in both countries is also 
similar since many Irish trade unions have British ancestors or are still 
part of a British trade union organization. In both countries, experiments 
with incomes policies and the introduction of a higher degree of coor-
dination in wage bargaining failed utterly during the 1970s. However, in 
the late 1970s, the governments in the two countries developed opposing 
approaches towards economic policy in general, but also towards the role 
of trade unions in particular. While the British government decentralized 
wage bargaining, deregulated the labour market and strived for labour ex-
clusion, the Irish government gave up decentralization in 1986 and since 
then has had a highly centralized wage bargaining system involving strong 
government participation.
 In summary, the correlation between these four variables – coordina-
tion, centralization, corporatism and government intervention – provides 
some evidence for the proposition that, though government involvement 
increases coordination, institutional accommodation of trade unions does 
not forestall government involvement. The correlation of the variables 
also indicates that corporatism is not a sufficient condition for the inter-
nalization of negative externalities. Since government involvement only 
takes place if the autonomous regulation of wages by the social partners 
is insufficient or not satisfactory, there seem to be frequent occasions 
– even in centralized wage bargaining systems – when this involvement is 
required.
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 Conclusion
In this chapter, an empirical measure for the negotiated response of gov-
ernments to the problem of accommodating trade union wage expecta-
tions was introduced. It was conceptually situated as a measure that tries 
to build a bridge between the political acceptance of the role of trade 
unions in the regulation of the labour market, on the one hand, and the 
need to adjust wage expectations to economic realities on the other hand. 
The measure for negotiated accommodation captured the degree of gov-
ernment intervention in wage bargaining. It was modelled as the behaviour 
of the government towards trade unions. Unlike other measures of cor-
poratism, it did not attempt to capture the institutional design on which 
the action of the government was based, but argued that any interference 
by the government in wage bargaining processes can be interpreted as a 
political response to reconciling the conflicting aims of preserving the 
political role of trade unions and the need to adjust wage expectations to 
a new economic environment.
When compared to other measures of the interaction between govern-
ments and the social partners, an important observation emerged: corpo-
ratism was found to be the weakest predictor for the extent of government 
intervention over time. Corporatism was positively related to government 
intervention during the 1970s, with highly corporatist countries show-
ing higher levels of government intervention. However, the corporatist 
structure of interest intermediation of the late 1970s does not predict the 
emerging pattern of the relationship between governments and the social 
partners for the following two decades. The quantitative empirical results 
here confirm observations that have been made on the basis of case stud-
ies in the literature, namely that the institutional context is increasingly 
ill-equipped to predict the behaviour of the actors (Royo 2002a; Baccaro 
2003). The traditional assumptions of corporatist theory could not stand 
up to the empirical reality that negotiated responses between govern-
ments and trade unions spread throughout Western European during the 
1980s and 1990s. For instance, Royo pointed out in his explanation of cor-
poratism in Spain and Portugal:
Th e institutional context is not able to explain the behaviour of the ac-
tors. Th is points to one of the main shortcomings of neo-corporatist 
theories: they fail to explain the actors’ attempt to develop new solu-
tions and change outcomes (Royo 2002a: 42).
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The importance of theoretical distinction between different responses is 
that it allows us to systematically and exclusively distinguish between the 
different approaches towards adaptation of the power of trade unions to 
demand redistribution. In the past, it was assumed that a high level of 
institutional accommodation would be a sufficient indicator of the extent 
to which trade unions would internalize the negative externalities of wage 
bargaining. The active involvement of governments in wage bargaining 
procedures, however, shows that this effect could be partly conditional on 
the role of the government. In assessments of the role of labour market in-
stitutions in economic performance the extent to which wage bargaining 
behaviour has been systematically influenced and supported by the gov-
ernment has not been thoroughly investigated, however. In addition, these 
findings show that governments have in fact frequently used their power 
to intervene in wage formation processes when the need arose. This pat-
tern was stronger during the 1970s when the shock of the oil crises tempt-
ed governments to freeze wages. But even during the shift towards tight 
monetarism and increasing levels of unemployment, most governments 
persisted in interfering in wage bargaining in order to restrain trade union 
demands. The degree of government intervention varied widely, not only 
between countries but also between time periods.
 In the following chapters, the factors that influence the varying degrees 
of government involvement are discussed. As has been outlined in Chap-
ter 2, governmental wage policies have been a tool to realign trade union 
wage expectations with the changing economic policy of the government. 
Chapter 4 addresses the shift in monetary policy as a major external fac-
tor that has prompted governments to negotiate over wages. Chapter 5 
addresses the political preconditions for choosing between trade union 
exclusion approaches and negotiations. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the 
responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions.
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4 Striving for Conservatism: The Shift in 
 Monetary Regimes
In the following three chapters I examine three potential explanations for 
the attempts made by governments to influence wage formation processes 
as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The present chapter focuses on the shift 
in monetary policy since the 1970s. The core argument is that govern-
ments have tended to employ corporatist policy approaches in order to 
strengthen the credibility of their monetary policy, particularly in situa-
tions where the preconditions for a credible monetary policy were weak. 
Government intervention thus serves as a policy instrument of govern-
ments for conveying a new economic policy. The argument is supported 
by a strong statistical correlation between an index measuring the legal 
independence of central banks and the index for government intervention 
developed in Chapter 3.
 Over the last three decades, economic policy has undergone a major 
transformation in the Western world, both in its theoretical assump-
tions and with regard to the priorities of policy-makers. Across the world, 
policy-makers learned to believe in and act upon a version of economic 
policy that rejected the trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
and, instead, insisted on fighting inflation by focusing on the expectations 
of economic agents. This shift in policy-making was prompted by new de-
velopments in economic theory and facilitated by the increasing financial 
integration of the world economy that made economic policy measures 
sensitive to international capital movements.
 This chapter argues that the role of governments vis-à-vis wage bar-
gaining interacts with the institutional framework on which the new eco-
nomic policy rests. All European governments since the early 1980s have 
attempted to shift their monetary policy towards conservatism. Monetar-
ism – as pushed by mainstream economists since the mid-1970s – has 
filtered through into mainstream economic policy-making.
 How government intervention as a policy instrument works for convey-
ing a new economic policy is explained in the latter two sections of the 
chapter. In section three, evidence is presented for how governments in 
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Western Europe have attempted to increase the credibility of their mone-
tary policy by using currency pegs. In section four, the relationship between 
credibility and government intervention is demonstrated empirically.
 Before that, in the first two sections, I introduce the issue of credibility 
as a policy device as it is discussed in the economic literature with regard 
to central bank independence and monetary integration. In the second 
section, I examine European monetary integration as a tool for achieving 
central bank conservatism.
 Credibility and the inﬂ ation bias
To understand the evolution of economic and, in particular, monetary 
policy-making, it is necessary to start by understanding some of the un-
derlying theoretical issues. This is not because the contentions of modern 
economic theory are necessarily valid or even complete. Many assump-
tions on which theories of modern central banking rest are disputed in the 
literature, on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds.51
 But even if one accepts as inadequate the argument that the indepen-
dence of central banks, and thus the claim that signalling credibly one’s 
commitment to a monetarist approach, is a potentially powerful econom-
ic policy device, it is nevertheless important to understand that many of 
the underlying theoretical claims have led to views on best practice in 
economic policy, which have in turn impacted on the realm of real-world 
policy-making. The role and conduct of monetary policy have changed 
tremendously over the last three decades, mostly in a direction recom-
mended by the mainstream of economic theory. In many countries, cen-
tral banks have introduced policy rules of inflation targeting or have been 
granted a higher degree of independence (McNamara 2002). In the design 
of the European Central Bank, strong emphasis has been placed on its 
formal independence from governments and the eu Commission in order 
to improve the reputation of the bank. Likewise, the designers of the new 
Bank of England or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand believed that chang-
ing the status of the bank in favour of greater political independence was 
an important step towards credibility.
 Politicians believe this issue of central bank independence to be of cen-
tral importance for policy-making and this belief is likely to have wide-
spread policy ramifications. Economic ideas are powerful tools once the 
scientific community has accepted them.52 Therefore, even if these tools 
are inadequate for theoretical or empirical reasons, there are reasons to 
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believe that governments have nevertheless not only pursued them, but 
have also accepted the theoretical foundations of these approaches as pol-
icy guidelines.
 The starting point for understanding the importance of the credibility 
of monetary policy-making is the claim of an inflation bias on the part of 
policy-makers.53 If there is a short-term trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation, a discretionary policy-maker can create surprise inflation, 
which might reduce unemployment and raise government revenue. A po-
litically motivated policy-maker, moreover, has reason to use this policy 
device, especially just before elections, in order raise the profile of the 
government. As the literature of the political business cycle argues, in a 
democracy a government will have incentives to pursue a policy pattern 
that starts with austerity in the early years and tends to become more ex-
pansive in later years (Nordhaus 1975).
 If inflation is mainly created by the expectation of economic agents, a 
political business cycle is therefore in itself inflationary. Economic agents 
will expect a more expansive economic policy at the end of the electoral 
cycle and thereby expect a shift towards inflation. Individuals will under-
stand the temptation of policy-makers and correctly forecast inflation. 
By internalizing these expectations, wage bargainers will tend to demand 
and settle higher wage increases than they would have done at a different 
point in time during the political cycle. Thus, any effect of inflation on 
employment will be neutralized. At the end of the day, inflation will have 
risen and the employment effect will not have taken place.
 Moreover, the inflation bias is not simply based on policy-makers tak-
ing deliberate advantage of the short-term trade-off. To policy-makers, 
the argument of time inconsistency also suggests that a more accommoda-
tory policy at that point in time is a sensible policy (Kydland and Prescott 
1977). When economic policy-makers try to internalize the expectations 
of economic agents, agents can be expected to internalize these consider-
ations as well. There is no reason why policy-makers should have a time 
advantage if these policy patterns are frequent. For instance, if inflation 
were on an upward path, people would expect a less accommodating pol-
icy. An optimal way to do this might be to accept the current high rate of 
inflation and promise that any future increases in inflation would not be 
accommodated. This would not entail any current loss in current output, 
and the promise not to accommodate any inflation in the future would 
moderate current wage and price adjustments.
 However, if it is optimal for the new policy to accommodate today’s 
inflation rate, then it will also be optimal to accommodate tomorrow’s 
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inflation rate, even if it is higher than today’s. If people were rational, they 
would expect that policy-makers would behave this way and guess that 
policy will be more accommodating than promised. Hence the promised 
move to a less accommodating policy is not credible, even though every-
one believes it would be superior relative to the more accommodating 
policy (Taylor 1982: 84).
 Therefore, within this theoretical framework, for any policy-maker who 
cares about welfare in general, an inflation bias exists. Even if policy-mak-
ers do not wish to consciously exploit the potential of surprise inflation, 
the expectations of individuals towards monetary policy will always err 
on the inflationary side if welfare assumptions are likely to guide the mon-
etary authority’s action. The only way to solve this dilemma, the economic 
literature argues, is to place monetary policy in the hands of a central 
banker, who is not only independent from the political cycle and electoral 
pressures, but also more conservative than society (Rogoff 1985).54 Only 
through the strong anti-inflationary reputation of the monetary authority 
can inflation bias be remedied.
 There is an important lesson to be drawn from this argument that un-
derlies all economic research into the independence of central banks and 
the role of monetary policy. The main effect of monetary policy-making 
by independent central banks is a reputation effect that the bank would 
react to inflation stronger than its politically controlled counterpart. It is 
the reputation of the bank that leads economic actors to anticipate reac-
tions to inflationary behaviour.
 In practice, monetary policy obviously affects the investment decisions 
of private business by setting interest rates and the supply of money. Tight 
monetary policy undoubtedly has a contracting effect on any economy. 
However, the necessity to use these monetary policy instruments depends 
primarily on the reputation of the bank. If the bank has a strongly con-
servative reputation and can thereby automatically reduce inflationary 
pressures by credibly committing itself to price stability, monetary policy 
in practice needs to be less conservative than when a bank has a less con-
servative reputation. According to these theoretical claims, we should not 
expect the actual policy of the bank to necessarily make a difference to the 
behaviour of economic agents; rather, the reputation of the bank or of the 
monetary authority will do so.
 Therefore, when monetary policy-makers engage in a tighter monetary 
policy, the primary aim must be to strengthen the non-accommodatory 
reputation of the monetary authority. Monetary policy itself can be used 
for this purpose, but it is the reputation effect that is important for the ef-
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fectiveness of monetarism in the medium and long term. This distinction 
between the reputation effect and the dampening effect of tight monetary 
policy is not trivial but important with regard to the indicators one can 
sensibly use to measure the tightness of monetary policy. For instance, 
it does not seem sensible to use measures that rely on actual monetary 
policy when assessing the role of monetary policy. Therefore measures 
of the legal independence of central banks, as have been attempted by 
Cukierman (1998) and Grilli, Masciandaro et al. (1991), more accurately 
gauge what central bank conservatism means for economic agents than 
do measures that emphasize monetary policy itself.55 In other words, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy rests on the credibility of the monetary 
authority and not primarily on its policy choice. For this reason, the Cuki-
erman index is used in figure 4.3 to investigate the relations between cen-
tral bank independence and government intervention.
 The role of central banks has not been constant over time, but is part of 
the moves towards European monetary integration. It is therefore neces-
sary to examine this integration process in order to understand relations 
between monetary regimes and government intervention.
 European monetary integration as a tool for achieving central bank 
conservatism
Monetary regimes have not been constant over time, but have shifted to-
wards conservatism themselves. In this section, I will explore the role of 
European monetary integration in this process as an attempt by govern-
ments to increase the conservative reputation of their monetary regimes. 
European monetary integration has been the most important means of 
increasing monetary conservatism in Western Europe over the last two 
decades. Nevertheless, it is not absolutely clear at what point in time Eu-
ropean monetary integration acquired the reputation of a conservative 
monetarist regime.
 This section explores the role of monetary integration in the relation-
ship between governments and trade unions. It argues that monetary in-
tegration was one integral instrument that governments used to swing the 
monetary regime towards conservatism. Governments aimed at monetary 
conservatism and used monetary integration as a tool to gain a reputation 
of credibility. Secondly, government intervention was used in order to 
underline and facilitate this process, but was not primarily used to meet 
the convergence criteria of monetary union itself. However, eventually, 
EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION AS A TOOL
Wages.indd   95 28-8-2006   15:43:18

the effects of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty started 
to feed back into the adjustment process of increasing monetary conser-
vatism and automatic wage deflation. European economic and monetary 
union thereby enhanced and supported a model of interaction between 
a conservative monetary regime and a coordinated wage bargaining sys-
tem that had already been conceived in the mid-1970s and disseminated 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Monetary integration and credibility
In economic theory, there are differing views about the usefulness of fixed 
exchange rate regimes. On the one hand, if they are accompanied by an 
anti-inflationary international monetary standard, they can be seen as 
one way of escaping the inflationary consequences of the time inconsis-
tency problem of optimal discretionary monetary policy discussed above. 
On the other hand, these regimes imply other costs that emanate from the 
lack of freedom to react to previously unanticipated real macroeconomic 
disturbances (Alogoskoufis and Smith 1991; Alogoskoufis 1994: 195). In the 
economic literature on emu, the latter problem is frequently discussed. 
Many economists argue that the advantages of a fixed exchange rate re-
gime are outweighed by the disadvantage of sacrificing national monetary 
policy as a response to asymmetric shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
1993). Moreover, given that emu combines a centralized monetary au-
thority with a decentralized political system, problems with identifying 
the relevant criteria for inflation targeting in a heterogeneous economic 
area lead to unsuitable policy positions (Enderlein 2001: 36).56
In this section, I will focus on the first aspect of monetary integration, 
as an anti-inflationary policy tool that has served as the driving force for 
pursuing the monetary union project, and will discuss briefly how, in eco-
nomic terms, monetary integration relates to the issue of credibility.
 When governments peg their currencies to a non-inflationary curren-
cy, the implications of such a move are similar to following a monetarist 
policy rule: “Any growth in domestic costs or inflation that threatens the 
government’s ability to maintain the current exchange rate in the medium 
term must be met by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy responses” 
(Iversen and Thygesen 1998: 63). Since economic agents know this, in a 
fixed exchange rate regime monetary authorities have to react to inflation 
differentials with the anchor currency; the hope of policy-makers is that 
the expectations of the agents will focus on the low inflation rate of the 
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anchor currency and thereby adjust their inflationary behaviour accord-
ingly. In other words, pegging one’s currency to a low-inflation currency 
has potentially the same reputation effect as having an independent cen-
tral bank. However, as in the discussion about the effect of central bank 
independence, the crucial question is the credibility of the exchange rate 
regime. The credibility of the exchange rate regime, in turn, depends on 
its potential to allow for depreciation.
 If a government enters a fixed exchange rate regime with a low infla-
tion anchor currency, the dampening effect of this move on inflation will 
depend on the capacity of the government to rule out any exchange rate 
adjustment. If the government allows depreciation despite its announce-
ment that the currency is fixed, the credibility of the exchange rate regime 
will be low and there is no reason why inflation differentials should be-
come smaller. At the same time, given the differentials in the real economy 
between two countries and differences in the historic record on inflation, 
currency traders will expect a currency adjustment if the differentials are 
too high and if the institutional credentials of the exchange rate regime 
are weak.
 When looking at the different types of exchange rate regimes that have 
been implemented in Western Europe, we can judge them by the credibil-
ity of their exchange rate commitment (table 4.1). It turns out that already, 
from a theoretical point of view, one should expect the ‘snake-in-the-tun-
nel’ and the ‘floating snake’ to have low credibility scores since currencies 
could be adjusted and inflation differentials between the participating 
countries were high. Under the previous European Monetary System, ex-
change rates were still adjustable, but the commitments by governments 
to minimizing inflation differentials were stronger than before. They had 
Table 4.1 Exchange rate regimes and credibility 
Snake: 
Fixed but frequently 
adjusted exchange rates 
EMS: 
Fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates 
EMU: 
Currency union 
Period 1973-79 1979-99 Since 1999
Devaluation Possible Under certain conditions Not possible 
Credibility Low Dependent on negotiations on 
currency adjustment 
Absolute
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become even stronger with the convergence criteria of the Maastricht 
Treaty. But only monetary union reaches the level of absolute credibility 
of sticking to a low inflationary regime.
The credibility of European monetary integration
The idea of a European economic and monetary union has been on the 
agenda since the Werner Report whose recommendations were adopted 
as a goal of the European Community in March 1971.57 It therefore pre-
ceded the spread of monetarist economic policy thinking, the return to 
monetary conservatism in Europe and also the massive increase in inter-
national capital flows that are all seen to have been the driving forces of 
European monetary union. The plans for a monetary and economic union 
were primarily politically motivated by the European integration process 
itself and by the aim to stabilize intra-European trade and the pricing 
system within the Common Agricultural Policy. Nevertheless, it would be 
wrong not to relate the further evolution of the European monetary union 
to the shift towards monetary conservatism in Europe.
 The actual currency system that followed the Werner Plan in 1971 was 
soon redefined in its goals and ambitions. The Werner plan provided the 
intellectual justification for the ‘snake’ arrangement, which was instituted 
by the European Community in March 1972. The snake, however, was far 
from what was expected of a currency union, as it consisted only of an 
intra-EC exchange rate regime to which some non-EC members could peg 
their currencies. From the very beginning, the snake was seen as inher-
ently unstable (Corden 1972). Since there was no pooling of foreign ex-
change reserves and no central monetary authority, there was no mecha-
nism capable of ensuring the coordination of national policies. Individual 
members might choose to absorb real resources from the other members 
by running a balance of payment deficit with them (Cobham 1989: 204).58
 The currency snake soon encountered fundamental weaknesses. Na-
tional economies dealt with the different business cycles through adopt-
ing different approaches to monetary policies, which allowed for inflation 
differentials between countries. After a while, the responses by govern-
ments to the challenges of the first oil shock had become increasingly 
diverse; adjustment became pressing and ended in regular turmoil. Parity 
alignments were large and on occasions required the temporary closure 
of foreign exchange markets while the package of realignments was bar-
gained over (Currie 1991). During the short life of the snake between 1972 
and 1978, a pattern of frequent emergency adjustments of individual cur-
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rencies emerged. The British pound only stayed in the snake for a couple 
of months during 1972, while the French franc left the snake twice in 1974 
and in 1976. Without the membership of the big European countries and 
ongoing realignments and reshuffling, the snake quickly regressed into 
a ‘permissive reptile’, as The Economist mocked it.59 Since these patterns 
could be anticipated and currency traders could speculate on currency 
adjustment, the instability of the system grew over time. In other words, 
the snake contributed more to the fragility of the international monetary 
system during the 1970s than to its strength. Although the snake was the 
beginning of increasing monetary integration in Europe, Gros and Thy-
gesen estimate that “the mid-1970s marked the low point in European 
monetary integration” (Gros and Thygesen 1992: 20).60 The snake never 
acquired a reputation for serving as a low inflation anchor.61
The policy shift towards monetarism
Despite the dismal failure of the snake to achieve exchange rate stabil-
ity and to the surprise of many observers, the pursuit of monetary and 
economic union in Western Europe continued throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. The European Monetary System (ems) and its Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (erm) were set up in March 1979. Since their institutions were 
similar to those of the snake, they were quickly dubbed the ‘super-snake’ 
and again met with universal scepticism from economists and public alike. 
Governments, on the other hand, not only pushed through the founding 
of the ems but also soon engaged in the Single European Market pro-
gramme. The German government of Helmut Schmidt made great efforts 
to get the ems accepted by the other European countries in order to sta-
bilize German exports. Moreover, and more importantly, there was also a 
decisive effort among various other national governments to make their 
participation in the ems work better than in the snake.62
 For instance, as has been documented by McNamara, the French gov-
ernment reacted to the failure of the French franc to remain within the 
snake with a radical policy shift. First, the French and the German gov-
ernments had spent vast sums of money to keep the French franc within 
the snake in 1976 and until the last minute were finalizing new plans for 
reforming the snake.63 Afterwards, President Giscard d’Estaing and Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre turned membership into a political question of 
top priority (McNamara 1998: 130ff.). In fact, unwillingness in late 1973 to 
follow Germany’s lead and reduce its monetary growth drained France’s 
foreign exchange reserves and prompted its departure from the currency 
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bloc. “The snake could impose a discipline on us we may not be willing 
to accept,” a senior official in the French Finance Ministry was quoted as 
saying.64 This approach was only interrupted briefly by the expansionary 
economic policy of the early Mitterand government. When the Mitterand 
government had to choose between abandoning the French franc in the 
ems and changing its expansive fiscal policy, the government reversed its 
policy.
 The example of France illustrates how governments started to use first 
the snake and later the exchange rate mechanism as disciplinary devices 
to support their own weakly equipped monetary policy. This policy has 
since spread to all countries that are now member countries of the emu. 
But more astonishing are those countries where an even sharper policy 
shift took place. The most prominent example here is Ireland. Ireland had 
the Irish pound fixed to the British pound sterling for 150 years. However, 
in 1978, the Irish government made a strong move towards joining the 
ems because of the promise of currency stability, better trading condi-
tions and extra EEC aid afterwards. The Irish government clearly feared 
that after the dismal record of the British economy during the 1970s, if 
they stayed outside with Britain they risked having to devalue, importing 
British economic troubles and facing new trade barriers set up by ems 
members. Moreover, government ministers stated that they thought that 
“ems membership may help them to keep down wages”.65 Throughout the 
1980s, therefore, European governments tried to prepare their countries 
for stable participation in the ems, because this was seen as a tool for the 
hard currency policy that had increasingly become the focus of economic 
policy-making.
The role of Germany within the EMS
In the general process of Western European governments moving towards 
a policy of ‘sound money’, the role of Germany is worth mentioning. By 
the mid-1980s, the German monetary regime had become the role model 
in Europe to which every other country and the European Commission 
oriented itself. The whole architecture of the emu, the construction of the 
European Central Bank and the exchange rate mechanism were modelled 
on a strong and low inflation German currency. Without this role model 
to which all governments could aspire, European monetary integration 
would not have been feasible, since the lack of a dominant mode of central 
banking and monetary policy had been a major stumbling block to earlier 
attempts at economic and monetary union (McNamara 1998).
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 The dominant position of the German economic model was partly re-
lated to its economic importance for the smaller neighbouring countries. 
Austria has traditionally enjoyed strong economic ties with Germany and 
has not pursued an independent monetary policy. The Netherlands and 
Belgium have perceived themselves as dependent on the strong German 
market. As mentioned above, the French Barre government already took 
a strong liking to the German role model in the mid-1970s.
 But the main attraction of the German model for those countries that 
were not direct neighbours was that the German model remained robust 
during the economic shocks of the 1970s and seemed to have succeeded 
in combining a stable currency and sound economic policy with mod-
erate levels of unemployment and reasonable rates of economic growth. 
The example of Germany showed that a hard currency and a high level 
of employment were not incompatible. Germany was among those Euro-
pean countries that had recorded a reasonable economic performance in 
the 1970s and 1980s (figure 4.1). With regard to inflation, Germany out-
performed all countries of the oecd; with regard to unemployment, only 
Sweden, Finland and Austria did better. Sweden and Finland, however, 
paid the price of above-average inflation rates.
Figure 4.1 Inflation and unemployment in Western Europe, 1970-89
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Figure 4.1 Inﬂ ation and unemployment in Estern Europe, 1970-89
Source: OECD Historical Statistics.
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 Governments therefore hoped to import the non-inflationary repu-
tation of the D-mark by pegging their currency to it. In contrast to its 
European neighbours, Germany stood out as successfully fighting infla-
tion in the wake of the first oil shock. On average, German inflation rates 
between 1972 and 1980 remained at 5 percent, half the European aver-
age (McNamara 1998: 152). In the debates of policy-makers of the time, 
the successful fight against inflation was fully attributed to the monetary 
policy of the Bundesbank, not the government.66 Associated with the 
non-inflationary reputation of the Bundesbank and endorsed by politi-
cal commitment, German governments hoped that they had found a role 
model of economic policy-making that would deliver low inflation auto-
matically.
 In comparison, most other European governments found themselves 
in the position of being unable to control domestic distributive conflict, 
especially in the wake of the oil price shocks of the 1970s. The experience 
of stagflation across Europe changed the minds of European social demo-
crats about how best to achieve wage and price stability, while also con-
verting Europe’s central bankers from soft Keynesians to hard currency 
advocates (Rhodes 2001b; Marshall 1999). The “brute reality of economic 
management in the 1970s and 1980s”, as Martin Rhodes has called this 
process, was more decisive in driving a shift in the policy regime than the 
arrival of a neo-liberal paradigm or the spread of a sound monetary ideol-
ogy (Rhodes 2001b, 3; quoted from manuscript).
Monetarism without credibility
The effect of monetary integration on national governments in the frame-
work of the snake and ems, however, was mixed. On the one hand, gov-
ernments lost their national autonomy in monetary policy since mon-
etary authorities had the primary task of ensuring that the currency was 
kept within the exchange rate mechanism. They were forced to follow the 
monetary policy of the anchor currency, the German mark, without being 
able to influence that policy. On the other hand, neither the snake nor the 
ems was domestically credible enough to adjust the inflationary expecta-
tions of economic agents to those of the Germans.
 The countries that experienced the dilemma of tight monetarism with-
out credibility most painfully were those of the inner circle of the snake, 
the Benelux countries plus Denmark, France and, from 1978, Ireland. They 
were severely hit by the high interest rates of the Bundesbank without be-
ing able to convey their commitment to the exchange rate system to their 
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wage bargaining partners. As a result, the core ems countries suffered 
from higher unemployment and inflation throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kurzer 1988 and 1993; Scharpf 2000; see also De Grauwe and Vanhaver-
beke 1990).
 During the 1980s, those countries that were openly committed to the 
exchange rate mechanism fared much worse in terms of employment than 
those that were not. The exchange rate commitment forced their central 
banks to deflate, but the credibility of the ems had not been strong enough 
to adjust the expectations of their trade unions. Those countries moved 
only very slowly towards the beneficial reputational effects of monetary 
conservatism. At the same time, there was little alternative to the at-
tempts made by governments to strengthen the commitment to the ems. 
The core snake countries plus France were among the founding countries 
of the EC and therefore committed to European integration. Apart from 
France, they were among the small countries that had a strong interest in 
supranational frameworks, which gave them more influence vis-à-vis the 
larger member states. The early participants were also the governments of 
the smaller European countries that traded heavily with Germany. They 
were determined to maintain the parity with the D-mark, because if their 
currencies depreciated they would again be subject to inflationary pres-
sures along rising import prices. Despite the negative effects, the early 
ems participants were condemned to proceed further towards monetary 
integration rather than seek alternatives.
The credibility of EMU
By the late 1980s, the ems had become a stable arrangement. Between 
April 1983 and January 1987 there were only four realignments, while be-
tween January 1987 and the ems crisis in September 1992 there were no 
currency realignments (McNamara 1998: 162). At the same time, capital 
flows and market integration increased significantly over the same pe-
riod. Policy-makers were satisfied with the working of the ems as a system 
that had reached a certain degree of stability. For the first time, domestic 
policies and the requirements of monetary integration were supporting 
and reinforcing each other rather than being at odds.
 Hence, in 1989, Jacques Delors re-launched the European Monetary 
Union and, in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty set out the route towards it. 
The Maastricht Treaty provided for the second stage of monetary union 
to start on 1 January 1994, by which date member states had to have taken 
measures to ensure the lasting convergence necessary for the achieve-
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ment of economic and monetary union, in particular with regard to price 
stability and sound public finance. By the time the Maastricht Treaty was 
adopted, the German role model was disseminated throughout Europe to 
the degree that European Monetary Union was not only modelled on the 
German Bundesbank, but also central bank independence had become an 
important precondition for monetary union. As the European Monetary 
Institute pointed out in its convergence reports, central bank indepen-
dence was seen as “essential for the move towards Monetary Union and 
thus a prerequisite for Monetary Union” (European Monetary Institute 
1999: 20). In the run-up to monetary union, the member states were there-
fore required to increase the legal independence of their central banks, 
despite the fact that the ems already required the central banks to employ 
monetary policies that would keep them in line with the currency bands. 
In order to guarantee a high degree of independence for the European 
Central Bank, the independence of national central banks was seen as a 
supporting pillar.
 As can be seen in Table 4.2, both central bank independence and cur-
rency pegging are monetary policy devices that were adopted universally 
in all countries in Western Europe – independent of whether a coun-
try was an active member of the European Monetary System or not. All 
countries had accorded their central bank the status of legal indepen-
dence, even the United Kingdom. The British government had notified 
the eu Council that it would not participate in the single currency and 
therefore was not required by the Maastricht Treaty to delegate a higher 
degree of independence to the Bank of England. Also the Swedish gov-
ernment, which did not participate in the erm, amended several laws 
affecting the Sveriges Riksbank in order to increase its independence. At 
the same time, apart from the United Kingdom, all European countries 
participated in a form of exchange rate system. The Nordic countries had 
started to peg their currencies in the early 1990s. Finland joined the ems 
after that.
An examination of the depreciation of national currencies vis-à-vis the 
German mark shows that credibility only emerged with the anticipation of 
the Maastricht Treaty and emu. During the 1970s and 1980s, only Austria 
and the Netherlands were really in a ﬁ xed exchange rate system with the 
German mark. Belgium approached a ﬁ xed currency regime in the 1970s, 
but lost momentum in the 1980s. For all other countries, a serious com-
mitment to a ﬁ xed exchange rate system only emerged in the 1990s, after 
the Treaty of Maastricht. It was only at the end of the 1980s, when the 
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domestic policy shifts had reached a degree of monetary conservatism, 
that the tight convergence criteria that were attached to emu became ac-
ceptable. Indeed, this led to the credibility of the exchange rate regime 
that governments had tried to achieve through the initial pegging of their 
currencies.67 Of those countries that were signed up for monetary union, 
only Italy (1.56), Spain (1.69) and Portugal (3.47) still had considerable in-
ﬂ ation diﬀ erentials with Germany during the 1990s (see table 4.3). All the 
early ems countries that had suﬀ ered under the strong D-mark during the 
1980s had negative diﬀ erentials. Th is was due in part to the relatively high 
Table 4.2  Exchange rate pegging and central bank independence
Currency pegging Recent changes in legal 
independence of central bank
Austria Oﬃ  cially pegged to DM in 1980, member 
of EMS and EMU
Belgium Member of snake, EMS, EMU Legal independence in 1993
Denmark Member of snake and EMS
Finland Markka pegged to ECU in 1991, member 
of EMU
Legal independence in 1998
France Member of snake 1971-73, 1975-76, EMS 
and EMU
Legal independence in 1993
Germany Member of snake, EMS, EMU
Ireland Member of snake until 1972; member of 
EMS in 1978 and EMU
Legal independence in 1998
Italy Member of the snake until 1973, 
member of EMS and EMU
Legal independence in 1992
Netherlands Member of snake, EMS and EMU Legal independence in 1998
Portugal Member of ERM-EMS in 1992 Legal independence in 1992
Spain Member of ERM-EMS in 1989 Legal independence in 1994
Sweden Associate to the ﬂ oating snake until 1977
Krone pegged to ECU in 1990.
Legal independence in 1999
United Kingdom Member of the snake-in-the-tunnel in 
1971-72 and of the ERM 1990-92
Legal independence in 1998
Note: Central bank independence was assumed when score was 0.35 or higher on the 
Cukierman index (McNamara 2002: 49). 
Sources: for currency pegging, Andrews (1994) and various sources; for legal independence of 
central bank, McNamara (2002) and European Monetary Institute (1999). 
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German inﬂ ation rate in 1994 and 1995 after uniﬁ cation, but the reduction 
of the large inﬂ ation diﬀ erentials of the 1970s and 1980s eased the pressure 
on European currencies considerably.
 Due to its economic importance within Western Europe and its eco-
nomic record of coming through the 1970s in a reasonable shape, Germa-
ny had become the monetary anchor in Europe. The German government 
itself promoted monetary integration largely modelled on its own experi-
ence. But the important point is that, apart from the case of Austria, the 
anticipated effect of wage bargaining actors adjusting inflationary expec-
tation – along the lines of the German model – did not automatically 
spread to other countries participating in the ems. Nor did the credibility 
of the Bundesbank suppress inflationary expectations in other countries 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Since, on the one hand, governments 
were committed to keeping their currencies within the ems while, on the 
other, domestic wage bargaining did not respond to these constraints, the 
net effects of the ems were negative.
 It was only when Economic and Monetary Union was finalized in the 
Maastricht Treaty – despite the massive speculative attacks on the Ital-
ian and British currencies in the ems crisis in 1992 – that the credibility 
Table 4.3 Depreciation of the national currency vis-à-vis the German mark (inﬂ ation 
diﬀ erential with Germany, average per decade)
1970s 1980s 1990s
Austria -1.50 (1.16) -1.20 (0.93) 0.00 (-0.12)
Belgium 15.70 (2.13) 33.00 (1.99) -0.30 (-0.38)
Denmark 43.20 (4.53) 33.60 (3.99) -0.90 (-0.42)
Finland 61.00 (5.56) 25.10 (4.41) 49.20 (-0.33)
France 46.50 (4.33) 65.80 (4.46) -0.20 (-0.63)
Ireland 102.40 (8.29) 80.50 (6.43) 4.70 (-0.24)
Italy 161.00 (8.15) 150.00 (8.27) 133.40 (1.56)
Netherlands 8.60 (2.01) 3.30 (-0.05) -0.10 (-0.06)
Portugal 225.30 (12.68) 718.20 (14.73) 151.90 (3.47)
Spain 97.20 (9.54) 118.10 (7.34) 106.80 (1.69)
Sweden 55.90 (4.07) 89.40 (5.07) 49.70 (0.98)
United Kingdom 79.20 (8.15) 83.90 (4.53) 3.50 (1.18)
Mean 74.50 (5.88) 116.60 (5.18) 41.50 (0.56)
Mean (without Portugal 
and Spain)
57.20 (4.84) 56.34 (4.00) 23.90 (0.15)
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank; Monatsbericht January 1998, p. 74; own calculations.
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effects began to filter through. Any reputation effects of monetary con-
servatism stemming from European monetary integration were therefore 
only to be expected from the 1990s onwards.
The eﬀ ects of monetary integration and restrictiveness on wage 
bargaining: sharpening the conﬂ ict between employment and
 real wage protection
The shift towards fixed exchange rates and restrictive monetary policy 
as anti-inflationary economic policy devices had real implications for the 
external conditions and conduct of wage bargaining in Western Europe 
from the 1980s onwards. Monetary integration via the ems and the lift-
ing of capital controls facilitated and required tighter monetary policy in 
the ems zone. Capital movements and the fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates forced the monetary authorities in all countries to follow the mon-
etary policy of the most powerful monetary authorities, in particular the 
American Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank. In Western Europe, na-
tional central banks tried to diminish the inflation differentials between 
their own currency and the German mark in order to ease the pressure on 
them to depreciate their currencies.
Figure 4.2 Real long-term interest rates in Western Europe, 1970-99
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 As a consequence, from 1980 onwards, two major changes took place 
in the monetary policy of Western European countries: firstly, monetary 
policy became severely restrictive; secondly, policies converged. Figure 
4.2 illustrates this development by showing real long-term interest rates 
as a measure of monetary policy. Between 1974 and 1984, the average real 
long-term interest rate in Western Europe increased from minus 1 percent 
to 5.5 percent. At the same time, the differences between countries dimin-
ished sharply (standard deviation declined from 5.5 to 0.9 in the same pe-
riod). As an illustration: in 1974 real long-term interest rates varied from 
-11 per cent in Finland to 3 per cent in Germany. By 1985, the variation 
had decreased to 4.5 per cent in Austria and 7.1 per cent in Ireland. The 
period of vastly differing responses to the economic shock of the 1980s 
had been replaced by a standard response of restrictive monetary policy 
to inflationary pressures.
 There exists a broad economic literature on the impact of surrendering 
monetary independence compared to fixed exchange rates, mostly with 
regard to the approach of emu.68 But, in fact, those countries that par-
ticipated in the ems had already abandoned a truly independent mon-
etary policy by the early 1980s.69 Even for those countries outside ems, 
the differential in real interest rates to the Western European average was 
less than 1 per cent throughout the period. As pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, devaluations became scarcer and increasingly difficult to portray 
as acceptable within the framework of the ems. Therefore, many of the 
implications that have been discussed in the literature on the impact of 
monetary integration on wage bargaining issues had in fact been relevant 
from the mid-1980s onwards and not only from the point at which emu 
actually started.
 There are two implications for wage bargaining and employment per-
formance that stem from tight monetary policy and monetary integra-
tion.70 Firstly, a tight monetary response to inflationary pressure has con-
tractory effects on the economy and reduces output and employment. 
The speed of adjustment and further employment effects are – among 
other factors – dependent on the responsiveness of real wages to the 
level in unemployment. The responsiveness of changes of the real wage 
to unemployment is termed real wage flexibility.71 A tighter monetary 
policy bears lower costs if real wage rigidities are low. It therefore has 
more severe employment effects in countries where real wage rigidities 
are higher.72 A shift towards monetarism requires a higher degree of real 
wage flexibility if negative employment effects were to be minimized in 
the case of external shocks.
STRIVING FOR CONSERVATISM: THE SHIFT IN MONETARY REGIMES
Wages.indd   108 28-8-2006   15:43:20

 Secondly, increasing monetary integration in the past removed the 
possibility of using exchange rate adjustments to respond to inflation dif-
ferentials. This change was particularly difficult for those countries that 
had used devaluations for boosting competitiveness. Changes in the ex-
change rate can alleviate balance of payments problems that are caused 
by external shocks or internal developments. Devaluations are a short-
term adjustment of relative prices without rendering to the adjustment of 
wages. For instance, the increase of domestic prices can be balanced by a 
change in the exchange rate, which in turn changes the relationship be-
tween domestic prices and import prices. This prevents a shift in demand 
from domestic to imported goods. On the other hand, prices for domestic 
and imported goods may increase so that devaluations reduce the real 
wage (without touching the nominal wage level).
 When devaluations are not possible because of fixed exchange rates, a 
differential in inflation rates will change the relationship between domes-
tic goods and imported goods and induce a shift in demand. An adjust-
ment of domestic prices will become necessary, frequently causing either 
a renegotiation of wage levels or changes in relative unit labour costs that 
produce changes in the real exchange rate. In both cases, under fixed or 
flexible exchange rates, the adjustment has to take place domestically. The 
adjustment of exchange rates can offer a short-term boost in competitive-
ness, while putting pressure on real wages. This might induce a pressure 
on wage bargainers to compensate for real wage losses. The difference of 
the impact of fixed and flexible exchange rates lies primarily in the form 
of wage adjustments (real wage losses versus money wage adjustments). 
In both cases, wages have to be adjusted eventually. However, in flexible 
exchange rate systems, devaluation offers a short-term opportunity to in-
crease competitiveness via productivity increases (Mitchell 1993).
 The effects of the increasing monetary integration and restrictiveness 
on the European countries therefore implied that the costs of different 
rates of inflation in different countries with stable exchange rates had to 
be compensated for by additional real wage adjustments. With the in-
creasing effectiveness of the monetarist policy of bringing down infla-
tion and nominal wage increases, adjustment also increasingly meant real 
wage losses. Moreover, the monetarist threat by central banks sharpened 
the trade-off between employment and real pay for trade union bargain-
ing priorities. The loss of real wages, however, conflicted with established 
rules and traditions of wage bargaining procedures in many countries. 
The combination of monetary restrictiveness and monetary integration 
sharpened the distributive dilemma trade unions faced when they tried 
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to protect real wages. The assumption here is that this affected different 
countries to different degrees and that the different effects led govern-
ments to intervene in wage bargaining processes.
 Central bank independence, monetary policy and government 
intervention
How do the preceding arguments on monetary credibility and exchange 
rate regimes relate to the issue of government intervention? In Chapter 2, I 
assumed that governments use negotiated approaches towards wage setting 
in order to strengthen their shift in disinﬂ ation policy from voluntary wage 
restraint to monetarist policies by increasing the credibility of a conserva-
tive monetary policy. Because labour markets are organized by trade unions 
and employers’ organizations, which serve as important information carri-
ers, governments intervene in wage bargaining procedures in order to em-
phasize a shift in their monetary policy approach. During the golden years 
of the post-war period up to the mid-1970s, governments, banks and social 
partners developed patterns of interaction with regard to the stabilization 
of the economy. In many countries, this was based on an accommodating 
monetary and ﬁ scal approach on the part of the government. When the 
economic policy by governments shifted towards monetarism, the govern-
ment needed to convey its new approach towards the social partners with-
out running the risk of negative deﬂ ation eﬀ ects. Government intervention 
in wage bargaining can be interpreted as the attempts of governments to 
enhance the credibility of a monetarist deﬂ ationary policy.
 If this is the case, we should be able to observe that, in those instances 
where central banks have a reputation for being conservative and inde-
pendent, the need for governments to enhance their reputation should be 
lower than in cases where central banks do not have a conservative repu-
tation. In other words, if the main effect of monetary policy as held in the 
literature is a reputation effect, one should assume that different degrees 
of reputation, in terms of banks’ predisposition towards conservatism, 
prompt different government reactions to wage bargaining. The higher 
the credibility of a conservative central bank, the lower is the need for 
governments to boost that credibility by intervening in wage bargaining 
processes. I will examine this by testing the correlation between an index 
of central bank independence and the measure of government interven-
tion developed in Chapter 3.
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Central bank independence
Indices of central bank independence are almost as abundant as mea-
sures of wage bargaining coordination (Mangano 1998). The two indi-
ces most used and respected in the literature are the ones presented by 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and by Cukierman (1998). Both 
indices are based on a set of legal characteristics of central bank constitu-
tions. They emphasize the appointment procedures of the governor, the 
procedure for formulating monetary policy, and particular processes of 
monetary policies such as lending to governments etc. The two indices 
correlate highly (correlation coefficient = 0.84** for the countries studied 
here).73
 In the following, I will use the Cukierman index of legal bank inde-
pendence mainly for reasons of data availability.74 The Cukierman index 
is a composed index made up of a number of variables that are designed 
to capture the legal independence of the bank. It measures both the in-
dependence of the bank from government and the “conservative bias” of 
the central bank as embodied in the law (Cukierman 1998: 377). It does 
not measure the actual monetary policy of the central bank in terms of 
changes in monetary supply or interest rates. Because the variables aim 
to measure the legal constitution of the bank, the index is basically time-
invariant, although it was measured for different points in time. With re-
gard to the countries of Western Europe, there was no change in the le-
gal independence of central banks between 1950 and 1990. Only after the 
Treaty of Maastricht set forth criteria for European Monetary Union were 
steps towards increased legal independence adopted.
 In Cukierman’s ranking of central banks by overall legal independence, 
Germany and Austria rank among the highest of the 68 countries studied, 
after Switzerland, which leads the independence table (table 4.4). Among 
the countries studied here, Belgium ranks lowest. The Mediterranean 
countries of Spain and Italy also have low scores (both 0.21), followed by 
Sweden and Finland (both 0.27).75 Unfortunately, no independence score 
exists for Portugal. Since the central bank of Portugal did not gain legal in-
dependence until 1992, it must have been below the independence thresh-
old in the preceding years. During the 1990s, only Germany, Austria and 
Denmark did not change the legal regulation of their central banks in 
favour of greater independence. All three countries, however, already had 
the highest-ranking central banks in Western Europe.
 The stability of central bank independence over time indicates that the 
measurement captures the reputation of the bank disseminated to politi-
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cal and economic actors. Even if the laws on which the status of the bank 
rests were changed, the reputation might nevertheless persist for a long 
period of time. What is measured is therefore a general conservative atti-
tude on the part of the political system towards economic policy-making, 
which is enshrined in legal foundations of the monetary authority and 
consequently not easily shifted.
 In an important finding, figure 4.3 shows a strong correlation between 
the Cukierman index of the independence of central banks and the aver-
age degree of government intervention in wage bargaining over the period 
of the 1980s and 1990s (correlation coefficient = 0.72**).76 The implication 
of the graph is in line with what could be expected from the theoretical as-
sumptions: in countries with a central bank that is highly independent and 
therefore has the reputation of being conservative in its monetary policy, 
governments are less likely to intervene in wage bargaining processes. (If 
one controls for the degree of wage bargaining coordination, the partial 
correlation coefficient increases to 0.85**.) In other words, the conserva-
tive reputation of the central bank is strongly negatively correlated with 
the likelihood of governments to intervene in wage bargaining processes. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, governments were much less likely to inter-
vene in the labour market in those countries where central banks were 
traditionally strongly independent and thus conservative.
Table 4.4 Legal independence of central banks, Western Europe
Cukierman index
Austria 0.58
Belgium 0.19
Denmark 0.47
Finland 0.27
France 0.28
Germany 0.66
Ireland 0.39
Italy 0.22
Netherlands 0.42
Portugal -
Spain 0.21
Sweden 0.27
United Kingdom 0.31
Source: Cukierman (1998).
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 The only outlier in the otherwise stable and strong correlation is the 
United Kingdom. (If the United Kingdom is taken out of the correlation, 
the correlation coefficient increases to 0.87**.) The Bank of England was 
traditionally controlled by the government and has only recently gained 
legal independence. Independence of the central bank was advocated by 
a number of Chancellors of the Exchequer before it was finally put into 
practice. At the same time, the British case is also an outlier since the gov-
ernment not only adopted particularly stringent monetary policies after 
1979 but was also exceptionally reluctant to engage in interventions into 
wage bargaining procedures for other – political – reasons. The British 
case, therefore, is an outlier on all accounts.
Monetary policy
As assumed above, an independent central bank does not have to pursue 
restrictive monetary policies in order to be credible. The credibility of 
the policies rests on the reputation of the bank for ensuring price stabil-
ity. If the reputation of the bank is strong, the bank has even less need 
to employ restrictive policies since economic agents anticipate deflation 
Figure 4.3 Central bank independence and state intervention in
wage bargaining, Western Europe 1980-99
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Figure 4.3 Central Bank independence and government intervention in wage 
bargaining, Western Europe 1980-99
Source: Cukierman (1998) for central bank independence.
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and its consequences without the instruments being used. Therefore, 
while there should be a clear impact of central bank independence on 
inflation, there should not necessarily be any recourse to tight monetary 
policy. It is in this sense that economists have assumed central bank in-
dependence to be something of a free lunch. Where the reputation of 
the central bank is traditionally conservative, the use of tight monetary 
policies should be lower than in those cases where the reputation of the 
central bank is less conservative. In those cases, however, where govern-
ments and the bank itself try to create a more conservative reputation for 
the central bank, we should also expect to observe a higher incidence of 
government intervention set on making these policies more credible for 
the social partners.
 Alternatively, one could assume that governments use monetary in-
tervention in order to strengthen a particularly tight policy measure. 
When central banks engage in deflationary policies, either by keeping 
the money supply tight or by raising interest rates, governments will 
interfere in wage bargaining procedures in order to make these policy 
measures understood by wage bargaining actors. We can therefore test 
to what extent government intervention is related to the conduct of 
monetary policies.
 In the following section, I will use two indicators for restrictive mon-
etary policy. Th e ﬁ rst is long-term real interest rates. Long-term real inter-
est rates indicate the real eﬀ ect of the setting of interest rates by the cen-
tral bank in a given economy. Changes in the money supply, on the other 
hand, are the direct mechanism with which central banks can inﬂ uence 
the availability of money in the market. Table 4.5 shows the averages for 
both indicators over the 1980s and 1990s. Th e mean values show that, for 
both policy instruments, monetary policy became tighter from the 1980s 
to the 1990s, although the average changes in the money supply hide wide 
ﬂ uctuations between years. Moreover, the real shift in monetary policy 
took place from the 1970s to the 1980s. On average for the 13 countries, real 
long-term interest rates were negative during the 1970s, while the average 
change in money supply stands at 13 per cent compared to 9 per cent in the 
1990s. Th ere is a clear shift towards restrictive monetary policy.
 My findings regarding the interaction between the reputation of the 
central bank, monetary policy and government intervention in wage bar-
gaining processes are presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7. The tables are based 
on annual observations of monetary policy and government intervention, 
while remaining constant for central bank independence. No time lags 
have been assumed for the relationship between monetary policy and 
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Table 4.6 Average government intervention by central bank independence and long-
term real interest rates (observation per cell), 1980-99
Central Bank Independence
Low High
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
 re
al
 
in
te
re
st
 ra
te
s
Low 2.59
(54)
1.34
(35)
High 3.02
(58)
2.42 
(45)
Note: high central bank independence was assumed when CBI > 0.28.
Sources: for central bank independence, Cukierman (1998) and for long-term real interest rates, 
OECD.
Table 4.5 Monetary policies by central banks, 1980s and 1990s, Western Europe
Long-term real interest rates
(as a percentage)
Changes in money supply 
compared to previous year 
(as a percentage)
1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99
Austria 4.14 4.33 6.59 7.93
Belgium 5.98 5.05 4.18 3.12
Denmark 4.64 4.05 15.16 5.55
Finland 7.00 6.10 11.52 31.25
France 4.77 5.70 8.05 1.25
Germany 3.52 6.68 6.22 7.51
Ireland 2.57 5.70 8.14 13.49
Italy 4.23 6.58 11.63 5.71
Netherlands 5.61 4.96 6.82 7.76
Portugal - 4.93 19.16 13.04
Spain 4.19 5.86 14.41 7.23
Sweden 4.07 5.30 7.27 2.59
UK 3.58 4.76 14.81 10.78
Mean 4.53 5.38 10.30 9.00
Note: data on Portugal on interest rates only available for 1993 and 1994.
Sources: OECD; IMF Financial Statistics.
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government intervention. As seen before, when correlating central bank 
independence and the degree of government intervention on the basis 
of countries, government intervention is generally higher in cases where 
central bank independence is low.
 The more interesting observation in this context, however, is that 
government intervention is particularly low where real long-term inter-
est rates are comparatively low and central bank independence is high. 
Where central banks have a strong conservative reputation and do not 
need to prove this reputation with tight monetary policies, governments 
tend to intervene less in wage bargaining. On the other hand, government 
intervention is particularly high in those cases where central bank inde-
pendence is low, but monetary policy is tight. Government intervention, 
in other words, goes hand-in-hand with tight monetary policy in situa-
tions where the institutional set-up does not provide a credible conserva-
tive reputation for the central bank.
 This result is partly endorsed by the data on changes in money sup-
ply. Once again, government intervention is highest in cases where the 
conservative reputation of the central bank is low and the low expansion 
of the money supply indicates a tight monetary policy (on average 2.95 in 
table 4.7). However, with regard to the cases where the independence of 
the central bank is high, government intervention is lowest where mon-
etary policies in terms of money supply expansion are also tight (on aver-
age 1.84). Again, given the volatility of the data, these results should be 
accorded less weight than the results on interest rates.
Table 4.7 Average government intervention by central bank independence and 
change in money supply (observation per cell), 1980-99
Central Bank Independence
Low High
M
on
et
ar
y 
ex
p
an
si
on Low 2.95
(65)
1.84
(51)
High 2.63
(54)
2.12
(34)
Sources: for central bank independence, Cukierman (1998); for money supply, IMF (Financial 
Statistics).
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Inﬂ ation
Finally, one counterargument needs to be explored. The main effect of in-
dependent central banks is to produce lower inflation. In empirical stud-
ies, the negative relationship between inflation, averaged over certain pe-
riods of time, and the legal independence of central banks has been shown 
(Alesina and Summers 1993; Cukierman 1998). If government interven-
tion in wage bargaining is negatively related to the legal independence of 
the central bank, one might be inclined to argue that governments really 
react to inflation and not in dependence on the reputation of their central 
bank. In other words, the measure of central bank independence might 
not capture the reputation of the bank but more the inflationary pressure 
on a given country to which the government responds. Does government 
intervention in wage bargaining merely reflect efforts by governments to 
influence wage bargainers in order to fight inflation?
 Th e data clearly shows that this is not the case. While government inter-
vention is positively correlated with inﬂ ation as expected, this correlation 
disappears entirely when controlled for central bank independence. On 
the other hand, when the correlation between central bank independence 
and government intervention is controlled for inﬂ ation, the correlation be-
comes only marginally weaker.77 Th e correlation is therefore driven by the 
independence of the central bank and not by the rate of inﬂ ation.
 If one looks at the means of government intervention under diﬀ erent 
monetary regimes and diﬀ erent levels of inﬂ ation (table 4.8), this observa-
Table 4.8 Average government intervention by central bank independence and inﬂ ation 
(observation per cell), 1980-99
Central Bank Independence
Low High
In
ﬂ a
tio
n
Low 3.01
(71)
1.69
(45)
High 3.26
(34)
1.88
(57)
Source: for central bank independence, Cukierman (1998); for inﬂ ation, OECD (Historical 
Statistics).
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tion becomes even more apparent. Th e row diﬀ erence of government inter-
vention between high and low inﬂ ation under the same monetary regime is 
only marginal, while the diﬀ erence between columns, between a high and 
low degree of legal independence of central banks under the same impact of 
inﬂ ation, is substantial. Government intervention in wage bargaining pro-
cesses is related to the reputation of the monetary regime. Th e fundamen-
tal constitution of the national economic and monetary policy framework 
matters for its policy behaviour and not the immediate policy pressure.78
Government intervention to foster monetary conservatism
Overall, the data gives support to the view that there is a systematic re-
lationship between the reputation of the monetary authority and the be-
haviour of governments vis-à-vis wage bargaining institutions during a 
period when governments have shifted their economic policy towards 
tighter monetary policies. The underlying credibility argument is, more-
over, intuitively reasonable in the context of the political economy litera-
ture: after World War ii governments developed standard patterns of em-
ployment, monetary and fiscal policies that were in accordance with the 
institutional and organizational set up of the labour market (Lange and 
Garrett 1985; Scharpf 1991). Governments that had control over their cen-
tral banks could use expansionary monetary policy in order to stimulate 
the economy and compensate trade union cooperation on wage restraint. 
Governments, which were not in control of monetary policy, had to ad-
just their economic policy accordingly. Wage bargaining actors learned to 
operate under a tight monetary framework.
In Sweden, the United Kingdom and Belgium, where the central banks were 
traditionally under the control of governments, the latter could force the 
banks to accommodate their economic policy, which was based on ﬁ nding a 
compromise with trade unions on voluntary wage restraint. In Sweden, the 
interplay between a politically dominated Riksbank and highly centralized 
trade unions enabled a pattern of real wage restraint and frequent depre-
ciation, which allowed for competitiveness and low labour costs (Lange and 
Garrett 1985; Scharpf 1991). In Germany and Austria, this option was not 
available and had not been pursued even by the social democratic govern-
ments of the 1970s. In both cases, the interaction between the social partners 
and the government rested on fundamental assumptions about the reaction 
of the other side to inﬂ ationary pressures. Th e independence of the central 
STRIVING FOR CONSERVATISM: THE SHIFT IN MONETARY REGIMES
Wages.indd   118 28-8-2006   15:43:21

bank indicated the degree of opposition against accepting inﬂ ationary pres-
sures. Where this opposition was constituted in the legal framework of the 
central bank, wage bargaining institutions had to accept this framework.
 When a new economic consensus on monetary conservatism emerged 
among the political elite in the beginning of the 1980s, the interaction 
between governments and wage bargaining institutions started to change. 
This was particularly the case in those countries where the conservative 
reputation of the bank did not exist. Governments used their potential for 
intervention to adjust wage bargaining actors’ expectations towards a new 
monetary regime.
 In summary, it has not been the aim of this chapter to explain the shift 
by governments towards monetary conservatism, but to point out that 
this move in countries with highly regulated labour markets has prompt-
ed governments to intervene in wage bargaining procedures in order to 
adjust the expectations of trade unions and employers towards the new 
monetary regime.
 That the relationship between economic policy and the attitudes of the 
governments vis-à-vis wage bargaining is primarily determined by a long-
term preference for hard money on the part of the monetary authorities, 
rather than by the problems of the government, such as the public deficit, 
inflation or unemployment, might seem surprising at first glance. Gov-
ernment intervention and social pacts often occur under crisis conditions 
when several problems of public finance, inflation and external deficits 
coincide. However, we can observe that government intervention is not 
primarily a reaction to an increasing problem load, but more a long-term 
measure of the propensity of governments to directly influence wage bar-
gaining outcomes averaged over decades. A long-term measure like the 
one used here, on the other hand, reflects the approach of governments 
to managing the issue of labour more generally, and is therefore seen as a 
better indicator of the general use of corporatist policy-making.
 Finally, this chapter has argued that European monetary integration has 
been an instrument for achieving monetary conservatism, which in turn is 
based on the conservative reputation of the monetary authority. Since both 
the snake and the ems were politically adjustable, neither exchange rate re-
gime was able to achieve a conservative reputation before the mid-1990s. 
Only after the strong commitment to the convergence criteria under the 
Maastricht Treaty and after the survival of the Maastricht commitments fol-
lowing the ems crisis in 1992 did the system ﬁ nally gain the necessary repu-
tation. By that time, many countries had already experienced a long period 
of trying to establish monetary conservatism – often without much success.
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5 The Politics of Government Intervention
So far, I have considered the link between corporatist government inter-
vention and monetary regimes. In this chapter, I will extend the line of 
explanation to the capacity of the government itself, examining how po-
litical institutions influence the decision of governments to intervene in 
wage bargaining procedures. Generally speaking, political decisions tend 
to be directed to preserve the status quo and governments have to over-
come inertia and opposition from other political actors against change, 
which can use institutional devices in order to block political decisions.79
Governments are primarily under pressure to avoid the political costs of 
a deflationary policy and aim to convince trade unions to commit them-
selves to wage restraint. Their ability to do so depends on the vulnerability 
of the government to the pressures from trade unions to be compensated 
for the negative externalities of restrictive monetary policy. This again is 
influenced by the political institutions themselves, the structure of the 
party system and the relationship between trade unions and political par-
ties. The aim of this chapter is therefore to locate the political – rather 
than the economic – interaction between governments and social part-
ners. Moreover, it aims to explain how weak governments and dependent 
political parties in particular use the means of government intervention 
to counteract economic crises that arise from the lack of adjustment of 
wage bargaining to a more restrictive economic environment.
 Below, I will trace the political institutional factors that influence gov-
ernments’ behaviour. My argument is that governments have different 
abilities for dealing with the political costs of economic crises that arise 
when wage bargaining does not sufficiently respond to the new environ-
ment. High wage settlements under tight monetary policy can lead to 
major welfare losses since the reaction by central banks will reduce em-
ployment and thereby sacrifice growth. Governments therefore have, on 
principle, an interest in persuading trade unions to pursue moderate wage 
claims. On the other hand, when governments are able to display a strict 
non-accommodating economic policy, the adjustment of wage bargaining 
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actors to the new conditions might take place faster without any further 
involvement on the part of the government. The choice is therefore be-
tween intervention in order to adjust trade union expectations or acqui-
escence to market forces disciplining wage bargaining actors.
 The approach taken by the government of either intervening in wage 
bargaining or leaving wage bargainers to their own devices rests upon the 
ability of the government to make a credible commitment to disciplining 
wage bargainers. If a government cannot credibly commit itself to the 
discipline of tight monetary and fiscal policy, it will be more tempted to 
negotiate wage restraint in order to avoid the negative externalities of 
high wage settlements. Other actors will also shift their approach from 
accepting restraint due to the disciplinary force of the market compelling 
them to negotiate a price for wage restraint itself.
 While restrictive monetary policy might solve the problem of high infla-
tion, it does not furnish an answer to the equally salient question of losses 
in output and employment that follow from a deflationary policy. Govern-
ments either are strong enough to insulate themselves from the fall-out of 
bad economic performance or try to negotiate a mode of adjustment that 
decreases the economic costs. The strength of the government is accord-
ingly based, firstly, on the institutions of the political system that translate 
votes into parliamentary majorities and the capacity of governments to 
act and, secondly, on the relationship between the governing parties and 
the trade unions themselves.
 The chapter is divided into two sections. The main section examines 
the political institutional constraints on governments with regard to gov-
ernment intervention. It starts with a review of key aspects of the litera-
ture, followed by an examination of the relationship between relevant in-
stitutional factors and the measure of government intervention developed 
in Chapter 3. The main finding is that competitive types of governments 
in unified party systems have a low degree of government intervention, 
while strongly consensus-based governments in fragmented party sys-
tems have the highest degree of government intervention.
 The next part presents an explanation for this pattern, drawing on an 
additional analytical element, the political fragmentation of trade unions. 
Finally, a more detailed case study compares the different government in-
tervention outcomes in Belgium and United Kingdom, two countries with 
markedly different institutional constraint frameworks.
 The second section considers another approach to the relations be-
tween political institutions and government intervention by examining 
the role of partisanship. The main finding is that, in general, right-wing 
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governments tend to intervene less in wage bargaining procedures than 
left-wing governments. This was particularly the case during the 1970s, 
when incomes policy was seen as a suitable tool for supporting the Keynes-
ian crisis management in many social democratic countries.
 Institutional constraints on governments
The ability of governments to make a firm commitment on economic 
policy is shaped by the constraints that are embedded in the institutional 
design of political systems. Nations differ in their political institutions.80 
With regard to public policy, a whole range of studies has shown how 
political institutions determine the ability of governments to act.81 The 
literature on political institutions has in recent years developed according 
to two diverging approaches: on the one hand, there have been increasing 
attempts to define the particular nature and interaction of veto players in 
political institutions in order to explain divergence in political outcomes 
by a particular set of veto players (Immergut 1992; Ganghof 2003; Tsebelis 
2002); on the other hand, parts of the literature have attempted to classify 
national political systems into different categories by combining a large 
number of indicators into only a few dimensions (Schmidt 2002b; Lijphart 
1999). While the first approach, regarding veto players, aims at answering 
the question of which type of veto player combination is responsible for 
which political outcome, the second, regarding consensus democracies, 
is more concerned with the general pattern of democratic institutions, 
while at the same time claiming that different types of democracies have 
distinctly different effects on outcomes (Lijphart 1999).
Veto players
The capacity of government to pursue and implement a policy can be 
hindered by the number of veto points a political system contains. Veto 
players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary 
for a change in the status quo (Tsebelis 1999: 593; for a similar definition, 
see Tsebelis 1995: 301). Constitutional design can therefore be related to 
political outcomes. The veto player concept is thus particularly useful for 
studying the capacity of national governments to introduce substantial 
reforms in public policy (Schmidt 1996: 152). It identifies the number of 
hurdles a government has to take to introduce a shift in public policy in 
terms of legislative measures.
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 The literature on veto players and veto points has made two distinct 
points. Firstly, the veto point concept has been used to highlight very 
particular constellations of political institutions that can explain particu-
lar political outcomes. For instance, the access of organized interests to 
political decision-making has been explanatory for differences in health 
systems in a number of countries (Immergut 1992).82 Secondly, the role of 
the German constitutional court can explain the particular situation of 
German tax reforms (Ganghof 2003).
 The second use of the veto player concept has been a more general one. 
It has been argued that in political systems that are heavily affected by a 
large number of veto points governments are ordinarily impeded in exer-
cising a major policy shift. This applies to a whole range of policies and 
seems to be unrelated to the type of policy. For instance, Tsebelis has ar-
gued that a large number of veto players can explain the lack of ‘substan-
tial’ legislation or political decisions (Tsebelis 1999, 2002). Governments 
are, for instance, prevented from pursuing egalitarian economic and so-
cial policy (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998) or from following particular traits 
in welfare development (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993).
 Veto player indices are usually composed of constitutional structures 
such as federalism, bicameralism, the role of judicial review, as well as the 
type of government and the independence of central banks (Huber, Ra-
gin et al. 1993; Schmidt 1996; Lijphart 1999; Schmidt 2002a). Hence they 
often include elements of concepts of consensus democracies, as will be 
discussed below.
Consensus democracies
The most relevant distinction for the relationship between governments 
and the social partners is the distinction between majoritarian forms 
of democracy and consensus or negotiation-based forms of democracy 
(Lehmbruch 1979; Lijphart 1999).83 Majoritarian democracies are defined 
by a strong degree of political competition between political parties that 
seek single-party or minimum-winning coalition governments. Institu-
tional constraints on governments are minimal and governments have a 
great leeway for implementing their policies. Moreover, the influence of 
interest groups on public policy is limited and public policy is exclusively 
performed by public administration (Armingeon 2002a and 2002b: 81). 
Majoritarian democracies are also modelled on the Westminster model 
and predominantly to be found in English-speaking countries of the Com-
monwealth.
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 In contrast, consensus or negotiated democracies are based on deeply 
institutionalized political and social cleavages that prevent an open politi-
cal competition on policy issues between parties. The majority party can-
not and will not exploit its majority at the expense of minority interests 
because of either institutional or political constraints. Power is shared 
between different social groups and consensus is sought on major politi-
cal issues. Consensus democracy is thus the reflection of the power struc-
ture and conflicts within societies that have turned into an institutionally 
based system of incentives that encourage the cooperation between po-
litical groups and minimize their competition.
 Consensus democracies are closely related to consociational democra-
cies and corporatism. Consociational democracies are discussed in the 
literature as a subtype of consensus democracy that in particular attempts 
to integrate several large minorities. They make greater demands on the 
division of power and the autonomy of segments of society in terms of the 
central decision-making bodies (Lijphart 1999: 41). Examples of consocia-
tional democracies are Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria (Lehm-
bruch 1979). Consociationalism is also part of the veto player index of 
Manfred G. Schmidt (2002a).
 Consensus and negotiated democracies, moreover, are often seen as 
complementary to corporatist decision-making. Lijphart and Crepaz 
(1991) and Lijphart (1999) have integrated the notion of corporatism into 
the measurement of consensus democracies, along with a wide variety 
of other indicators such as the independence of central banks, the bal-
ance of power between parliamentary chambers, and the power of the 
executive. The claim is that “corporatism is the interest group system that 
goes together with the consensual type of democracy and its opposite, the 
‘pluralist’ interest group system, goes together with majoritarian democ-
racy” (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991: 235). Under the very broad assumptions 
of a “structural affinity” between consensus democracies and corporatism 
(Keman and Pennings 1995: 274), the relevance of the extent of consensus 
societies and corporatist interventions by governments becomes immedi-
ately obvious, if not altogether self-evident. In consensus democracies, the 
political elites have reacted to cultural segmentation by including broad 
groups of society in decision-making processes. These elites have em-
ployed the same mechanism for “stabilizing and steering highly developed 
capitalist economies by promoting a new type of social integration” such 
as liberal corporatism (Lehmbruch 1979: 53). The literature on consensus 
democracy has therefore tended to include corporatist decision-making 
as one of its elements.84
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 The very broad and comprehensive approach adopted towards produc-
ing a measure of consensus democracy is, however, open to criticism (Ke-
man and Pennings 1995; Armingeon 2002a; Schmidt 2000). In particu-
lar, the integration of corporatism into the executive party dimension of 
governments has been criticized on the grounds that the two phenomena 
are interrelated but empirically and theoretically distinct from each oth-
er (Keman and Pennings 1995). Empirically, it has been pointed out that 
there are important outlier countries that affect the correlation between 
the two concepts. For instance, Austria, Sweden and Norway are highly 
corporatist but not consociational or in other ways consensus societies. 
On the other hand, Italy can be classified as a non-majoritarian country, 
but not a corporatist one.
 Theoretically, Keman and Pennings (1995) point to the fact that both 
concepts are based on different actors. “Consensus democracies repre-
sents a mode of institutionalization of political actors by referring to as-
pects of parliamentary democracy, whereas corporatist interest interme-
diation represents the incorporation of societal actors typically by means 
of non-parliamentary consultation in order to avoid zero-sum outcomes 
of policy formation” (Keman and Pennings 1995: 274). The concept of 
consensus democracies versus majoritarian democracies therefore pres-
ents an alternative classification of political institutions compared to veto 
points and veto players. It is theoretically distinct from the concept of 
corporatism but empirical observations point to parallels of consensus 
and corporatist systems of decision-making.
The choice of relevant institutional factors
Th e disagreements over deﬁ nitions and the cohesiveness of indicators are 
not just academic debates. Th e question of how to resolve them is essential 
for the argument of how political institutions aﬀ ect the economic perfor-
mance and behaviour of governments. For instance, Arend Lijphart has re-
peatedly claimed that consensus democracies are kinder, gentler and better 
democracies which, moreover, show better political and economic perfor-
mance in terms of political inclusion and inﬂ ation (Lijphart 2001 and 2002). 
In reaction, Liam Anderson (2001) has shown that the superior economic 
performance of consensus democracies is primarily due to the inclusion 
of the degree of corporatism and central bank independence as part of the 
index of consensus democracy. After having controlled for the degree of 
corporatism and central bank independence, he was able to show that the 
economic eﬀ ects of the other indicators measuring consensus democra-
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cy are transformed into the opposite: consensus democracies are associ-
ated with higher inﬂ ation and higher unemployment. In addition, Klaus 
Armingeon rebels against the general claim that consensus democracies 
are superior and argues that consensus democracies are merely a form of 
government for segmented societies that does not necessarily lead to worse 
performance than majoritarian democracies (Armingeon 2002b: 99).
 The various dimensions of consensus democracies examined in the 
literature, built on research on corporatism and veto player, will not be 
developed further in this analysis. Rather, I choose to focus on political 
institutional variables that are at the core of consensus democracies inde-
pendent of their relationship to corporatism and veto players85 and the de-
gree of corporatism. In particular, I will argue that two of the key elements 
of consensus versus majoritarian democracies – whether a government 
is competitive or consensus-oriented, and the degree of fractionalization 
of the party system – can serve as potential predictors of governments’ 
willingness to negotiate with trade unions over wages.
 The argument, however, remains basically the same: a more competi-
tive and unified political system that is at the heart of a majoritarian de-
mocracy reduces the likelihood of governments negotiating with trade 
unions, while a more fragmented and cooperative system increases the 
likelihood. The argument rests on the assumption that, firstly, a more 
unified and competitive political system will find it easier to give a clear 
signal to trade unions on its expectations of wage bargaining and thereby 
shift the responsibility for it more clearly into the wage bargaining arena 
and, secondly, the system will be generally less dependent on seeking a 
consensus with other parties.86 It is thus generally assumed that a more 
fragmented party system reflects a higher degree of division of polities, 
and that in turn the dependency of political parties on trade unions will be 
higher in fragmented party systems than in unified systems. The overall 
effect of fragmentation and dependency of parties on trade unions is that 
which drives the attempts by governments to find a negotiated solution 
with the social partners.
 The argument and findings therefore broadly support the approach 
taken by Lijphart and Crepaz in assuming a systematic relationship be-
tween the structure of political institutions and interest organizations in 
general (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). It seems useful, however, to keep the 
individual indicators separate, since not all of the factors co-vary and not 
all the combinations of single factors work in the same direction. While 
there is a logical and structural affinity between the degree of political 
competition and the interest organizations which support the tendency 
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of consensus democracies to find solutions in negotiations with the social 
partners, the aim in this chapter is to distinguish between the two arenas 
of political competition and interest group organizations.
Consensus versus majoritarian governments
In order to ﬁ nd a measure of consensus democratic political institutions 
that can be distinguished from the general degree of corporatism, I have 
only used partial indicators that are widely seen as indicating consensus 
democracy. In tables 5.1 and 5.2, two main indicators of consensus versus 
majoritarian democracies are depicted. Th e ﬁ rst measure is the type of 
government that distinguishes a competitive from a cooperative political 
system; the second is the fractionalization of the party system. Th e type of 
government and fractionalization of the party system do not necessarily 
co-vary. In principle, a more fragmented party system makes the forma-
Table 5.1 Eﬀ ective number of parliamentary parties, 1970-98
1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1980-98
Austria 2.28 2.50 3.51 3.01
Belgium 6.53 8.46 9.63 9.05
Denmark 5.46 5.46 4.79 5.13
Finland 5.96 5.75 5.90 5.83
France 5.16 4.40 6.04 5.22
Germany 2.91 3.28 3.76 3.52
Ireland 2.80 2.96 3.88 3.32
Italy 3.83 4.37 6.80 5.59
Netherlands 5.99 4.08 4.92 4.50
Portugal 3.74 3.47 3.02 3.25
Spain 4.31 3.64 3.57 3.61
Sweden 3.54 3.53 4.21 3.87
United Kingdom 2.85 3.03 3.13 3.08
Average 4.28 4.23 4.86 4.54
Note: the eﬀ ective number of parties carries the same information as the Rae index and is 
calculated from this index as follows: N=1/1-Rae. Index of fractionalization of the party-system 
according to Rae.
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tion of a winning coalition more diﬃ  cult. Th e more parties participate in 
a political system, the more likely is a coalition government. In practice, 
while majority party governments are frequently associated with two-party 
systems and therefore have a lower score of party fragmentation, majority 
coalition governments are as frequently based in fragmented party systems 
as minority governments (Strom 1984: 206). Both indicators, however, can 
be used to show the propensity of the political institutions to ﬁ nd negoti-
ated approaches rather than competitive unilateral ones.
 Th e type of government divides the Western European countries into 
two relatively separate groups: those countries in which governments are 
based on either single party governments or minimum-winning coalitions. 
In the period between 1970 and 1998, Austria, Germany and the United 
Kingdom were the countries in which governments were always competi-
tively organized; in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands governments 
were predominantly formed on a competitive basis. In the Scandinavian 
and Southern European countries, on the other hand, governments were 
primarily formed on a cooperative or consensus-seeking basis. Minority 
governments were to be found for most of the period in question in Den-
mark and Sweden; France, Finland and Italy had surplus coalitions. As ex-
pected, the United Kingdom had the strongest competitive political system, 
followed however by the two corporatist countries Germany and Austria.
 Th is assessment is reinforced by the fractionalization of the party sys-
tem as shown in table 5.2. Again the uk, Austria, Germany and Ireland are 
the countries with the lowest degrees of fractionalization of the the party 
systems, followed by Portugal, Sweden and Spain. Party systems were sub-
stantially more fragmented in Belgium and Finland, followed by Denmark, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. Th e fractionalization of the party system 
increases over time on average and in most of the countries. Only in the 
transition countries, Spain and Portugal, and the Netherlands is the party 
system of the 1990s more uniﬁ ed than it was during the 1970s. Th ere is a 
positive correlation between the type of government and the fractionaliza-
tion of the party system, although it is not very strong (0.59, not signiﬁ cant).
 What is the relationship between government intervention and the two 
measures discussed above? Based on the use of the government interven-
tion index, table 5.3 displays the means of annual observations of govern-
ment intervention by the type of government and the fractionalization of 
the party system.
 The pattern of the data shows that both aspects of negotiated democra-
cies positively contribute to the propensity of governments to intervene 
in wage bargaining procedures. Competitive types of governments in uni-
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fied party systems have a low degree of government intervention, while 
strongly consensus-based governments in fragmented party systems have 
the highest degree of government intervention. Both aspects of consensus 
democracies, the party system and the type of government, contribute to 
the propensity to intervene. Within unified party systems, the move from 
a competitive to a consensus type of government increases the average 
degree of government intervention from 1.38 to 2.58 throughout the pe-
riod of the 1980s and 1990s. While all governments in fragmented party 
systems are on average more likely to intervene in wage bargaining, this 
effect is again increased by moving from a competitive to a consensus 
government. As expected, the pattern is stronger in the period between 
1980 and 1998 than for the overall period. In that period, the move from a 
unified to a fragmented party system within the group of competitive gov-
ernments has the strongest effect on government intervention. This effect 
indicates that the degree of party competition influences the position of 
governments vis-à-vis trade unions.
Table 5.2  Type of government, Western Europe
Frequency of type of government, 1970-98 Minimal 
winning 
one party 
cabinet (%)
single 
party 
government
minimal 
winning 
coalition
surplus 
coalition
single 
party 
minority
multi-
party 
minority
1971-96
Austria 11 16 2 65.1
Belgium 26 3 28.8
Denmark 4 10 15 23.9
Finland 3 25 1 6.0
France 3 18 5 3 63.5
Germany 29 46.2
Italy 4 16 2 3 9.2
Ireland 7 15 4 3 57.3
Netherlands 21 6 37.3
Sweden 1 3 19 5 41.4
United 
Kingdom
27 1 93.3
Note: no data on Portugal and Spain available.
Sources: for columns 2-6, Armingeon, Beyeler et al. (2002) and own calculations; for column 7, 
Lijphart (1999). 
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 A combined measure of party system fragmentation and the type of 
government using the two Lijphart indicators can be found by simple fac-
tor analysis, which produces a standardized score for consensus govern-
ment based on the two indicators.87 The bivariate plot in figure 5.1 of the 
Table 5.3  Government intervention by the competitive nature of the government and 
fractionalization of the party system (observation per cell), 1970-98 and 
1980-98
Competitive governments Consensus governments
1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98
Uniﬁ ed party system 1.72
(123)
1.38
 (78)
2.14
(42)
2.58 
(24)
Fragmented party system 3.16
(103)
3.00
(72)
3.21
(47)
3.45
(31)
Note: Portugal and Spain are not included due to data availability.
Sources: for party system fractionalization and type of government, Armingeon, Beyeler et al. 
(2002).
Figure 5.1 State intervention and consensus democracy
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standardized score of consensus government and government interven-
tion for the period 1980-98 illustrates the relationship. There is a corre-
lation between the standardized score on consensus democracy and the 
degree of government intervention of r = 0.77**. It shows that in stronger 
consensus democracies, governments are more likely to negotiate an in-
comes policy than in majoritarian democracies.
 The shared roots of consensus democracy and corporatist 
responses: the political fragmentation of trade unions and the role 
of union-party relations
The fragmentation of party systems and the type of government are not 
directly related to the attitude of governments to wage bargaining. The 
assumptions made in the literature have been largely based on the general 
attitude of political elites in dealing with conflictual situations. Consen-
sus orientation has evolved in segmented political systems in which large 
minorities that could not be circumvented or oppressed had to be inte-
grated into decision-making (Lehmbruch 1979; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). 
In a similar situation, it was argued, political elites tend to negotiate with 
trade unions over the need to restrain wages rather than merely confront 
them with a restrictive monetary policy alone.
 In majoritarian countries, on the other hand, it is argued that political 
elites are accustomed to an approach of unilateral decision-making by 
the government that may or may not be restricted by other constitutional 
players, but not by other political actors within the parliamentary or par-
ty system. As a consequence, their approach towards organized interests 
would be more distant and not oriented towards negotiation.
 In this section, another factor supporting the relationship between 
consensus democracies and negotiations on incomes policy will be intro-
duced that has not been addressed systematically. The political fragmen-
tation of party systems in Western Europe corresponds to the political 
fragmentation of trade union systems. The fragmentation of trade unions 
has two implications. First, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, it under-
mines the responsiveness of wage bargaining actors to the new economic 
environment and thereby gives rise to a more active role of the government 
in shifting workers’ expectations. Second, the political fragmentation of 
trade unions is directly related to the fragmentation of party systems. 
Fragmented political party systems go hand-in-hand with fragmented po-
litical trade union systems, although not in all cases. The overlapping is 
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high and not symmetrical. For instance, politically split trade unions are 
always reflected in the party system while not all political cleavages in the 
party system are mirrored by trade union organizations. This is due to the 
higher degree of dynamism of party systems that are generally more open 
to the formation of new cleavages.
 The fragmentation on both sides gives rise to a negotiated approach by 
governments when dealing with difficult economic policy decisions, since 
there is no clear commitment from a strong majoritarian government to 
enforce the view of a reduced bargaining scope for wage bargainers. Rath-
er, political conflicts between trade unions with different political affilia-
tions and between different parties in coalitions that are tied to different 
trade unions hinder the necessary adjustment. Also, multi-party systems 
give trade unions more opportunities for access to the government and a 
greater bargaining power. The political divisions of trade unions increase 
not only the competition between the unions but also the degree of com-
petition between those political parties that have to take into account the 
demands of individual unions to a greater extent than in systems where 
trade unions are a unified political actor.
Frozen landscapes of party systems and trade union organizations
In Western Europe, the historical evolution of trade unions is based on 
several cleavages that have led to a frozen landscape of several types of 
trade union organizations (Ebbinghaus 1993). Trade unions have followed 
the society-church splits of European societies and the political split on 
the left into socialist and communist camps. In many cases, these organi-
zational cleavages within trade union movements have been matched by 
organizational cleavages in party systems.
 Table 5.4 illustrates the party-union links and indicates the systematic 
pattern between fragmented party systems and politically divided trade 
union systems. As it turns out, the most politically unified trade union 
and party systems are to be found in countries as diverse as the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, Germany and to some extent Sweden. In Swe-
den, however, the party system is more fragmented due to a number of 
parties in opposition to the dominant Social Democrats. In all five coun-
tries, both the political parties on the left and the trade union umbrella 
organization enjoy a unified link with each other that is not threatened by 
competitive rivals.
 The party-union linkage is most direct in the cases of Sweden and the 
uk. In both cases, the trade unions founded the social democratic party 
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Table 5.4  Political aﬃ  liations of major trade union confederations in Western Europe
Union 
confede-
ration
Aﬃ  liated  
party
Party-union link Share of left 
party in gvt. 
(1970-2000)
Austria ÖGB SPÖ No formal ties between the ÖGB 
and political parties; however trade 
union leaders frequently hold high-
ranking oﬃ  ces within the SPÖ. 
Trade union is ex oﬃ  cio at party 
conferences.
68.1
Belgium ABVV/ FGTB BSP Formal aﬃ  liation of the Socialist 
Union Confederation to the party.
33.2
ACV/ CSC CVP Unions provide candidates for 
political oﬃ  ces.
ACLV/ CGSLB VLD, PRL No oﬃ  cial link.
Denmark LO SD Formal ties between LO and SD. 
Union is automatically represented 
and provides ﬁ nancial support.
49.0
Finland SAK SDP Informal ties between SAK and 
SDP in competition with Finnish 
Peoples’ Democratic League.
40.7
France CGT PCF Unions support PCF; General 
Secretary has a position in PCF 
political bureau.
37.2
FO PS Informal links.
CFTC
CFDT
MRP
UDF
Personal links (CFDT).
Germany DGB SPD Uniﬁ ed trade union structure 
prohibits direct party aﬃ  liation. 
In reality, majority of unions are 
strongly related to the SPD, with 
only minor interconnection with 
CDU.
37.5
CDU Minor representation between 
CDU and DGB.
Ireland ICTU Labour Party Labour Party founded by unions; 
formal. 
14.5
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and traditionally exercised a high degree of control over the party leader-
ship. In both cases, the strong integration has led to a strict division of 
labour between the role of the party and the role of the union. However, 
the internal organizational structures of the unions mean that there are 
different bases for this division of labour. In Sweden, the impact of a social 
Table 5.4  Political aﬃ  liations of major trade union confederations in Western Europe
Union 
confede-
ration
Aﬃ  liated  
party
Party-union link Share of left 
party in gvt. 
(1970-2000)
Italy CGIL PCI, PDS Personal links, relaxed since 
the beginning of the 1970s; 
reorganization in 1992.
29.1
CISL DC
UIL PSI
Nether-
lands
FNV PvdA Union leaders often represented 
on executive boards of parties.
24.6
CNV CDA
Portugal CGTP PC Close ties. 25.5
UGT PSD/PS Founded by PSD in 1979.
Spain CCOO PCE Close ties. 52.0
UGT PSOE Personal links.
Sweden LO SAP Union involved in the founding of 
the party; union leaders have high 
inﬂ uence over party leadership.
70.9
UK TUC Labour Party Unions founded Labour Party. 
Individual unions are still aﬃ  liated 
to the party and have block votes 
at national congress; however, 
comparatively low inﬂ uence on 
party politics.
30.0
Note: data on party in government for Spain 1977-98 and for Portugal 1974-98.
Sources: for Finland Arter (1987); for Ireland Hardiman (1988); for Spain and Portugal Magone 
(2001); for all other countries Ebbinghaus (1993), Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), Western 
(1997: 69-70); for share of left governments Armingeon et al. (2002), and own calculations.
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democratic political understanding of an organized market economy and 
the cooperation between economic policy and wage restraint has been 
explicit. In the uk, however, due to the fragmentation of wage bargain-
ing and the lack of control on the part of the trade union leadership, this 
understanding has never clearly developed.
 Also, in Austria and Germany, the unification of the labour movement 
in the post-war period was matched by a unification of the political left. 
In both cases, due to the legal underpinning of the unification of the trade 
union organizations, political representation of other factions had to be 
organized within the framework of the trade union organizations. In Ger-
many, at least one position on the executive board of the union is reserved 
for a member of the Christian Democratic Union (cdu). In Austria, the 
unions have internal political wings that compete in elections against 
each other. Therefore, within the unions and in their relations to the par-
ties that carry the government, the political allegiances of the Austrian 
and German trade unions are less clear than in the cases of Sweden and 
the uk. In all four cases – but in particular in the case of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom – it can be assumed that government intervention is less 
likely to occur due to the clear and undisputed political linkages. If the 
social democratic party has wholeheartedly agreed to pursue a more dis-
ciplinary approach towards wage bargaining, it has no real need to negoti-
ate with the unions about it, since the unions have no alternative political 
force that they can lobby instead of the social democrats. At the same 
time, for other political parties not on the left, the incentive to negotiate 
with trade unions is minimal because they will not enjoy the support of 
trade unions in electoral campaigns in any case and might have a higher 
price to pay for cooperation.
 Ireland is an exceptional case since it emulates a number of the charac-
teristics of the British political system, which are, however, overshadowed 
by the conflict over national independence from the uk. On the one hand, 
the Irish Labour Party was founded by the Irish trade unions and has been 
dependent on the unions in a similar way to the British Labour Party. On 
the other hand, the national conflict has become the overriding cleavage 
of Irish politics and has greatly reduced the influence of the Irish Labour 
Party. Among the countries here, the Irish Labour Party is the least influ-
ential left-wing party of all parties on the left.
 In contrast, the remaining Western European countries all have to deal 
with political cleavages within the trade union organizations. The differ-
ent political affiliations of unions to political parties that are represented 
in parliament make it more difficult for individual parties in government 
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to forge a unified approach that can clearly display the implications of the 
new economic environment to the unions. Also, the political fragmenta-
tion of unions and parties can slow down the acceptance of the new envi-
ronment by the unions so that more government intervention is needed 
to achieve any results.
 A strong split of the political left into a social democratic and a com-
munist camp of political parties and affiliated trade unions not only in-
creases the fragmentation of the party system, but also fragments the po-
litical organization of the trade unions. In Finland, France, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal, the political cleavages on the left have had important im-
plications for left-wing governments because the political rivalry among 
the left makes it more difficult for governments to pursue a more austere 
economic policy.
 For instance, the French communist party (pcf) rejected any incomes 
policy as pursued by the French socialist party in 1982. The pcf, more-
over, continued criticizing the socialist austerity policy until it left the 
government in 1984 over economic policy.88 Therefore, the social demo-
cratic government found it more difficult to indicate to trade unions via 
its economic policy that wage restraint was essential for macroeconomic 
adjustment, but tended to adopt a more fuzzy mixture of tight monetary 
policy and looser fiscal policy. Trade union wage restraint was sought, but 
not requested, because of partisan-based constraints by social democratic 
clientele.
 Examples of tense relationships between trade unions and social demo-
cratic governments on economic policy can also be found in Spain during 
the Gonzalez government (Gillespie 1990). The president of the socialist 
trade union (ugt), Nicholas Redondo, was not only a member of parlia-
ment for the social democratic psoe but also almost became the leader 
of the socialist party in place of Gonzalez. During the Gonzalez govern-
ment, Nicholas Redondo was among the fiercest critics of the govern-
ment and led his trade union into many public sector conflicts over pay.89 
This conflictual relationship was not least rooted in the fact that the more 
oppositional communist trade union (ccoo) kept gaining ground on the 
socialist unions in workplace elections (Hamann 1998). A similar dynamic 
can be found in Italy between 1978 and 1992 when communist party-based 
opposition towards any concessions agreed by the cgil put pressure on 
the other unions not to surrender too much ground in the negotiations 
over the Scala mobile. In Portugal, the establishment of a non-communist 
trade union in the late 1970s – supervised and guided by the governing 
social democratic party – was intended to undermine the militant opposi-
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tion towards the government but first of all only succeeded in introducing 
further fragmentation into the political representation of the unions.
 Finland has been the exception to the Scandinavian compromise and 
has had much more in common with the unstable democracies of main-
land Europe. This was particularly apparent with regard to the split of 
the left in the immediate post-war period, which overshadowed most of 
the tripartite negotiations even after the cooperation between communist 
and socialist improved post-1969. As Arter has pointed out, comparing 
the politically more homogeneous Swedish situation: “In a historically di-
vided polity like Finland it is not surprising that governments have had 
a vested interest in sustaining the incomespolicy system. In an obvious 
way it has appeared to strengthen the government, enabling cabinets to 
achieve a measure of stability and continuity in the industrial relations 
field. Whilst not a signatory to incomes agreements, the state has been 
interventionist in seeking centralized deals in a way that has not been the 
case (at least until recently) in Sweden, for example” (Arter 1987: 214).
Church-based cleavages continued to play a role after World War ii in 
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands (Ebbinghaus 1993: 85). In Aus-
tria and Germany, the thorough reorganizations of the unions diminished 
the role of Catholic trade unions. In Belgium and the Netherlands, a simi-
lar attempt failed due to the resistance of the Christian labour movements 
(Ebbinghaus 1993: 95). In the late 1960s, the two church-based trade union 
organizations in France, cftc and cfdt, represented together 20 per cent 
of all trade union members. In Italy, the cisl had a third of all union mem-
bers. Similarly, in the Netherlands nkv and cnv represented a third of all 
union members. In Belgium, the acv had half of all union members.
 The relations between Christian trade unions and Christian democrat-
ic parties has traditionally been looser than between socialist parties and 
trade unions (Ebbinghaus 1993: 93), but in all cases the Christian trade 
unions possess a political counterpart to which they are at least indirectly 
related.
 In the most complex systems of party-trade union linkages, there are 
three different political constituencies in both the party system and the 
trade union organization that are systematically related: a social demo-
cratic or socialist, a communist and a Christian constituency. This combi-
nation could be found in Belgium and Italy until the early 1990s. Belgium 
and Italy are also among the countries with the highest degree of party 
system fragmentation and government intervention.
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Comparing the United Kingdom and Belgium
In this section, I will illustrate the causal links between the type of po-
litical institutions and government intervention more directly by a closer 
examination of the two extreme cases, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
The two countries are at opposite ends of the party system spectrum: Bel-
gium has the most fragmented party system and weak short-lived multi-
party governments, while the United Kingdom has the most unified party 
system and strong governments. At the same time, the Belgian govern-
ment has been the most active on the issue of wage bargaining over the 
last twenty years, while the British has been the most restrained. The ex-
amples of Belgium and the United Kingdom show two important insights: 
firstly, that the various Belgian governments lacked the capacity, not the 
will, to adjust to the challenges and, secondly, that in the United Kingdom 
the absence of government-trade union coordination is not exclusively 
due to the weak organization of the labour market but also attributable 
to the majoritarian nature of the political system. It is not by chance that 
Belgium and the United Kingdom have been chosen by Arend Lijphart to 
illustrate benchmark cases of consensus versus majoritarian democracies 
(Lijphart 1999).
 Belgium was first chosen by Lijphart to represent a classic case of a 
consensus model of democracy (Lijphart 1999). Starting as a three-party 
system in the late 1960s (with the Christian Democrats, Socialists and 
Liberals), the parties in Belgium have split over time along linguistic lines 
and several new parties have attained importance. About a dozen politi-
cal parties have been able to gain seats in national elections; nine of them 
have participated in the government (Lijphart 1999: 36). During the 1990s, 
the fragmentation of the party system even increased with an additional 
split between Flemish and Walloon parties (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 
1996: 209). Governments usually consist of many parties although they 
rarely constitute a surplus or minority government. Due to the multitude 
of parties and cleavages, the average life span of a Belgian government is 
particularly short: between 1970 and 1998, there were eighteen changes in 
government. On several occasions over the post-war period, there have 
been governments of national unity in which all three of the major parties 
have participated.
 Given the organizational links between political parties and trade 
unions as described in the previous section, Belgium’s governments have 
found it difficult to govern in ‘opposition to the unions’. At least one 
party with close ties to at least one segment of the labour market has 
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been represented in the government for most of the post-war period (Van 
Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996: 211). On several occasions the unions have 
been able to form an alliance against governments that had begun to turn 
against the interest of the unions. Combined trade union opposition has 
also been able to bring about changes in the government.
 At the same time, the trade unions have been in competition with each 
other. Competition between Belgian trade unions is played out in works 
council elections that are widely seen as indicative of the representative 
nature of the unions. Competition has been sharpened by the fact that 
the two biggest confederations, the acv/csc and the abvv/fgtb, have 
exchanged dominance over time. While in the 1950s the fgtb was by far 
the strongest union with almost 60 per cent of the works council seats, 
with the csc having 37 percent, this relationship had reversed by the mid-
1990s. Independent of partisan considerations, the competition between 
trade unions per se has led to obstruction of government policies that 
could hurt trade union constituencies.
 The relationship between government and wage bargaining actors is 
therefore characterized by mutual dependency. The two main political 
parties that alternated or shared in government throughout the post-
war period were tightly linked to the labour movement. Even when the 
government realized the urgency of adjusting to the new situation in the 
early 1980s, no party managed to distance itself from the demands of the 
bargaining actors. In 1982, the centre-right government sought special 
powers approved by the Senate to impose wage decrees on the social part-
ners rather than decouple the links between the Christian Democrats and 
trade unions.90 Although frequently attacked by the trade unions, no Bel-
gian government has really attempted to curtail or restructure the party-
union relations in a complex multi-party system.91
 The economic policy-making by wage decrees had the effect that nec-
essary steps could be taken without the unions having to accept respon-
sibility for the measures. The social partners could therefore shift the 
blame of adjustment from the wage bargaining arena to the government. 
Over time, a pattern evolved in which the social partners were increas-
ingly unable to agree on adjustment since they were able to anticipate in-
tervention by the government as a solution to deadlock (Van Ruysseveldt 
and Visser 1996: 218). Hence the government not only lacked the capacity 
to distance itself from the demands of the social partners but was also 
unable to confine their room for manoeuvre. The government was con-
sistently forced to carry forward economic adjustment processes without 
shifting the responsibility for maladjustment of wages back into the wage 
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bargaining arena. In consequence, negotiations about wages remained a 
government responsibility without the government ever having the op-
tion to deregulate wage formation.
 In contrast, British Westminster democracy is the role model for all 
political systems in countries that have been under British control and 
that now form the group of majoritarian countries in Lijphart’s study. 
The British party system is in effect a two-party system with the govern-
ment alternating between two choices. The third party is represented by 
the former second large party, the Liberals, which merged with the social 
democrats in the late 1980s to form the Liberal Democrats. In practice, 
however, the third party does not play an influential role since the large 
parties frequently achieve almost 90 per cent of the votes and more than 
95 per cent of the seats in parliament. In the post-war period, no third 
party has ever participated in government. Changes in government have 
alternated between the two major parties.
 The dominant parties in the British political system are the Conserva-
tive Party and the Labour Party. Both parties enjoy exceptionally clear 
relations with the trade unions. Unlike the tradition of many Christian 
democratic parties or even liberal parties on the Continent, the British 
Conservative Party does not have any formal relations with the Trade 
Union Congress (tuc) or with its affiliated trade unions. There is no 
channel for influencing the Conservative Party from a trade union per-
spective. Since the Labour Party has been founded by the trade unions, 
the vast majority of trade unions have been officially affiliated to the party 
and have remained its main source of funding.
 The two-party system, however, gives both political parties – not just 
the Conservative Party – a greater leeway in their positioning vis-à-vis 
trade unions. This is partly due to the electoral system that gives the gov-
erning party a larger than proportional majority in parliament and there-
by frees the government from worrying about fringe demands. Secondly, 
the two-party system also allows Labour to be relatively negligent about 
trade union interests since there is no alternative political force that trade 
unions can potentially turn to. Whether or not a governing Labour Party 
pursues trade union interests has little effect on the traditional close rela-
tionship between the party and the trade unions.
 Therefore, despite the tight links between the Labour Party and the 
trade unions, in effect the majoritarian political institutions insulate any 
government from the demands of any lobby organization, including trade 
unions and employers’ confederations. This allows governments to take a 
clear stand on economic policy and wage bargaining issues and to shift the 
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responsibility for labour market performance to the collective bargaining 
arena if it wishes to do so. In contrast, the incomes policy of the British 
government during the 1960s and 1970s – both Conservative and Labour 
governments – was based on the assumption that the British government 
should shoulder the responsibility for employment performance while ac-
cepting free collective bargaining. In these cases, the government pleaded 
for wage restraint with trade unions incapable of providing this, without 
being really prepared to concede much in exchange. Once the government 
effectively dropped this responsibility with the change of government in 
1979, there was no need or incentive to ever deal with wage-related issues 
directly.
 It is important to note that it is also the majoritarian nature of its po-
litical institutions that distinguishes the British case from other cases in 
this book – and not simply the country’s strong degree of voluntarism and 
decentralization of wage bargaining structures. The low degree of central-
ization of British wage bargaining has been blamed for the collapse of in-
comes policy (Scharpf 1991; Regini 1984). While the British labour market 
has been exceptionally deregulated and voluntarist, there are a number 
of other European cases where trade unions also have only slight control 
over local wage bargaining issues, such as Italy and Ireland or, in some 
respects of wage drift, even Sweden and Denmark. The Irish industrial 
relations system has many parallel features with the British. However, the 
fact that the Irish and Italian governments have turned towards negotia-
tion and the British government towards further deregulation and absten-
tion is due to the country’s political isolation from trade union pressure. 
Moreover, a number of other European governments would have liked 
to follow the British example of radically cutting their ties with the trade 
unions, but found themselves unable to do so.92 Even the Belgian govern-
ment of 1981 realized that major steps on the labour market were neces-
sary if adjustment to the new situation was to occur.
 After the change of government in 1979, the British government met 
fierce opposition from the trade unions. However, the unions were un-
able to deliver on this opposition in political terms. During the 1980s, the 
Conservative Party won elections with little more than 40 per cent of the 
votes and was able to achieve a large majority in parliament. The strong 
executive position of the government enabled a strong prime minister to 
be immune to further requests for social and trade union protection.
 In sum, institutional constraints on governments directly influence 
their propensity to negotiate wage restraint with trade unions. These 
institutional constraints can be identified as the core attributes of ma-
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joritarian versus consensus democracies. A fragmented party system and 
multi-party governments are both conducive to open lobbying pressure 
by trade unions on the government to take up negotiations. The politi-
cal institutional factors are particularly well suited to explain the shift in 
behaviour by the British government after the change of power in 1979. 
The majoritarian nature of the British political system allowed the Brit-
ish government to disregard political pressures by trade unions and thus 
opened the way to deregulation, which was not possible in consensual 
democracies.
 The role of partisanship
Besides the institutional constraints that influence the capacity of a gov-
ernment, partisanship has been in the past a major explanatory variable 
for economic policy choice.93 In this section, I test the extent to which 
– and over which time periods – a relationship exists between patterns of 
partisanship and of government intervention.
 Partisanship theories of economic policy have frequently assumed that 
different political parties will tend to exploit in different ways the trade-
off between unemployment and inflation in the short-term Phillips curve. 
The arguments used are ultimately based on the distinctions drawn by 
Hibbs on the relationship between voters and parties. Different classes of 
voters have different preferences in economic policy, prompting politi-
cal parties that draw their support from these classes to respond to these 
preferences (Hibbs 1977). According to Hibbs, left-wing parties draw their 
support from working people who benefit from full employment and 
therefore favour expansionary policies in order to achieve high employ-
ment levels. Conservative parties, on the other hand, are more concerned 
about fighting inflation by focusing on a balanced budget and controlling 
the money supply at the expense of full employment.
 While the partisanship argument of economic policy by Hibbs provides 
an elegant explanation for the 1960s, two major modifications have had 
to be made since. Firstly, the breakdown of the long-term Phillips curve 
in the 1970s diminished the scope for partisanship in economic policy. 
Because an expansionary economic policy as pursued by left-wing gov-
ernments tended to become inflationary, workers would try to catch up 
with higher prices and thereby dampen the expansionary effect of the pol-
icy. The effects of an expansionary policy were anticipated by economic 
agents and quickly translated into rising prices. Left-wing governments 
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could therefore attempt only in the short run to boost economic perfor-
mance by expansion; in the long run, left-wing governments had to coun-
teract the inflationary implications of their policies (Alesina, Roubini et 
al. 1997).94
 Secondly, the effectiveness of expansionary economic policy was in-
creasingly seen as being dependent on the organization of the labour mar-
ket and the capacity of trade unions to engage in moderate wage bargain-
ing (Scharpf 1991; Lange and Garrett 1985). Governments can only boost 
the economy if expansion is not undermined by inflationary tendencies. 
It was therefore argued that the responses made by trade unions were the 
precondition for a social democratic economic policy. If trade unions do 
not respond to an expansionary policy in a responsible way, even left-
wing governments are eventually forced to return to deflationary poli-
cies rather than commit themselves to further expansionary approaches 
(Lange and Garrett 1985; Alvarez et al. 1991).
 Th erefore, the restrictions that are placed upon political parties when 
exercising their preferred economic policy are tight, and institutional pre-
conditions for economic policy are important. However, at the same time, 
partisanship continues to matter on a number of policy issues and there is 
little reason to assume that the underlying preference order – of left-wing 
parties preferring employment over price stability while conservative par-
ties have the reverse order of preferences – is completely obsolete (Wid-
maier 1989: 52; Schmidt 1996). Assuming that partisan preferences for full 
employment versus price stability are still salient, the institutional frame-
work in which their economic policy operates makes the eﬀ ectiveness of 
the policy dependent on the responses by wage bargaining actors and other 
economic agents. Nevertheless, a left-wing government, which is assumed 
to put a higher premium on employment than a right-wing government, 
faces stronger pressure to ensure that wage bargaining actors respond to 
its economic policy by showing wage restraint. One could therefore as-
sume that, in principle and in any institutional setting, left-wing govern-
ments are more likely to intervene in wage bargaining procedures than 
right-wing governments. According to this view, government intervention 
becomes the functional equivalent to wage bargaining coordination.
My findings, presented in table 5.5, give some broad support for the par-
tisan thesis. In general, right-wing governments tend to intervene less 
in wage bargaining procedures than left-wing governments. This was 
particularly evident during the 1970s when incomes policy was seen as 
a suitable tool for supporting the Keynesian crisis management in many 
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social democratic countries. But government intervention by left-wing 
governments was even more pronounced during the 1990s in the run-up 
to European Monetary Union. It was only during the transition period of 
the 1980s, when tight monetary policy diffused throughout Western Eu-
rope as an anti-inflationary device and concertation on wage formation 
had been seriously discredited in economic policy-making that left-wing 
governments did not intervene more frequently in wage bargaining than 
conservative governments.
 Moreover, the data fits in with the ‘congruence’ thesis propounded by 
Lange and Garrett (1985) for the period of the 1970s in the sense that there 
is an interaction between the degree of corporatism and government pol-
icy towards trade unions. Since the economic policy by the government is 
contingent on the reaction by the trade unions, the interaction between 
the partisanship of the government and the capacity of trade unions to 
restrain wages can be divided into congruent and less congruent regimes. 
Lange and Garrett have assumed that an expansionary, employment-fo-
cused economic policy adopted by a left-wing government would be ben-
eficial only under the condition that trade unions were encompassive and 
wage bargaining was comprehensive. If we assume that government inter-
vention is an attempt to prompt trade unions to restrain wages where the 
conditions are not right for wage bargaining responsiveness, we should 
expect this strategy by a left-wing government to be most likely found 
in non-corporatist countries, since in corporatist countries centralized 
trade unions would find a more consensual way of entering into coordi-
nated wage bargaining.
Table 5.5  Partisanship of government and government intervention per decade 
(observation per cell), 1970-98 
1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 1970-98
Cabinet dominated by non-
left-wing parties
2.38
(65)
2.51
(95)
2.38
(86)
2.43
(246)
Cabinet dominated by left-
wing parties
2.87
(45)
2.51
(35)
2.95
(57)
2.81
(137)
Cabinet composition based on Schmidt index: Cabinet dominated by right-wing and centre 
parties (gov_left<51); cabinet dominated by social democratic and other left parties (gov_
left>50). 
Sources: Armingeon, Beyeler et al. (2002); own calculations.
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The findings in table 5.6 present some evidence that right-wing govern-
ments are less affected in their policy choice by the degree of wage bar-
gaining centralization, while governments that are dominated by left-wing 
parties change their approach towards trade unions depending on the de-
gree of coordination of wage bargaining. In non-corporatist countries, 
governments are particularly active at persuading trade unions to mod-
erate wage claims; in corporatist countries, they can assume more easily 
that trade unions will tend to comply with their economic policy.
 There is, however, a trend in the data over the decades that mirrors the 
changing nature of the interaction between governments and trade unions 
particularly well: the strongest incidence of government intervention 
took place in the non-corporatist countries during the 1970s, reflecting 
the strong wish of left-wing governments to lure trade unions into coop-
eration even in countries that lack the necessary organizational precondi-
tions in the labour market. The examples of the United Kingdom and Italy 
have been frequently analysed as unsuitable attempts by governments to 
engage with particularistic trade unions in corporatist exchanges (Regini 
1984; Pizzorno 1978). The 1970s are therefore the prime example of the 
attempt by left-wing governments to find a solution to a ‘non-congruent’ 
situation by intervening in wage bargaining. However, over time, left-wing 
Table 5.6  Government intervention by partisanship of government and degree of 
corporatism (observation per cell), 1970-99
Corporatist Non-corporatist
70-79 80-89 90-99 70-99 70-79 80-89 90-99 70-99
Cabinet 
dominated by 
the left
2.70
(40)
1.90
(20)
3.13
(31)
2.67
(91)
4.20
(5)
3.33
(15)
2.73
(26)
3.09
(46)
Cabinet not 
dominated by 
the left 
2.90
(30)
2.58
(50)
1.98
(46)
2.44
(126)
1.94
(35)
2.42
(45)
2.85
(40)
2.42
(120)
Cabinet composition based on Schmidt index: Cabinet dominated by social democratic 
and other left parties (gov_left>50). Cabinet not dominated by the left (gov_left<51). 
Corporatism by country classiﬁ cation: corporatist countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. Non-corporatist countries are Ireland, UK, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and France.
Sources: Armingeon, Beyeler et al. (2002); own calculations.
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governments have become increasingly disillusioned with the attempts to 
discipline trade unions in non-corporatist settings and government inter-
vention has declined. Conversely, for right-wing governments the trend is 
the opposite. While during the 1970s right-wing governments tended to 
refrain from political exchanges with trade unions, they tended to inter-
vene increasingly in later years, albeit under the conditions of a non-ac-
commodating economic policy.
 In the corporatist countries, some evidence is found for the ‘congruent 
argument’ as well, though again this is conditioned by changes over time. 
In these countries, right-wing governments intervened more forcefully 
than left-wing governments during the 1970s, in particular in Finland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. However, in the 1980s and 1980s, the right-
wing governments in these countries tended not to engage in government 
intervention any more. Left-wing governments, on the other hand, were 
particularly interventionist in the corporatist countries during the 1990s, 
when previous adjustment attempts failed.
Consequently, when the potential for expansionary economic policies 
disappeared, the arguments of the ‘congruency assumption’ were re-
versed. In the 1990s, it was more likely for a right-wing than a left-wing 
government to intervene in wage formation in a non-corporatist country, 
whereas in corporatist countries left-wing governments intervened more 
strongly than right-wing governments. The assumption therefore that in 
corporatist countries the interaction between left-wing governments and 
trade unions is based on a shared strategy of expansion and wage restraint 
has clearly eroded. Since expansionary policies are only rarely available 
any more, left-wing governments in corporatist settings will intervene in 
wage bargaining in order to shift trade unions’ expectations to the new 
realism of non-accommodation. To the extent that voluntary wage re-
straint also hits the public sector, left-wing parties in government might 
face partisan-based restrictions by their constituencies or parliamentary 
supporters. This plays out particularly convincingly in coalition govern-
ments comprising both left- and right-wing political parties, where the 
government’s position on wage restraint might be torn between conserva-
tive and left-wing members of the cabinet undermining the government’s 
resolve on the issue.
 This task might be further complicated by the ambiguity of left-wing 
governments. Social democratic parties have remained highly ambigu-
ous about their economic policies and have traditionally tried to shift the 
negative impact of tight monetary policies onto expansive fiscal policies 
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that relied on public spending and employment schemes, even after pub-
lic finances had deteriorated substantially. For instance, social democratic 
governments or governments with a considerable social democratic input 
were often unclear about the tightness of their economic policies even 
after they had adopted a strict hard currency strategy. The less likely it 
seems that the government would actually press ahead with tight mon-
etary and fiscal policies, the more likely it is that trade unions might push 
up wages, the threat of unemployment being diminished.
 A good example of the lack of government resolve on wage restraint is 
the Dutch centre-left coalition of 1981/82. Here, the stronger conservative 
party under Prime Minister Van Agt had been preparing signiﬁ cant public 
cuts in the budget after receiving strong criticism from the Dutch central 
bank on the question of public spending, while the junior social democrat-
ic partner in the government under ex-Prime Minister Den Uyl proposed 
a major employment scheme (Wolinetz 1989). When the two conservative 
parties in the government (the cda and vvd) pushed through the spend-
ing cuts against the will of the social democrats, the latter left the govern-
ment. As soon as the social democrats had left the government, the prime 
minister announced the abolition of wage indexation.95 Almost exactly the 
same happened in Ireland in January 1987, when Labour left the coalition 
government with Fine Gael over spending cuts after experiencing ongoing 
disputes with public sector trade unions in preceding years.96
 Conservative governments found it easier to display commitment to 
such restraint since their constituency would not be affected by wage re-
straint. Moreover, the distant relationship between conservative parties 
and trade unions enabled them to adopt a clear policy towards the trade 
unions.97 Consequently, new tripartite agreements were struck after the 
government swung to the right in the Netherlands in 1982 and in Ireland 
in 1987, with the incoming governments being determined not to repeat 
the stalemates of the previous administrations (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997; Hardiman 2002).
 In contrast to accounts of political exchanges during the 1970s, gov-
ernment intervention in the 1990s was not based on an understanding 
between friendly social democratic parties and trade unions but rather 
on a mutually beneficial master plan. Trade unions would restrain wages 
if there were signals from governments that excessive wage settlements 
would be punished. Social democratic parties in government found it 
much harder to suggest and pursue a tight policy. Incomes policy based 
on the condition of tight economic policy might therefore be more attrac-
tive for conservative governments than for left-wing governments.
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 Conclusion: Negotiated adjustment and the role of political 
institutions
In the two realms of academic research on consensus democracies and 
neo-corporatism, there has traditionally been a great area of overlap. Po-
litical scientists who have studied political institutions have incorporated 
the role of interest associations as one indicator of consensus democra-
cies. Those who have studied neo-corporatism and the interaction be-
tween interest associations and the capacity of the state and governments 
have long recognized that there is a close relationship between political 
institutions and neo-corporatism. However, the systematic study of the 
relationship between neo-corporatism and political institutions has in re-
cent years subsided and the study of new forms of concertation between 
governments and the social partners has generally failed to focus on po-
litical institutions.
 Th is chapter has aimed to draw attention to the fact that governments, 
when facing diﬃ  cult economic policy choices, are restrained by the insti-
tutions of their political systems. I have attempted to show that there are 
systematic linkages between the type of government and the type of party 
system, and that these give incentives to governments to negotiate with so-
cial partners. Th e underlying argument has focused less on the traditional 
observation that in consensus societies the elite is generally socialized to 
seek consensus and more on the notion that governments ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to 
display their commitment to a tight economic policy to the social partners 
if these are deeply intertwined with the political party system.
 In addition, the chapter has shown that there is indeed a greater pro-
pensity for left-wing governments to start negotiating with trade unions. 
This observation was to be expected, since left-wing parties and Christian 
democratic parties generally have the closest links with trade unions. It 
has also been possible to show that this behaviour is especially salient 
in non-corporatist countries. This observation gives some credit to the 
congruency argument put forward by Lange and Garrett (1985): not with 
respect to economic performance, but with respect to economic policy 
choices open to left-wing governments
 Finally, the chapter has pointed out the distinct role of the majoritarian 
political institutions in the British case, which enabled governments not 
only to keep trade union concerns at arm’s length but also to abstain from 
negotiations. Despite the close relationship between the Labour Party and 
the tuc, it is the lack of competition between unions and parties over ac-
cess that insulates the government from further trade union influence.
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6 The Responsiveness of Wage Bargaining Institutions
Wage formation processes are embedded in the institutions that regu-
late the labour market. They are influenced by market developments on 
the one hand and mediated by institutional factors on the other. Market 
factors put pressure on wage bargainers to take into account the effects 
on the economy of changes in wages. External shocks, rising prices and 
high levels of unemployment alter the conditions under which wages are 
formed. Institutional factors are particularly strong in the labour market 
since wages determine the well-being of the majority of citizens. Concerns 
about social justice and the distribution of income are thereby integrally 
linked to the processes of wage setting. Since collective bargaining is car-
ried out by wage bargaining institutions, the design of these institutions 
usually has a strong impact on the conduct of bargaining.
 The shift towards restrictive monetary regimes has increased the role 
of market pressures in wage bargaining procedures. Previously, an accom-
modating monetary policy and changes in the exchange rate were policy 
instruments that buffered the trade-off between higher wages and employ-
ment performance. Incomes policies and wage restraint by trade unions 
operating in corporatist wage bargaining institutions were compensated 
for by an expansive economic policy. With the loss of these buffers, wage 
bargaining institutions had to internalize the effects of wage bargaining 
outcomes that had previously been taken care of by the government.
 This shift in the external environment of wage bargaining process has 
altered the distributional conflict in the labour market. In wage bargain-
ing, trade unions have to weigh up the interest of the membership in pro-
tecting and raising real wages on the one hand and the employment ef-
fects of wage settlements on the other. Members expect their trade union 
to raise the real wage, while the market pressure on firms imposes limits 
on their ability to pay without suffering losses in employment. This ba-
sic tension applies to any institutional wage bargaining setting. However, 
trade unions in coordinated wage bargaining institutions have tended to 
dampen real wage demands when facing high unemployment more than 
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trade unions in decentralized wage bargaining settings. Trade unions 
have thereby sacrificed their potential to raise real wages in exchange for 
employment gains. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the capacity of wage 
bargainers to implement wage moderation in corporatist countries con-
tributed to the relatively superior performance of economies with coor-
dinated wage bargaining institutions compared to those with decentral-
ized wage bargaining institutions. In non-coordinated wage bargaining 
institutions, trade unions tended to focus on real pay protection and were 
willing to sacrifice employment.
 However, under the new competitive conditions of low productivity 
increases and tight economic policy, real wages have been constrained 
throughout the oecd since the mid-1970s. In all countries, real wage 
gains have been diminished and the previously big differences in real pay 
developments have converged. Corporatist bargaining institutions have 
thus lost their competitive edge vis-à-vis deregulated bargaining systems 
(Traxler 2001).
 At the same time, in some European countries the established practice 
of centralized collective bargaining combined with the political integra-
tion of trade unions has led to expectations and rules in wage bargaining 
that have been highly focused on the protection of real wages. In particu-
lar, in those countries where previous periods of incomes policy facili-
tated the institutionalization of rules on wage indexation that fed changes 
in prices immediately into the wage formation process, wage bargainers 
have found it difficult to adjust downwards the real wage expectation of 
trade unions and their members.
 In this chapter, I will argue that governments have tried to address in 
particular the issue of adjusting wage expectations to new external condi-
tions when intervening in wage bargaining procedures. Intervention by 
the government aimed at stopping trade unions’ focus on real wage pro-
tection when the policy of governments generally was to reduce the infla-
tion differentials with Germany. This was particularly the case in those 
countries where the labour market was organized by centralized trade 
unions and employers’ association but real wage expectations were based 
on the previous regime of accommodating monetary policy and fixed 
rules on wage indexation. By intervening in the wage bargaining process, 
governments tried to influence the real wage expectation of trade unions 
and their constituencies with regard to the new economic environment.
 This chapter is distinct from the previous two chapters in that the fac-
tors discussed previously – monetary regimes and political institutions 
– do not change over time but are fixed factors that determine the room 
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for manoeuvre for governments. In contrast, the relationship between 
wage bargaining institutions and the behaviour of governments is more 
fluid and interactive, and therefore offers greater scope for developing the 
understanding of how governments try to influence wage formation. As 
such, this chapter and the next, which highlights the interactions between 
wage bargaining institutions and government behaviour, are at the core 
of the argument of this book. In broad terms, the chapter seeks to use 
the established literature on the relationship between wage bargaining 
institutions and economic performance as a starting point. It does so by 
identifying a key element within this relationship – the responsiveness of 
wage bargaining institutions to their economic environment measured by 
indicators such as the level of unemployment – that helps explain national 
differences more fully. In this analysis, and unlike much of the political 
economy literature, the degree of responsiveness is not derived from the 
institutional properties of the wage bargaining systems but from perfor-
mance indicators of wage flexibility under a given institutional regime. It 
turns out that countries with relatively similar wage bargaining institu-
tions produce different degrees of wage responsiveness.
 Th e innovations in this chapter fall into two areas. First, a statistical 
model of the responsiveness of trade unions to external factors in wage set-
tlements adds to our understanding of why, for instance, Austrian unions 
respond signiﬁ cantly in such settlements to rising unemployment while 
their counterparts in the United Kingdom hardly respond at all. Th is is pre-
sented in the second section. Subsequently, the analysis of the institutional 
basis of wage responsiveness, in the third section, takes a fresh look at fac-
tors that inﬂ uence this responsiveness by examining three such factors in 
addition to the core issue of the degree of wage bargaining coordination. In 
examining these factors – dissenting factions, exposure to the market and 
the role of wage indexation – special attention is paid to the latter aspect, 
as this has traditionally received little attention in the literature. Th e chap-
ter starts with a brief review of aspects of the literature on the relationship 
between wage bargaining institutions and economic performance.
 Theoretical assumptions about wage ﬂ exibility and the role of 
wage bargaining institutions
The neo-corporatist literature on the impact of wage bargaining institu-
tions on the performance of labour markets is extensive and will not be 
summarized here.98 In very general terms, the literature makes assump-
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WAGE FLEXIBILITY
Wages.indd   153 28-8-2006   15:43:25

tions about how institutions shape the bargaining behaviour of trade 
unions when facing the trade-off situation of choosing between pay and 
employment. Depending on the bargaining strategy of the union, wages 
are more or less oriented towards promoting employment growth. Instead 
of presenting the different facets of the literature, three aspects that are of 
importance for the subsequent arguments will be highlighted.
The role of coordination
The coordination capacity of wage bargaining institutions is the primary 
factor influencing the responsiveness of wages to changes in the exter-
nal economic environment. Since coordinated wage bargaining institu-
tions internalize the negative externalities of high wage settlements, wage 
bargainers react sensitively to the level of unemployment when setting 
wages. In order to prevent employment losses, trade unions in coordinat-
ed or centralized bargaining institutions do not exploit their bargaining 
potential. In the corporatist countries, real wage moderation facilitated 
by centralized wage bargaining institutions has become a substitute for 
labour cost flexibility (McMorrow 1996: 12).
 Economy-wide coordination mechanisms have been accepted as the 
most important factor influencing wage bargaining behaviour.99 As has 
been pointed out by David Soskice (1990) and subsequently by Traxler, 
Blaschke et al. (2001), the coordination of wage bargaining can take place 
even in organizationally decentralized wage bargaining institutions. If de-
centralized wage bargaining is organized around a pattern-setter mecha-
nism or replaced by other mechanisms such as government intervention, 
the lack of formal centralization can be compensated for.
 If there is no coordination in the wage bargaining behaviour, local wage 
bargaining will always reflect the local conditions on the labour market 
and will not be sensitive to wider economic constraints. Moreover, lo-
cal bargaining encourages leapfrogging with highly profitable companies 
influencing the expectations of workers in other companies. Local trade 
unions that are not embedded in a national bargaining system have to 
exploit their bargaining power since they do not have any reason to do 
otherwise (Soskice 1990; Flanagan 1999).
 The centralization argument has always been countered by the bar-
gaining power argument. The crux of the bargaining power argument 
concerns the effect of bargaining arrangements on the elasticity of the 
demand curve for union labour. Union bargaining power declines when 
wage increases threaten significant employment losses for union mem-
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bers. Decentralized bargaining structures tend to face highly elastic de-
mand curves, since customers can easily shift their purchases to other 
companies if a collective bargaining settlement raises wages at one com-
pany (Flanagan 2003). As a result, in the economic literature, economists 
such as Calmfors and Driffil have hypothesized a hump-shaped relation-
ship, where highly centralized and highly decentralized wage bargaining 
institutions outperform intermediate levels of centralization (Calmfors 
and Driffil 1988).
Distributive conﬂ icts
The potential of distributive conflicts to upset wage bargaining respon-
siveness has been pointed out by Iversen (1999). He argued that real wage 
restraint under highly centralized bargaining structures is dependent on 
ﬁ scal and monetary accommodation. Th is claim is based on the observa-
tion that highly centralized bargaining systems are based on a “coalition of 
diverse and conﬂ icting interests” (Iversen 1999: 29). Th e internal dynamic 
of such a system depends on the successful reconciliation of these inter-
ests. If the confederal leadership has to work out a distributive compro-
mise between high-wage unions and low-wage unions, this tends to result 
in an egalitarian wage policy because the low-wage unions can veto pro-
posals that do not have redistributive eﬀ ects. In practice, diﬀ erentiation is 
achieved through an increase in the wage drift, which, however, increases 
inﬂ ationary pressures. Th erefore, “the wage-inﬂ ationary eﬀ ects of central-
ization clearly pose a challenge to the neo-corporatist emphasis on the 
dampening effects of centralization on wage claims” (Iversen 1999: 30).
In fact, the distributive conflict argument has turned the hump-shaped 
argument and, to some extent, the whole coordination argument upside 
down. According to Iversen, under a non-accommodating monetary pol-
icy, wage restraint will be highest under intermediate bargaining central-
ization, while high levels of centralization will lead to inflationary distrib-
utive struggles that will be penalized by restrictive monetary policy. On a 
more general level it should be pointed out, however, that an accommo-
dating monetary policy can control any inflationary wage drift, whether 
it is due to distributive conflicts within centralized wage bargaining in-
stitutions or whether it is due to leapfrogging behaviour. Therefore, the 
potentially upsetting behaviour of sectoral pressure groups is not specific 
to the highly centralized Swedish model but must generally be integrated 
into the analysis of wage bargaining coordination.
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Nominal versus real wage adjustment
Under monetary integration and low inﬂ ation rates, nominal wage adjust-
ment has gained in importance, since the adjustment of the real exchange 
rate is increasingly dependent on the adjustment of the nominal wage dif-
ferential. However, the connection between labour market institutions 
and the responsiveness of wages to changing prices (nominal ﬂ exibility) 
is much less clear and has been regarded diﬀ erently by various authors. 
Th eoretically, a high degree of nominal wage responsiveness is viewed as a 
sign of beneﬁ cial labour cost ﬂ exibility. On the other hand, in the empiri-
cal literature relating to the economics of the stagﬂ ation of the 1970s, a low 
degree of wage responsiveness to prices is seen to have been beneﬁ cial for 
avoiding the worst eﬀ ects of the stagﬂ ation period since wages at the time 
did not try to catch up with inﬂ ation. As Bruno and Sachs (1985) have ar-
gued, as long as trade unions were generally competent in exercising real 
wage restraint and as long as rising prices did not immediately translate 
into wage increases through a high level of nominal wage responsiveness, a 
serious squeeze on proﬁ ts could be avoided (Bruno and Sachs 1985: 241).
 During the 1960s, wage indexation was proposed as an appropriate pay 
norm in the us wage bargaining system. Among economists like Milton 
Friedman, general systems of wage indexation were assumed to be techni-
cal formulae for reducing industrial strife and improving the responsive-
ness of wages (Braun 1976). Until today, the assessment of wage indexation 
in the economic literature has remained ambivalent.100 On the one hand, 
indexation rules are seen theoretically as being welfare enhancing since 
they automatically adjust expectations in line with changing prices. Wel-
fare gains can be made by reducing the level of uncertainty about future 
inflationary pressures. Since changes in wages can automatically adjust 
downwards if inflation goes down, indexation mechanisms were initially 
seen as an anti-inflationary device. On the other hand, this line of eco-
nomic arguments has never been popular among policy-makers (Fischer 
and Summers 1989; Milesi-Ferretti 1994).
 The different approaches towards nominal wage responsiveness derive 
primarily from the fact that a theoretical increase in nominal wage re-
sponsiveness is discussed in the context of an economic downswing in 
which nominal wages could potentially be decreased if flexibility were 
high. Here nominal wages are supposed to respond to deterioration in 
economic performance. In practice, however, a high level of nominal wage 
flexibility has traditionally meant that wages have adjusted rapidly to a 
change in prices that in itself is inflationary and puts pressure on eco-
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nomic performance. During the supply shocks of the 1970s, a low level 
of nominal wage responsiveness had positive effects because it helped 
reduce real pay, as the example of Sweden shows.
 With regard to labour market institutions, nominal wage ﬂ exibility has 
been linked to institutional features of wage bargaining procedures such as 
the duration of collective agreements, the degree of wage indexation and 
the synchronization of wage bargaining (Bruno and Sachs 1985: 238; Layard, 
Nickell et al. 1991: 429). Th ese institutional features determine how rapidly 
unexpected changes in the economic environment can feed through to 
nominal wages. If the duration of collective agreements exceeds one year, 
nominal wages cannot automatically adjust to changes in prices. On the 
other hand, wage indexation clauses introduce automatic adjustment into 
nominal wage formation. Th e synchronization of wage bargaining allows 
for a strategic adjustment of wages rather than pattern bargaining.
 With regard to the relationship between the degree of wage bargaining 
coordination and nominal wage ﬂ exibility, the theoretical assumptions are 
not clear. Calmfors (2001) argues that wage bargaining coordination po-
tentially has a positive eﬀ ect on increasing nominal wage ﬂ exibility. Higher 
levels of wage bargaining coordination automatically increase the synchro-
nization of wage bargaining. Moreover, since wage bargaining coordination 
rests on the assumption that trade unions base their decisions on economy-
wide considerations, it is thought they might be willing to exercise nominal 
responsiveness in order to allow for the interests of labour market outsid-
ers. On the other hand, there are indicators that wage bargaining coordi-
nation might reduce nominal wage ﬂ exibility. According to Alogoskouﬁ s 
and Manning (1988) and Layard et al. (1991), wages tend to respond less to 
consumer price changes in a more corporatist wage bargaining system. Em-
pirically, Bruno and Sachs do not ﬁ nd a relationship between nominal wage 
responsiveness and their measure of corporatism. “Interestingly, these two 
dimensions (corporatism and nominal wage responsiveness) are largely 
unrelated, so it appears that countries could beneﬁ t from one or the other 
of the favorable characteristics” (Bruno and Sachs 1985: 241).
 Priorities of trade unions between employment and real wage 
protection in wage bargaining – an empirical measure
One way of establishing the relationship between the relative priority of 
real wage protection and employment is to estimate the impact of the 
change in consumer prices and unemployment on changes in nominal 
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wages in a simple wage regression. I have done this by using a wage equa-
tion, with the findings presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 and figure 6.1. The 
coefficients of the change in consumer prices and of the level of unem-
ployment serve to indicate the conflicting priorities of trade unions in 
wage bargaining. A high and significant coefficient of inflation illustrates 
the attempt of the unions to protect real wages; a high and significant co-
efficient of the level of unemployment serves as a measure for the respon-
siveness to unemployment of the change in nominal wages.
The responsiveness of wage bargaining
Table 6.1 shows the coefficients of a simple wage equation that estimates 
the effects of the change in consumer prices and the level of unemploy-
ment on the change in the nominal wages of Western European countries 
between 1970 and 1999. The time span covers the period of the end of the 
so-called golden years up to 1974, the period of stagflation and the shift 
towards a tight monetary regime after the early 1980s. It does not allow 
for structural breaks.101 The aim of the wage equation is not to present a 
model with a particularly good fit, but to indicate the different degrees of 
nominal responsiveness of wage bargaining in different European coun-
tries to a changing economic environment.102
 As would be expected, in all countries a rise in consumer prices has a 
positive eﬀ ect on wages, whereas a high level of unemployment has a damp-
ening eﬀ ect on wages. Both coeﬃ  cients can only be used as rough indica-
tors of the orientation of actors when taking decisions on which bargaining 
goals to pursue. In the equations, it is assumed that these orientations are 
long term and can be averaged over the lengthy period of 30 years.
 Nevertheless, as can be seen in table 6.1, the degree to which trade 
unions decide either in favour of real wage protection or in favour of re-
sponding to unemployment levels differs substantially across Western 
Europe. Three groups can be distinguished. Firstly, there is a monetarist 
corporatist group, where nominal wages are affected by unemployment 
levels but not by changes in prices. Here, trade unions prioritize employ-
ment over real pay. Secondly, there is a real-wage corporatist group, where 
wages are affected by both. Trade unions are torn between two conflicting 
goals and only gradually come to prefer one to the other. Thirdly, we find 
a real-wage non-corporatist group, where nominal wages follow the aim 
of protecting real wages irrespective of employment effects.
 One should note that the coefficients do not indicate how real wages 
have developed in these particular countries. Over a 30-year period be-
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Table 6.1  Responsiveness of nominal wages of Western European countries, 1970-99 
Inﬂ ation Unemployment Productivity Adj R2 Durbin-Watson
Responsive to unemployment
Austria 0.23 (0.23) -2.58*** (0.44) -0.47** (0.20) 0.77 2.10
Germany 0.23 (0.16) -0.88*** (0.12) 0.00 (0.06) 0.87 1.00
Non speciﬁ ed
Sweden 0.27 (0.21) -0.55 (0.27) -0.71 (0.39) 0.62 1.27
Responsive to unemployment, but real wage protection
Italy 0.82*** (0.09) -0.98*** (0.22) 0.21 (0.25) 0.93 1.82
France 0.81*** (0.07) -0.73*** (0.10) -0.53** (0.23) 0.97 1.97
Belgium 0.89*** (0.09) -0.63*** (0.10) 0.51** (0.20) 0.91 1.07
Netherlands 1.05*** (0.15) -0.51*** (0.13) 0.47 (0.26) 0.86 1.18
Denmark 0.88*** (0.08) -0.39*** (0.11) -0.03 (0.04) 0.84 1.55
Spain 0.72*** (0.12) -0.46*** (0.12) 0.48 (0.29) 0.96 1.51
Finland 0.93*** (0.17) -0.37** (0.15) 0.16 (0.27) 0.81 0.93
Ireland 0.86*** (0.09) -0.33** (0.14) 0.25 (0.24) 0.86 1.67
Real wage protection only
Portugal 0.86*** (0.13) -1.09 (0.77) -0.18 (0.34) 0.69 1.27
United 
Kingdom
0.93*** (0.11) -0.17 (0.20) 0.02 (0.31) 0.83 2.06
Note: Non-standardized Coeﬃ  cients, ** p <0.05, ***p<0.001. Dependent Variable: change in 
nominal wages in per cent. Germany 1992 was excluded due to the high uniﬁ cation wage 
settlements. 
* The Durbin-Watson test indicates that substantial autocorrelation of the residuals in the 
cases of Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal cannot be ruled out. In the cases of 
Germany and Finland there is evidence for autocorrelation. Coeﬃ  cients were nevertheless 
interpreted since further speciﬁ cation of the models as shown in the appendix could 
justify this. However, the coeﬃ  cients should be interpreted as loose indicators for general 
tendencies. 
Independent Variables: change in consumer prices, level of unemployment, productivity 
(see Appendix). 
 Portugal since 1975, Spain since 1977 and Germany: 1992 excluded.
Source: see Appendix.
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tween 1970 and 1999, the average increase in real wages in the United 
Kingdom was exactly the same as in Germany (2.2 per cent per annum) 
with Austrian real wages rising slightly faster (2.4 per cent per annum). 
The coefficients indicate to what extent a change in consumer prices can 
predict the nominal wage change in a particular country, not to what ex-
tent wage bargaining outcomes will raise the real wage.
 Between 1970 and 1999, only Austria and Germany belong to the group 
of countries where wages reacted strongly to the requirements of a tight 
economic policy. The degree of responsiveness of wages to unemploy-
ment levels was high and the high levels of unemployment created con-
stant pressure for wage restraint. Austrian trade unions behaved in a more 
restrictive way towards unemployment levels than German unions did. 
This partly reflects the comparatively lower unemployment levels in Aus-
tria. In fact, wage developments in Austria followed the German pattern 
of restrictive wage settlements despite the more favourable labour mar-
ket situation. The coefficients are consistent with the interpretation that 
Germany was the first country that pursued a restrictive monetary policy 
from a credible and independent central bank that was immediately ac-
cepted by German trade unions (Scharpf 1991).
 The second group comprises countries in which wage bargaining out-
comes tend to react to both real wage protection and to unemployment 
levels. The group of ambivalent countries consists of most of the Western 
European countries. It is noticeable that all countries in this group have 
committed themselves to European monetary integration and thus to 
the German monetarist role model, although at different points in time. 
Within this group the tension between the real wage protection interest 
and the employment interest is greatest. Unfortunately, there are serious 
problems of autocorrelation in a number of countries, as the Durbin-Wat-
son statistics highlight.
 Thirdly, a real-wage non-corporatist type can be identified where 
nominal wage changes are highly influenced by the changes in price lev-
els, but not the level of unemployment. This group comprises the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Portugal. The low degree of responsiveness of British 
wage bargainers to the changing employment levels is a classic example 
of the corporatist assumption of the effects of low wage coordination. 
Throughout the 1980s, the wage bargaining of British trade unions did 
not react to the steep increases in unemployment. Real wage growth in 
the United Kingdom was the highest of all European countries. In Por-
tugal, a coordinated approach towards wage bargaining only developed 
from 1991 onwards.
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 Finally, in Sweden, nominal wages can be seen not to respond either 
to changes in consumer prices or to the levels of unemployment. The 
non-responsiveness of nominal wages in Sweden reflects the extent to 
which the unions focused on the Swedish model of extensive real wage 
restraint and the active labour market policy. The Rhen Meidner Model 
was a political model that operated irrespective of market pressures. 
However, it also shows how exceptional the Swedish wage bargaining 
practices were compared to the rest of Europe. This fact is also borne 
out by the responsiveness of real wages as shown in table 6.2. Here, 
Sweden, Germany and Austria are the countries where real wages are 
strongly negatively affected by an increase in consumer prices. In these 
countries, inflationary pressure signals to wage bargaining actors that 
they should prioritize real wage restraint in order maintain competitive-
ness. At the other end of the spectrum, real wage developments in the 
United Kingdom are influenced neither by inflationary nor by unem-
ployment effects. Between the two extremes, we again find the majority 
of European countries, with mixed reactions. Inflationary pressure has 
had a negative impact on real wage growth in France and Spain, but not 
in the other European states.
 From the perspective of adjusting wage expectations to the new eco-
nomic environment, Austria and Germany are the countries where low 
nominal wage responsiveness created the least problems for a restrictive 
monetary policy. Sweden can be singled out for being capable of adjusting 
real wage expectations. Austria and Germany in principle outperformed 
Sweden, since nominal wages responded to unemployment levels as well. 
This result is in accordance with the assessment of the stagflation experi-
ence by Bruno and Sachs. They concluded: “High corporatism and low 
nominal wage responsiveness helped countries to avoid a serious profit 
squeeze and the worst of the stagflation of the last decade… Austria, Ger-
many, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland come closest to having both sets 
of favourable institutions, while the Commonwealth countries Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have had the least favourable 
structures” (Bruno and Sachs 1985: 241).
Government intervention and the responsiveness of wage bargaining 
institutions
The responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions in the period between 
1970 and 1999 can be related to the degree of government intervention 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In the following graph the coefficient of the 
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change of consumer prices on the change in nominal wages will be used 
as a proxy variable for the responsiveness of national wage bargaining in-
stitutions to economic conditions. Changing consumer prices push trade 
unions to increase nominal wages in order to prevent real wage losses. A 
small effect of inflation on nominal wage development therefore indicates 
high degrees of responsiveness and a strong effect indicates low degrees 
of responsiveness. Correlating the proxy variable for responsiveness with 
Table 6.2  Responsiveness of real wages of Western European countries, 1970-99 
Inﬂ ation Unemployment Productivity Adj R2 Durbin-Watson
Responsive to inﬂ ationary pressure
Austria -0.77*** (0.23) -2.58*** (0.44) -0.47** (0.20) 0.55 2.10
Germany -0.77*** (0.16) -0.88*** (0.12) 0.00 (0.06) 0.66 1.00
Sweden -0.73*** (0.21) -0.55 (0.27) -0.71 (0.39) 0.26 1.27
Spain -0.28** (0.12) -0.46*** (0.12) 0.48 (0.29) 0.39 1.51
France -0.19*** (0.07) -0.73*** (0.10) -0.53** (0.23) 0.74 1.97
Responsive to unemployment
Italy -0.18 (0.09) -0.98*** (0.22) 0.21 (0.25) 0.46 1.82
Belgium -0.11 (0.09) -0.63*** (0.10) 0.51** (0.20) 0.74 1.07
Netherlands 0.05 (0.15) -0.51*** (0.13) 0.47 (0.26) 0.52 1.18
Denmark -0.12 (0.08) -0.39*** (0.11) -0.03 (0.04) 0.35 1.55
Finland -0.07 (0.17) -0.37** (0.15) 0.16 (0.27) 0.18 0.93
Ireland -0.15 (0.09) -0.33** (0.14) 0.25 (0.24) 0.14 1.67
Non-responsive
Portugal -0.14 (0.13) -1.09 (0.77) -0.18 (0.34) 0.15 1.27
United 
Kingdom
-0.07 (0.11) -0.17 (0.20) 0.02 (0.31) 0.09 2.06
Note: Non-standardized Coeﬃ  cients, ** p <0.05, ***p<0.001. Dependent Variable: change 
in nominal wages in per cent. * The Durbin-Watson test indicates that as in table 6.1 serial 
correlation of the residuals cannot be ruled out in the cases of Germany, Sweden, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Finland and Portugal. 
Portugal since 1975, Spain since 1977 and Germany: 1992 excluded.
Independent Variables: change in consumer prices, level of unemployment, productivity (see 
Appendix). 
Source: see Appendix.
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS
Wages.indd   162 28-8-2006   15:43:26

the degree of government intervention yields a correlation of 0.52 (Pear-
son correlation, non-significant). As can be seen in the graph, most coun-
tries cluster into an area where the effect of changes in consumer prices 
on nominal wages and government intervention are both relatively high, 
with the exception of Germany, Austria and the uk.
 The countries that drive the correlation are Austria and Germany, 
where nominal wage increases did not react to increases in consumer 
prices, but primarily to an increase in unemployment (table 6.1), while 
at the same time state intervention is low. Sweden achieves a similar re-
sult for nominal wages, but shows higher degrees of government involve-
ment. The correlation is weakened by the case of the United Kingdom. 
Given the low responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions, the ex-
pected degree of government intervention should be higher. If the United 
Kingdom is excluded, the correlation increases to 0.72 (Pearson correla-
tion, significant).
Figure 6.1 Responsiveness and state intervention
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The institutional basis of wage responsiveness
The trade-off between real pay protection and employment, as reflected 
in the notion of responsiveness presented and analysed in the previous 
section, is mediated by wage bargaining institutions. The framework of 
wage bargaining institutions influences the perceptions of wage bargain-
ing participants about what bargaining goal to prioritize. In this section, 
I will explore the institutional and organizational factors that influence 
the decision-making process, particularly that of trade unions. I will in-
troduce the degree of wage bargaining coordination as a precondition for 
any form of responsiveness of wage bargaining behaviour. At the same 
time, I will argue that the benefits of coordination have been influenced 
by other intervening variables, in particular by the role of dissenting fac-
tions within trade unions, by pay indexation mechanisms and by the role 
of the exposed sector in wage bargaining. Dissenting factions within trade 
unions and pay indexation schemes have inhibited wage bargaining actors 
from responding to external constraints by focusing their expectations on 
real pay protection. The strong role played by the exposed sector, on the 
other hand, has facilitated responsiveness.103
Wage bargaining coordination as precondition for responsiveness
In Western Europe, coordination of wage bargaining has been strong and 
widespread. Among the countries in this book, only the United Kingdom 
has no degree of coordination in wage bargaining at all (table 6.3). There 
was some coordinated voluntary wage restraint by British trade unions 
with the Social Contract of the 1970s and, as will be shown in Chapter 7, 
British trade unions at that time were able to restrain wages considerably. 
In all other countries, however, wage bargaining is generally coordinated. 
The types of coordination can be distinguished into those that rest on 
powerful wage bargaining institutions – either on the employers’ or the 
trade unions’ side – and others based on different arrangements. Coordi-
nation by powerful social partners is a particularly strong form of coordi-
nation since it assumes that the social partners can implement the wage 
settlements they coordinate with each other. Strong coordination can be 
found in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Among these countries, coordination is strongest in Aus-
tria, Sweden and Germany because of their centralized trade union or-
ganizations. In the other countries, conflicts and fragmentation between 
the trade unions are more common. In the six remaining countries, the 
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forms of coordination rest either on agreements between large companies 
(Italy), on weakly developed sectoral negotiations (Spain) or on the pay 
coordination in the public sector (Portugal and France). Among the latter 
four countries, coordination is strongest in Italy, because of the strength 
of the unions, and weakest in Portugal, because of the absence of any wage 
bargaining pattern.
 The degree of coordination explains to some extent the degree of re-
sponsiveness of wage bargaining outcomes. The complete lack of coordi-
nation in the United Kingdom under the condition of a hostile political 
environment can be seen as the main explanatory factor for the failure of 
British bargaining to respond to the changing environment. The degree of 
coordination does not explain, however, why even in the small corporat-
ist states of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark responsiveness was 
comparatively low during the 1980s and 1990s, and government interven-
Table 6.3  Wage bargaining coordination in Western Europe, 1970-99
Type of coordination
Strong coordination
Austria Coordination through pattern setting 
Belgium Coordination through National Labour Council 
Denmark Coordination through centralized trade unions, some internal sectoral conﬂ icts
Finland Coordination through national wage agreements
Germany Coordination through comprehensive sectoral bargaining
Netherlands Coordination through Labour Foundation and Economic Council
Sweden National coordination through centralized trade unions and employers
Weak coordination
Ireland Coordination through national wage agreements, little sectoral coordination
France Coordination through government in public sector and nationalized industries
Italy Informal coordination between major employers and within trade unions
Portugal National agreements, no coordination
Spain Weak sectoral coordination
No coordination
UK
Sources: Ferner and Hyman (1998a); EIRO-online various reports; Traxler, Blaschke et al. (2001); 
various sources. 
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tion was comparatively high. If the corporatist interaction in small states 
as described by Peter Katzenstein (1985) was particularly geared up for 
adjusting wage behaviour to external constraints, why did the majority 
of small corporatist states encounter intense conflicts between govern-
ments and trade unions over the adjustment procedure during the 1970s 
and 1980s? Why did coordinated wage bargaining institutions fail to in-
ternalize the new economic constraints? At the same time, why were, in 
the non-corporatist countries, new coordination mechanisms and institu-
tions in pay bargaining developed in order to overcome existing frictions 
and a lack of pay adjustment?
Dissenting factions
Dissenting factions within the trade unions can upset the coordination of 
wage bargaining by voicing opposition to general wage agreements. Dis-
senting factions can either be organized along the lines of political or reli-
gious cleavages or arise as a sectoral or professional group within a trade 
union organization. Competition between major trade union organiza-
tions that negotiate alongside each other for the same groups of workers 
in the same industries can drive wage expectations up. Similarly, within a 
seemingly centralized organization, profession- or workplace-based bar-
gaining structures can give incentives for leapfrogging behaviour when 
groups within trade unions compete against each other.104 As the exam-
ples of Sweden and Denmark show, even highly centralized organizations 
cannot always ensure that dissenting factions can be disciplined and inte-
grated into coordinated wage bargaining procedures. Opposition can be 
based on the potential bargaining power of the dissenting group exceed-
ing the general settlement, or it can be based on the political competition 
that gives rise to ideologically grounded opposition to general rules. De-
pending on the organizational and interorganizational structures of trade 
unions, the role of dissenting factions can be minimized or pronounced.
 As can be seen in table 6.4, it is only in Austria and Germany that 
there is no tradition of dissenting factions in collective bargaining. In 
Austria and Germany, comprehensive trade union organizations have an 
overarching monopoly position over collective bargaining with no inter-
nal group being able to voice dissenting views. In Austria, the compre-
hensive nature of the Austrian Trade Union Confederation is complete. 
Political factions are organized within the ögb but are not relevant to 
wage bargaining behaviour. In Germany, a weak competitive white-collar 
organization existed until 2000, but this was unable to dominate collec-
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tive bargaining. Within the industry-based trade union organizations, no 
sector- or industry-specific pressure group has managed to organize ef-
fective opposition to general wage norms. Moreover, extensive legal regu-
lation prevents competing groups from intervening in wage bargaining.
 In all other countries, there have been dissenting factions intervening 
in wage bargaining procedures at least on a temporary basis. Fractional-
ization within centralized trade unions has become stronger in Denmark 
and Sweden, where an internal split has developed within the lo between 
the manufacturing and the public sectors. In Denmark, trade union or-
ganization has traditionally been more craft-based and therefore more 
Table 6.4 Dissenting factions within trade unions  
No dissenting factions 
Austria and Germany Comprehensive integration of political and sectoral interests in 
sectoral organizations
Sectoral competition  
Denmark and Sweden Sectoral competition between manufacturing and public 
sector
Politically and church-based competition  
Netherlands Weak competition between Catholic, liberal and social 
democratic trade unions
Belgium Strong political competition between socialist, liberal and 
Christian trade unions
Italy Political competition between socialist and communist trade 
union with spells of cooperation
Finland Some political competition between social democratic and 
communist trade unions 
Portugal, France and Spain Strong political competition between socialist and communist 
trade unions 
Professionally based competition
Ireland Weak competition between locally organized trade union 
branches
UK Strong competition between locally organized trade union 
branches
Sources: various sources. 
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fragmented. In both cases, the notion of a wage levelling policy combined 
with a strong increase in public sector employment has contributed to the 
emergence of a political rift between the two groups. Wage drift mecha-
nisms that in themselves became inflationary were the safety valve that 
has let out the pressure from interorganizational conflict by restoring 
wage differentials.
 In Belgium and the Netherlands, the organizational cleavages that oc-
curred in the past between liberal, Christian and social democratic trade 
unions had less of a direct impact on the conduct of collective bargain-
ing. However, as has been pointed out in Chapter 5, since in both coun-
tries the role of the government had traditionally been strong in wage 
formation, the affiliation of these religiously and politically rooted trade 
unions with political parties influenced the wage bargaining behaviour of 
the unions vis-à-vis the government. This was particularly the case when 
the government was dominated by a party to which the strongest trade 
union was affiliated. Examples of this were the period of social demo-
cratic rule in the Netherlands during the 1970s. In Belgium, the main 
trade union confederations (csc and ftgb) were affiliated to the main 
governing parties for most of the post-war period. In Finland, the split of 
the social democratic party in 1956 into a social democratic and commu-
nist faction had serious knock-on effects for sectoral groups within the 
trade unions, which started to act more militantly with the support of the 
communist party.
 In weakly coordinated wage bargaining systems, the role of dissenting 
factions has further inhibited the institutionalization of wage bargaining. 
In France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, strong political cleavages exist be-
tween social democratic and communist trade unions. In all the countries 
with a strong communist-party-based trade union organization, wage 
bargaining coordination has been traditionally weak or even largely ab-
sent. In Ireland and the uk, the pluralist nature of trade union organiza-
tions embodies the notion of different factions that legitimately pursue 
group-based interests.
 Dissenting factions are particularly effective in wage bargaining sys-
tems that are otherwise highly institutionalized. Since wage bargaining 
institutions are aimed at finding a comprehensive wage solution for the 
economy as a whole, dissenting groups can strongly affect the process 
of compromising on a shared wage norm. This process is particularly 
pronounced in Belgium, since it combines a strong role for the state, an 
affiliation of political trade unions to the government party and politi-
cal competition between the unions based on workplace elections that 
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determine their relative strength within tripartite committees. This has 
caused tremendous tensions between the incorporation of trade unions 
into political decision-making on the one hand and political competition 
between trade unions on the other. In the Scandinavian cases, the con-
flicts were largely confined to the confederations themselves and their 
direct relationship with employers in wage bargaining.
The exposure to the market
The exposure of trade unions to international markets interacts with 
the pattern of coordinated wage bargaining. The coordination of wage 
bargaining only refers to the capacity to find a norm that can be applied 
throughout the economy. The exposure of trade unions to international 
markets contributes to the relative importance of the export sector. In 
coordinated wage bargaining institutions that are dominated by the inter-
ests of export or exposed-sector trade unions, the impact of wage settle-
ments on the real exchange rate will inevitably play a role since it affects 
employment security in the export sector.
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Figure 6.2 Share of trade union members in exposes sector and responsiveness
Source: Table 6.1 for eﬀ ect of changes in consumer prices on nominal wages; Crouch (1993: 
274) for share of trade union members in exposed sector. 
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 Since international market conditions determine the price of goods and 
services, the competitiveness of national producers depends among other 
factors on changes in labour costs. In the public or sheltered sector, this 
relationship is weaker (Garrett and Way 2000; Franzese 2001). Employ-
ment security depends not so much on global competitiveness as on the 
preferences of the government and on the domestic consumption of the 
goods and services that are produced in the sheltered sector. Therefore 
one would expect trade unions that are dominated by the sheltered and 
public sector to push up wages more than trade unions that are domi-
nated by the exposed sector. Trade unions that are heavily influenced by 
the exposed sector can be expected to be more responsive to changes in 
employment and prices.
 Calculations for exposure to the market are presented in figure 6.2, 
which shows the relationship between trade union members in the ex-
posed sector as a share of the main trade union confederation and the 
degree to which nominal wage increases are affected by changes in con-
sumer prices. Low scores on the effects of changes in consumer prices 
indicate high levels of responsiveness. The Pearson correlation is -0.64. 
Again, Germany and Austria are the countries with the highest degree 
of responsiveness. They also have the highest share of trade union mem-
bers in the exposed sector: Germany has 44 per cent of its trade union 
members in the exposed sector, and Austria has 29 per cent (Crouch 
1993: 274). In contrast to what the literature on the role of public sector 
trade unions claims, the Scandinavian countries do not have the lowest 
share of trade union members in the exposed sector. Rather, it is the 
pluralist countries of Ireland and the United Kingdom that have a very 
low share of market exposure, which is also reflected in a low degree of 
responsiveness.
 In Germany, the high level of exposure is tightly linked to the pattern 
setting procedure of wage bargaining. The key leading settlement takes 
place in the regional engineering wage round. Moreover, the leading re-
gion is often Baden-Wurttemberg, in which highly exposed companies 
are situated. The strong influence of the exposed sector means that ne-
gotiations centre on the changes in unit labour costs. However, since the 
settlement is likely to determine the general wage norm for that year, it 
also focuses on the likely impact of the settlement on the exchange rate. 
Wage bargainers are aware of the effect that inflationary wage settlements 
will have on the appreciation of the exchange rate and are therefore prone 
to moderate wages to avoid an appreciation (Soskice 1988).
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The role of wage indexation
Wage indexation has been the main point of conflict in most of the cases 
where the relationships between governments and trade unions have been 
highly conflictual and where frequent government intervention has been 
necessary in order to bring the wage expectations of the unions more in 
line with the new macroeconomic constraints. In most cases, govern-
ments have engaged in lengthy battles in order to abolish wage index-
ation and replace it with new pay norms. In this section, the role of wage 
indexation is explored further. I will argue that in countries where wage 
bargaining has been insufficiently institutionalized, wage indexation has 
become a decisive instrument employed by the unions to strengthen their 
bargaining position. At the same time, with the increasing need for wage 
adjustments, indexation rules have also been a major stumbling block for 
economic adjustment. Government intervention reflects the struggle be-
tween the bargaining position of the unions reliant on indexation and the 
need to accept macroeconomic constraints.
 The dissemination and practice of wage indexation has varied con-
siderably among countries, irrespective of their wage bargaining institu-
tions and the degree of coordination or centralization of their collective 
bargaining system (see table 6.5). Since rules on wage indexation do not 
require a particular wage bargaining set-up, but can be laid down either 
in law or as a general rule in decentralized wage agreements, they can be 
applied in any institutional environment. In some cases, wage indexation 
clauses have been a quid pro quo for contracts of a fixed duration and have 
thereby served as a form of compensation for trade unions in exchange 
for incomes policy and real wage restraint (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983: 
664). In particular, immediately after the war and also in the high-growth 
period of the 1960s, governments throughout the oecd looked for ways 
to avoid industrial conflict. In many countries, wage and price controls 
imposed during the war were extended in the post-war period. In this 
period, there was an apparent expectation that centralized control over 
prices and wages would become an institutionalized factor of economic 
policy in a number of countries. This was reinforced by the implications 
of the Korean War, which created an upsurge in international prices and 
therefore also posed the first real challenge to the post-war approach to 
the management of wages.
 In fact, in the majority of the oecd countries, including the non-cor-
poratist countries of the usa, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Australia, some form of wage indexation rules were introduced in the 20th 
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Table 6.5  Wage indexation in Western Europe
Austria No tradition of indexation.
Belgium Since 1948, automatic indexation of 95% of wages. Suspended in the early 
1980s by government decree, but reinstated in the mid-1980s. Real wage 
agreements are negotiated in national and sectoral wage bargaining. 
Denmark Indexation introduced in the 1920s including a ﬂ at rate component. 
Suspended by several rounds of incomes policy during the 1970s. 
Suspended in 1982 and abolished in 1983.
Finland Full indexation between 1947-67; abandoned after devaluation in 1968; 
partially reintroduced after 1969. Suspended in 1991 and replaced by 
thresholds in 1992. 
France Indexation was widespread in the 1950s, but banned by law in 1958. 
Exception is the minimum wage (SMIC). Indexation clauses in the public 
enterprises and parts of the private sector in 1969 provided for automatic 
adjustment mechanisms following the Grenelle Agreement in 1968.
Germany Wage indexation without authorization by the Bundesbank banned in the 
Monetary Law in 1948. 
Ireland Automatic indexation introduced in national agreement in 1970; 
reconﬁ rmed in 1974 and 1975.
Italy Automatic cost of living adjustment of wages since the war. Frequent 
renegotiations in the 1970s and 1980s; scope reduced by referendum in 
1985, abolished in 1992.
Netherlands Indexation since 1969, suspended by statutory incomes policy in 1974; 
abolished by the Wassenaar Agreement in 1982; disappeared from collective 
agreements in 1985.
Portugal Introduced brieﬂ y in a pact between government and unions in 1987.
Spain No tradition of indexation.
Sweden No tradition of indexation.
United 
Kingdom 
Long tradition of escalator clauses until 1966, when incomes policy 
abandoned them. Threshold clauses introduced in 1973-74. Afterwards 
abandoned.
Sources: Page and Trollope (1974); Braun (1976); various sources.
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century. In British wage bargaining, escalator and threshold clauses exist-
ed until the early 1970s. Wage agreements were thereby made conditional 
on a particular inflation rate. If inflation moved upwards more quickly 
than expected, a new bargaining round was triggered.
 In Ireland, wage indexation began in 1970 with the National Wage 
Agreements. The first three agreements contained a partial retrospective 
index-linked element. The onset of the oil price-led recession during 1974 
meant that expectations regarding inflation were central to the agreement 
of 1975. The employers agreed to a one-year agreement involving quar-
terly phased increases linked to the consumer price index. The principle 
of indexation was also endorsed by the government White Paper ‘A Na-
tional Partnership’. Initially this was acceptable to employers as a means 
of containing the inflationary expectations of employees (Hardiman 1988: 
59). However, in contrast to the assumptions by economists, wage index-
ation was soon to be regarded as a precious tool by trade unions for pro-
tecting the real wage, rather than for adjusting wage expectations down-
wards. Therefore, indexation rules were used as compensation devices 
in incomes policies. In France, wage indexation was part of the Grenelle 
agreements in 1968; in Italy, it took the form of the Scala mobile from 1975 
onwards; and in the uk, there were the threshold agreements of 1973-74 
(Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983: 665).
 Among the corporatist countries, there were two distinct approaches 
towards the relationship between wage indexation and collective bargain-
ing processes. In some countries, wage bargaining institutions were em-
bedded in a tight network of centralized labour organizations and some-
times in government-run tripartite institutions that were based on an 
understanding of responsibility for economic outcomes. In Austria and 
the Netherlands, the formation of wage bargaining institutions and the 
first generation of wage bargaining after the war took place under the 
tight control of government agencies. In Germany, wage indexation was 
outlawed, while in Sweden, highly centralized and political trade unions 
were not interested in sacrificing their autonomy for the sake of legislated 
guarantees of wage increases. Obviously, a change in prices always threat-
ened the real wage, and wage increases were also based on protecting pur-
chasing power. But the setting of wages was seen as an inherently political 
process that would respond to a number of different external factors that 
could not be replaced by an automatic mechanism.
 In contrast, in other countries where the institutional control over 
wages by either labour organizations or tripartite bodies could not be en-
sured, direct rules on wage indexation were applied more easily. Among 
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the traditionally corporatist countries, wage indexation rules played an 
important role in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. In each 
case, wage indexation was introduced soon after the war in the context of 
price and wage controls. In some cases, indexation had already been estab-
lished after World War i and was only reintroduced in the 1950s.
In Belgium, Denmark and Finland, the history of wage indexation goes 
back to the aftermath of World War i. The Netherlands is a mixed case 
between an initially highly institutionally controlled system of wage bar-
gaining – more like the Austrian system – and a system that ultimately 
moved towards wage indexation because the institutions could not con-
tain local wage pressures during the 1960s. At the same time, the Nether-
lands is an example of how wage indexation had been discovered by trade 
unions as a means of ensuring real wage protection. The incorporation 
of trade unions in government-controlled institutions had been particu-
larly harsh during the immediate post-war period. Dutch incomes policy 
had been prepared during the latter part of the war, when trade union 
officials and employers’ representatives began secret deliberations on 
post-war reconstruction and set up an organization to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the labour market, the bipartite Labour Foundation. By 
1954, the Netherlands was the only country in Western Europe in which 
there had been no increase in hourly wage earnings since 1948 (United 
Nations 1967: Ch. 4, p. 3). There was considerable discontent within the 
trade unions, to which the government did not respond. Instead, in 1959, 
the government instituted a new system linking pay to expected produc-
tivity increases. The discontent led to opposition by the unions and wages 
exploded throughout the 1960s. As a result, wage indexation clauses were 
introduced first at Philips and later, in 1969, into all collective agreements 
(Visser and Hemerijck 2000).
Wage indexation during the economic crisis
However, wage indexation was not an appropriate tool for the real in-
comes policy that was required from the early 1970s onwards. Indexation 
rules did not decrease inflationary pressure but increased it. When the oil 
crisis changed the terms of trade of the industrialized world with many 
countries requiring downward adjustments in wages in order to restore 
competitiveness, nominal wages were particularly sticky in countries that 
had firm wage indexation rules. The high increase in world prices had 
particularly negative effects on the price–wage spiral in countries with 
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indexed wages. Through higher import prices, international prices en-
tered the consumer price index and therefore directly into the wage in-
dex. Moreover, since wages were tied to prices, the rise in international 
prices had an immediate impact on the cost structure (Flanagan, Soskice 
et al. 1983: 666). In countries with a looser coupling of prices and wages, 
the upsurge in international prices could be counteracted with real wage 
restraint. “Despite – or because of – the real-wage protection goals of 
unions, however, every European country that introduced or extended 
wage-indexation systems as compensatory devices during the 1970s at-
tempted subsequently to move in the reverse direction, and in countries 
in which wage indexation was already well established, the indexation ar-
rangements posed difficult problems for incomes policy” (Flanagan, Sos-
kice et al. 1983: 665).
 In more decentralized and loosely regulated wage bargaining systems 
such as the British and the Irish, rules on wage indexation disappeared 
quickly. However in both countries, given the lack of institutionalization 
of wage bargaining procedures, protecting real wages remained the most 
important focus of trade union strategy in wage bargaining throughout 
the crisis. Therefore, in non-corporatist countries, wage indexation was 
discarded as official policy, but informally the changes in cost-of-living 
expenses remained the main guide for wage bargaining. For governments, 
the informal wage bargaining behaviour of trade unions, however, was out 
of their immediate control.
 In other countries where wage bargaining institutions were more for-
malized, wage indexation rules tended to be ingrained in wage bargaining 
processes and sometimes in labour law. Trade unions, which originally 
were rather reluctant to accept wage indexation rules since they reduced 
their bargaining scope, had started to rely on them as a guarantor for 
protecting real wages in hard times. Moreover, since wage indexation had 
become a part of modern life in these countries, trade unions gained their 
legitimacy from bargaining on top of wage indexation. Wage bargaining 
in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1970s was about the scope of 
increasing the real wage on top of inflation. Hence the expectations by 
trade unions of the potential pay increase were particularly far from what 
the economic situation required.
 Wage indexation was not abolished in any of these countries during the 
stagflation of the 1970s. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, 
wage indexation was either suspended several times or the parameters of 
adjustments were renegotiated. Governments suggested that energy pric-
es should be omitted from the price index in order to take into account 
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the changing terms of trade. In other countries, the coverage and frequen-
cies of adjustment were cut down. In Denmark, parts of the indexed wage 
increases were rerouted into the pension scheme (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 
1983: 667). In Belgium, proposals were made to tax wage increases above 
the indexation rate. Later on in the negotiations for the Global Plan, the 
index was changed to a ‘health index’ with health-damaging contents be-
ing excluded from the index. Despite the guise of health-related issues, 
the primary task of the ‘health index’ was to push the process of further 
de-linking wage increases from price increases. However, the trade unions 
in all the countries in which indexation procedures were established man-
aged to keep to these guidelines throughout the 1970s, even though they 
were sometimes reduced in scope.
 Governments started to renegotiate wage indexation during the 1970s 
once the crisis set in. While the tinkering with existing mechanisms gen-
erally did not resolve the problem, indexation remained a bargaining is-
sue. The problem worsened over time, since the employment situation 
in these countries deteriorated more rapidly than elsewhere. During the 
1980s, unemployment rates in the indexation countries of Italy (9.5 per 
cent), Belgium (10.8 per cent), Denmark (8.9 per cent) and the Nether-
lands (9.7 per cent) exceeded the European average of 8 per cent.
 The increase in unemployment, however, did not restrain trade union 
wage bargaining behaviour, but rather led to further conflict over wage 
formation. Trade unions already felt hard done by as a result of the wors-
ening labour market performance and asked for more compensation for 
this hardship rather than be willing to make concessions. Instead of ac-
cepting the need for adjustment, they blocked any reform. The automatic 
protection of the real wage had become ingrained in the expectations of 
the trade unions and their members to the extent that every negotiation 
about indexation was perceived as an outright attack on the legitimacy 
of the unions. In all four countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Denmark, unions had started to become dependent on indexation.
 In Italy, wage indexation had become a powerful tool the trade unions 
could exploit in a situation which was characterized by weak bargaining 
institutions. In combination with the Workers Statute 1970, Italian unions 
started to build plant-level bargaining institutions, while at the national 
level they gained legitimacy from protecting wage indexation. But why 
were the trade unions in corporatist and consensus-based societies such 
as the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark not in the position to give up 
indexation more easily when the need arose, and why in particular were 
social democratic governments under so much strain from the changing 
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economic environment? The main reason was that wage indexation had 
become popular with working people and easily justifiable to the general 
public. With inflation eroding workers’ incomes, indexation had become 
popular among trade union members.
 In the early 1980s, Belgian workers had their wages adjusted four times 
a year. Every three months workers could expect a pay increase to catch up 
with rising costs of living. Among trade union members, indexation had 
become a precious good and unions were well advised to protect the mech-
anism. Policy-makers and trade unions for most of the 1970s lived under 
the impression that, because they cooperated in a corporatist, consensus-
oriented, socially just society, economic adjustment should be possible on 
the basis of protecting what had been achieved so far. In the negotiations 
on incomes policy during the 1970s, trade unions therefore asked a high 
price in compensation for agreeing to wage restraint. Moreover, index-
ation had become a tool of redistribution towards groups of workers with 
low wages. Since indexation often guaranteed real wage protection more 
eﬀ ectively for lower income than for higher income workers, it had also 
become a political instrument of redistribution within the working class.
 Th erefore, in order to adjust wage expectations downwards, the politi-
cal pressure was increasingly directed at the indexation mechanism. Th is 
pressure derived initially from employers who had quickly recognized the 
rigidity of the current system. For governments, the issue was more diﬃ  cult 
since they often defended the principle of indexation to secure the purchas-
ing power of workers as justiﬁ ed and found it diﬃ  cult to oppose this.
 At the same time, the economic effects of indexation became more 
apparent and, increasingly, were openly addressed. For instance, at the 
European Summit of 1980, Belgium was advised to modify its “prejudi-
cial system of wage indexation” if it wanted to stay in the ems (Dancet 
1988: 211). In Italy, indexation had long been identified as a major factor 
preventing economic adjustment. However, for the working population, 
indexation had become a form of insurance against the hardships of the 
market. As other forms of welfare rights came under pressure during the 
1990s, the safeguarding of real pay was highly popular in these countries 
since they provided direct benefits to workers.
Eventually, indexation was abandoned in Denmark and the Netherlands in 
1982 and in Italy in 1992. In all three cases, the abolition was a major turn-
ing point in the restructuring of the wage bargaining institutions in these 
countries. This indicates just how important indexation had become, 
since it took a major shift of approach in order for it to be abolished.
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Establishing new wage guidelines
The adjustment of wage expectations under new economic constraints 
not only required abandoning all expectations that real wages could be 
safeguarded under any condition, but also prompted a search for new 
guidelines on pay. During the high growth decades of the 1960s, pay was 
easily determined by a compensation for cost of living and an additional 
rise stemming from productivity increases and economic growth. Under 
the new conditions of more fragile competitiveness, rearranged competi-
tive conditions and, in particular, lower growth, new expectations on how 
pay should develop had to be shaped.
 Therefore, in line with the increasing involvement of governments in the 
restructuring of wage bargaining, a search began for new pay guidelines, 
which might replace the old mechanism of cost-of-living adjustments and 
productivity (table 6.6). Pay guidelines were required in a situation where 
the new orientation was unclear or where decentralized bargaining units 
were to be directed onto a new course. No pay guidelines were issued in 
countries with largely deregulated wage bargaining institutions, such as 
France and the uk, or in countries where responsiveness was generally 
high, such as Austria. In France, wage bargaining had become oriented to 
the minimum wage increases that were set by the government. In the uk, 
wage formation had become completely decentralized. In Spain, after the 
collapse of tripartite incomes policy agreements in 1986, the issue of pay 
formation was largely excluded from tripartite talks.
In other countries, where wage bargaining remained coordinated and 
based on wage bargaining institutions, new rules on pay formation were 
issued for two reasons. First, wage guidelines were used in order to pro-
vide lower level wage bargaining actors with orientation guidelines. Sec-
ond, wage guidelines were also issued as reconfirmation by the social 
partners of a newly emerging consensus on pay. For instance, the social 
partner declarations in the Netherlands (1982), Germany (1999), Belgium 
(1989), Sweden (1995), Portugal (1996) and Denmark (1987) confirmed the 
importance of safeguarding competitiveness for pay formation. On sev-
eral occasions, social partners in the exposed sectors and governments 
both attempted to use the constraints of the exposed sector as the primary 
base for wage formation.
 In Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, these pay guidelines have 
had a strong effect on wage bargaining behaviour and have generally been 
taken seriously. In the Netherlands, the rather vague declaration in the 
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Table 6.6  Wage guidelines for shifting expectations
Year Name Content
Belgium 1998 Recommendation made by the Central Economic 
Council, which is composed of representatives of 
employers’ associations and trade unions, plus six 
independent experts. Follows previous legislation 
on the Global Plan. Recommendation is based on 
the assumed average wage increases of Belgium’s 
main trading partners, namely France, Germany 
and the Netherlands.
Denmark 1987 National tripartite 
declaration
Declaration recommends that the development 
of labour costs should not exceed the 
development of labour costs in competing 
countries.
Finland 1995 Agreement of the 
national tripartite 
incomes policy 
commission 
Wage formula for ‘non-inﬂ ationary wage cost 
development’ recommends wage increases in line 
with the total sum of the inﬂ ation target of the 
central bank and the growth of productivity in the 
whole economy.
Germany 1999 Statement of the 
national tripartite 
‘Alliance for Jobs’ 
Recommends productivity growth as a guideline.
Italy 1993
1998
Tripartite 
agreements
Sectoral wage developments should be in line 
with the planned inﬂ ation rate and company-
level wage bargaining should take into account 
the performance of the ﬁ rm. Endorsed by the 
agreement in 1998; orientation is the average 
European inﬂ ation rate.
Netherlands 1982 Agreement of 
Wassenaar
Recommends wage moderation.
Portugal 1996 Strategic 
Concertation Pact
Promotes guidelines that are based on expected 
inﬂ ation and expected increases in productivity. 
Sweden 1995
1997
Bipartite 
agreement in the 
industry sector
Edin-Norm
’European norm’, according to which Swedish 
wages should not rise faster than the EU average, 
was recommended by the Economic Council.
Sources: Hyman and Ferner (1998); Hassel (2000); Schulten and Stueckler (2000); Schulten 
(2002); various sources.
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Agreement of Wassenaar has led to a number of years of real pay losses. 
Similarly in Denmark, the period of the late 1980s, after the five-party 
declaration was signed, was characterized by particularly moderate wage 
settlements.
 However, in a number of other countries, including Germany, Belgium 
and Portugal, the agreements on pay norms have played a more strategic 
role and have not inﬂ uenced wage bargaining actors directly. Th is is not to 
say that in these countries wage bargaining outcomes have not fallen into 
line with the macroeconomic constraints of the 1990s. But with regard to 
the expectation of wage bargaining actors on wage formation, the new pay 
norms have been more a rhetorical concession in tripartite agreements 
rather than tending to reﬂ ect a shift in their bargaining goals. For instance, 
in Portugal, the productivity norm quickly lost its importance (Naumann 
2000). In Belgium, the general issue of the relationship between competi-
tiveness and wage indexation has still not been resolved in trade union 
wage bargaining strategies (Pochet 1999a). In Germany, a country with a 
high degree of responsiveness, the wage norm on productivity that was put 
forward by the Sachverständigenrat and within the Alliance for Jobs has 
deliberately left out the issue of cost-of-living adjustments.
 In Germany, the role of the tax wedge and high non-wage labour costs 
was the more decisive issue for labour costs than wages themselves. Since 
the government has not managed to address this issue, the focus tempo-
rarily shifted back to pay; especially since the employers would have liked 
to see pay issues dealt with in tripartite agreements. The strength of the 
German system and the domination of the export sector in pay settle-
ments have started to backfire with the increasing vulnerability of Ger-
man export industries to union demands (Thelen 2000).
 In most cases, the government has been directly involved in drawing 
up new pay guidelines. In the Netherlands the government of 1982 threat-
ened a major intervention in the overall wage bargaining system if the 
social partners did not respond to its macroeconomic constraints. The 
Agreement of Wassenaar has therefore been seen as negotiated in “the 
shadow of hierarchy” (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). In Sweden and Bel-
gium, the pay norms were designed by economic experts, but advocated 
by the government and state mediators at a later date. In Portugal, Italy, 
Finland, Belgium and Germany, the new pay norms were explicitly dis-
cussed in tripartite negotiations with government participation. By this 
means, governments deliberately pressed wage bargaining actors to adopt 
pay policies that were in line with the economic constraints they them-
selves faced.
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 In sum, wage indexation regulations have frequently been introduced 
both before and since World War ii in order to ease the adjustment of 
wages to new economic conditions. In reality, the regulations fixed expec-
tations on protecting the real wage. When these regulations were tied to 
otherwise highly institutionalized wage bargaining systems, wage index-
ation made these systems more rigid rather than more flexible. Despite 
good intentions, wage indexation at no time fostered adjustment.
 Conclusion: Shifting workers’ wage expectations
The wage expectations of trade unions and workers are largely shaped by 
the institutions under which wage bargaining takes place. In the post-war 
Western European countries, these institutions were shaped by four fac-
tors: by the degree to which wage bargaining could be coordinated across 
the economy, by the extent to which dissenting factions could establish 
themselves as competing forces within or outside trade union organiza-
tions, by the amount of exposure of the leading trade unions to the mar-
ket, and by the level to which mechanisms of wage indexation had been 
established. Coordination and international exposure thereby increased 
the responsiveness of wage bargaining behaviour to changing external 
conditions, while wage indexation mechanisms and the presence of strong 
dissenting factions contributed to a lack of responsiveness. Depending on 
the institutional mix, wage bargaining outcomes displayed different de-
grees of responsiveness.
 The four factors influencing wage responsiveness are interrelated: a 
strong tradition of dissenting fractions within trade unions has often fore-
stalled a high degree of coordination. Only when factionalism was over-
come has coordination been able to take place effectively. Similarly, a high 
degree of coordination might contribute to minimize the fractionalization 
of trade unions if coordination were to channel the organization of diverse 
interests and discriminated against others. The process of increasing in-
stitution building in a number of previously loosely coordinated collective 
bargaining systems, such as those in Italy and Ireland, has also minimized 
the conflicts between factions. On the other hand, where dissenting fac-
tions have been and continue to be strong, the competition between trade 
unions has forced them to insist on protecting the powerful instrument 
of wage indexation. In some cases, a higher degree of coordination and 
institutionalization has frozen existing patterns of political competition 
between trade unions. For instance, the tripartite councils in Belgium are 
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based on the distribution of seats between the different politically divided 
peak associations. The representation within the tripartite councils thus 
strengthens the existing cleavages. The exposure of trade unions to inter-
national markets has had a greater effect where wage bargaining has been 
coordinated, since the competitive pressure that rests on the exporting 
sector has been able to be transformed into a generalized wage formula 
for the whole economy.
 Building on the factors, one can identify different configurations of 
institutions that suggest a higher or lower degree of bargaining wage re-
sponsiveness (table 6.7). It becomes apparent that Germany and Austria 
have a combination of institutional features that are highly conducive to 
wage bargaining responsiveness. In Germany and Austria, the degree of 
dissenting factions within and outside trade union organizations is virtu-
ally zero. In both countries, trade unions are dominated by the exposed 
sector, wage bargaining is highly coordinated, and wage indexation has 
been ruled out either by law or by practice. At the other end of the spec-
trum, wage bargaining institutions in the United Kingdom do not suggest 
any form of responsiveness: coordination in wage bargaining is absent, lo-
cal competition is encouraged by the organizational rivalry between trade 
unions, and the share of union members in exposed sectors is moderate. 
While wage indexation has not played an important role in wage bargain-
ing since the mid-1970s, the main preoccupation of local wage bargaining 
in the United Kingdom has actually been to preserve the real wage.
Again, we find the majority of countries caught between the two extremes. 
Sweden comes closest to the model of Germany and Austria. The highly 
political nature of wage formation in Sweden makes an assessment of the 
responsiveness of wage formation difficult. Furthermore, high degrees of 
wage drift undermine the capacity of wage bargaining institutions to co-
ordinate wage formation. The wage drift, moreover, is primarily due to 
distributive conflicts between different groups of workers belonging to 
the same umbrella organization, which in turn has not managed to find 
a solution to these conflicts and therefore allows them to find their ex-
pression in local bargaining. The other traditional corporatist countries 
are all affected either by some degree of factionalism within the trade 
unions or by wage indexation mechanisms. Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Belgium have subscribed to wage indexation that prevented real wage 
adjustments from being made via lower nominal wage increases. Among 
the coordinated countries, the worst combination of factors is to be found 
in Belgium. Here, strong political competition between trade unions pre-
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vents the adjustment of an outlived wage formation model that is based 
on strict indexation criteria. While the high degree of coordination in 
Belgium theoretically could facilitate the adjustment of wages, in practice 
the interplay between the coordinating institutions, the rule of indexation 
and the competition between trade unions has reinforced a vicious circle 
of low adjustment and continuous contestation.
 Low levels of responsiveness of trade union wage bargaining behaviour 
have prompted governments to intervene in processes of wage formation. 
Where responsiveness of wage bargaining has been high, such as in Aus-
tria and Germany, intervention has largely been absent. Where respon-
siveness has been mixed, intervention has been more pronounced. The 
more trade unions have emphasized the protection of real wages at the 
expense of responding to high levels of unemployment, the more govern-
ments have been tempted to use their authority to shift trade union wage 
expectations. In particular, governments have become active in abolish-
ing systems of wage indexation in all countries where rules on indexation 
have been present.
 In many cases, the adjustment of wage expectations has created the 
need for new mechanisms on which wage bargaining could be based. 
Where indexation has been abolished, the distributive conflicts between 
different groups have had to be minimized and more external pressure has 
been needed to contain wage expectations in the sheltered sectors. Hence 
governments and wage bargaining actors have been on the lookout for 
new distributive compromises. The solution as presented in a number of 
countries has been the adoption of pay guidelines.
 The emphasis of new pay guidelines on competitiveness has strength-
ened the role of the exposed sector, particularly in countries where the 
exposed sector has not been strongly represented within the unions. By 
focusing on competitiveness rather than on the preservation of real pay or 
pay equality, wage bargaining institutions have shifted their responsive-
ness towards macroeconomic requirements at the expense of other prior-
ities. They have enhanced their central quest for national competitiveness 
at the expense of delivering their traditional contribution to equity.
 In this process, the interaction between governments and wage bar-
gaining institutions has been crucial. Governments have been forced to 
act in order to increase the responsiveness of their bargaining systems. 
The imperative to act arises from both the high costs of poor adjustment, 
in terms of accommodating increasing numbers of unemployed in Eu-
ropean welfare systems, as well as the responsibility of national govern-
ments to deal with the pressures on exchange rates. External openness 
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and increasing capital mobility on the one hand and welfare expectation 
of working people on the other hand, put governments into a mediating 
role. Governments frequently filled this role by interfering into the wage 
setting process and thereby supported the adjustment process of wage 
bargaining institutions.
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7 The Interaction between Wage Bargaining Institutions
 and Government Intervention
I now turn to the 13 country cases to discuss the interaction between wage 
bargaining responsiveness and government intervention. The analysis 
builds on Chapter 6, in which the responsiveness of wage bargaining in-
stitutions was assessed. In this chapter I go a step further, examining the 
interaction between wage bargaining institutions and the behaviour of the 
government.
 Th e case studies themselves aim to synthesize the extensive literature on 
each of the countries and to do so in a way that places particular emphasis 
on developing a greater understanding of why, and under what conditions, 
governments intervene in the wage bargaining process. In this sense, this 
chapter reﬂ ects the overall approach of the book in combining, and at the 
same time seeking a balance between, approaches based solely on quanti-
tative analysis and those based on qualitative country-based case studies.
 The chapter is in four sections. The first section presents the responsive 
wage bargaining regimes of Germany and Austria. Section two consid-
ers corporatist countries with non-responsive wage bargaining regimes. 
These are divided into countries that have experienced massive interven-
tion subsequent to declining economic performance (Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands), and those that have moved from real to nominal 
wage restraint and monetary policies (Sweden and Finland).
 The third section deals with non-corporatist countries with non-re-
sponsive wage bargaining regimes. The cases of France and the uk are 
characterized by de-institutionalization and decentralization as reactions 
to institutional failure, while in Italy and Ireland wage bargaining institu-
tions have been built through government intervention. Finally, Spain and 
Portugal are discussed as cases where the building of responsive bargain-
ing regimes followed government intervention. Figure A1 in the appendix 
accompanying the case studies shows wage formation over time through 
the relationship between unemployment and nominal wages. The fourth 
section presents conclusions derived from the case studies.
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The guiding questions of the case studies are the following: How are wage 
expectations formed? Which incentives for wage responsiveness to exter-
nal economic constraints are provided by wage bargaining institutions? 
Did government intervention occur as a reaction to an apparent decline in 
responsiveness in the wage bargaining institutions? How did government 
intervention interact with existing wage bargaining institutions?
 The responsive wage bargaining regimes: Germany and Austria
The monetarist corporatist wage bargaining countries have been identi-
fied as those bargaining regimes in which the reality of external economic 
constraints had an immediate impact on the formation of pay while ne-
glecting the priority of real wage protection. Austria and Germany are 
known as countries where labour entered the post-war period in a weak 
state. In both countries, the trade unions were organized along new lines 
after the war, disregarding older forms of workers’ organizations. The new 
trade union organizations were highly centralized and, in both countries, 
the main trade union umbrella organization gained a near monopoly over 
the labour market. Nowadays, wage formation is dominated by sectoral 
concerns, while special arrangements are generally made for white-collar 
workers.
 In both Germany and Austria, wage restraint is neither due to incomes 
policy nor to open political exchanges with the governments. Already in 
the mid-1960s, Kindleberger called the German wage bargaining systems 
an “incomes policy from below” (Kindleberger 1965: 248). Th e strategic 
capacity of wage bargaining institutions is particularly high in both coun-
tries (Hall 1986: 242; Scharpf 1991: 249). Th ey are based on a system that 
diminishes distributive struggles between diﬀ erent groups of workers and 
sectors, while at the same time allowing for sector-speciﬁ c adjustments. 
Moreover, they are dominated by the wage bargaining procedures in the 
exposed sectors that are highly vulnerable to the appreciation of the euro.
 Sectoral bargaining is based on pattern bargaining that is usually led by 
the metal sector. In Austria, the sequence of sectoral bargaining is highly 
habitualized in that metal starts the annual bargaining round and the other 
bargaining units follow in a given order in the course of the year (Traxler, 
Blaschke et al. 2001: 171). In Germany, the pattern varies more since wage 
agreements are concluded for different periods of time which can lead to 
changing pattern setters other than the ig Metall. In both countries, there 
is an understanding between the trade unions and the employers’ confed-
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erations that the pattern setter is not determining pay for other sectors 
but merely providing a model for other sectors to follow.
 Given the lack of formal coordination procedures, informal coordina-
tion is achieved in two ways. The first manner in which informal coor-
dination is achieved is through the competence of the pattern setter to 
establish a fine balance between the ability of companies to pay within 
the sector and the macroeconomic environment. On the trade union side, 
members’ expectations in those companies which dominate the wage bar-
gaining are usually informed by the specific company’s ability to pay. On 
the company side, companies orient their willingness to engage in wage 
conflicts with reference to their own ability to pay.
 At the same time, the pattern setters are based in the exposed sectors 
that are particularly vulnerable to the monetary policy of the Bundesbank. 
The comparatively high proportion of jobs in export industries and their 
relative role in the wage bargaining system has made the wage bargainers 
particularly sensitive towards the impact of their wage behaviour on a 
potential appreciation of the currency via restrictive monetary policy.
 The second factor which keeps wage bargaining in a coordinated frame-
work is the weakness of the sheltered and public sector trade unions in 
wage bargaining. Although trade unions in the sheltered and public sec-
tors have less incentive to lower their expectations since they are not un-
der the disciplining force of foreign competition (Garrett and Way 2000), 
they are not usually able to exploit their comfortable position of being 
protected from market forces. Rather, the pattern bargaining as set by ex-
posed sector collective agreements helps these trade unions to pull wag-
es in the sheltered and public sector up to a level which they would not 
achieve otherwise.105 This trend exists even though union membership in 
the public sector is higher than in the manufacturing sector,106 and as a re-
sult, trade unions find it difficult to achieve substantial wage increases un-
der the condition of high public deficits. Within wage bargaining rounds, 
trade unions use the notion of catching up with manufacturing sectors as 
an argument. This is partly in order to evoke an argument about an equity 
norm in wage bargaining in the public debate and partly in order to keep 
the public sector as an attractive employer. At the same time, trade unions 
in the exposed sector have an interest in pulling the sheltered and public 
sector unions up to their level since a general wage increase for the whole 
economy can be used as a floor for future bargaining gains.
 As a consequence, in Austria and Germany there is a high degree of in-
stitutional control over wage developments and little potential for group-
specific distributional struggles undermining the strategic capacity of 
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wage bargaining actors to react to changing external conditions. Both 
countries survived the test of time when, in 1975, a major adjustment in 
wage expectations was needed in face of double-digit inflation rates. The 
strong reaction by the Bundesbank led to immediate wage adjustments 
(Scharpf 1991). A similar adjustment of wage expectations took place in 
the immediate post-reunification phase in 1991. Business expansion to the 
east had led to high increases in prices and profitability, and trade unions 
aimed at participating in the boom by negotiating high wage increases in 
1991 and 1992. A stark reaction by the Bundesbank again restricted the 
subsequent wage rounds.
Austria
In Austria, wage bargaining arrangements are tightly incorporated into 
the political system. From 1957 until 1994, a parliamentary committee on 
pay and prices (Parity Commission, or Paritätische Kommission) had the 
ultimate power to reject pay settlements. It had already started refrain-
ing from doing so, however, in the late 1970s (Traxler 1998: 246). The 
political incorporation of pay bargaining procedures stemmed from the 
immediate post-war period. Already in September 1945, the newly formed 
Arbeiterkammer approached the Chamber for Business (Wirtschaftskam-
mer) and suggested a permanent committee be set up for consultation on 
wages. In the years that followed, the committee issued four price and 
wage agreements that kept wage increases under control. In 1950, after a 
violent strike by Austrian workers against the declining standard of living, 
the price and wage agreements were dropped. However, by this time, the 
exceptionally centralized chambers of labour and business along with the 
Austrian trade union confederation were firmly in control of wage devel-
opments (Talos and Kittel 1996).
While wage bargaining normally has taken place at a sectoral level, it was 
the Parity Commission which was accustomed to monitor bargaining pro-
cedures. Th e Austrian trade union confederation (ögb) had, in fact, to apply 
for sectoral negotiations to take place in the Parity Commission. Th is pro-
cedure gave the ögb a gatekeeper role vis-à-vis its own aﬃ  liates, since the 
ögb is free to decide when to apply for the negotiations to start. Since em-
ployees and employers were jointly represented in the Parity Commission, 
employers were also in control of the conduct of negotiations. In particular, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the Parity Commission was an important in-
strument for coordinated wage negotiations. Th e ögb and the chamber of 
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business could delay the start of negotiations and thereby dampen the wage 
expectations of the sectoral union leaders (Traxler 1982: 245).
 By the early 1980s, the metal sector trade union had become the pat-
tern setter in wage negotiations and the Parity Commission had lost in 
importance. Nowadays sectoral trade unions focus their expectations on 
the lead sectors. Nevertheless, the Parity Commission is still officially in 
control of the timing of negotiations and meets twice a month in order to 
discuss wages. If time is pressing, sectoral trade unions start negotiations 
before the Commission has officially cleared the way, and occasionally 
even wage agreements are settled before the Commission has officially 
decided on the conduct of the negotiations.
 Coordination therefore takes place between the peak trade union con-
federation, i.e. the ögb, and the sectoral trade unions. Although the role 
of both the Parity Commission and the ögb has been reduced in recent 
years, both instruments are still present in the background of negotiations 
and could be evoked if necessary. Given the high degree of responsiveness 
of Austrian wage bargaining, these institutions played only a minor role 
in the public perception of wage bargaining. However, in conflictual situ-
ations, trade union leaders of the ögb can intervene in sectoral disputes 
in order to avert open conflict.
 The high degree of wage bargaining responsiveness has been supported 
by the political institutions.107 On the one hand, the close integration of 
the Austrian economy with the German one has implied adherence to the 
restrictive monetary regime of the Bundesbank, even though the Austrian 
National Bank has been more politically dependent than the Bundesbank. 
On the other hand, Austria’s late membership of the European Union and 
the potential for monetary and fiscal expansion in contrast to the adjust-
ment process in Germany have allowed for greater safeguarding of em-
ployment in Austria, which in turn has honoured the cooperation by the 
trade unions (Hemerijck, Unger et al. 2000). A challenge to the hitherto 
highly successful Austrian adjustment process only arose in the aftermath 
of the 1992/93 recession, when the Austrian economy was affected par-
ticularly badly. The government reacted to the recession with a tight eco-
nomic policy that broke with the Austrian tradition of supporting wage 
restraint through an expansive economic policy. The trade unions com-
plained about the government breaking with the tradition of implicit con-
certation and argued that their trust had been violated (Hemerijck, Unger 
et al. 2000: 204).
 However, despite the complaints by the unions, wage bargaining re-
sponded to the worsening situation with only a minor delay. After unem-
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ployment rose to more than 5 per cent in 1996, which was exceptionally 
high by Austrian standards, the Austrian wage bargaining system reacted 
with real wage losses in two consecutive years, in 1996 and 1997 (see also 
figure A1). By 1995, therefore, the cooperation between the government 
and the unions on wage restraint had been restored again and the unions 
supported the restrictive budget policy of the government (Talos and Kit-
tel 1999).108
Germany
In Germany, wage bargaining institutions were set up at arm’s length from 
the political system, but with a high degree of legal regulation. In the im-
mediate post-war period, labour was weak and had a stronger focus on 
political issues than on wages. It was only after the defeat in the co-deter-
mination laws in 1952 that German unions developed greater bargaining 
power with regard to wage formation (Lutz 1984; Scharpf 1991). The in-
flux of foreign labour and the politically sensitive situation vis-à-vis East 
Germany restrained the role of the unions in the post-war period consid-
erably (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983). Moreover, as has been described 
extensively in the literature, German wage bargaining reacted particularly 
smoothly to the restrictive monetary policy of the Bundesbank after 1975 
(Scharpf 1991, Streeck 1994).
Compared to other European countries, Germany had been in a compara-
tively favourable position until the early 1990s.109 Nominal wage develop-
ments spiralled out of control in the early 1990s when the unions claimed 
their dividend in the unification boom. The drastic wage increase of 1992 
was only partly due to the lifting of wage levels in Eastern Germany but 
also consisted of an exceptionally large wage claim in Western Germany 
(figure a1 in appendix). The recession between 1992 and 1994 brought 
wage increases down to the average European level, but the competitive 
advantage of being able to agree wage settlements far below the European 
average had been lost. Given that private-sector wage settlements deter-
mine public sector pay to a large extent, the German government was 
facing similar economic problems that many Western European govern-
ments had faced since the early 1980s.110
 However, in 1995 the Kohl government initially reacted to the problems 
in a traditional way and was rather reluctant to take up the offer from 
the metal sector union ig Metall to initiate tripartite negotiations. Klaus 
Zwickel, President of ig Metall, proposed wage increases in line with in-
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flation for 1997 and agreed to lower wages for the long-term unemployed 
over a limited period of time. In exchange, the government should com-
mit itself to refrain from further welfare cuts and to encourage companies 
to provide more and better training. The role of the employers was to pro-
vide 300,000 more jobs, 5 per cent more training and the promise not to 
make employees redundant for business-related reasons.111 From the very 
beginning, the Alliance for Jobs was a sector-based initiative (eirr 1996).
 The proposal was discussed heatedly at the trade union congress of 
ig Metall, but was quickly picked up favourably by public opinion and 
policy-makers alike. It became the main topic at one of the ‘Talks with the 
Chancellor’ (Kanzlergespräche) on 22 January 1996. The ‘Talks with the 
Chancellor’, in which the government invited trade unions and employ-
ers’ confederations for an informal exchange of opinion, had been taking 
place for some years since German unification (Lehmbruch 2000). After 
the meeting in January, a lengthy document was drawn up which listed 
eight pages of reform proposals, ranging from tax reforms via research 
and innovation to education and training as well as planning permissions 
to labour market and social policy. It is this process that became known 
as the Alliance for Jobs.
 During the subsequent meeting in mid-February, an initial agreement 
was reached between the three sides on reform of the early retirement 
scheme. The previous highly popular and expensive early retirement 
scheme had expired in 1988, and both the trade unions and employers’ 
confederations voiced their interest in a new scheme. Parallel to the Al-
liance talks, the government had pursued the route of parliamentary re-
forms. At the end of January 1996, the government published a 50-point 
programme entailing a range of detailed welfare cuts and labour market 
deregulation. Three important state elections took place in spring 1996. 
In all three elections, the liberal party (fdp), which was the smaller coali-
tion partner, gained unexpectedly good results while the oppositional So-
cial Democrats lost ground. After the elections, and with a strengthened 
liberal party that has traditionally been suspicious of corporatist policy-
making, the government increasingly turned to the parliamentary route. 
It presented a list of cuts within the next round of Chancellor talks on 23 
April, which included the de-coupling of benefits from wages, reduction 
of health benefits such as spa holidays, and an extension of fixed term 
contracts to 24 months. The list met with fierce protests from the trade 
unions (Bispinck 1997: 68).
 The government, however, remained firm and presented to parliament 
in September 1996 those parts of the package that did not require the 
THE RESPONSIVE WAGE BARGAINING REGIMES
Wages.indd   193 28-8-2006   15:43:30

consent of the upper house. Th e trade unions pulled out of the Alliance 
for Jobs and started campaigning with parliamentary support from the left 
and moral support from the churches. In the following collective bargain-
ing round, the trade unions focused on counteracting the changes in sick 
pay by having sick pay covered by collective agreements. Within a year, the 
unions were able to force employers in collective bargaining to continue 
with the previous statutory scheme (100 per cent rather than 80 per cent 
pay). Many other changes on the list of cuts were later reversed or re-
formed by the new government, which came to power in September 1998.
 The initial proposal of the leader of ig Metall to exchange wage mod-
eration for assurances of employment from the employers was never se-
riously discussed. Employers’ federations quickly pointed out that they 
could not make any commitment to job creation on behalf of their mem-
bers and that a halt to any business-related redundancies was not work-
able. Nevertheless, the collective bargaining round resulted in moderate 
wage agreements. Moreover, at the plant level, companies increasingly 
negotiated longer working hours and lower fringe benefits in exchange for 
investment promises with their works councils.112 Yet negotiations never 
reached the level of far-reaching reforms, which is probably because la-
bour costs fell. As a result, employers handled cost-cutting locally, but 
had no incentive to organize at a higher level. After the conflict between 
the government and the trade unions in autumn 1996, there were no fur-
ther attempts to pursue the Alliance for Jobs at a national level. Nor did 
the trade unions and employers’ confederations continue bilateral nego-
tiations on the issue.
 The new Schröder government relaunched tripartite concertation soon 
after it took office in September 1998. The first meeting in December 1998 
presented a list of 11 major topics, all of which were to be dealt with in the 
tripartite negotiations. Compared to the programme in 1996, the list was 
both shorter and closer to the interests of the trade unions and employers’ 
confederations. Despite the much more institutionalized set-up of the Al-
liance for Jobs and the high level of public attention compared to the first 
initiative in 1995, there has not been an agreement on a substantial reform 
proposal nor has there been any form of political exchange between the 
actors involved. Moreover, the proposed political exchange which was 
on the table focused once again on the extension of early retirement op-
tions.
 The government had moved quickly to enact a number of reforms in the 
context of the topics of the Alliance for Jobs. In April 1999 it introduced a 
new environmental tax, which allowed the lowering of payroll taxes and 
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thus lower non-wage labour costs. It also repealed some of the legisla-
tion of the old government on employment protection in small firms and 
extended social security to cover precarious employment. In a second 
step, the government addressed corporate taxation and lowered tax rates 
for companies considerably. By enacting these reforms, the government 
mainly acted in the interest of the associations, first in the interest of the 
trade unions and then in the interest of the employers.
 The associations themselves resorted to rather vague wording in joint 
policy documents on the role of wage bargaining in the Alliance for Jobs. 
Officially, both sides strongly disagreed over the impact of wages on em-
ployment. None of the associations granted any concessions, apart from 
grudgingly accepting legislative changes in favour of the other side. The 
first and most contentious issue, which emerged as a joint discussion top-
ic between the associations, was again focused on early retirement. The 
trade union side, led again by ig Metall, proposed that the retirement 
age should be reduced to 60 (Rente mit 60).113 This new early retirement 
scheme was to be financed by a wage fund to be administered by the as-
sociations. Employers and employees were each to pay half a percent-
age of gross wages per employee into the fund. In exchange, ig Metall 
would exercise wage restraint for several years. The employers’ federa-
tions, however, rejected a lower retirement age and any individual right 
to early retirement as a matter of principle. The government was initially 
interested in the agreement and offered to host a compromise, but soon 
found out that this would be an additional burden on public financing. 
Since no agreement could be reached in a meeting of the Alliance for Jobs 
in December 1999 and again in January 2000, the Chancellor sent the 
associations away to find a solution in the current collective bargaining 
round.
 Behind the scenes, a deep political rift developed between the two ma-
jor industrial trade unions in the metal and the chemical sector. While ig 
Metall publicly campaigned for a reduced retirement age, the chemical 
trade union had already agreed to a compromise with both the govern-
ment and the employers, accepting improvements in early retirement leg-
islation in order to pull ig Metall away from its more radical stance. To 
achieve this, the chemical sector settled the first major agreement on 22 
March 2000, two months before the collective agreements in the chemi-
cal sector expired and well in time before the metal sector could seriously 
bargain over early retirement. A moderate wage increase in the chemical 
sector was accompanied by further improvements in partial early retire-
ment by employers.
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 While the increasing role of the government in wage bargaining in Ger-
many was initially due to a voluntary proposal by the metal sector trade 
union in the aftermath of the 1992/93 recession, the initiative was picked 
up by the new government in 1998, which started to use tripartite meetings 
to pressurize the unions into further wage restraint (Hassel 2001). Overall, 
however, the increasing involvement of the government in wage bargain-
ing processes has yet to have any major impact on the wage bargaining in-
stitutions. Th e sectoral, export-based logic of wage bargaining procedures 
is still the main characteristic of wage bargaining in Germany.
 The non-responsive corporatist countries
In most countries the struggle between the protection of real wages and 
the internalization of employment effects on wage bargaining procedures 
was not easily resolved. High growth rates and social unrest in the late 
1960s created high wage expectations for the coming years; the external 
shock of the oil crisis, financial liberalization and the impact of monetary 
integration created pressure towards wage restraint. In traditional corpo-
ratist and non-corporatist countries, distributional conflicts erupted be-
tween the expectation of the government and the wage bargaining strate-
gies of the unions. In both cases, these conflicts altered the relationship 
between the wage bargaining institutions and the state, as governments 
increasingly tried to bring the unions’ wage expectations in line with the 
economic constraints they were facing.
 Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands share a num-
ber of features of small open economies that have a corporatist legacy in 
which the state has traditionally played an important role in wage bar-
gaining (Katzenstein 1985). In contrast to the countries in the preceding 
section, Austria and Germany, and with the exception of Sweden, the gov-
ernments in these countries occupied a legitimate place in wage bargain-
ing negotiations from a very early stage. Rather than resting on forms of 
self-regulation, corporatist wage bargaining took place under the close 
supervision of a state that frequently intervened if outcomes were not 
satisfactory in the eyes of the government.
 In Denmark, strong collective actors emerged early after the September 
Compromise of 1899, which recognized trade unions and initiated cen-
tralized wage bargaining. General wage agreements for a two-year period 
had been concluded since the 1930s. Likewise, parliamentary intervention 
in wage bargaining had already emerged by 1933, when employers orga-
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nized a nationwide lockout in order to achieve reductions in pay (Scheuer 
1997: 151). Tighter corporatist structures only materialized in the 1960s, 
however, with the setting up of the Economic Council in 1962.
The Swedish national coordination of pay bargaining did not take place 
under active involvement of the government, but was rather a system of 
self-regulated centralization. The Saltsjobaden Agreement of 1938 be-
tween the lo and saf was aimed at pre-empting the threat of government 
intervention. It was achieved by means of several national understandings 
on various policy issues agreed by the central organizations between 1946 
and 1954 and was brought to completion with the centralized wage bar-
gaining system that was set up in 1956. National wage coordination was 
based on the dominance of the blue-collar, private-sector trade union, 
lo. The lo had complete control over the wage bargaining activities of its 
affiliates (Iversen 1999: 123). Solidaristic wage policy supported the trend 
towards centralization by presupposing a tight top-down coordination of 
wages across industries.
 Finnish corporatism emerged at a later date and was more fragment-
ed than in the other Scandinavian countries. The first central agreement 
between the Finnish Trade Union Federation (ffc) and the Employers 
Association (afc) was concluded after a general strike in 1956 (Elvander 
1974: 432). Corporatist integration of labour, however, was undermined 
by a split within the left in the early 1960s, both within the unions and 
the Social Democratic Party, sdp, which impeded all further cooperation 
on incomes policy in Finland. Rather untypical for a corporatist society, 
Finland has a tradition of strong political contestation within the unions 
and also a high strike rate.
 In the Low Countries, i.e. the Netherlands and Belgium, national wage 
bargaining coordination was embedded in corporatist agreements that 
were struck between trade unions and employers during World War ii. 
In Belgium this was based on the National Solidarity Pact of 1944 and the 
Productivity Agreement made in 1952; in the Netherlands it was based on 
the agreement on the Labour Foundation (star) and later on the Socio-
Economic Council (ser). In both cases, the new post-war settlement was 
conceived during the war when business and labour forged a clandestine 
alliance against German occupation. National coordination of wage bar-
gaining was tightly linked to government intervention. For instance, the 
Netherlands was the only country in 1945 where pay settlements could be 
applied only with government approval and where approved pay settle-
ments determined maximum as well as minimum pay (United Nations 
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1967: 9). Until the 1960s, the Netherlands had an administered wage deter-
mination system (Windmuller 1969: 392). Th e institutional framework was 
established immediately after the war at a time when “thorough regulation 
of almost anything was thought unavoidable or even natural” (Pen 1964: 
183). As in Denmark, excessive agreements could be prevented by govern-
ment action. But unlike Denmark, national coordination was a disciplinary 
device for trade unions that negotiated wages at the sectoral level. Th ere 
was no overall coordination between the sectors on wage formation.
 In Belgium, a similar process of tight government supervision over wage 
bargaining conduct was inaugurated. Th e Belgian wage bargaining institu-
tions reﬂ ect the strong pillarization of the society combined with the urge 
to install consensus policies. Since social and political groups are divided 
not only politically (into socialist, Catholic and liberal camps) but also 
regionally and since governments have generally been inherently weak, a 
multitude of diﬀ erent concertation and bargaining institutions have been 
produced over time. Wage settlements are therefore embedded in a com-
plex web of institutions that mediate between the sectoral aﬃ  liations of the 
national social partners and the national consultation institution with the 
prime purpose of involving a large number of diﬀ erent social groups.114
 Among many institutions, the National Labour Council (nar/cnt), set 
up in 1952, has become the body that was instrumental in settling inter-in-
dustry collective agreements. It also declares agreements as legally bind-
ing by royal decree, which gives the council quasi-legislative powers.115 In 
the National Labour Council, representatives from both sides conclude 
the inter-industry collective agreements that establish the framework for 
employment relations in the private sector, including pay. On the basis of 
these agreements, sectoral agreements are concluded annually in Joint 
Committees. Sectoral agreements are thus bound by higher-level agree-
ments. In order to implement the sectoral agreements, the Minister of 
Employment ratifies the agreements and thereby gives them legal force 
for the whole sector.
Massive intervention after declining performance: Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands
Since Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark all belonged to the found-
ing states of the European currency snake they were confronted early on 
with the effects of the restrictive monetary policy of the Bundesbank. The 
year 1976 was therefore, in all three countries, a turning point that had 
severe implications for the relationship between the government and the 
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social partners. Despite the long tradition of openness and corporatism 
– which was seen as being conducive to rapid adjustments to changing 
external environments (Katzenstein 1985) – the monetary policy shift led 
to major conflicts and frictions between the trade unions and the mainly 
social democratic governments. During the 1970s, all three countries had 
spells of incomes policies and wage freezes. Moreover, all three countries 
struggled with forms of wage indexation that turned out to be a major 
stumbling block for economic stabilization policy. In Belgium and Den-
mark, wage indexation had been introduced before the war; in the Nether-
lands it emerged during the 1960s. In all three countries, wage formation 
is based on an interplay between national agreements under the auspices 
of the government and sectoral implementation. Wage bargaining insti-
tutions are numerous and widely spread. However, the evolution of the 
relationship between the government and the wage bargaining process in 
the 1980s and 1990s turned out differently in each of the cases.
The Netherlands
Dutch wage formation during the 1960s was basically determined by the 
attempts of the government to maintain control over wage formation and 
increasing discontent in the unions with the extreme wage restraint.116 
The friction between the government and the unions was reflected in 
a temporary wage explosion that was, however, followed by a commit-
ment on the part of the Labour Foundation (star) to reorganize itself. At 
the time, this was seen as an indicator of the tight corporatist structures: 
“Perhaps nothing illustrates the close integration of government and pri-
vate organizations in the Netherlands industrial relations system so well 
as the willingness of the foundation to consult closely with government in 
overhauling its original constitution and its structure so as to equip itself 
for an administrative role” (Windmuller 1969: 308).
 However, in the 1960s, the tension between tight government direc-
tives and union attempts to increase wages became apparent. The unions 
increasingly tried to break free from the tight state-controlled framework. 
One indication of the tension was the introduction of the New Wage Act 
in 1970. The government adopted the right to reject agreements which it 
deemed excessive. The new law was heavily criticized by the trade unions, 
in particular those that later were to become the fnv, and which withdrew 
from star and ser (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 94). Between 1970 and 
1982, the government suspended wage agreements on seven occasions 
(Visser 1997: 302).
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 Until 1982 the interaction between the government and wage bargain-
ing actors in the Netherlands was rather similar to the Belgian situation. 
The employers responded to the shock of 1976 by protesting against es-
calator clauses. Pay indexation in the Netherlands had been adopted in 
the collective agreements of major firms that in the late 1960s had sought 
a formula for social peace by agreeing to automatic pay increases in line 
with inflation. Just as in Belgium, the system had spread across indus-
tries and to social security benefits by the mid-1970s (Visser and Hemeri-
jck 1997: 98). And again as in Belgium, wage indexation had become an 
untouchable issue. The inflationary spiral of high inflation reinforced by 
high wage increases inflicted the same difficult economic situation on 
the Netherlands as it did on Belgium and Denmark. Like the Belgian and 
Danish governments, the Dutch government responded by intervening 
directly on several occasions in pay bargaining and wage freezes. Govern-
ment intervention in wage setting went hand in hand with rising conflicts 
and political crisis (Hemerijck, Unger et al. 2000: 214).
 In contrast to Belgium, the Dutch trade unions in 1982 modified their 
approach towards wages. Already in 1979, the Industries’ Unions (IB) had 
proposed a similar agreement, which was, however, rejected by other af-
filiates of the fnv (Visser 1997: 279). In the Wassenaar Agreement (central 
recommendation concerning elements of an employment policy) of 24 
November 1982, the unions recommended to their affiliated bodies that 
they accept wage agreements which kept wage increases lower than pro-
ductivity increases and that they abstain from price compensation. This 
recommendation was immediately agreed to by lower level bargaining ac-
tors: “In less than a year, two thirds of all collective agreements were re-
newed, mostly for two years during which the payment of price compen-
sation was suspended and a 5 per cent reduction of working hours took 
place. By 1985 cost of living clauses had virtually disappeared.” (Heme rijck, 
Van der Meer et al. 2000: 262).
Afterwards, the relationship between the government and the social part-
ners relaxed again, despite the fact that the government cut public sector 
pay in 1983. In principle, the shift by the unions had been accepted by 
sectoral bargaining. The Dutch unions repeated a period of exceptional 
wage restraint in the 1980s similar to the early 1950s, when the Nether-
lands was the only country in Western Europe with no increase in hourly 
wage-earnings since 1948 (United Nations 1967: Ch. 4, p. 3). The initial 
success of the policy supported further adjustment: “Over time, wage re-
straint allowed for a rather smooth interplay between wage setting and 
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fiscal policy, stimulating economic growth while keeping inflation down” 
(Hemerijck, Unger et al. 2000: 254).
 Since 1982 there has been no further intervention by the government 
and wages have developed in line with productivity growth. The Labour 
Foundation (star), which had been on the brink of being abolished, is now 
seen as a central element in the exchange of views between the govern-
ment and the social partners on the future of economic and social policy. 
The pattern of tripartite agreements has strengthened during the 1990s. 
Several social pacts were concluded with wage restraint being traded for 
compromises on social policy retrenchment. In 2003, a two-year agree-
ment was concluded that froze wages for 2004 and allowed for minor 
wage increases in 2005 (eirr 2003b and 2005).
Denmark
As in the Netherlands, Denmark already had a history of incomes policy 
as a national emergency measure in the 1960s (Elvander 1974: 435).117 In 
Denmark, the ‘totality solution’ was an emergency measure the govern-
ment adopted in 1962, which included price and wage freezes. Th e solution 
had been prepared by the government in close cooperation with the main 
union, lo. Th e lo supported the government view that a wage freeze was 
necessary in order to stabilize the economy. Since the unions could not 
agree with the employers on the term of the wage freeze, the government 
decided to implement the programme by means of legislation (Elvander 
1974: 420). Th e legislation on wages was not entirely new since the Dan-
ish government had often turned the results of mediation into law. At the 
same time, it remains the most comprehensive intervention since the war.
Th roughout the 1970s, the government made frequent attempts to reach a 
general agreement with the unions on stabilization of the economy. In 1970, 
the non-socialist government proposed a package of wage restraint, price 
freezes and the abolition of wage indexation that was not accepted by the lo 
(Elvander 1974: 421). In 1975, the social democratic government under the 
former trade union leader Joergensen legislated moderate wage increases 
and a proﬁ t freeze. Th is was backed by a ﬁ ve-party declaration that prom-
ised to curb indexation and reduce costs (Th e Economist 1975a). However, 
despite a relatively slow growth in real wages, the emergency measures were 
not suﬃ  cient to stop the price–wage inﬂ ation in Denmark throughout the 
1970s. In the late 1970s, incomes policy and wage indexation had become 
salient and even downright contentious political issues in parliament.
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 Furthermore, as in the Netherlands, the first step towards breaking the 
ice between the demands of the government and the unions was taken in 
1982, when the new conservative minority government abolished wage 
indexation. Despite the political turmoil this issue had caused earlier, this 
move was not met with any major strike. Nor was this political move ac-
companied by an understanding between the social partners on the future 
conduct of wage bargaining. The trade unions were divided internally in 
the manufacturing sector, where the unions were increasingly unhappy 
with the leftist leanings of the Social Democrats, while the general work-
ers’ union, SiD, saw industrial confrontation as a way to topple the gov-
ernment (Scheuer 1997: 162). The de-indexation of wages therefore did 
not lead to wage restraint but to further political conflict (Benner and 
Bundgaard-Vad 2000: 439). The wage bargaining round in 1985 ended 
in a national strike and a legislated wage agreement by the government. 
However, by 1987 the position within the unions had changed: The trade 
unions and employers signed an agreement stating that “the level of costs 
in this country does not exceed that of the foreign countries” (Lind 2000: 
139). Moreover, they agreed to a four-year agreement involving fixed wage 
increases per annum. In the years since, wage bargaining has remained 
conflictual in the face of a restrictive government policy, but stayed fo-
cused on wage moderation.
From the early 1980s onwards, wage bargaining institutions underwent 
a major restructuring process. Between 1933 and 1980, a system of bian-
nual national wage agreements existed. The national employers’ associa-
tion (da) and the union confederation (lo) settled an agreement for a 
going rate for the whole economy. Wage bargaining was highly synchro-
nized, but not wholly comprehensive. Special groups outside the scope 
of the da–lo negotiations were able to upset the whole system by fail-
ing to reach an agreement (Scheuer 1992). Since conflicts in one sector 
could have repercussions for the whole economy, particular negotiation 
deadlocks could prompt government intervention. A public concilia-
tor would then propose a compromise that would tend to be similar to 
agreements in other sectors and then put the whole package to a col-
lective vote (Iversen 1999: 122). This mechanism had a threefold effect: 
it introduced an early route for government intervention, it enforced 
coordination within the associations and it centralized decision-making. 
Moreover, deviating special interest groups were disciplined by govern-
ment action if the associations themselves were not in a position to exert 
discipline.
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 The tensions over incomes policy translated increasingly into conflicts 
between different trade unions and the attempts of the employers to re-
gain control over dissenting bargaining branches. Bargaining procedures 
were passed from the central level to the sectoral level. At the same time, 
the organizations on both sides were restructured. The number of affili-
ates of the employers’ confederation da was reduced from 150 to 33 by 
the late 1990s (eirr 1994a). In 1991, the metal sector employers merged 
with the other manufacturing employers to form the Confederation of 
Danish Industry (Dansk Industri, di). di has become an important veto 
block within the overall employers’ association. On the union side, lo 
attempted to design a new cartel structure. This led to conflict with the 
general workers’ union, SiD, which would have lost out. Consequently, 
wage bargaining structures have now become more rationalized on the 
whole, at the expense of the left within the trade unions.
Belgium
In 1976, the Belgian government ended a 15-year phase during which the 
social partners autonomously concluded a whole range of bipartite cen-
tral agreements on the construction of the welfare state. Between 1960 
and 1974, the National Labour Council finalized numerous agreements 
on the representation of trade unions in companies, social security and 
other issues – agreements that had become law without much govern-
ment interference. The active role of the Council rested on sectoral wage 
bargaining institutions that were crucial in providing the political support 
for central agreements (Vilrokx and Leemput 1998: 335). During this pe-
riod, the government was very much absent from the regulation of welfare 
and labour issues.
 However, in 1976, the government responded to mounting pressure 
from employers, increasingly radical demands from the unions and the 
rapid deterioration of the competitiveness of Belgian companies and pub-
lic finances. As a first step, the government imposed a ‘special levy’ of 50 
per cent on all contractual pay increases above those linked to indexation 
so it might finance a special fund for older unemployed workers. The de-
cision provoked a national strike, jointly organized by the socialist and 
Christian unions, the first-ever strike undertaken by the latter against the 
government (Hemerijck, Unger et al. 2000: 235).118
 From the very beginning, the issue of pay indexation was at the fore-
front of the struggle between the government and the unions. Belgium 
maintains a system of automatic pay increases linked to changes in con-
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sumer prices. This link was originally part of a collective agreement be-
tween trade unions and employers in the mining sector that was conclud-
ed immediately following World War i. Over time, pay indexation spread 
to all industrial and public sector wages and social benefits (eironline 
1998).119 Wage negotiations between trade unions and employers at the 
national and sectoral level therefore only ever applied to increases above 
inflation.
 After 1976, a new pattern of negotiation between the government and 
the social partners emerged that steadily increased the role of the govern-
ment in wage formation. Between 1976 and 1999, the government tried 
to negotiate wage restraint with the unions on many occasions, usually 
presenting this to both sides as a tripartite package. On several occasions, 
particularly in 1982 (Recovery Plan) and 1993 (Global Plan), the govern-
ment proposed packages in which employers were asked to commit them-
selves to a reduction in job targets and working hours in exchange for 
wage restraint from the unions (table 7.1). The government was actually 
willing to increase spending on the subsidized reduction of working hours 
(Hemerijck and Visser 2000: 247-8; Hemerijck et al. 2000). In both cases, 
negotiations failed and were followed by a unilateral decision by the gov-
ernment to set norms for real wage increases. In 1982, the government de-
cided to initially freeze wages and later on temporarily suspend the wage 
indexation mechanism. In 1993, it legislated an upper ceiling on wages 
that was based on a watered down indexation mechanism and a formula 
of wage comparisons with neighbouring countries.
 The government intervention in 1976 also led initially to a suspen-
sion of the negotiations on wage agreements within the National Labour 
Council. Between 1976 and 1986, no central agreements were concluded. 
Table 7.1  Incomes policy in Belgium, 1976-93
Year Policy Implication
1976 Wage freeze Imposed unilaterally
1982 Plan for Recovery Negotiations failed. Pay freeze and 
suspension of indexation imposed
1989 Law on Competitiveness Upper ceiling on wage increases 
1993 Global Plan Wage norm based on competitiveness
Sources: Vilrokx and Leemput (1998); Pochet (1999a). 
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Between 1987 and 1993, the central organizations resumed the negotia-
tion of biannual wage agreements, but according to some observers these 
were “devoid of content and largely dictated by the government” (Vilrox 
and Leemput 1998: 340). After the failure of the Global Plan negotiations 
in 1993, no agreement was reached. However, the government introduced 
further legislation in 1996 (Law on Safeguarding the Competitiveness of 
Enterprises), which prescribed national bargaining on a biannual basis. 
This was to determine the pay margin for sectoral bargaining in order 
to forestall a government decree. In 1998 and 2000, central agreements 
were negotiated again. Both produced pay settlements that were within 
the framework of the law.120
 Since the imposition of a wage norm in 1993, wage formation processes 
have been sandwiched from two sides. From below, the system of wage in-
dexation continues to guarantee the protection of the real wage by adjust-
ing wages to changes in consumer prices several times per year. Indexation 
has remained the primary source of wage expectations from workers and 
is defended by the unions at all costs. From above, a government-imposed 
norm sets a ceiling for all wage increases negotiated at the national and 
sectoral level in line with pay developments in other European countries. 
The government is determined to enforce this ceiling and has done so. As 
a result, the bargaining scope for trade unions and employer confedera-
tions is particularly small.
Rather than abandon the indexation mechanism the government has 
aimed at limiting its inflationary effects by dampening real wage increas-
es. Negotiations between the government and the unions have therefore 
been trapped in a dilemma, according to which the unions have defended 
the floor because there is a ceiling while the government and the employ-
ers have argued in favour of the ceiling because they cannot abolish the 
floor. The expectations of those employed have remained firmly fixed on 
the protection of the real wage, which has been automatically adjusted 
several times a year.121
 The stand-off between the social partners and the government indi-
cates the fragility of the Belgian corporatist institutions. While the social 
partners reject interference in the autonomous regulation of the welfare 
state they had acquired, the move by the government did not lead to any 
closer cooperation between the partners that might prevent further gov-
ernment intervention. Being entrenched in a whole array of institutional 
safeguards, on the one hand, and part of a fierce political battle, on the 
other, the Belgian trade unions – in particular the socialist trade union, 
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ftgb – were unable to accept any concessions that the government re-
quested with the aim of restoring the competitiveness of the Belgian econ-
omy.
From real to nominal wage restraint and belated monetarism: Sweden 
and Finland
In contrast to the other corporatist countries, Sweden and Finland share 
the position of switching late towards a more restrictive monetary policy, 
though for different reasons. Finland had been a latecomer to the Scan-
dinavian model due to its agricultural and forestry background and its 
close ties to the Soviet Union. Stabilization measures had already become 
necessary in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s, and, from the first agreement 
on incomes policy in 1969 onwards, Finland developed a policy mixture 
of moderate negotiated wage restraint and devaluation. It was only after 
the deep economic crisis in 1991/92 and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
that Finland’s economic policy converged on the central European hard 
currency model.
 Conversely, the Swedish form of real wage restraint was based on nego-
tiated monetary accommodation. In the interpretation by Torben Iversen 
(1999), based on similar assessments by Fritz Scharpf (1991), Walter Korpi 
(1983) and others (Martin 1985 and 2000; Stephens and Huber 1998), the 
solidaristic wage policy that the Swedish unions adopted in the 1950s led 
to a combination of a commitment to real wage restraint and a simultane-
ous accommodation of inflationary wage pressures. Real wage restraint 
in Sweden was only possible under the condition of an accommodating 
economic policy. In the words of Walter Korpi (1983: 228): “If the gov-
ernment cannot settle the distributive conflicts, at least temporarily, say, 
by increasing the money supply, they will appear in other forms, such as 
severe industrial disputes.” Monetary and fiscal accommodation, in other 
words, were the precondition for real wage restraint.
Sweden
Real wage restraint was a successful tool in Sweden for responding to 
the external shock of 1975. In fact, Sweden and Denmark had the lowest 
increase in real wages during the 1970s in Western Europe. Between 1977 
and 1979, real wages fell in three consecutive years following the devalua-
tion in 1976. The same mechanism was employed between 1982 and 1984 
when devaluation was followed by real wage restraint and a restoration of 
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competitiveness (Martin 1985; Iversen 1999). Owing to the combination 
of real wage restraint after major devaluations and an expansive economic 
policy, employment could be protected and growth was stimulated (Lange 
and Garrett 1985).
 Th roughout the 1980s the economic and institutional basis for the 
Swedish model of competitive devaluation was increasingly eroded. Th e 
Swedish government could not insulate itself from the increasing liber-
alization of capital markets in the oecd and did not manage to regulate 
Swedish currency markets eﬀ ectively (Iversen 1999: 145). Instead of intro-
ducing further regulation and controls, the government started to liberal-
ize capital markets and to control inﬂ ation itself. All exchange controls 
were abolished in July 1989 and the krona was pegged to the ecu in 1990. 
Th e government thus committed itself to a restrictive monetary policy. At 
the same time, the institutional basis for the Swedish wage bargaining sys-
tem came under attack from the employers who allied with the industrial 
sector unions against the dominance of the public sector. Th e central em-
ployers’ organization saf withdrew from national bargaining twice, in 1983 
and in 1990. In 1991, saf dismantled its bargaining unit and announced 
that it was no longer willing to play a role in bargaining (eirr 1992).
Both policy shifts – the pegging of the krona and the stern refusal of saf 
to engage in centralized bargaining any more – were arguably the most 
important economic policy changes in Sweden, since they marked the end 
of the commitment to full employment based on centralized real wage 
restraint and to an expansive economic policy. Nonetheless, the shift to-
wards monetarist decentralization (Iversen 1999) did not automatically 
shift the wage expectations of the unions or the workers they represented 
towards nominal wage restraint. Instead, the adjustment of wage expecta-
tions took place over several stages during the 1990s, which were primar-
ily initiated by the government.
 First of all, new inflationary pressure in 1990 prompted the govern-
ment to propose a two-year general pay freeze and strike ban that would 
have been the most far-reaching government intervention in Swedish 
wage bargaining, had it been implemented (Kjellberg 1998: 89; Martin 
1995). However, after widespread protests against the proposals, the gov-
ernment resigned and the plans were abandoned. In place of the state-
imposed wage freeze, the tripartite Rhenberg Commission was set up to 
persuade unions and employers to accept a two-year stabilization pro-
gramme for 1991 and 1992. The stabilization agreement included a 1 per- 
cent increase for the low paid, a pay freeze for other workers and a ban 
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on local bargaining that particularly upset the public sector trade union, 
the ptk (Financial Times 1991). In 1993, the same commission helped to 
coordinate a new round of stabilization agreements.
 In the years that followed, state mediation took on an increasingly im-
portant role. The Rhenberg Commission had been centred on a national 
mediator who was commissioned to find a compromise solution for nom-
inal wage restraint. Starting with the Rhenberg Commission, the role of 
state mediators became increasingly important. In 1995, for instance, the 
state mediator tried to push for the adoption of the Edin norm in sectoral 
pay negotiations. Since the lo tried to counteract this norm with its own 
‘strong norm’, the bargaining round turned out to be the most conflictual 
since 1980 (Elvander and Holmlund 1997: 31).
 The Edin norm had been developed by a commission of economists 
that had been delegated by the unions and employers without government 
interference. The proposal that the Edin report had come up with, how-
ever, was pushed strongly by the government. In 1997, the government 
exerted strong pressure on the social partners to reorganize the wage bar-
gaining system. The government stated that if the social partners failed to 
come up with a formula before the end of March 1997, it would intervene 
in order to achieve its goal (eirr 1997). The massive threat of interven-
tion was followed by a commission report that recommended a stronger 
role for a new mediation authority. It was only after these threats that the 
unions and employers in the private sector agreed on a new cooperation 
agreement – the Industrial Agreement of 1997 – that took up a number 
of suggestions from the government report.122 Over the next few years, a 
number of cooperation agreements were concluded in other sectors and, 
in June 2000, a national Mediation Institute was set up (eirr 2001a and 
2002a). The mission of the new Institute was to implement an ‘efficient’ 
wage policy that contributed to the stability policy of the Riksbank and 
promoted the so-called Euro-Norm, which was in fact a successor to the 
previous Edin norm.123
 Among Swedish observers, the Industrial Agreement is seen today 
as the “most important innovation in Swedish industrial relations since 
the Agreement of Saltsjobaden” (Elvander 2002a: 197).124 It parallels the 
Saltsjobaden agreement to the extent that, in both cases, a cooperative 
agreement between trade unions and employers aimed at averting further 
intervention by the government. For the first time since the early 1980s, 
both sides of industry are now committed once again to a cooperative and 
self-regulated approach towards the regulation of wage bargaining issues. 
However, unlike the post-war settlement, the room for accommodating 
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distributive struggles is much narrower today than it was before. The as-
sociations alone have not been able to refocus expectations, and, as a re-
sult, the government has had to step in.
Finland
In Finland, the cooperation between the government and the unions on a 
common approach towards stabilization was briefer than in Sweden. Af-
ter devaluation of the Finnish markka in 1967, a tight incomes policy was 
negotiated by a national mediator (Keijo Liinamaa). An agreement was 
reached between the government and both sides of industry that entailed 
minor wage increases below productivity rates. After the agreement was 
settled, parliament enacted an emergency law that gave the government 
the power to regulate wages and prices. The scale of government inter-
vention was a novelty in post-war relations between the government and 
wage bargaining institutions.125
 After the stabilization agreement, a national wage coordination scheme 
was established in 1968. The pattern of wage coordination was based on 
tripartite package deals with the government. At first, only the peak em-
ployers’ confederation, the stk, and the main trade union sak were part 
of the wage bargaining. But from the mid-1970s onwards, other federa-
tions were officially incorporated in the system (Lilja 1992). The outcomes 
of the Finnish wage bargaining institutions, however, were not binding for 
the member unions of sak. Sectoral trade unions were entitled to break 
away from central agreements and could negotiate better agreements at 
the sectoral level. This became a weak point of Finnish wage bargaining 
since, at the same time, a political split had divided the trade unions, in 
which communist trade unions exploited workplace grievances and start-
ed to push up wages (Kauppinen 1994: 69).126
 Tripartite wage agreements during the economic shocks of the 1970s 
were therefore under pressure from the left and grassroots activists, while 
the main trade union confederation cooperated in incomes policies. Per-
formance improved in the early 1980s and, compared to the other coun-
tries that are studied in this book, led to relatively stable development. 
The economy was, however, dependent on trade with the Soviet Union 
and forestry exports. The link between government policy and wage bar-
gaining was quite direct: in 1988 taxes were reduced by the same amount 
that pay increased (Kauppinen 1994, 66).
 The economic recovery in the 1980s also led to the reintroduction of 
wage indexation in the tripartite agreement in 1984. Wage indexation had 
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been a feature of Finnish wage bargaining until 1968 when it was abol-
ished in the first stabilization agreement mediated by Keijo Liinamaa. At 
the time, it seemed surprising that Finland succeeded in eliminating in-
dexation since this had become a deeply rooted system as in Denmark and 
Norway (Elvander 1974: 432). In the mid-1980s, however, with economic 
recovery at hand indexation reappeared.
 In the 1990s, Finland encountered two major challenges that again were 
solved by striking tripartite wage agreements. First, the Soviet Union col-
lapsed, prompting the deepest recession in Finland since World War ii 
and, second, Finland joined the eu and aspired to join emu. As in Sweden, 
the recession of the Finnish economy in the early 1990s was combined 
with a commitment from the government to avoid further devaluation. 
A comprehensive pact was negotiated with the national union to achieve 
this goal, which included a 3 per cent wage cut. Despite these efforts for a 
negotiated agreement, the agreement was rejected by the sectoral unions. 
The Finnish markka, which had been pegged to the ecu in June 1991, was 
devalued in November 1991. Following devaluation, a comprehensive tri-
partite agreement was adopted that included a pay freeze (Kauppinen 
2000: 166).
 In 1994, Finland acceded to the eea and in 1995 it joined the eu. Again, 
the new challenge was met by a comprehensive tripartite agreement of 
September 1995. The government was assured of the support of the social 
partners, who were firmly committed to enabling Finland to join emu. In 
1997, a joint declaration confirmed this support and was turned into an-
other pact. Both agreements were explicitly aimed at paving the way for 
European monetary integration.
 The underlying dynamic of Finnish wage bargaining in the framework 
of tripartite agreements was the relationship between the national tripar-
tite negotiations and the sectoral level of bargaining. National solidarity 
between the government and the unions could be evoked frequently un-
der the impact of serious challenges. The Finnish social democrats and 
the social democratic strand of the trade unions were both firmly com-
mitted to cooperation. Since the mid-1960s, there were only four years in 
which the sdp was not in the government. The threat by the communist 
organizations in the late 1960s had strengthened their cooperation.
 Sectoral wage bargaining emerged at times of recovery, when sectoral 
branches sought to catch up with sector-specific productivity gains, and 
during the years of the conservative government between 1991 and 1995, 
when no tripartite agreement could be reached.127 In 1998 and 1999, on 
the basis of economic recovery, sectoral bargaining emerged again, when 
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some of the industrial unions (the paper workers’ union, the chemical 
workers’ union and the electricity workers’ union) refused to accept the 
terms of the new central agreement. While the sectoral breakaway was 
seen as a sign of the decline of the Finnish tripartite mode of adjustment, 
this is not necessarily the case. Rather, sectoral adjustments of relative 
wages could serve as a safety valve in an otherwise centralized and highly 
controlled wage formation process.
 Adjustment of wage expectations in the non-corporatist countries 
with non-responsive wage bargaining regimes
The non-corporatist countries can be divided into three subgroups: the 
continental European countries of Italy and France, where contestation 
rather than cooperation characterized the post-war settlement between 
trade unions and the government; the Anglo-Saxon countries of the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Ireland with fragmented and pluralist trade unions; and 
the post-authoritarian countries of Spain and Portugal, which missed out 
on the post-war settlement altogether. The absence of corporatism in the 
post-war settlement did not mean, however, that labour was not inte-
grated into the political decision-making. Political integration was merely 
impeded either by political conflicts or by the lack of institutional and 
organizational conditions.
 As a case in point, economic planning in the United Kingdom and 
France in the 1960s took place under the active involvement of trade 
unions (Shonfield 1965). In the uk, the wartime cabinet was dependent 
on the goodwill of trade union leaders, who were supported by liberals 
like Beveridge and economists like Keynes. After the war, Clement At-
tlee headed the first Labour government in the United Kingdom to have a 
clear majority and was elected on its promises to the working people. Al-
though this resulted in the National Economic Development Act of 1947, 
business organizations managed to block it in parliament.
 In France, the country with the most detailed and formalistic type of 
economic planning, the role of trade unions in the planning process was 
limited because the real contact was between the government and busi-
ness, with neither side being interested in seriously discussing their plans 
with trade unions (Barbash 1972: 149). In contrast to the United Kingdom, 
the role of labour was weak in France and Italy, and price controls were 
mainly directed at producers. In Italy, labour was excluded from political 
decision-making for most of the period of the 1950s and 1960s.
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 France and Italy share a tradition of labour exclusion, political con-
testation between communist and socialist trade unions, and weak in-
stitutionalization of wage bargaining up to the 1970s (Crouch 1978: 205; 
Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983). In both countries, governments initially 
targeted their incomes policies on price controls rather than wage con-
trols. Both countries have been at the core of European integration and 
were early members of the ems. Both had to abandon the currency peg 
during the 1970s because of high inflation differentials in relation to the 
German mark.
 Nevertheless, both countries displayed very different ways of adapting 
to the shift towards restrictive monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While in Italy steps towards an increasing institutionalization of wage 
bargaining under the control of the government took place, wage bargain-
ing institutions in France steadily disintegrated. Consequently, govern-
ment intervention and tripartism in France only occurred with regard to 
welfare reforms, where trade unions still exercised considerable influence, 
albeit hardly over pay. National negotiations between the social partners 
on the framework of wage bargaining institutions in 1993 and 1995 result-
ed in further decentralization of bargaining. In contrast, in Italy, progres-
sive institutionalization of wage bargaining procedures took place from 
the early 1970s onwards. While this process was held up and interrupted 
several times by political negotiations over wage indexation, it resulted in 
the adoption of a formal framework for pay bargaining in 1993 that was 
negotiated between the social partners and the government.
 In a similar vein, the history of British and Irish labour relations was 
tightly coupled until 1979, when both countries went their separate ways. 
In 1979, the change of government ended the Social Contract in the uk, 
while the Irish government decided to abandon the fixed exchange rate 
with the pound in order to join the ems. Until then, both countries shared 
a tradition of pluralist trade unions, voluntarist wage agreements and a 
close economic union, with the Irish punt pegged to the pound sterling, a 
constant flow of Irish workers to the United Kingdom and a steady stream 
of British goods into Ireland. Moreover, British trade unions organized a 
substantial minority of Irish workers in Ireland and as such reinforced a 
British view of trade unionism in Ireland.
 At the same time, there were also important national differences in 
the institutions and political organizations that were partly reinforced by 
their ambivalent post-colonial relationship. These differences were main-
ly rooted in the role of the Catholic Church in Ireland, which propagated 
a notion of Catholic social integration into labour relations and their in-
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stitutions, and the role of nationalism in the party formation after Ire-
land gained independence in 1922. The differences were reinforced by the 
asymmetrical relationship between the two countries, in which the Unit-
ed Kingdom was an overarching ex-colonialist world power and Ireland 
the ex-colony with a small, largely rural economy. Over time, when the 
economic and political institutions faced economic crises, these differ-
ences became more pronounced: Ireland turned to the central European 
corporatist approach while the United Kingdom moved firmly towards 
the Anglo-Saxon pluralist way.
 In Spain and Portugal, the incorporation of labour was part of an au-
thoritarian corporatist regime. Systems of national and centralized unions 
were established under the control of the government. Wages were set by 
statutory regulation and, particularly in Portugal, wages were often indi-
vidually determined on the labour market (Barreto 1992: 453).
France and the United Kingdom: de-institutionalization and 
decentralization as a reaction to institutional failure
France and the United Kingdom both took a path of gradual de-institu-
tionalization of wage bargaining institutions as a consequence of insti-
tutional failure. While in the uk institutions were deliberately abolished 
for political reasons, in France tripartite negotiations took place and la-
bour market regulation remained strong. This, however, did not lead to a 
strengthening of the institutions. In both cases, there is a trend towards 
market based settlements of wages.
France
Attempts to institutionalize wage bargaining in France and improve the 
relationship between trade unions and the government have been rare.128 
Despite the tradition of economic planning, the government, the unions 
and the employers have rejected cooperation as in principle unhelpful. 
The state “agreed to such negotiations only when pressed by national 
crises of the sort generated by the steel strike of 1963 and the events fol-
lowing May 1968” (Hall 1986: 247). The communist trade union cgt took 
the view that cooperation with the government would be useful, but only 
“if it took place in a different society than ours” (United Nations 1967: 
Ch. 4, p. 21). The two biggest trade unions, cgt and fo, withdrew their 
participation from the preparation of the second economic plan (which 
began in 1953) and boycotted subsequent involvement until the eighth 
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plan (Hall 1986: 158). The employers’ behaviour was described as ‘antedi-
luvian’, dominated by paternalistic and family-controlled companies that 
opposed innovation (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983: 567). In 1968, trade 
union rights were recognized in companies by law and trade unions have 
since been entitled to appoint trade union delegates (délégués syndicaux). 
They gained the power to negotiate and sign collective agreements. For 
these reasons, collective bargaining was virtually non-existent in France 
before 1968.
 In contrast to Italy, this situation was not changed fundamentally by the 
social unrest in 1968, although the events of May 1968 sent a shock wave 
to the political establishment (Levy 2000: 320). The discontent on the 
shop floor led to a new initiative by the French president Georges Pom-
pidou to build plant-level institutions and to expand trade union rights at 
this level. The employers’ confederation cnpf increased its role in collec-
tive bargaining and started to negotiate national agreements (Flanagan, 
Soskice et al. 1983: 620). However, the spur of institutionalization came 
to a halt with the political conflicts between the unions and the persistent 
opposition of the cgt to any role in collective bargaining. Given political 
contestation and the industrial weakness of the unions, the government 
adopted a policy of price controls as a reaction to the oil shock. More-
over, the government used its close links with industry to make sure that 
a level of real wage restraint could be attained (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 
1983: 640). The deflationary programme of the Barre government there-
fore worked via the pressure on industry rather than the imposition of an 
incomes policy.
 As France struggled to remain within the ems, real wage restraint was 
hardly sufficient. Until 1984 annual nominal wage increases hovered above 
10 per cent. Moreover, the new Mitterand government initially raised 
the minimum wage substantially in 1982, driving wage inflation further 
upwards. When France was under threat of being forced out of the ems 
once more in 1982, the government shifted its position. A four-month 
wage freeze was decreed in June 1982. France gained the edge through 
“competitive disinflation” (Fitoussi 1993). It became the priority of the 
Mitterand government to regain competitiveness by achieving a rate of 
inflation lower than that of its trading partners. “Toward this end, redis-
tributive Keynesianism gave way to austerity budgets, wage indexation 
was abandoned and, most importantly, monetary policy was tightened, 
with real interest rates ranging from 5 to 8 per cent for over a decade” 
(Levy 2000: 324). After the compulsory wage freeze in 1982, the govern-
ment no longer intervened directly in pay issues, but used the adjustment 
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of the minimum wage as the focal point for influencing wage expectations 
in the private sector.
 With regard to wage bargaining institutions, the cautious steps towards 
institutionalization in 1969/70 gained new relevance in the late 1970s, 
when the relations between the socialists and communists turned sour. 
The socialist trade union cfdt had traditionally been more open towards 
collective bargaining issues and had initiated new attempts to propose 
bargaining rights at the industry and company level. Given the temporary 
distance from the cgt, which still rejected cooperation, the proposals 
were able to find their way into the socialist party and became law under 
the new Mitterand government in 1982. The Auroux Laws imposed an 
obligation on companies to bargain over wages with trade unions on an 
annual basis (Goetschy 1997). By these means, Mitterand and his labour 
minister Jacques Delors had broken with the post-war government tradi-
tion of trying to weaken the union movement. They envisaged strength-
ening wage bargaining institutions and attempted to co-opt the unions by 
encouraging participation in bargaining.
 However, the Auroux Laws did not help the situation of weak trade 
union organization and weak institutions. In the 1980s, the trade unions 
were already too weak and remained too internally divided to exploit 
their newly gained entitlement to bargain with employers. While new 
company agreements spread throughout the industry, the institutional 
basis was not strengthened. Wage bargaining remained fragile, lacking 
confidence in the ability of employers and trade unions to regulate labour 
affairs.
 Since the trade unions were, however, a powerful political force, labour 
relations remained a political issue. The conservative governments of the 
1990s held tripartite summits on employment in 1993 and 1996 to discuss 
working hours and labour market policy. In 1995, a summit of the social 
partners was called to discuss how bargaining might be better articulated. 
At the summit, a solution was found that enabled company bargaining to 
be carried out by mandated employees rather than union officials. The 
understanding also reversed the hierarchical order of bargaining: Com-
pany agreements could now undercut collective agreements (eirr 1995). 
Although at first glance the summit showed the capacity of the social 
partners to deal with the restructuring of the wage bargaining system, 
the effects of the agreements contributed towards a further process of 
decentralization and also de-institutionalization of wage bargaining pro-
cedures.129
ADJUSTMENT OF WAGE EXPECTATIONS
Wages.indd   215 28-8-2006   15:43:32

United Kingdom
The failure of incomes policy in the United Kingdom between 1961 and 
1979 is generally ascribed to two factors: first, the lack of authority of the 
trade unions over their local constituency in wage bargaining and, second, 
the lack of interest by the government in protecting and sustaining the 
international competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.130
 Unlike other countries that lost competitiveness in the 1960s, negoti-
ated wage restraint in Britain was not used in combination with the de-
valuation of the currency. For twenty years (between 1950 and 1970), Brit-
ish policy-makers refused to devalue, except when forced to in 1948 and 
1967. They consistently defended an exchange rate that by the end of the 
1950s was seriously overvalued and, in doing so, generated a disruptive 
set of stop-go cycles. This policy served the perceived interests of finan-
cial capital. “At each turning point spokesmen for the City and the Bank 
of England pressed the government to deflate rather than devalue and 
in each instance their view prevailed” (Shonfield 1965; Brittan 1970; Hall 
1986: 251).
 For most of the 1960s and 1970s, incomes policies were based on a 
reluctant, but nonetheless voluntary, commitment by the trade unions to 
accept wage restraint. Governments and trade unions signed a declara-
tion of intent that recorded the willingness of unions and management 
representatives to cooperate with the government on behalf of their mem-
bers both in setting voluntary norms and procedures for reviewing such 
changes. Incomes policy became more rigorous in 1966 when the govern-
ment introduced statutory penalties for breaches of its pay norms (Clegg 
1979: 345). In 1973-74, statutory pay norms were imposed (see table 7.2).
 At the same time, the practice of wage bargaining remained firmly 
based on a system that prioritized local bargaining arrangements and 
that was only partially encompassed by sectoral coordination. Neither 
the voluntary commitments nor the statutory policy prevented powerful 
bargaining groups from pursuing their own sectional interests. Standoffs 
between the government and the unions over the restructuring of the vol-
untarist and decentralized system of collective bargaining resulted in tur-
moil, lasting from 1970 until 1979. Despite the negative record of voluntary 
and statutory incomes policy, in 1975 the Labour government again tried to 
negotiate wage restraint in exchange for tax concessions and other beneﬁ ts 
for labour. Th e Social Contract initially managed to reduce wage inﬂ ation 
considerably (see ﬁ gure A1 in appendix). But it failed in the medium term 
due to distributional conﬂ icts within the trade unions, sectionalist leap-
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frogging by major parts of the British trade unions and the lack of commit-
ment from other parts of the trade unions to accept the concessions by the 
Labour government, in particular in the public sector.
 With the change of government in 1979, all attempts to negotiate an 
incomes policy were replaced by a firm commitment to deregulate the 
labour market instead. A number of legislative changes removed tradi-
tional restrictive practices of wage bargaining and trade union organiza-
tion. The scope and level of bargaining were considerably reduced. Tight 
monetary policy was deliberately employed to discipline wage bargaining 
(Rhodes 2000a and 2000b). After 1979, no British government attempted 
to directly influence or negotiate private-sector pay formation with trade 
unions. Tripartite bargaining or summits with governments and the social 
partners that occurred in all Western European countries in the 1980s and 
1990s were deliberately absent from British policy-making, even when La-
bour returned to power in 1997. Labour market regulations are today the 
weakest in Europe, and with the exception of France, British trade unions 
also have the weakest role as wage bargaining institutions.
 During the 1970s, real wage growth in the United Kingdom was among 
the lowest in Europe, matched only by the highly corporatist countries 
of Denmark and Sweden. Despite the weak institutional foundations, the 
Social Contract delivered real wage restraint and led to a substantial re-
duction in real wages in 1976 and 1977.131 However, given the ailing manu-
facturing sector and a strong currency, real wage restraint was not even 
a temporarily sufficient instrument for economic recovery. With the out-
spoken hostility of the government towards labour from 1979 onwards, the 
trade unions engaged in protecting real wages. In contrast to the 1970s, 
real wage increases in the 1980s and 1990s were markedly above the Eu-
ropean average. Despite rapidly rising unemployment during the 1980s, 
Table 7.2  Incomes policy in the UK, 1970-79
Year Policy Pay Content Implication
1972-74 Incomes Policy Several stages of low wage 
increases
Challenged by the miners’ 
union
1975-1979 Social Contract Several stages of voluntary 
wage restraint
First tacitly accepted by the 
unions, later challenged by 
the public sector
Sources: Flanagan, Soskice et al. (1983); Scharpf (1991); various sources. 
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wage bargaining did not respond to economic needs, but trade unions 
rather tried to protect the immediate interests of their members. Since 
no shared view of a legitimate pay norm has evolved since 1979, wage bar-
gaining has remained unresponsive to the economic policy of the govern-
ment and is today largely accidental and contingent on local conditions 
and local power constellations.
 The extent of the shift in the approach of British governments, how-
ever, cannot be explained solely by the failures of the wage bargaining 
system. As the other national examples show, adjustment failure was 
equally pronounced in a number of countries – both corporatist and non-
corporatist. Similar problems to the British situation existed in Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Denmark. In Italy and Ireland, wage 
bargaining institutions were similarly fragmented, with trade unions not 
prepared to sacrifice real wage losses for economic adjustment. Equally, 
many governments in the early 1980s shared the adversarial attitude to-
wards labour. However, in a number of countries at the end of the 1980s, 
the adversarial approach had reverted to cooperation under new terms. 
The British government, however, has not returned to this position and 
wage bargaining institutions have continued to wear away throughout the 
period.
Italy and Ireland: building wage bargaining institutions through 
intervention132
While Italy started out in a similar position to France, the reaction of the 
unions towards the ‘hot autumn’ of wildcat strikes and social unrest of 1969 
changed the situation from a tradition of a weakly institutionalized wage 
bargaining system to a steady process of institutionalization. Th is process 
took almost a quarter of a century to complete. It was in the tripartite Ci-
ampi Agreement of July 1993 (Accordo 23 luglio 1993) that a legally binding 
collective bargaining framework was established that introduced a two-tier 
bargaining process similar to the German and Austrian model. In contrast 
to the German model, however, the Italian framework agreement included 
tighter rules on the wage formation process itself, by suggesting that inﬂ a-
tion be used as a norm to guide sectoral bargaining and productivity be 
taken as the yardstick for plant-level bargaining. Th e 1993 agreement was 
accompanied by further action to strengthen the wage bargaining institu-
tions at the plant level, by introducing a unity trade union representation 
(rappresentanza sindacale unitaria) that was mandated and dominated by 
the big three Italian trade union confederations.
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 The immediate effect of the social unrest in 1969 was to shift wage 
bargaining to the level of the plant. Plant-level bargaining reversed the 
role of the wage bargaining hierarchy; sectoral and national bargaining 
only generalized the agreements that were concluded in large firms in 
northern Italy (Regalia and Regini 2004). This was accompanied by the 
Workers’ Statute in the 1970s, which gave Italian workers the most com-
prehensive body of individual employment rights in Europe (Ferner and 
Hyman 1992b: 534). In contrast to France, all the trade unions including 
the communist cgil seized the opportunity to extend bargaining rights 
to the local level. The political motivation of the unions, however, had al-
ready contributed to a move towards centralized negotiations in the early 
1970s. The trade unions forged an alliance – the Unitary Federation – and 
engaged in national negotiations with the employers’ confederations and 
the government. The key achievement of the national negotiations was 
the agreement concluded in 1975 on the revision and extension of the pay 
indexation mechanism (Scala mobile) to the entire economy (see table 
7.3).133
 The extension of the Scala mobile at the time of strong external infla-
tionary pressure exacerbated the shock to the Italian economy. The gov-
ernment reacted by forming a ‘national solidarity’ government in 1976, 
which included the communist party, pci. In February 1978, the first tri-
partite agreement on wage restraint and social policy was negotiated dur-
ing the so-called eur union assembly (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000b). The 
cooperation between the Christian Democrats and the Communists did 
not last; nor did the agreement solve the economic problem.
Table 7.3  Tripartite agreements in Italy, 1970-98
Year Policy
1978 EUR agreement
1983 Revision of Pay Indexation 
1992 Amato agreement abolishing scala mobile
1993 Ciampi Protocol: Agreement on labour costs and collective bargaining system
1996 Employment Pact (Accordo per il Lavoro)
1998 Social Pact for Growth and Employment
Sources: Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000); Regalia and Regini (2004). 
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 As in Belgium and the Netherlands, pay indexation was the main bone 
of contention. Th e ‘Unitary Federation’ broke up over conﬂ icting views on 
indexation. In 1983, an anti-inﬂ ation pact was signed that entailed some 
revision of the pay indexation scheme. Another attempt to revise index-
ation was made as early as 1984, but failed. Th e government was widely 
criticized for the generous compensation it oﬀ ered to the unions, while the 
unions were split politically. Th e cgil did not sign the agreement. In fact, 
the communist party campaigned against the agreement by demanding a 
referendum, which turned out to be a defeat for the communists.134 Never-
theless, the experience forestalled further attempts at tripartite bargaining 
on pay indexation during the 1980s. For the remainder of the decade, the 
unions and the government stayed in their trenches and did not move.135
 When the political situation changed fundamentally in the early 1990s 
a new approach could at last be adopted. In 1992, the old political system 
collapsed and the new ‘technocratic governments’ of Amato and Ciampi 
came to power. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty was followed by a se-
rious fiscal and monetary crisis. Just as in the late 1970s, a national emer-
gency situation mobilized the consensus required from the trade unions 
to abandon the pay indexation mechanism (Regalia and Regini 2004; Fer-
rera and Gualmini 2000b). In contrast to the emergency agreement (1978) 
and the agreement on pay indexation (1983), neither the Amato agreement 
nor the Ciampi agreement (1992 and 1993, respectively) was accompanied 
by further commitment from the government to public expenditure.
 The Italian tripartite agreements136 on the abolition of pay indexation 
and the restructuring of wage bargaining institutions of 1992 and 1993 
parallel the agreements reached in the traditional corporatist countries of 
the Netherlands (1982) and Denmark (1987), where an adjustment in wage 
bargaining priorities took place under strong pressure from the govern-
ment. In Italy, with its lack of a corporatist tradition, a similar move led 
to wildcat strikes in unionized companies and the temporary resignation 
of the leader of the cgil, Bruno Trentin. But the agreement could not be 
undone by these signs of protest; on the contrary, it was further devel-
oped by the Ciampi agreement in 1993 and subsequent ones. The process 
indicates that the institutional evolution of Italian wage bargaining since 
1970 has been strengthened rather than weakened – despite the politi-
cal stand-offs that characterized the 1980s. This is partly due to the fact 
that, beyond the national and political cleavages between the actors, the 
relationships at the local level have been more cooperative. The contesta-
tion and political weakness of the 1960s has been replaced by workplace 
institutions, though often informal and limited to the formal economy.137
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Ireland
Despite the voluntarist and pluralist nature of Irish trade unions, wage 
bargaining procedures have been surprisingly centralized for most of the 
post-war period.138 National wage agreements were concluded during the 
1950s and 1960s, though these were controversial: the national agreement 
of 1964 met with resistance in many plants and fuelled social unrest in the 
late 1960s (von Prondzynski 1992: 78). Strike rates in Ireland, too, have been 
comparatively high. Since Ireland, like the United Kingdom, encountered 
problems with high inﬂ ation rates in the 1960s, the government threatened 
to pass legislation on a statutory incomes policy (the Price and Incomes 
Bill) in 1970. In order to avert government intervention, the unions and em-
ployers’ confederation reacted by setting up the Employers–Labour Con-
ference, which was charged with negotiating national wages agreements.139
 The national wage agreements, however, were unsuitable for coping 
with the oil crisis, but proceeded to follow the inflationary trend. In 1975, 
therefore, the government stepped in for the first time and promised the 
social partners budgetary concessions in exchange for lower wage settle-
ments (von Prondzynski 1992: 79). The deal worked, at least temporarily, 
but by 1978 the trade union confederation took a vote not to continue with 
national bargaining. Again, in 1980, the government pushed the unions 
towards national negotiations, this time on the basis of a ‘National Un-
derstanding’ that was meant to replace the wage agreement and serve as 
a pay guideline. By this time, however, the employers were determined 
to abandon centralized bargaining and no further agreement was settled 
between 1981 and 1987.140
 As in Denmark and the Netherlands, the shift in the government’s ap-
proach took place in 1982. The continual political crises led to three gen-
eral elections in 18 months in 1981 and 1982. For the first time, the govern-
ment refused to comply with a pay agreement in the public sector because 
of macroeconomic considerations. By that time, public sector borrowing 
stood at almost 20 per cent and foreign debt at 40 per cent of national in-
come. Inflation was around 20 per cent in 1981. In the meantime, however, 
Ireland had abandoned the currency peg with the British pound and had 
joined the ems. In line with the slowdown of nominal wage increases in 
the ems zone, Irish wage increases fell slowly, but not sufficiently to keep 
in line with the rest of the ems. Between 1980 and 1986 unemployment 
rate exploded from 7.3 per cent to 17.4 per cent.
 While wage bargaining moved to the plant level, the government nev-
ertheless attempted to influence wage bargaining by issuing pay norms 
ADJUSTMENT OF WAGE EXPECTATIONS
Wages.indd   221 28-8-2006   15:43:33

for the private sector or by trying to impose the public sector norm on 
other sectors. This, however, only worked in the early 1980s. On several 
occasions thereafter, to no avail, the government urged employers to im-
plement wage freezes. In 1984, the trade unions offered incomes policy 
as an instrument for economic recovery, a move picked up by the Na-
tional Economic and Social Council (nesc). The nesc prepared a study in 
which wage restraint, though not incomes policy, was a central element 
(Hardiman 2002: 8).141 Only a change in government in 1987 enabled a 
breakthrough for a new agreement between the state and the social part-
ners. The government invited the trade unions to talks and reached a con-
sensus, which was then forced upon the employers’ organization and the 
Irish Farmer’s Association (Aust 1999).
 With the Programme for National Recovery that was agreed upon in 
October 1987, a series of tripartite pacts were initiated that are widely 
seen as a major contribution to the recovery of the Irish economy (see 
table 7.4). The country not only escaped the deep economic, social and 
political crisis of the 1980s, but it also addressed its long-term develop-
ment problems of emigration, unemployment, trade deficits and weak in-
digenous business development (O’Donnell and O’Reardon 2000: 239).
 Four tripartite agreements were settled between 1987 and 2000, each 
of them lasting several years. Wage formation within the agreements took 
the form of graduated (usually annual) increases in the basic wage rate, 
plus provision for a locally bargained pay increase. Public sector pay tend-
ed to be treated separately, and this remained a point of contention. The 
range of bargaining issues broadened as the new agreements were negoti-
Table 7.4  Tripartite agreements in Ireland, 1987-2000
Year Policy Pay Content
1987-90 Programme for National 
Recovery
2% on balance
1990-93 Programme for Economic and Social 
Progress
10.75% over three years
Local bargaining permitted up to 3%
1994-97 Programme for Competitiveness and 
Work
8% over 39 months
1997-2000 Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, 
Employment and Competitiveness
7.25% for 3 years
local bargaining clause
Sources: Hardiman (2002), O’Donnell and O’Reardon (1997); various sources.
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ated. The Programme for Economic and Social Progress (pesp, 1990-93) 
introduced a local productivity-related bargaining clause. Nevertheless, 
wage drift remained relatively low.
 While the negotiations for each of the agreements were accompanied 
by conflicts and each time gave way to pessimistic forecasts that the 
time for tripartite pacts would soon be over, the agreements rested upon 
a number of factors that served the stability of the new bargaining ar-
rangements. One aspect is obviously the immediate success of the initial 
agreement in 1987 that was contingent on an upturn in the international 
economy and a drop in inflation (Hardiman 2002: 9). Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, real pay increases in Ireland were higher than the eu av-
erage. Real wage restraint – which was the main feature of the traditional 
corporatist countries – remained difficult, with the Irish unions insisting 
on the protection of the real wage (Kavanagh, Considine et al. 1998). But 
equally important, the tripartite agreements very quickly moved from a 
general shared understanding of a macroeconomic strategy to addressing 
numerous supply-side issues (Roche 1997: 121). In particular, the insti-
tutional basis of wage bargaining was strengthened by introducing the 
Labour Relations Commission in 1990 (eirr 1990). Wider social issues 
such as ‘social inclusion and equality’ and workplace representation were 
included in the agreements. Overall, the instrument of settling tripartite 
agreements has now reached such a level of political legitimacy in Irish 
economic policy-making in a period of exceptional economic success that 
they bind the actors together rather than letting them drift apart. How-
ever, during the period of 1987 and 2000, wage formation was dependent 
on the government agreeing to concessions to the social partners. To date, 
the institutional basis has not been strong enough to devise a wage for-
mation procedure that is able to survive only by the support of the wage 
bargaining actors themselves.142
Spain and Portugal: building responsive wage bargaining institutions 
after government intervention143
In Spain, tripartite agreements including an incomes policy are so insepa-
rable from the transition to democracy that the process has been charac-
terized as ‘pacted transition’ driven by elite compromises (Hamann 1998 
and 2001: 162; Heywood 1996). The actual transition to democracy in Spain 
was not only exceptionally smooth, compared with Portugal and Greece, 
but also amazingly well prepared by the outgoing Francoist government. 
The Political Reform Law of 1976 provided the necessary framework for 
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the elections in 1977 and for a new democratic constitution (Heywood 
1996: 147). The consensus and pact-based transition also included the re-
lations with the social partners.
 After the 1977 elections, the political parties that were represented in 
parliament signed an all-party agreement (Pactos de la Moncloa) in which 
the first post-authoritarian incomes policy was agreed (see table 7.5). In 
order to break the inflationary trend that had emerged in the mid-1970s 
(see figure A1 in appendix), wage growth was linked to monetary growth 
and not to past inflation. The leaders of the main trade unions, cc.oo and 
ugt, held seats in parliament and therefore assisted in ratifying the pacts 
(Perez 2000b: 344). The pacts were the basis for a number of tripartite 
agreements that regulated pay increases in Spain in the first decade after 
the transition until 1986. The early agreements committed the unions to 
wage restraint in line with inflation. From 1981 onwards, the Interconfed-
eral Framework Agreement (ami) permitted pay increases on the basis 
of productivity improvements at the company level. The agreements also 
dealt with a number of other labour-related issues, such as the legal regu-
lation of industrial relations (the Workers’ Statute) and the reduction of 
working time. Cooperation was fostered further by the attempted coup 
d’etat in 1981, which prompted the communist trade union ccoo to sign 
the 1982 agreement.
Table 7.5  Tripartite agreements in Spain, 1977-86
Year Policy Pay Content Signatories
1977 Moncloa Pacts Parliamentary parties
1979 Acuerdo de Base Interconfederal 13.0-16.0 UGT, CEOE
1980-81 Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal 11.0-15.0 UGT, CEOE, USO
1982 Acuredo Nacional de Empleo 9.0-11.0 Gvt., CEOE, UGT, CCOO
1983 Acuerdo Interconfederal 9.5-12.0 CEOE, CEPYME, UGT, 
CC.OO
1985 Acuerdo Económico y Social 7.2-8.6 Government CEOE, 
CEPYE, UGT
1986 Acuerdo Económico y Social 5.5-7.5 Government CEOE, 
CEPYE, UGT
Sources: Royo (2002b: 82); Hamann (2001: 158).
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 When the Spanish Socialist party won the election in 1982, the govern-
ment was eager to continue with the agreements. In the first year of the 
socialist government, an agreement was signed that included both trade 
unions. Still, as early as 1984, a dispute between the government and the 
unions broke out over public sector pay and the introduction of ﬁ xed term 
contracts. Consequently, the communist trade union ccoo opposed the 
agreement. In 1985 and 1986, negotiations became increasingly strained. 
Th e expectations on both sides of the bargaining table, which support-
ed cooperation through the transition years, had evidently diverged. Th e 
government perceived centralized agreements as increasingly disadvanta-
geous and so assumed an increasingly uncompromising attitude towards 
the unions (Perez 2000b: 345). Th e socialist trade union ugt, on the other 
hand, became increasingly disillusioned with government policy. Th e con-
ﬂ ict escalated in 1987 when the leader of the ugt, Nicolas Redondo, re-
signed from his psoe party seat in parliament.144 This move was followed 
by the first general strike in Spain for 58 years in 1988.
 Between 1988 and 1996, the socialist government made several attempts 
to bring the unions back to the bargaining table. In 1991, a ‘Social Pact for 
Progress’ was proposed by the government, which would have tied wage 
increases to productivity increases for three years (Perez 2000b: 348). In 
1993, another pact for employment was negotiated in the aftermath of the 
ems crisis, which triggered the worst recession in Spain since the war. 
Both pacts failed to meet with the agreement of the unions, who blocked 
the minor labour market deregulations that accompanied the pacts. The 
government nevertheless implemented the labour law changes and there-
by severed its relationship with the unions.
 Since 1993, there has been no further tripartite attempt to effect wage 
agreements. As in the case of France, central negotiations have taken 
place on the issue of pension reform (1996) and on part-time and tem-
porary work (1998). Between the social partners, a major agreement on 
the restructuring of collective bargaining procedures was reached in 1997, 
but without the involvement of the government. The agreement aimed in 
particular at reversing the move towards further decentralization of wage 
bargaining to the regional level that had been taking since 1994.145
 Government intervention in Spain has therefore not responded to fail-
ures of the wage bargaining institutions but instead has preceded their 
evolution. Until 1977, there was a tradition neither of wage bargaining nor 
effective trade union organizations and employers’ associations. In the 
first decade after the transition, wage bargaining was shaped by national 
tripartite agreements. Therefore, the primary problem of wage formation 
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in Spain after the national agreements broke down was the lack of articula-
tion and institutionalization of wage bargaining procedures. In the litera-
ture, the attempts made by the social partners in the mid-1990s to create 
better coordinated wage bargaining institutions are mainly attributed to 
the incapacity of the exposed business sector to control labour costs in 
absence of wage bargaining institutions. Despite overall wage moderation, 
sector-speciﬁ c wage drifts have undermined the competitiveness of the ex-
port sector (Perez 2000a). In recent years, both social partners have been 
engaged in establishing a wage bargaining regime in which pay increases 
are in accordance with the macroeconomic policy of the government.
 Nevertheless, an assessment of the wage bargaining system by the oecd 
concludes that “the system of wage bargaining has barely changed since 
the 1997 agreement between the social partners was adopted and remains 
complicated” (oecd 2000: 60). In particular, the overlapping nature of 
several layers of agreements is criticized, since in some sectors national 
agreements on wages are modified at the provincial level, and then possibly 
again at the firm level. In other sectors, negotiations are conducted at the 
provincial level, though certain recommendations on wage increases are 
passed down from national organizations. The problem of fragmentation 
and lack of articulation had already been addressed in a National Multi-
industry Framework Agreement between the ugt and ceoe in 1980. This 
view has since been reinforced in the tripartite agreements and in the 1997 
agreements. These issues have not yet been resolved and wage formation 
remains rather uncoordinated and subject to market pressures.
Portugal
In contrast to the Spanish case, the transition to democracy in Portugal 
was characterized by a period of constant political turmoil until 1979. The 
downfall of the regime in 1974 was followed by an attempted military coup 
by the far left in 1975. In subsequent years, a number of minority govern-
ments with brief tenure in office attempted to steer the country through 
continual crisis. Throughout the 1970s, wage bargaining by trade unions 
and employers was virtually non-existent.146 This was due to the fact that 
the unions were largely dominated by the communist trade union Inter-
syndicat (later the cgtp), which sought political influence but not bar-
gaining strength, and to fact that the Salazar regime lacked any real bar-
gaining tradition.147 The restoration of free trade unions coincided with 
communist dominance. For most of the 1970s transition period, there was 
a fierce struggle within labour organizations over the monopoly repre-
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sentation by the Intersyndicat. During this period, wages were regulated 
directly by the government which fixed the wage ceilings. It was not until 
December 1979 that the law that had set a ceiling on wage gains was re-
pealed (Pinto 1990: 249). Even after the government withdrew from direct 
wage setting, it still played a key role in setting wages indirectly, through 
its involvement in the public sector and the nationalized industries.
 From 1980 onwards, the approach by the government towards wage 
formation changed. This was due to several factors. First, a non-commu-
nist trade union emerged with the ugt in 1978, which enjoyed the sup-
port of the socialist (ps) and social democratic party (psd). Secondly, from 
1983 until 1985, the centre bloc parties (socialist and social democratic) 
formed a coalition government. And third, in the early 1980s, Portugal 
plunged into a deep economic crisis.
 In this situation, while the government was forced to implement an imf 
stabilization plan, it also conceived a new forum for consultation with the 
social partners, the Permanent Council for Social Concertation (cpcs). In 
subsequent years, the cpcs became an important tool for the government 
to use when trying to achieve wage restraint. The council could not agree 
on the deregulation of the labour market and the liberalization of labour 
laws, but did find it easier to reach an agreement on incomes policy. In 
June 1986, the first tripartite agreement on incomes policy was conclud-
ed (see table 7.6). The incomes policy contained a wage agreement that 
was tied to government inflation targets. In 1987, the targets for the year 
were met. In 1988, the political contestation between the unions relaxed 
and the communist trade unions that had so far boycotted the tripartite 
council took up their seats. But, already in 1988, the government had to 
deal with two problems. On the one hand, the relations between the com-
munist unions and the employers were still highly conflictual. In the 1988 
wage round, neither the Confederation of Portuguese Industry (cpi), nor 
the communist trade union, cgtp, signed the agreement. The cpi refused 
to sign the pact, regarding 6 per cent inflation and 5 per cent targets for 
wage increases as too high. The cgtp refused because it considered the 
wage targets too low.148 On the other hand, the inflation targets on which 
the agreement rested were not met. When the government missed the 
target and inflation rose to 11 per cent, it even lost the support of the ugt. 
After a series of hefty conflicts and strikes, the government broke off its 
consultations with the unions and imposed a unilateral deregulation of 
labour laws (Financial Times 1989a and b).
 Soaring inflation rates, despite moderate wage settlements, brought 
the actors back to the bargaining table in 1990. The government proposed 
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a package to the unions, the Economic and Social Agreement, which in-
cluded a working time reduction and a new version of a wage ceiling of 
13.5 per cent. On this basis, a new labour pact was signed in the cpcs in 
1991, but again without the support of the cgtp.149 However, inflation in 
the early 1990s was still running in double figures and, with the entry of 
Portugal into the ems in 1992, a further move towards wage discipline was 
needed. After months of negotiations, the government failed to agree a 
national wage pact for 1994. The centre-right government of Prime Min-
ister Anibal Cavaco Silva tried to hold the unions to a 2 per cent wage-rise 
ceiling and set a tough example by stipulating a wage freeze for the public 
administrative sector. The unions opposed this. It was only after the escu-
do was devalued in March 1995 and the socialist party gained an electoral 
victory in the same year that a new consensus could be forged for signing 
another pact that included a public sector pay settlement of below 5 per 
cent.150 The spell of the inflationary wage spiral was thus broken.
 As in Spain, collective bargaining institutions in Portugal have re-
mained weak. The political conflict between the unions, on the one hand, 
and the contestation between employers and unions, on the other hand, 
has not encouraged trustful relations at any level. In addition, high levels 
of inflation have created insecurity about realistic wage claims. In this 
book, Portugal has the strongest variation in increases in real pay, be-
tween 16 per cent increases in real pay in the mid-1970s and 4 per cent real 
pay loss in the late 1970s. Bargaining patterns have remained arbitrary and 
are largely confined to large companies. There is still no overall coordina-
tion of wage bargaining at the sectoral level, but lower-level agreements 
override agreements at the sectoral level.
Table 7.6  Tripartite agreements in Portugal, 1977-99
Year Policy Pay Content
1986-87 Agreement on Prices and Incomes Policy 7% wage increase
1988 Agreement on Prices and Incomes Policy Not signed by CGTP and CIP 
1991 Economic and Social Agreement Wage guideline of 13.5%; not signed 
by CGTP
1996 Short-Term Social Dialogue Agreement Cap on wage increases 
1996-99 Strategic Social Pact No reference to wages after 1998
Source: Royo (2002b: 85). 
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 Conclusion: A comparative view on the dynamic between wage 
bargaining institutions and government intervention
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the cases above. As hypothe-
sized, the countries with the most responsive wage bargaining institutions, 
Germany and Austria, have experienced comparatively little government 
intervention. However, by the end of the three decades, only Austria still 
has a successful model of monetarist responsiveness. In all other coun-
tries, wage bargaining actors have found it more difficult to adjust their 
wage expectations to the new challenges. In Denmark and the Nether-
lands, frictions in wage bargaining, already apparent in the 1960s, were 
exacerbated by the shock of the monetarist response of the Bundesbank 
in 1975. In Belgium, this process started in 1976. In all three countries, the 
main tension arose because wage indexation rules set the focus of wage 
bargaining firmly on protecting the real wage. In Denmark and the Neth-
erlands, government intervention could finally abolish indexation rules; 
this did not happen in Belgium.
 Finland and Sweden were both relatively unharmed by the crisis of the 
1970s because government policy combined devaluation and real wage 
restraint, which was able, at least temporarily, to ease the economic pres-
sures. In Finland, real wage restraint was weaker due to political conflicts 
on the left. Both countries, however, were challenged in the early 1990s 
when devaluation as an economic strategy had become unacceptable. In 
both countries, the corporatist base on which the real wage restraint had 
rested was also challenged by dissenting sectoral pressures. However, in 
both countries, a new interaction between national-level wage formation 
(in the case of Sweden through mediation, in the case of Finland through 
tripartite agreements) has since emerged that allows for a higher degree 
of sectoral differentiation in a national framework.
 Germany was the last country to encounter a similar situation, in the 
latter part of the 1990s. In Germany, the increasing role of the government 
was prompted by the pressures of reunification in the 1990s, which coin-
cided with a decline in the competitiveness of German industry (Hassel 
and Rehder 2001). The high productivity regime did not deliver the cuts 
in labour costs to stop companies squeezing the wage bargaining system. 
Since then, the social partners and the government have been under pres-
sure to find new solutions to increase competitiveness.
In all five non-responsive corporatist countries, a process of restructuring 
of wage bargaining institutions can be observed that has attempted to find 
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a new balance between macroeconomic constraints and sectoral and local 
differentiation. At the core of the restructuring has been the acceptance by 
wage bargaining actors of the tightness of these constraints. Even though 
at times painful, the limits of real wage protection have been recognized 
by the unions. In this process, the role of the government has been crucial 
and has gained in importance as the friction between the external envi-
ronment and the wage expectations of the unions has increased.
 In none of the corporatist countries governments have actively at-
tempted to undermine existing coordinated wage bargaining institutions. 
Wage bargaining has transformed under the impact of new economic 
conditions, but has not been dismantled by government action. In Den-
mark and the Netherlands in 1982, the newly elected conservative govern-
ments indicated that they were no longer prepared to engage in political 
exchanges over incomes policy, as their predecessors had done during the 
1970s. The British no-nonsense approach towards trade unions enjoyed 
some appeal but, by leaving the issue of wage formation to the social part-
ners, the government was also dependent on trade union wage bargaining 
behaviour. In the Netherlands, the unions immediately gave in to the pres-
sure from the government, while in Denmark internal rivalry between the 
SiD and the lo made adjustment more difficult. In both cases, the same 
conservative governments returned to the bargaining table, although un-
der newly defined conditions.
 All the non-corporatist countries started out with a weak institutional 
base for wage negotiations and wage bargaining responsiveness. However, 
Ireland had a tripartite structure from the 1970s onwards. While the Irish 
trade union structure resembled the British, the actual wage bargaining 
patterns in Ireland had always been more coordinated. Central wage bar-
gaining failed during the 1970s, but the pattern served as a starting point 
in the severe economic and fiscal crisis of the early 1980s. Given its size 
and economic openness, Ireland would in any case have been a prime can-
didate for cooperative labour relations in the sense of Katzenstein’s “small 
state in world markets” (Katzenstein 1985).
Similarly in Portugal and Spain, the history of tripartism served as a base-
line for further negotiations at the peak level during the 1990s, although 
it encountered several difficult phases in Portugal and failed altogether 
in Spain in 1986. In Italy, the dynamic was somewhat different since the 
Italian trade unions engaged in more pragmatic workplace industrial re-
lations while at the same time obstructing national negotiations. When 
the political crisis became a national emergency situation in 1992 with 
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the collapse of the old political regime, Italian unions could draw on local 
support to organize a change of approach. In Italy, the shift in trade union 
approaches was also due to the strong labour leader of the cgil, Bruno 
Trentin, who led his organization out of the stalemate.
 The case studies support the theoretical claim made in the political 
economy literature about the close interaction of wage bargaining and 
monetary policy. In each case, on the one hand the shift in monetary pol-
icy responses created economic pressures for the government, while on 
the other hand, a clear traditional reputation of the monetary authority 
eased the transition towards a new regime provided that wage bargain-
ing institutions were in control of wage formation. The transmission of 
restrictive monetary policy to wage formation processes was, however, 
only partly carried out by the social partners. In all cases, it was the role 
of the government to redefine and confine the room for wage bargaining 
by trade unions, either by refusing, like the British government, to accept 
responsibility for the employment effects of monetary policy or by push-
ing trade unions towards the acceptance of voluntary wage restraint.
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8 Negotiated Adjustment – A European Approach
During the 1980s and 1990s, many observers assumed that corporatism 
in Western Europe had come to the end of its useful life. Economic inter-
nationalization, the changes in the labour market and the increase in un-
employment after the oil shocks had changed the structure of European 
economies to such an extent that neither governments nor trade unions, 
it was believed, would be interested or able to engage in further forms of 
political exchange. Incomes policies had proven unsuccessful during the 
1970s and forms of centralized wage bargaining seemed to lack support. 
To the surprise of many, the reality since has been different. Western 
governments, facing the constraints resulting from the oil shock, have 
pursued a double strategy of economic adjustment, combining elements 
that were previously seen as incompatible. They have firmly committed 
themselves to a non-inflationary economic and monetary policy within 
the European Monetary System and have further engaged in collabora-
tion with their trade unions in order to adjust the wage expectations of 
workers to the needs of the economic and employment policy of govern-
ments.
 The purpose of this book has been to explain government behaviour 
and to specify the conditions under which governments would choose 
either to negotiate on wage restraint or leave the effects of wage settle-
ments exclusively to the market and to restrictive monetary policies. I 
have proposed three main factors that explain government behaviour. 
The first factor is the monetary regime that determines the room for ma-
noeuvre and, moreover, signals to wage bargainers the strictness of the 
monetary response. In countries that have traditionally had a reputation 
for strict monetary policy, governments would be less likely to negotiate 
with trade unions over wages. The second factor is the political insti-
tutions that determine the capacity of governments to resist demands 
by unions. In consensus democracies, I have argued, governments are 
more closely intertwined with unions and, what is more, the governing 
parties offer access points for the social partners. In these cases, they 
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are more likely to negotiate than to disregard trade union demands. The 
third factor is the responsiveness of the wage bargaining system that has 
created the necessity for trade unions to adjust their wage expectations 
in the first place. The responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions de-
termines the extent of the necessary adjustments in the wage formation 
system. I have argued that the combination of these different factors in 
particular countries can explain the variance between different govern-
ments’ behaviour.
 The broader implication of this book is the argument that close inter-
action between governments and social partners on wages has survived 
and been revived for two reasons. Firstly, governments in a consensus de-
mocracy have not been able politically to abandon the post-war consen-
sus on the role of trade unions in the organization of the labour market. 
In consensus democracies, governing parties are often too close to the 
demands of the social partners to openly pursue their exclusion. The frac-
tionalization of party systems in consensus democracies combined with 
the access of political trade unions to competing parties makes it virtually 
impossible politically to neglect their demands.
 Secondly, the wage bargaining institutions that the post-war settle-
ments produced offered suitable starting points for negotiations about 
adjustment in the face of the effects of the internationalization of finan-
cial markets. Past governments generally attempted to cope with the in-
creasing vulnerability and openness of their economies by seeking mon-
etary stability without questioning the political and economic role of 
trade unions. These governments, moreover, used the increasing external 
constraints of monetary integration to draw trade unions further into the 
acceptance of long-term wage restraint.
 As in the golden years of the post-war period, government intervention 
in wage bargaining has thus remained a double-edged sword for those 
involved. Governments can achieve a higher degree of control over wag-
es but have to surrender autonomy and control over other policy issues; 
trade unions gain political legitimacy and influence but lose some of their 
autonomy in wage bargaining. Overall, an active role of governments in 
wage formation reproduces interdependency between governments and 
social partners. Although governments intervene in wage bargaining pro-
cedures, often with a clear intention of repelling trade union demands, 
this interaction legitimizes and often strengthens wage bargaining coor-
dination along with trade union organizations themselves. The process of 
negotiated adjustment that could be observed in most countries in West-
ern Europe throughout the 1980s and 1990s now feeds back on itself. This 
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concluding chapter presents my main arguments and findings over five 
sections. The sixth section discusses the implications for adjustment un-
der European Monetary Union.
 Policy options towards trade unions’ redistributional power
The post-war consensus on free collective bargaining and full employ-
ment posed for governments an extraordinarily challenging economic 
policy problem. While trade unions were free to pursue the wage aspira-
tions of their members and of the society as a whole, the economic effects 
of high wage settlements had become a political problem of government. 
The Keynesian economic policy paradigm even encouraged the view that 
governments were capable and legitimately responsible for the perfor-
mance of labour markets.
 This combination created a trilemma of domestic objectives of full em-
ployment, price stability and free collective bargaining for governments, 
whereby any pair could be achieved only by sacrificing the third goal. The 
trade-off between employment and price stability – the Phillips curve – 
accordingly depended on the conduct of collective bargaining. Under the 
given institutional design of a regulated labour market and free collective 
bargaining, a decrease in unemployment would lead to an increase in in-
flationary pressure. Given the universal pledge by governments to aspire 
to full employment, the price of increasing unemployment in return for 
price stability was unacceptable. Given the universally accepted right of 
trade unions to bargain freely with employers and enjoy protection by law 
against their restraint, governments had no way of forcefully interfering 
with the organization of the labour market. At the same time, the effects 
of full employment on the position of trade unions in the economy had 
to be accommodated in order to keep wage expectations in line with the 
economic reality of low growth rates from 1970 onwards.
 In an ideal-typical perspective, this accommodation could take three 
policy responses (see figure 8.1): accommodation by institutions, accom-
modation by negotiations or accommodation by the disciplinary force 
of the market. The institutional form was the corporatist integration of 
trade unions in the overall economic policy framework. The corporatist 
solution assumed that trade unions were given organizational securities, 
often in the form of labour market monopolies, while it was hoped that 
their wage bargaining conduct would be responsive to government needs. 
Trade unions gained the status of semi-public bodies and were involved 
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in the administration of social security programmes, training schemes 
and labour market policy. With the increasing levels of responsibility for 
economic policy, trade unions accepted this responsibility by adjusting 
their wage demands accordingly. The institutional incorporation of trade 
unions thus contributed directly to the responsiveness of wage bargain-
ing. As the neo-corporatist literature on the effects of labour market 
organizations on economic performance shows, in the stagflation years 
during the 1970s, incorporation often led to better results than negotia-
tion.
 In other cases, the political and wage bargaining role of trade unions 
was not institutionalized in this form and governments had to negotiate 
with trade unions about their willingness to restrain wages. Negotiations, 
which in some cases took the form of imposed wage freezes, embodied 
the acknowledgment that wage bargaining outcomes were not in line with 
Figure 8.1 Political economy of monetary and incomes policies, Western Europe, 1980-99
Hard currency policies
Responsive wage bargainers
Germany and Austria
 since 1974 
Non-responsive
wage bargainers
Negotiations on incomes policy
Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden
Disinﬂ ation and deregulation 
policies
Denmark (82-87), UK, France 
(1982), Spain (90s)
Institutional policy response: 
reliance on corporatist wage 
bargaining
Austria, Germany
German 
uniﬁ cation 
increases 
debt and cost 
pressures
DK, Spain
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the needs of the government in its economic policy, but that the wage 
expectations of trade unions had to be adjusted.
 The third way of accommodation was the market solution. By relying 
on the disciplinary force of the market, governments rejected the notion 
that it was their task to find a balance between the wage expectations of 
the employed and the need to maintain the competitiveness of its econo-
my. The underlying idea was that competitiveness would be restored once 
the labour market had adjusted to imbalances and forms of centralized 
wage formation procedures had been removed.
 In fact, the three policies were not clear-cut alternatives, but highly 
interrelated. When institutions failed to respond, but governments were 
committed to an economic policy that rested on the political inclusion 
of trade unions, most governments started to negotiate. In the process of 
negotiations, governments often used the pressure of market discipline to 
extract further commitments from the trade unions on wage moderation. 
There was, however, little overlap between the use of institutions and the 
use of the market. Where institutions were strong and responsive, dereg-
ulation was not pursued. Where deregulation and trade union exclusion 
were the primary policies, institutions could not be maintained. In this 
sense, negotiations are also a third way between powerful institutions on 
the one hand and market driven approaches on the other.
 The pursuit of tight monetary policy as an anti-inflationary tool 
emerged primarily from the dissatisfaction felt by policy-makers in those 
countries where the institutional incorporation of trade unions was weak 
and negotiations on incomes policies had persistently failed – in particu-
lar the United Kingdom. After the experiences with the Social Contract 
and the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in contrast to the sharp reaction by the 
Bundesbank to the oil shock and the following wage settlements in Ger-
many in 1975, conservative policy-makers in the United Kingdom pre-
pared the return to restrictive economic policies and the deregulation of 
the labour market in order to discipline labour.
 However, while governments in most countries turned towards mon-
etarist responses to the inflationary threat, they were not so easily freed 
from the post-war commitment to labour inclusion. While monetarism 
promised low inflation without costs in terms of employment losses in the 
long run, governments still faced the pledge of restoring full employment 
– by then a universal demand of the electorates of any government. If the 
short-term negative employment effects of restrictive monetary policies 
could be alleviated by a voluntary wage restraint by trade unions, govern-
ments still had incentives to find cooperative solutions with them.
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 Therefore, as a theoretical concept, monetarism sought to disentangle 
the relationship between monetary policy and the real economy and, with 
that, the relationship between economic policies and the wage bargaining 
process, which had become increasingly interdependent during the first 
three decades after World War ii. In practical terms, however, govern-
ments were still caught in the interlocking policy fields of wages and eco-
nomic policy, to the extent that they could neither renounce their promis-
es to work towards high employment levels nor forsake their commitment 
to leave the organization of the labour market to strong trade unions.
 Th e return of tight economic policy as a disciplinary device (which had 
been used traditionally before World War i and in the inter-war period) 
and its dissemination in the process of European monetary integration 
have consequently increased the capacity of governments to ﬁ ght inﬂ ation. 
It has not, however, been an adequate policy tool for easing the potential 
frictions between trade union wage expectations and the changing eco-
nomic environment. In fact, quite the opposite is the case: tight monetary 
policies and ﬁ xed exchange rates require a higher degree of responsive-
ness from wage bargaining actors in order to allow for balanced economic 
growth. Th e responsiveness of wage bargaining outcomes and, equally, the 
institutions that govern responsiveness have therefore increased in their 
importance for economic performance. Since in post-war industrialized 
economies, governments are still held responsible by the electorate for em-
ployment performance, governments are more dependent on the respon-
siveness of these wage bargaining institutions than before. Hence, rather 
than letting monetary policy discipline unresponsive wage bargaining ac-
tors, a government’s incentives to inﬂ uence wage bargaining outcomes 
have tended to increase rather than decrease compared to earlier periods.
 A pure market solution, involving no government interference and in-
dependent from the responsiveness of the wage bargaining system, has 
been a challenge too difficult for most European governments. Only the 
British government, which is strongly insulated from electoral and trade 
union pressure, could really afford the market solution. In addition, only 
the British Conservative Party under the leadership by Margaret Thatcher 
had the ideological strength to deny trade unions a legitimate role in orga-
nizing the labour market and influencing public policy.
 In all other Western European countries, the combination of the full 
employment pledge, free collective bargaining by strongly institutional-
ized social partners and the use of tight monetary policies to achieve eco-
nomic stabilization changed – and ultimately fostered – the interaction 
between governments and social partners on the issue of wage formation. 
NEGOTIATED ADJUSTMENT – A EUROPEAN APPROACH
Wages.indd   238 28-8-2006   15:43:35

Countries with centralized bargaining institutions moved from the cor-
ner of responsive institutions towards negotiations in order to adjust to 
the changing monetary regime. Non-corporatist countries that could not 
abandon their commitments to the political integration of trade unions 
started to negotiate more seriously on wage restraint. Even in France, 
where trade union control over wages had become extremely weak and 
where government-union relations had been hostile throughout the post-
war period, governments during the 1980s and 1990s still made repeated 
attempts to restructure wage bargaining procedures, organize tripartite 
summits and negotiate over wage formation.
 In other words, restrictive monetary policy did not liberate Western 
European governments from their dependence on trade unions and col-
lective bargaining decisions in economic policy as Fritz Scharpf had as-
sumed (Scharpf 1991), but only altered the conditions under which the in-
teraction would take place. Monetarism could only liberate governments 
from their dependence on trade union behaviour if they both disregarded 
the medium-term employment effects and were able to reduce the degree 
of labour market regulation by trade unions, as the British did. The major-
ity of governments, however, were not prepared to go that far.
 For continental European governments, an increase in market disci-
pline through restrictive economic policy and monetary integration has 
led to intensification of the relationship between trade unions and the 
government, not to its diminishing. The disciplinary force of monetary 
policy has not been sufficient to replace previous attempts to accommo-
date trade union wage demands.
 Moreover, politically, labour inclusion has not been abandoned as a 
tool for achieving political stability in the European political economy. 
This is particularly the case in the transition countries. In the post-au-
thoritarian countries in the south of Europe, Portugal and Spain, the tran-
sition to democracy was built around a concept of including the trade 
unions into the new democracies. This process also took place in the post-
socialist countries of Eastern Europe after 1989.151 Tripartism and trade 
union consultation were used as a safety valve in these countries against 
the dissatisfaction of the population with economic hardship, and they 
spread rapidly throughout the post-socialist countries. This occurred 
even though the existing trade unions often did not represent substantial 
parts of the working population. Though a seemingly dated concept, the 
inclusion and institutionalization of labour has remained a cornerstone in 
the design of the European political systems throughout the last quarter 
of the twentieth century.
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Therefore, apart from the uk, European governments were not success-
ful in distancing themselves from trade union influence in the 1980s and 
1990s. In Ireland and Denmark, the move towards deregulation of the 
labour market and decentralization of wage formation in the early 1980s 
did not work out, but instead put a strain on government economic poli-
cies. In Italy and Belgium, governments tried to negotiate away from the 
trade unions’ acquired rights on labour market regulation, and failed. In 
the Netherlands, the threat to exclude labour led to a rejuvenation of cor-
poratist concertation.
 At the same time, the traditional corporatist solution of self-governance 
by centralized trade unions and employers’ associations lost its strength 
in many cases. High degrees of responsiveness of wage bargaining actors 
based on the incorporation of trade unions only worked in Austria and, 
to a certain degree, Germany. In Sweden it was contingent on accommo-
dating economic policies. When the Swedish model of expansive fiscal 
policy ran out of steam, only Austria remained as the role model for low 
unemployment in a tight hard currency framework. In Germany, the same 
was true in principle, but the German performance was burdened by re-
unification. In particular, the post-reunification boom in 1991/92 knocked 
the German wage bargaining off course. In the early 1990s, German wage 
bargaining was out of tune with the challenge that unification would pose 
to the German economy in the long run.
 The other small corporatist states – Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Finland – all had particular aspects of wage bargaining in-
stitutions that had over the years started to undermine the institutions’ 
capacity for restraining wage expectations. In Sweden and Finland, the late 
switch to a hard currency strategy made automatic adjustment difficult. 
In both countries, the adjustment to a hard currency policy required a 
more active involvement by the state. Moreover, in all the small corporat-
ist countries with the exception of Austria and Sweden, institutionalized 
systems of wage indexation and rivalry between unions for membership 
shares deflected trade unions from their responsibility for wage restraint, 
on which the initial process of incorporation rested.
 In the non-corporatist countries, tight monetary policies had an even 
more intense effect. While being tied to the post-war consensus on em-
ployment and free collective bargaining, the trade unions in these coun-
tries nevertheless had little tradition of responsible wage bargaining pro-
cedures. However, since in all countries but France they were in control of 
wage formation, governments had to try to influence their wage bargain-
ing behaviour. Moreover, in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the tradi-
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tion of political competition between unions and governing parties made 
a clear move by the government even more difficult.
 As a result, a hard currency policy on its own was not a sufficient dis-
ciplinary tool for trade unions in political systems that were still well 
grounded in a post-war consensus of free collective bargaining, trade 
union responsibility for wage formation and government responsibility 
for employment performance. The monetarist solution might have been a 
sufficient disciplinary force for holding down inflation; it did not, howev-
er, have the potential strength to translate disinflation into employment-
promoting wage bargaining behaviour on the part of the unions. While 
corporatist mechanisms were failing, negotiations on wages were gaining 
in importance.
 The interaction of institutions and policies
According to institutionalist analysis, the organization of wage bargaining 
has been the main institutional factor influencing economic performance 
and the economic policy of governments. In the past, a high degree of or-
ganizational centralization was conducive to both economic performance 
and close cooperation with governments. Centralized wage bargaining 
was able to guarantee a level of wage restraint that was welcomed by 
governments. In turn, governments supported the trade unions through 
political inclusion. Without centralized wage bargaining, and therefore 
less responsive wage bargaining behaviour, governments had to turn to 
policies of labour exclusion and deregulation. Under these circumstances, 
the mutually beneficial interaction between public policy and interest as-
sociations did not emerge. The notion of corporatism describes the close 
interlocking relationship between governments and wage bargaining in-
stitutions. The mechanism on which this relationship rests is the politi-
cal exchange. Trade unions achieve political power by converting their 
ability to strike in the market place into a tool that they can use vis-à-vis 
governments (Pizzorno 1978). By refraining to use the full extent of their 
industrial power, trade unions can ask governments for compensation, 
particularly in those cases where the political survival of governments 
depends on restraint.
 When looking at the evolution of corporatism in a dynamic perspec-
tive, it emerges that the organizational dimension of corporatism only 
captures the potentially virtuous policy feedback circle of centralized 
wage bargaining institutions and government support. Over the past three 
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decades, however, the forces of interaction that were responsible for the 
evolution of the relationship between governments and trade unions lied 
in the mismatch of wage bargaining outcomes and the economic policy 
constraints of the government. While the commitment towards labour 
inclusion created restraints for governments, which they tried to tackle 
by means of cooperation and persuasion of wage bargaining actors, the 
failure of wage bargaining actors to respond generated further interaction 
between governments and trade unions. Rather than assume that the re-
sponsiveness of wage bargaining institutions gave incentives for govern-
ments to incorporate labour, the opposite has been argued here, namely 
that the decline and lack of responsiveness in countries where labour 
inclusion was high led to the increasing involvement of governments in 
wage formation. In other words, non-responsive trade unions with a high 
degree of industrial power could insulate themselves from the forces of 
the market.
 In this book, the responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions to 
changing economic conditions has been used as an indicator of the mis-
match between governments’ preference for wage bargaining and the ac-
tual wage bargaining outcomes. When looking at factors influencing the 
change of nominal wages, it has emerged that wage bargaining systems 
differ in their degree of responsiveness to changes in consumer prices and 
unemployment. Countries where changes in nominal wages have been 
significantly influenced by unemployment levels have been labelled re-
sponsive, whereas countries where changes in nominal wages have been 
largely dominated by changes in consumer prices have been termed non-
responsive (see Chapter 6).
 Only the bargaining institutions in Germany and Austria were respon-
sive in the period between 1970 and 1999. In Finland, the uk, Ireland and 
Portugal wages reacted to consumer prices but not to unemployment. In 
the majority of continental European countries, wage bargaining institu-
tions were caught in the middle: they were somewhat employment-sensi-
tive and somewhat price-sensitive. In these countries, wage bargaining 
institutions were trapped in the conflict of ensuring real wage increases, 
on the one hand, and responding to the employment crisis, on the other. 
Only in Sweden were nominal wages affected neither by the change in 
consumer prices nor by unemployment levels.
 It has emerged that responsiveness of trade unions is not exclusively 
determined by the centralization of trade union or wage bargaining insti-
tutions, as has been argued in most contributions in the literature. While 
the capacity of trade unions to control wage bargaining through either 
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centralized bargaining structures or coordination is a necessary condi-
tion for responsiveness, it is not a sufficient one. This phenomenon has 
increasingly been recognized in political economy literature, as empirical 
studies have shown a declining effect of centralization of wage bargaining 
institutions on economic performance.
 Moreover, this book has shown that, over time, wage bargaining pro-
cedures have been layered by a number of normative and institutional 
principles that influence their capacity to adjust wages to a changing eco-
nomic environment. The first one is the expectation of wage bargaining 
actors of how the monetary regime will behave. As pointed out in Chap-
ter 4, governments changed the monetary policy regime by pegging their 
currencies in the hope that wage bargaining actors would adjust their be-
haviour accordingly. However, throughout the conduct of the currency 
snake and the ems, there was a chance in a number of countries that gov-
ernments might react to economic imbalances with devaluation, which 
would have caused real wage losses. Often, the degree of non-accommo-
dation of monetary policies, since this was action ex post, could not be 
assessed ex ante by the policy-makers themselves.
 A government opting to adjust the currency rather than use tight 
monetary policies made it more difficult for trade unions to adjust wage 
agreements to changing economic conditions. The shift from an accom-
modating monetary regime to a non-accommodating regime required ei-
ther prior consensus on wage restraint or a high degree of credibility on 
the part of the monetary regime to cause any change in the behaviour of 
wage bargaining actors. The potential to adjust exchange rates under the 
currency snake and the ems blurred the expectation of wage bargaining 
actors as to the credibility of a non-accommodating policy while creat-
ing incentives to press for real wage increases. Even when a highly cred-
ible monetary policy was introduced, the adjustment of wage bargaining 
behaviour to the new monetary regime could have been potentially very 
time-consuming. Therefore, for the non-hard currency countries enter-
ing the snake and the ems, the appropriate response to inflation differen-
tials to the D-mark was not necessarily obvious, especially in cases where 
the effects of devaluation would be felt differently in separate economic 
sectors.
 Secondly, past political exchanges had already affected the conduct 
of wage bargaining. Feedback processes had altered the pay-off for trade 
unions with regard to issues of real pay protection, pay equality and the 
social protection of workers. For instance, normative principles of wage 
formation had become engraved in wage bargaining procedures. The 
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most important one of these principles in the Western European context 
was the indexation of wages to inflation, which basically ruled out any 
real wage reduction. In countries where strong elements of wage index-
ation had been institutionalized in wage bargaining procedures, such as 
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark, adjustment was more 
difficult despite the sufficient organizational structures. Other factors 
were the exposure of trade union membership to international markets, 
the cohesiveness of trade union organizations and the potential for intra-
organizational distributional conflicts. The extent to which wage bar-
gaining actors were capable of responding to these conflicting pressures 
therefore depended to a large degree on the way in which real wage ex-
pectations had been incorporated in the bargaining institutions them-
selves.
 In contrast, the responsiveness of German wage bargaining actors was 
largely explained by the fact that the principle decisions on wage forma-
tion were taken by industrial trade unions in the exporting sector, which 
measured their claims against the impact of labour cost increases on the 
competitiveness of their industries and the consequences of tight mone-
tary policies for the revaluation of the D-mark. Moreover, being based on 
a system of cooperative workplace relations and one with the potential for 
high productivity increases, the unions could adjust their nominal wage 
claims to the economic situation and at the same time make real wage 
gains. Neither wage indexation nor wage equality ever became a guiding 
principle for German trade unions. Export orientation and a hard cur-
rency ensured that the unions were convinced that wage increases had to 
be earned before they could be delivered. The same observations can be 
made for the case of Austria.
 The nature of negotiated adjustment: Reinforcing mechanisms of 
trade union incorporation
The main claim this book makes is that the evolution and persistence of 
negotiated adjustment, in preference to deregulation and market forces, 
is explained by the interaction between the responses of governments to 
wage bargaining outcomes and the political role of trade unions as linked 
to political parties. At the core of the evolution of corporatism lies the 
construction of the post-war settlement, whereby trade unions became 
fully integrated into the political system, class conflict was confined to the 
realm of collective bargaining through trade unions acquiring the legiti-
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mate role to regulate and organize the labour market, and governments 
meanwhile were made responsible for the economy in general and for 
achieving full employment in particular.
 Political institutions that comprised the notion of consensus democ-
racy provided incentives for governments to negotiate over wage restraint 
rather than leave the employment effects of high wage settlements to the 
market. In consensus democracies, party systems are more fragmented 
with trade unions affiliating to a variety of political parties. The competi-
tion between both parties in the electoral arena and trade unions in the 
wage bargaining arena diminish the strength of the government to pursue 
policies that were not trade union friendly. In turn, governments in politi-
cal systems in which trade unions enjoyed several access points to politi-
cal parties tended to negotiate with trade unions over economic adjust-
ment rather than push the responsibility for employment performance 
onto the unions.
 When economic imbalances arose, governments chose to approach 
trade unions and in the course of negotiating with them tended to of-
fer incentives for wage restraint. Over time, however, all material gains 
for the unions – with the exception of tax cuts – were in effect seen as 
either detrimental to labour costs or inflationary or they were not accept-
able to employers. The tightness of monetary policy reduced the room for 
governments to expand economic policy and thereby offer employment 
gains. Instead, the incentives for wage restraint became matters of orga-
nizational security. This process already started during the 1970s, when 
participation and co-determination became important union demands 
that were traded for wage restraint (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 1983; Esping-
Andersen 1990: 176). Both the institutional incorporation of trade unions 
and the increasingly common negotiations with trade unions over wage 
restraint helped to secure the position of the unions on the labour market, 
though not necessarily their degree of responsiveness.
 As a result, the incorporation of trade unions, whether in the form of 
corporatist structures, coordinated wage bargaining or persistent nego-
tiations with governments, has had predominantly two effects. On the 
one hand, to the extent that these negotiations foster the coordination 
of wage bargaining and the adoption of moderate wage norms, they ease 
the frictions on the labour market over issues of wage formation. During 
the 1970s, the centralization of wage bargaining procedures was aimed at 
dampening wage expectations. During the 1980s and 1990s, government 
negotiations on wages also introduced further flexibility and differentia-
tion (Visser 2002).
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 On the other hand, this process also reinforces the dependence of gov-
ernments on the performance of trade unions in regulated labour markets 
and roots the unions further in the European political system. The West-
ern European process of negotiated adjustment is thereby reinforced by 
the practice of negotiations. This is particularly apparent in comparison 
to the Anglo-Saxon alternative policy of deregulating the labour market. 
Rather than facilitating decentralization and deregulation on the labour 
market generally, the political effect of negotiations has been to strength-
en the principles of negotiation and the legitimacy of the political role of 
trade unions.
 Negotiations between governments and trade unions on wages – 
whether economically successful or not – have frequently tended to build 
new tripartite or bipartite institutions that at the time were thought to 
foster cooperation. In the corporatist countries, these institutions usually 
already existed and were rejuvenated by negotiations. In the Dutch case, 
Visser and Hemerijck called this process ‘corporatism regained’ (Visser 
and Hemerijck 1997). In the non-corporatist countries, for instance Ire-
land and Italy, institutions were newly established. Normally, the insti-
tutional support for tripartite negotiations helps to stabilize trade union 
organizations. As has been well developed in the literature on trade union 
membership and density, institutional factors have the strongest explana-
tory power with regard to the resilience of trade union organizations dur-
ing times of economic distress (Western 1997; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; 
Visser 2002). Th e institution building aspect that evolves with continuous 
negotiations with the state has therefore not only fostered the political role 
of trade unions but also helped to establish organizational securities for 
trade unions that would not otherwise have come into being.
 The German role model
Instead of embracing the approaches by the British government and us 
administration of labour market deregulation and labour exclusion, the 
German model of restrictive monetary (and fiscal) policy in conjunction 
with corporatist labour market regulation became the reference point of 
economic policy-making for its neighbouring countries during the 1970s 
and 1980s and, subsequently, for the European Union as a whole. By the 
mid-1970s, most European governments had realized that the impact of 
the oil shock was at odds with the wage expectations of European work-
ers. Real wage expectations had become sticky, inflation endemic. All 
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governments started to depress demand, but inflation and unemployment 
increased less in Germany and Austria than in other European countries. 
During the worst recession since the war, Germany remained “the world’s 
over-achiever”, in the words of The Economist.152
 In neighbouring countries, the problem of inflation differentials be-
came particularly pressing since these countries were trading heavily with 
Germany and losing their competitiveness. The German way of achieving 
non-inflationary economic adjustment was therefore particularly appeal-
ing. In the political debates of the time, Germany was held as an example 
of success. For instance, in France, the reference to the German model 
was quite explicit: the Barre plan of 1976 made direct reference to it (Mc-
Namara 1998: 131).
 The main gateway through which the German model entered the ad-
justment process of most Western European countries was the currency 
snake. The European currency snake drew on the early Werner plan on 
European economic and monetary integration and was set up in 1972 in 
order to protect trade within the European Community from exchange 
rate volatilities and to stabilize the administration and financing of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. However, soon after the first oil shock, the 
European governments hoped to use the discipline of a stable exchange 
rate with the D-mark to force down inflation. The stringency of the 
Bundesbank, the lack of enthusiasm of the German government to en-
gage in huge deficit spending and the responsiveness of the German wage 
bargaining institutions turned Germany into a successful model for the 
adjustment of wages to macroeconomic conditions without major nega-
tive consequences.
 Through the currency snake, the participating countries imported the 
restrictive German monetary policy, but not necessarily its wage bargain-
ing responsiveness or fiscal prudence (Scharpf 2000). In the core coun-
tries of the snake, apart from Germany and Austria, unemployment rose 
faster and problems of public finance were frequent. Governments had to 
comply with strict monetary policies in order to keep their currency in 
the snake, but tended to compensate for looming job losses through pub-
lic spending. Even so, compared to the crisis-ridden examples of Italy and 
the uk, who had to ask the imf to bail them out, the countries that man-
aged to stay within the snake considered themselves better performers.
 The dissemination of the German model of economic adjustment was 
particularly appealing to those small corporatist countries that already 
had a tradition of pursuing policies of combining economic flexibility and 
social inclusion (Katzenstein 1985). Economic openness had put pressure 
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on the governments and interest associations of these countries to adjust 
flexibly to changes in the international economic order. Because small 
state corporatism was rooted in the notion of economic vulnerability and 
the national consensus of adaptation, the smaller countries had a tradi-
tion not only of economic openness and flexible adjustment but also of 
mobilizing the national consensus to support the necessary steps. In con-
trast, large countries have greater room for manoeuvre in economic ad-
justment and less capacity for forging a national consensus on economic 
flexibility.
 Th e monetary straightjacket deriving from the snake and the conse-
quent European Monetary System did not undermine small-state corpo-
ratism but rather presented a normal feature of vulnerability of the small 
and open economy in international markets. Governments in Denmark, 
Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria had developed forms of na-
tional consensus policies to cope with changing economic environments 
since and through the political crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. But not even 
the small corporatist countries that were so used to adjusting to world 
market changes could meet the challenge easily. Apart from Austria and 
Switzerland, all the small neighbouring countries experienced diﬃ  cult ne-
gotiations between governments and unions during the 1970s and 1980s.
 For the big non-corporatist states, adjustment was more difficult. Italy, 
the uk and France had major adjustment problems and left the snake at 
some point during the 1970s. However, despite the failure of the snake to 
ensure currency stability, the mini-snake of Germany along with the Ben-
elux countries and Denmark (with Austria in tow) had developed enough 
political momentum by the late 1970s to keep the French, Italian, Irish 
and even British governments aspiring to participate in some form of cur-
rency targeting and eventually in a European Monetary System. Under 
the impact of the increasing internationalization of financial markets, the 
stability of exchange rates and prices had become a priority for govern-
ments. Monetary integration was widely regarded as the suitable tool for 
achieving these goals.
 Corporatism was not directly linked to the decision to use the German 
mark as the currency anchor for low inflation. In Ireland (1980-87), the 
Netherlands (1982) and Denmark (1982-87), for instance, tight monetary 
policies were initially accompanied by the rejection of incomes policies 
and concertation by governments. But the disciplinary force governments 
hoped to secure from currency pegging turned against them when and 
wherever trade unions refused to respond to the changed circumstances. 
Only after the tensions became acute did governments return to previ-
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ously established corporatist practices in order to gain trade union ac-
ceptance of non-inflationary wage settlements. Meanwhile, the case of 
Germany could be used to show that in the strongest economy in West-
ern Europe a reconciliation of low inflation, relatively high growth and a 
socially just form of labour market regulation was possible. For govern-
ments who were battling with inflationary tendencies and stronger pres-
sure from trade unions, it was able to serve as a reference point for eco-
nomic adjustment.
The German role model started to falter at the moment when its prin-
ciples were finally accepted by the member states of the European Union 
in adopting the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Stability Pact in 1997. 
The high costs of unification, the recession of the early 1990s and the in-
creasing burden of facilitating wage restraint by encouraging early retire-
ment policies took their toll. Frictions within the employers’ camp over 
the future of coordinated wage bargaining had erupted since wage re-
sponsiveness had been bought by means of an increasingly expensive so-
cial security system (Streeck and Hassel 2003). Thus the role of Germany 
in disseminating a model of tight monetary policy and responsive wage 
bargaining had become a problem of adjustment in itself.
 The German government reacted to the decreasing responsiveness of 
German wage bargainers in the same way as the other continental gov-
ernments during the 1970s and 1980s. When the institutions failed them, 
they started to negotiate with the unions on further wage restraint. As in 
the other corporatist countries when governments aimed to modify union 
expectations, this process was slow and difficult. Unlike many of the other 
European examples, the negotiations ultimately failed due to structural 
problems of the social partners involved (Hassel 2003). They also failed 
because wage restraint could be achieved without negotiations and firms 
opted for concession bargaining at the company level.
 The United Kingdom as the European exception
Th e British case is the main outlier in the pattern of negotiated adjustment 
in Western Europe. Despite the fact that the responsiveness of British wage 
bargaining was the weakest in Europe and the monetary regime did not 
have a reputation for non-accommodation, British governments after 1979 
did not engage in further negotiations, as the theoretical assumptions of 
this book might lead one to expect. Th e book has shown that it was not 
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just the weakness of British labour market institutions that prevented the 
government from negotiating further. While incomes policies in the uk 
were clearly unsuccessful in dealing with the crisis of the 1970s and while 
negotiations between trade unions and various governments in the 1960s 
and 1970s were particularly tense, these factors on their own are not suﬃ  -
cient to explain the stark reaction by the Conservative government against 
further negotiations with the trade unions. An analysis of comparable cas-
es reveals this: Firstly, wage bargaining institutions in Italy were similarly 
weak during the 1970s (Regini 1984). Secondly, the trade union organiza-
tions in Ireland were equally pluralist and fragmented with the Irish indus-
trial relations model being to some extent an expression of the prolonged 
dominance of British trade unions in Ireland. Th irdly, diﬀ erences over in-
comes policies were just as conﬂ ictual in the Netherlands and Denmark 
during the same period. Fourthly, British trade unions were ﬁ rmly rooted 
in the political and industrial arena of the British economy. Nevertheless, 
in all the other cases, governments did not abandon their propensity to 
negotiate a solution with trade unions. It was only in Britain that the gov-
ernment assumed an entirely uncompromising stance after 1979.
 The British case, and with it the role of the uk in the European social 
model, cannot be understood without reference to the strong majoritar-
ian nature of the political institutions that encouraged and allowed the 
Conservative government to pursue a vehement policy against the inter-
est and political role of the British trade unions. The exclusionary atti-
tude of British public policy towards the trade unions after 1979 contrasts 
starkly with all other European countries and is also attributable to politi-
cal institutions. The key to the British case lies in the combination of the 
high degree of wage bargaining fragmentation and the majoritarian po-
litical system, which is based on a two-party system and strong one-party 
majority government. These features insulate British governments to a 
far greater extent than any other European government from the lobbying 
and influence of trade union organizations.
 However, since the shift in government policy towards trade union ex-
clusion, British trade unions have defended their position on the labour 
market and have become more focused on real wage gains than they had 
been before. As in the case of consensus democracies, the British case also 
displays mechanisms of reinforcement, in which an exclusion policy is fol-
lowed by low responsiveness in wage bargaining, which again fosters ex-
clusion. On the whole, the negotiated adjustment of continental Western 
European economies, on the one hand, versus the market-driven approach 
by the British government, on the other, has not bridged the gap between 
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the two models. Even though, at the level of monetary policy, convergence 
has taken place in all countries, at the level of adjustment of labour market 
and wage bargaining institutions, strong diﬀ erences remain.
 Outlook: Implications for adjustment under EMU
Since the adoption of emu in 1999, two aspects of the European political 
economy have changed. Firstly, under the regulations of European Mon-
etary Union, monetary policy has to target the European average inflation 
rate and cannot be designed for particular countries or regions.153 Second-
ly, in contrast to the ems, there are no longer any conditional factors for 
membership of emu since the member states that had signed up for emu 
have now joined. National differences in public deficits and debts are con-
trolled by the commitments of national governments to the Stability Pact. 
Therefore, there is a reasonable expectation that the incentives to coop-
erate might decrease under emu. Governments might soften attempts for 
fiscal consolidation and might exploit the lack of strength of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Trade unions, on the other hand, might go for more 
radical wage claims since their behaviour does not determine a reaction 
by the European Central bank. The moment for grand encompassing bar-
gains might have passed since the immediate pressure has gone (Hancké 
and Rhodes 2005: 223).
 However, as has been shown in Chapter 4, national monetary policy 
had already converged during the 1990s. From the early 1990s onwards, 
national monetary policy was no longer in the position to react to national 
economic developments, but instead was charged with securing the sta-
bility of the ems. With regard to nominal wage adjustment – an asymmet-
ric shock notwithstanding – the situation has not changed fundamentally, 
but rather sharpened the focus on nominal wage flexibility for adjustment 
to economic imbalances.
 Therefore, as in the period of the ems with its fixed exchange rates, the 
responsiveness of wage bargaining institutions to regional economic de-
velopments has remained of major importance. In particular, in the case 
of asymmetric shocks or regional imbalances, the European Union gov-
ernments have no economic policy tools available that allow for a regional 
economic policy approach other than increasing the mobility of labour 
markets and the flexibility of pay. As a consequence, for governments the 
importance of wage bargaining responsiveness at the national level in the 
medium term is likely to persist.
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 Given this context, one should expect the interaction between govern-
ments and wage bargaining institutions to continue in the future. Gov-
ernments committed to the Stability and Growth Pact are under strong 
pressure not to employ fiscal policy against economic downturns and 
therefore the role of wage bargaining will remain on the agenda. This 
claim is supported by the fact that in all the countries that have used 
the instrument of social pacts in the run-up to emu, this instrument was 
further used after 1999. In the Netherlands, a wage freeze was agreed in 
2003, in Denmark a new agreement including a three year pay deal was 
negotiated in 2003; in Belgium three pacts were signed in 2000, 2002 and 
2005. In Finland (2002 and 2005) and Ireland (2003 and 2004) more pacts 
were signed too.154 So far there has been no sign of a slackening role of the 
government in wage bargaining.
 But in the euro-zone wage bargaining units are now smaller than the 
area for which monetary policy is made. While national control over wag-
es might remain, there is no direct low-inflation incentive for each and ev-
ery government and trade union anymore. Some governments and unions 
might be tempted to free ride on the low inflation behaviour of others. A 
remedy for this scenario would be stronger coordination of wage bargain-
ing across countries. However, mechanisms of European wage bargaining 
coordination are only weakly developed. European wage agreements are 
not to be expected in the near future (Hassel 2004). How can coordina-
tion of wage bargaining under emu be achieved?
 This book has tried to shed some light on the determining factors for 
wage bargaining responsiveness and the propensity for smooth adjust-
ment. It has claimed that the coordination of wage bargaining can still be 
regarded as a precondition for responsiveness, but has also pointed out 
intervening factors that in the past have undermined the responsiveness 
of otherwise coordinated wage bargaining systems. The degree of faction-
alism, the protection from international markets and the institutionalized 
rules on wage formation have had an impact on how wage formation has 
been able to respond to changing economic conditions. The adjustment 
process over the last two decades has also shown how governments have 
attempted to improve the responsiveness of their wage bargaining insti-
tutions. In most cases, this has involved a strengthening of coordinating 
mechanisms and the adoption of new and more flexible guidelines on pay. 
Compared to how wage bargaining was conducted two decades ago, these 
measures have brought wage formation closer to the requirements of the 
market and have introduced a substantial amount of flexibility without 
generally deregulating wage formation procedures. As the pressures on 
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wage formation as the main adjustment tool continue, there is some evi-
dence that wage bargaining institutions might become more rather than 
less responsive over time.
 There are signs that emu will contribute to a closer integration of 
wage bargaining procedures. Some countries have explicitly started to 
take note of wage developments in other countries. In the Netherlands, 
wage bargainers have been careful to keep wage increases below the going 
rates in Germany, which has resulted in complaints about a Dutch beg-
gar-thy-neighbour strategy. In Belgium, the reference to wage bargaining 
in the neighbouring states (Germany, the Netherlands, France) has even 
been legislated on by the government. In Sweden, the Edin norm has been 
based on European pay developments.
 If negotiated adjustment helps to sustain the coordination capacity of 
national wage bargaining systems within Europe, this might give rise to 
wage bargaining coordination between countries, leading to an informal 
European pay norm. As in the national wage bargaining systems, which 
have to accommodate a large number of different sectors with different 
productivity levels, a European pay norm would serve as a focal point 
and not determine pay for all. Deviation would be necessary to adjust pay 
development to nationally specific circumstances. As in national systems, 
there would be modifications of this at the lower level, reflecting national 
economic conditions and local labour market conditions. Subnational va-
riety would be likely to continue albeit rooted in the straightjacket of pay 
guidelines.
 Negotiation and coordination have for decades been the instruments 
for economic adjustment in Europe’s political economy. Consensus-ori-
ented political institutions that provide multiple veto points combined 
with high degrees of union incorporation and centralization contribute 
to an approach of small steps of rebalancing government policy with self-
regulation by the social partners. This should not be interpreted as a sign 
of weakness and governments following this course should not be blamed 
for avoiding tough and radical decisions; rather governments’ behaviour 
must be understood in the political and economic context in which they 
operate. At the same time, adjustment has taken place with regard to both 
monetary policy and wage setting. For researchers and politicians alike it 
is of crucial importance to understand the process of negotiated adjust-
ment in general and the interplay between economic and political op-
portunities and constraints in particular in order to gear up European 
policy-making for the challenges ahead.
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 Appendices
 Appendix to chapter 3
Bargaining Coordination Index: the index captures the overall level of co-
ordination in national bargaining systems and includes state involvement 
in private-sector pay setting. Therefore countries with a high degree of 
government involvement in the form of national tripartite wage agree-
ments tend to be classified as highly coordinated.
 Coding: 1 = fragmented and firm-level bargaining; 2 = industry bar-
gaining, no pattern setting; 3 = industry bargaining, pattern setting, only 
moderate union concentration; 4 = centralized bargaining or government 
imposition without peace clause or industry bargaining by centralized 
unions; 5 = centralized bargaining or government imposition with peace 
clause or extremely high degree of union concentration.
 The coding of the index and a fair amount of the data are based on 
Kenworthy (2001a). Data on Portugal and Spain has been added and some 
countries have been reclassified. Data has been drawn from the European 
Industrial Relations Review, various issues, the European Industrial Rela-
tions Observatory website (www.eiro-online.ie) and Ferner and Hyman 
(1998).
 Government Intervention Index: 1 = no role of government (govin 1, 
2, 3, 4); 2 = government tries to influence (5, 6); 3 = government tries to 
determine indirectly (threat of intervention, attempts to negotiate pact); 
4 = government is part of wage bargain; 5 = government imposes private 
sector wage (govin 7, 8, 11, 13, 11, 15).
 The government intervention index is based on a recoding of the Gold-
en-Lange-Wallerstein index (govin) combined with new information.
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Table A1  Government Intervention, 1970-2000
Year AT B DK FL FR G IR I NL S UK P Sp
1970 2 1 5 4 2 2 3 1 4 2 1
1971 2 1 5 4 2 2 2 1 5 2 1
1972 2 1 5 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1973 2 1 5 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 5
1974 2 1 5 4 2 2 2 1 5 2 1
1975 2 1 5 4 2 2 2 1 5 2 5
1976 2 5 5 4 3 2 2 1 5 2 5
1977 2 1 5 4 2 1 3 1 2 2 5
1978 2 1 5 4 2 1 3 1 2 2 5
1979 2 1 5 4 2 1 3 1 2 2 5
1980 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 4 4
1981 1 5 5 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 4 4
1982 1 5 2 4 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 4 4
1983 1 5 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 4 4
1984 1 5 2 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 4 4
1985 1 5 5 4 3 1 1 3 2 4 1 4 4
1986 1 5 5 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 4 3
1987 1 1 2 4 3 1 4 3 2 2 1 4 3
1988 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 3 2 2 1 4 3
1989 1 5 2 2 3 1 4 3 2 2 1 4 3
1990 1 5 2 4 3 1 4 3 2 2 1 4 3
1991 1 5 2 4 3 1 4 3 2 3 1 4 3
1992 1 5 2 4 3 1 4 4 2 3 1 4 3
1993 1 3 2 2 3 1 4 4 3 3 1 3 3
1994 1 5 2 2 2 1 4 4 3 3 1 3 1
1995 1 5 2 3 2 1 4 4 2 3 1 3 1
1996 1 5 2 3 2 1 4 4 2 3 1 4 1
1997 1 3 2 3 2 1 4 4 2 3 1 4 3
1998 1 5 3 3 2 1 4 4 2 3 1 4 1
1999 1 5 3 3 2 1 4 4 2 3 1 4 1
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 Appendix to chapter 5
Table A2  Assignment of governing political parties to the left, centre and right
Left Centre Right
Austria Sozialistische Partei 
Österreichs (SPÖ)
Kommunistische Partei 
Österreichs (KPÖ)
Österreichische 
Volkspartei (ÖVP)
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ)
Belgium Belgische Socialistische 
Partij (BSP, Flemish)
Kommunistische Partij 
van België (KPB)
Parti Socialiste Belge 
(PSB, Francophone)
Christelijke Volkspartij 
(CVP, Flemish)
Parti Social Chrétien 
(PSC, Francophone)
Front Démocratique des 
Francophones (FDF)
Christelijke Vlaamse 
Volksunie (VU)
Democratic Union (DU)
Rassemblement Wallon 
(RW)
Liberal Party (LP)
Partij voor Vrijheid 
en Vooruitgang (PVV, 
Flemish)
Parti de la Liberté 
et du Progrès (PLP, 
Francophone)
Parti des Réformés et de 
la Liberté de Wallonie 
(PRLW)
Parti Réformateur Libéral 
PRL, Francophone)
Independent Catholics 
(ICAT)
Denmark Social Demokratiet (SD)
Left Socialist Party (LSP)
Socialistik Folkeparti 
(SPP, Socialist People’s 
Party)
Communist Party (COM)
Centre Democrats (CDM)
Christian People’s Party 
(CPP)
Venstre (LIB)
Det Konservative 
Folkeparti (CON)
Justice Party (JP)
Det Radikale Venstre 
(RAD
Finland Suomen 
Socialdemokraatinen 
Puola (SDP, Finnish Social 
Dem Party)
Suomen Kansan 
Demokraattinen Liitto 
(SKDL, communist)
Social Democratic 
League of Workers and 
Smallholders (TPSL)
Vaemmisto Liitto (VAS, 
Linksallianz) 
Keskustapuolu (KESK, 
center party)
Liberaalinen 
Kansanpuolue (LKP, 
Liberal People’s Party)
Finnish Rural Party (FRP)
Kansallinen Kokoomus 
(KOK, National Coalition)
Svenska Folkepartiet 
(RKP, SFP)
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Table A2  Assignment of governing political parties to the left, centre and right
France Parti Socialiste Français 
(PSF)
Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF)
Centre des Démocrates 
Sociaux (CDS)
Parti Républicain et 
Radical Socialiste (RSP, 
Radical Socialist Party)
Mouvement Républicain 
Populaire (MRP)
Centre du Progrès et de 
la Démocratie Moderne 
(PDM)
Union pour la 
Démocratie Française 
(UDF)
Mouvement 
Réformateur (REF, 
Reformer’s Movement)
Gaullistes (GAUL)
Centre National des 
Indépendants (IND)
Centre Démocratie et 
Progrès (CDP)
Union pour la Nouvelle 
République (UNR)
Rassemblement Pour la 
République (RPR)
Mouvement des 
Radicaux de Gauche 
(RAD, MRG).
Germany Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD)
Christliche 
Demokratische Union 
(CDU)
Christliche Soziale Union 
(CSU)
Deutsche Partei (DP)
Freie Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
(FDP)
Ireland Labour Party (LAB)
Democratic Left (DL)
Clann na Poblachta (CNP, 
Republican Party)
Fine Gael (FG)
Clann na Talmhan (CNT, 
The People of the Land)
Progressive Democrats 
(PD)
Fianna Fail (FF)
Italy Partito Socialista Italiano 
di Unità Proletaria (PSIU)
Partito Communista 
Italiano (PCI)
Partito Socialista Italiano 
(PSI)
Partito Socialista 
Uniﬁ cato (PSU)
Partito Socialista 
Democratico (PSDI)
Democrazia Cristiana 
(DC)
Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano (PRI)
Partito Liberale Italiano 
(PLI)
Nether-
lands
Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA, Labour Party)
Politieke Partij Radicalen 
(PPR)
Katholieke Volkspartij 
(KVP)
Christen Democratisch 
Appel (CDA)
Democratische 
Socialisten’70 (DS’70)
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid 
en Democratie (VVD)
Christelijk Historische 
Unie (CHU)
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij 
(ARP)
Democraten’66 (D’66)
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Table A2  Assignment of governing political parties to the left, centre and right
Portugal Socialist Party (PSP)
Communist Party (PCP)
Popular Democrats, 
Social Democrats (PPD, 
PSD)
Centre Social Democrats, 
Popular Party (CDS, PP)
Spain Socialist Party (PSOE)
Communist Party, United 
Left (PCE/PSUC)
Popular Alliance, Popular 
Party (AP/PP)
Centre and Unity (CiU)
Sweden Socialdemokratische 
Arbetarpartiet (SDA)
Centerpartiet (CP, BF)
Kristen Demokratisk 
Samling (KDS)
Moderata 
Samlingspartiet (MUP, 
Moderate Unity Party)
Folkepartiet Liberalerna 
(FP, Liberal Party)
UK Labour Party (LAB) Conservative Party (CON)
Source: Armingeon et al. 2002.
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 Appendix to chapter 6
Wage equations are usually estimated when estimating equations for fac-
tors that best explain the rise or persistence of unemployment (Bean 1994; 
Layard et al. 1991; McMorrow 1996). In the context of this study, wage 
equations were used for specifying the choices of wage bargaining actors 
in particular countries in order to find an indicator for the responsive-
ness of wage bargaining institutions. The coefficients were used for in-
dicating the orientation of the wage bargaining actors; the best fit of the 
model was not necessarily required. Nevertheless, due to autocorrelation 
problems, several models were estimated in order to ensure that the key 
determinants of the nominal wage growth in the countries were taken 
into account. Based on existing econometric studies on wage equations 
(McMorrow 1996; Grubb et al. 1983, Layard et al. 1991) the following vari-
ables were used:
Table A3  Description of the variables used in the regression analysis of nominal wage 
growth
Variable Name Description Source
Dependent Variable
Nominal wage 
growth
Annual percentage in nominal 
compensation per employee, total 
economy
OECD, Historical Statistics
Independent Variable
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate OECD, Historical Statistics
Change in 
unemployment 
Annual percentage change in the 
standardized unemployment rate
OECD, Historical Statistics
Productivity growth Annual percentage change in real GDP OECD, Historical Statistics 
Inﬂ ation Annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index
OECD, Historical Statistics
Inﬂ ation t-1 Annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index, lagged by one year
OECD, Historical Statistics
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Since changes in prices and unemployment have different time spans no 
overall wage equation generally suits all countries (Flanagan, Soskice et al. 
1983). The different wage equations show that time lags are important in 
some countries but not in others. On the whole, however, the degree of re-
sponsiveness of wage bargaining in particular countries is not changed by 
using different models. The model for Finland has satisfying results in the 
Durbin-Watson test when the lagged inflation rate is included. Germany 
has better results when the exceptional year of 1992, the first wage round 
after reunification, is included. Yet on the whole, the size and significance 
of the coefficients remain stable in different models. Based on these ob-
servations, the coefficients were used in the subsequent calculation for a 
combined index for wage responsiveness as shown in figure 6.1.
Table A4 Wage equations
Austria
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.23 (0.23) -0.12 (0.22) -0.28 (0.3) -0.41 (0.26)
Unemployment -2.58*** (0.44) -3.24*** (0.41) -2.58*** (0.4) -3.16*** (0.39)
Productivity -0.47** (0.2) -0.51** (0.19) -0.47** (0.18) -0.54*** (0.18)
Change in 
unemployment
- 2.08*** (0.59) - 1.78*** (0.58)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.58** (0.24) 0.41 (0.22)
Adj R2 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.84
Durbin-Watson 2.10 1.43 2.17 1.55
Belgium
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.89*** (0.09) 0.85*** (0.11) 0.69*** (0.17) 0.68*** (0.18)
Unemployment -0.63*** (0.1) -0.63*** (0.1) -0.67*** (0.1) -0.67** (0.11)
Productivity 0.51** (0.2) 0.54** (0.21) 0.48** (0.2) 0.49** (0.21)
Change in 
unemployment
- 0.19 (0.35) - 0.09 (0.35)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.23 (0.16) 0.22 (0.17)
Adj R2 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91
Durbin-Watson 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.03
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Table A4 Wage equations
Denmark
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.88*** (0.08) 0.84*** (0.09) 0.67*** (0.17) 0.62*** (0.18)
Unemployment -0.39*** (0.11) -0.4*** (0.11) -0.44*** (0.12) -0.47*** (0.12)
Productivity -0.03 (0.04) 0.21 (0.21) 0.07 (0.21) 0.14 (0.21)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.34 (0.24) - 0.34 (0.24)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.25 (0.17) 0.25 (0.17)
Adj R2 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85
Durbin-Watson 1.55 1.77 1.58 1.83
Finland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.93*** (0.17) 0.98*** (0.17) 1.52*** (0.24) 1.5*** (0.25)
Unemployment -0.37** (0.15) -0.31 (0.16) -0.31** (0.13) -0.3** (0.14)
Productivity 0.16 (0.27) 0.16 (0.27) 0.03 (0.24) 0.04 (0.25)
Change in 
Unemployment
- -0.42 (0.29) - -0.13 (0.28)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - -0.65*** (0.21) -0.61** (0.23)
Adj R2 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.85
Durbin-Watson 0.93 0.95 1.61 1.58
France
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.81*** (0.07) 0.8*** (0.07) 0.66*** (0.12) 0.65*** (0.12)
Unemployment -0.73*** (0.1) -0.73*** (0.11) -0.75*** (0.1) -0.75*** (0.1)
Productivity -0.53** (0.23) -0.51** (0.24) -0.51** (0.23) -0.52** (0.24)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.12 (0.36) - -0.06 (0.37)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.16 (0.1) 0.17 (0.11)
Adj R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Durbin-Watson 1.97 1.96 1.82 1.82
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Table A4 Wage equations
Germany (including 1992)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.48** (0.22) 0.58 (0.34) 0.65 (0.34) 0.68 (0.39)
Unemployment -0.7*** (0.16) -0.65*** (0.22) -0.68*** (0.17) -0.66*** (0.23)
Productivity 0.04 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08)
Change in 
Unemployment
- -0.21 (0.57) - -0.09 (0.62)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - -0.18 (0.27) -0.16 (0.3)
Adj R2 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76
Durbin-Watson 1.29 1.27 1.26 1.25
Germany (not including 1992)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.23 (0.16) 0.21 (0.26) 0.04 (0.27) 0.06 (0.17)
Unemployment -0.88*** (0.12) -0.89*** (0.17) -0.91*** 0.90*** (0.17)
Productivity -0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.05 (0.41) -0.07 (0.44)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.18 (0.21) 0.19 (0.23)
Adj R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Durbin-Watson 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.02
Ireland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.86*** (0.09) 0.72*** (0.13) 0.87*** (0.2) 0.81*** (0.19)
Unemployment -0.33** (0.14) -0.49*** (0.17) -0.33** (0.15) -0.49** (0.18)
Productivity 0.25 (0.24) 0.25 (0.23) 0.25 (0.24) 0.27 (0.24)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.71 (0.51) - 0.85 (0.56)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - -0.01 (0.18) -0.13 (0.19)
Adj R2 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86
Durbin-Watson 1.67 1.57 1.68 1.61
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Table A4 Wage equations
Italy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.82*** (0.09) 0.83*** (0.09) 0.72*** (0.15) 0.65*** (0.16)
Unemployment -0.98*** (0.22) -0.97*** (0.22) -1*** (0.22) -0.98*** (0.22)
Productivity 0.21 (0.25) 0.24 (0.25) 0.29 (0.26) 0.4 (0.27)
Change in 
Unemployment
- -0.48 (0.68) - -1.01 (0.76)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.12 (0.14) 0.22 (0.15)
Adj R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Durbin-Watson 1.82 1.83 1.7 1.68
Netherlands
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 1.05*** (0.15) 1.1*** (0.26) 0.84*** (0.28) 0.88** (0.37)
Unemployment -0.51*** (0.13) -0.48** (0.18) -0.55*** (0.14) -0.53*** (0.18)
Productivity 0.47 (0.26) 0.44 (0.29) 0.44 (0.27) 0.42 (0.29)
Change in 
Unemployment
- -0.15 (0.58) - -0.12 (0.58)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.23 (0.25) 0.22 (0.26)
Adj R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Durbin-Watson 1.18 1.2 1.09 1.11
Portugal
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.86** (0.13) 0.84** (0.14) 0.20 (0.17) 0.20 (0.17)
Unemployment -1.09 (0.77) -1.11 (0.78) -1.66** (0.55) -1.66** (0.56)
Productivity -0.18 (0.34) -0.11 (0.36) 0.14 (0.25) 0.13 (0.26)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.69 (1.39) - -0.08 (0.75)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.81** (0.17) 0.81** (0.18)
Adj R2 0.69 0.68 0.85 0.84
Durbin-Watson 1.27 1.28 1.56 1.56
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Table A4 Wage equations
Spain
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.72** (0.12) 0.64** (0.12) 0.47* (0.17) 0.48* (0.17)
Unemployment -0.46** (0.12) -0.52** (0.12) -0.47** (0.12) -0.51** (0.12)
Productivity 0.48 (0.29) 0.17 (0.33) 0.50** (0.27) 0.31 (0.34)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.43 (0.25) - 0.27 (0.27)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - 0.26** (0.13) 0.19 (0.15)
Adj R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Durbin-Watson 1.51 1.39 1.35 1.28
Sweden
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.27 (0.21) 0.32 (0.22) 0.32 (0.24) 0.35 (0.25)
Unemployment -0.55 (0.27) -0.48 (0.3) -0.58 (0.29) -0.5 (0.33)
Productivity -0.71 (0.39) -0.67 (0.4) -0.68 (0.4) -0.66 (0.41)
Change in 
Unemployment
- -0.35 (0.52) - -0.31 (0.56)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - -0.09 (0.21) -0.05 (0.22)
Adj R2 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59
Durbin-Watson 1.27 1.3 1.32 1.32
UK
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inﬂ ation 0.93*** (0.11) 0.89*** (0.13) 1.02*** (0.19) 1.02*** (0.19)
Unemployment -0.17 (0.2) -0.21 (0.22) -0.14 (0.2) -0.21 (0.22)
Productivity 0.02 (0.31) -0.03 (0.33) 0.13 (0.36) 0.11 (0.36)
Change in 
Unemployment
- 0.21 (0.47) - 0.48 (0.54)
Inﬂ ation t-1 - - -0.1 (0.16) -0.18 (0.19)
Adj R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Durbin-Watson 2.06 2.02 2.2 2.22
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries
Evolution of wage formation in Austria, 1970-99
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Evolution of wage formation in Denmark, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
Evolution of wage formation in Finland, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
Evolution of wage formation in France, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
Evolution of wage formation in Ireland, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
Evolution of wage formation in the Netherlands, 1970-99
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Evolution of wage formation in Portugal, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
Evolution of wage formation in Spain, 1970-99
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Evolution of wage formation in Sweden, 1970-99
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 Evolution of wage formation in the UK, 1970-99
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Figure A1 Evolution of wage formation, 13 Western European countries, continued
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 Notes
 1 See McNamarra on the convergence of monetary policy (McNamarra 
). 
 2 See on debate on emu, wage bargaining and labour market regulation Calm-
fors (), Crouch (), Enderlein (), Hancké and Rhodes (), 
Hancké and Soskice () and Soskice and Iversen ().
 3 In particular Richard Layard ( and ), Layard et al. () and Da-
vid Soskice, based on Carlin and Soskice (), and Flanagan, Soskice et al. 
().
 4 On the emergence of new social pacts see Pochet and Fajertag ( and 
), Hassel (), Regini (), Rhodes ( and a), Schmitter and 
Grote (), Traxler () and Visser ().
 5 See on the evolution of wage bargaining structures in Scandinavia Iversen 
(), oecd (a), Wallerstein and Golden (), Wallerstein, Golden et 
al. () and Chapter .
 6 Tripartite concertation also became a major policy-making tool in the post-
socialist political systems of Eastern Europe, mainly for reasons of increased 
legitimacy and policy implementation (Schmitter and Grote ).
 7 See for an overview of corporatist theory Molina and Rhodes () and Bac-
caro (). For the main contributions to the debate on neo-corporatism see 
Schmitter ( and ), Schmitter and Lehmbruch (), Berger (), 
Heinze (), Lehmbruch (), Lehmbruch and Schmitter (), Gold-
thorpe (), Streeck (), Streeck (). For finer distinctions within 
the neo-corporatist debate see Chapter .
 8 Interpenetration of public policy and interest groups was to be found in other 
policy fields such as technical standardization or health policy. But it was the 
incorporation of trade unions into the political decision-making procedures 
that dominated the neo-corporatist literature.
 9 For instance Nedelmann and Meier (), Lehmbruch (), Marin ( 
and ), Treu (), Regini (), Compston (). Lucio Baccaro has 
specifically addressed the emergence of concertation in countries that do not 
have corporatist structures of interest representation (Baccaro ). Bac-
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caro emphasizes that inter-organizational coordination that is a prerequisite 
for concertation can take in fragmented organizational systems.
10 See on the notion of political exchange the seminal article by Pizzorno (). 
In later publications, political exchanges and generalized exchanges were de-
veloped (Marin ; Crouch b and ; Streeck and Schmitter ).
11 See Chapter  for a summary of the political economy literature.
12 Own calculation based on data in table  (Armingeon ). The data is 
based on the International Social Survey ‘Role of Government’ ().
13 For studies in comparative political economy that focus on employers and 
firms see Swenson (), Hall and Soskice () and Thelen (). A si-
milar claim – that employers did not play an important role in the emergence 
of concertation – is made by Baccaro (: ) for the cases of Ireland and 
Italy.
14 This omission might be a serious one. Recent literature on concertation has 
emphasized the close link between wage bargaining and social policy (Ebbin-
ghaus and Hassel  and ; Streeck and Hassel ). Moreover, studies 
on welfare reforms have pointed to the role of unions either as veto players 
in welfare reform (Pierson ; Schludi ) or as actors who fill the gap 
that is left by welfare privatization (Trampusch ). Wolfgang Streeck has 
pointed to welfare provisions as a functional equivalent to Keynesian eco-
nomic policy (Streeck ). Nevertheless, in this book welfare is treated as 
one – though the most important – of many contextual factors that do not 
systematically enter the explanation.
15 For instance Siegel (), Donaghey and Teague (), Rhodes (a).
16 In line with for instance Hancké and Rhodes ().
17 For most recent contributions on this debate see Flanagan (), Traxler, 
Blaschke et al. () and Traxler ().
18 Having a mixed approach of quantitative variables combined with case stud-
ies has become more popular in recent years. See for instance Iversen (), 
Scharpf and Schmidt () and Enderlein ().
19 For instance, the view that governments are responsible for reducing unem-
ployment is strongly shared in the eu member states ( per cent agree) com-
pared to the oecd countries outside Europe such as Japan, the us, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand (. per cent agree). Data from International So-
cial Survey, Armingeon (, table ).
20 On this point in general see Ebbinghaus ().
21 One could argue that the crudeness of the data does strictly speaking not al-
low for comparative means tests or bivariate correlations. However, I used 
these tools nevertheless, while being aware of the limitation. On the role of ag-
gregate statistical data in the social sciences in general see Widmaier ().
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22 This applies even to those cases where governments wished to delegate their 
control to independent monetary authorities such as independent central 
banks.
23 In the Anglo-Saxon countries, various economists were working on the de-
sign of tax-based incomes policies that had automatic tax incentives for wage 
restraint. See Blackwell and Santomero () and Slitor ().
24 For an assessment of incomes policy during that period see Braun (), 
Soskice (), Flanagan, Soskice et al. ().
25 The report adds an interesting footnote when it states: “In this respect, things 
are very different than they were in, say, , when it was possible to write: 
‘…the fundamental problem is how to get people to exercise the moderation 
that they would do if they believed that a major recession was possible, wit-
hout actually having to administer the lesson’” (oecd : ).
26 There have been many discussions about the short-term Phillips curve. While 
some economists argued that even in the short run people would adjust their 
expectations so that no relationship exists between the two (Lucas ), 
the mainstream in macroeconomics now assumes that there is a short-term 
trade-off, either based on the stickiness of wages and prices or on informa-
tion asymmetries (Taylor ).
27 The political economy literature on the impact of wage bargaining instituti-
ons on economic performance is vast. See Flanagan (), Calmfors () 
and Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel () for the most comprehensive reviews 
of the impact of wage bargaining institutions on economic performance and 
for references. The most important references are Crouch (), Bruno and 
Sachs (), Calmfors and Driffil (), Soskice () and more gene-
rally Olson (), and most recently Iversen (), Traxler; Blaschke et al. 
() and Traxler ().
28 Iversen argues that industry level bargaining is most effective under restric-
tive monetary policy (Iversen ). See for a good overview of the different 
arguments Adolph ().
29 With the exception of Calmfors () and Calmfors and Johansson (), 
who argued similarly with regard to the effects of emu. The difference here, 
however, is that it is not emu that prompts an incentive to increase coordi-
nation, but any disinflationary policy that is based on the credibility of the 
monetary regime.
30 For an overview of the economic literature on credibility see Cukierman 
(), Alesina and Summers () and Rogoff () and further referen-
ces in Chapter .
31 See Chapter  for references to the literature on central bank independence.
32 See references in endnote .
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33 The exact relationship between wage bargaining institutions and economic 
performance has been discussed extensively and many modifications can be 
found in the literature. For the latest assessment see Traxler, Blaschke et al. 
() and Franzese ( and ). This, however, is not important for 
the argument presented here as long as one assumes that this approach as a 
whole is credible. It is only important to point out that different institutional 
properties are connected to different outcomes on the labour market.
34 Iversen (), however, uses a different argument to explain the lack of in-
teraction of highly centralized wage bargaining systems. He argues that the 
responsive of highly centralized bargaining systems decreases due to the co-
alitions that highly centralized bargaining units have to engage in between 
the low paid and the high paid, which then leads to a higher degree of wage 
compression.
35 For a more formal economic treatment on the issue see Flanagan, Soskice 
et al. (). For the case of erm and emu see Hancké and Soskice (). 
Hancké and Soskice emphasize that “for governments (as well as unions and 
employers) the need to meet the Maastricht conditions meant that the coor-
dinated bargaining was a valuable instrument in the development of social 
pacts” (Hancké and Soskice : ).
36 The argument in this section can also be found in Hassel ().
37 For a comprehensive overview, see Streeck and Kenworthy ().
38 Starting from Schmitter () who introduced the role of organizational 
structures of interest associations for policy-making.
39 The use of the term ‘accommodation’ is owed to Gosta Esping-Andersen 
when he discusses the ‘institutional accommodation to full employment’ (Es-
ping-Andersen , Chapter ). Esping-Andersen himself accredits it to the 
contribution originally made by Michael Kalecki, who anticipated the pro-
blems a democratic government might face in the pursuit of full employment 
if there was no institutional support for restraining expectations (Kalecki 
).
40 In what follows, political and negotiated accommodation will be used syno-
nymously.
41 In the uk, for instance, the attempts to create institutional structures that 
could accommodate trade union policy were half-hearted. The British uni-
ons refused to cooperate with two successive advisory bodies set up by Con-
servative governments in  and  to take evidence and issue reports 
on incomes, prices and productivity. In , the tuc after much hesitation 
agreed to take part in the nedc – a new consultative organization appointed 
by the government, with ministers as well as management, unions and inde-
pendent experts among its members and with a strong staff. The purpose of 
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the nedc was to promote economic growth and to elaborate a national plan; 
it was not, however, expected to concern itself in any detail with incomes 
policy. See Peter Hall on France and Great Britain (Hall ).
42 Incomes policies are all measures by government to restrain wage bargaining 
behaviour. The price that governments in some situations have to pay for 
wage restraint is expressed by the notion of political exchange. Obviously, 
there can be policies without compensation.
43 With the exception of the Golden-Lange-Wallerstein index as discussed be-
low.
44 There have since been yardsticks proposed for ranking the degree of corpo-
ratism, which aimed at measuring something similar. For a ranking of con-
sensual incomes policy see Marks (). For more descriptive studies see 
Armingeon ( and ), Braun (), oecd () and United Nations 
().
45 Erga omnes clauses are mechanisms for extending the terms and conditions 
of collective agreements to areas that are not covered by the agreement. They 
exist in most eu member states that are covered by this study with the excep-
tion of Italy, Sweden and the uk (eironline a)
46 In the Golden-Lange-Wallerstein index, the Agreement of Wassenaar was 
categorized as  despite the fact that the government was not a signatory to 
the agreement.
47 More detailed periodization might mark the end of the s in  with 
the establishment of the ems and begin the s in  with the Maastricht 
Treaty. Since the data should not be overemphasized, but only give a broad 
account of the attitudes of governments towards the organization of the la-
bour market and the need for adjustment, the periodization in decades is 
equally acceptable.
48 A similar bargaining authority and coordination index has been developed 
by Calmfors () that is not based on annual data points, but also covers 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. It correlates with the Iversen index with ..
49 For coding and sources see Appendix. For a thorough overview of the diffe-
rent measures see Kenworthy (a).
50 Other measures of corporatism, such as the one constructed by Siaroff (), 
which is more time-sensitive, also fail to correlate with the degree of govern-
ment intervention as measured here.
51 The claim of the beneficial effects of central bank independence as claimed 
by Alesina and Summers () has been strongly contested. See Forder 
() for the theoretical criticism; Forder ( and ) and Mangano 
() for conceptual criticism. Empirically, negative employment effects 
have been pointed out by Hall and Franzese (), Iversen (), Garrett 
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and Way () and Posen (). Central bankers themselves have seriously 
questioned the assertion that politicians or politically controlled central ban-
kers are more lenient towards inflation than independent central banks. Af-
ter having served a term as Vice Chairman of the us central bank, the Federal 
Reserve, Alan Blinder argues that the policy-makers do not try to sacrifice 
price stability for employment (Blinder ). From a different position, but 
with a similar conclusion, Kathleen McNamara has argued that the spread of 
central bank independence across the developed and developing world is not 
due to narrow functional benefits but rather “because delegation has impor-
tant legitimizing and symbolic properties which render it attractive in times 
of uncertainty or economic distress. The spread of central bank indepen-
dence should be seen as a fundamentally social and political phenomenon, 
rooted in the logic of organizational mimicry and global norms of neo-liberal 
governance” (McNamara : ). Similarly, Adolph contests the assump-
tion that central bankers value low inflation (Adolph ). Others have ac-
knowledged the empirical relationship between central bank independence 
and low inflation, but questioned the mechanism of credibility. Posen, for 
instance, argues that central bank independence might more usefully be seen 
as a social preference for reacting strongly to inflationary shocks rather than 
as a credibility mechanism (Posen : ).
52 See, on the powerful role of economic ideas, the edited volume by Peter A. 
Hall (). On the role of ideas in the evolution of European monetary uni-
on see McNamara ().
53 See for a further discussion on the issue from a political science perspec-
tive and with respect to wage bargaining institutions Iversen (), Hall and 
Franzese () and Franzese ().
54 That independent central bankers are more conservative than others is ho-
wever empirically not the case as has been shown by Adolph ().
55 It is for this reason that empirical studies which, in researching the interac-
tion between monetary policy and wage bargaining, focus solely on monetary 
policy seem to miss the point of the argument. For instance, Traxler, Blaschke 
et al. () employ annual changes in money supply as their indicator of 
monetary policy. Iversen () uses a combined index of Cukierman’s legal 
independence and the changes in the real exchange rate of the national cur-
rency. Both studies are driven by the aim to have time-variant data for mone-
tary conservatism used in cross-sectional time-series analysis.
56 The arguments are based primarily on the literature on optimum currency 
areas, which has defined criteria for the design of currency areas according 
to the incidence of economic disturbances across regions (Mundell ). 
Following on from here, many economists have judged the euro-zone to be 
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unsuitable as a currency area because of low-level factor mobility and labour 
market rigidities. For a common view see De Grauwe ().
57 Monetary union in the Werner report was identified with: () total and ir-
reversible convertibility of currencies; () elimination of margins of fluctu-
ation in exchange rates; () irrevocable fixing of parties; () elimination of 
restrictions on capital movement; and () coordination of aggregate demand 
policies (The Economist c).
58 The snake was soon criticized by the All Saints’ Day Manifesto, which propo-
sed a European parallel currency held constant by exchange rate adjustments 
between national currencies and the epc (Basevi et al. in The Economist 
c). This would trigger an automatic and gradual integration as well as 
stability of the currencies.
59 ‘The currency chameleon’, The Economist ().
60 On the evolution of the snake see McNamara (: ff.) and Gros and Thy-
gesen ().
61 This was also due to the fact that the snake followed a functionalist logic 
that was the conventional wisdom about the process of eu integration at the 
time. It assumed that major political decisions could only be taken through a 
process of ‘incremental decision-making’. The snake was therefore designed 
to develop and encourage a political climate that would be conducive to mo-
netary unification (Cobham : ).
62 These efforts are well documented in McNamara ().
63 “The French tried to keep the franc in the snake right up to the last moment. 
When Mr Fourcade arrived at the snake ministers’ meeting at  pm on Sun-
day evening, he was clutching a plan for reform of the snake which would 
allow the franc to stay. He proposed a devaluation of the franc by  per cent 
and an upvaluation of the D-mark by  per cent, as well as wider margins of 
permitted fluctuations and a more effective system of intervention, involving 
pooling of reserves…” (The Economist ).
64 ‘British woes help European unity’, Business Week ().
65 ‘As Ireland stakes its shirt on ems, Italy wants shorter odds’, The Economist 
(b).
66 See for instance the portrait of Otmar Emminger as the new president of the 
Bundesbank in Business Week ().
67 A similar observation can be made when looking at inflation differentials 
over the three decades. Neither the average inflation differential with Ger-
many nor the standard deviation was considerably lower during the s 
compared with the s.
68 The difference is twofold. Firstly, under fixed but adjustable exchange rates, 
an adjustment would have been possible in case of an external asymmetric 
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shock. Even without such a shock, a major adjustment of the exchange rates 
took place during the ems crisis . Secondly, monetary policy can still 
vary from country to country, even if it has to prioritize to diminish infla-
tion differentials. Nevertheless, the principal theoretical implications are the 
same. See Calmfors ().
69 The implications for monetary policy of monetary integration under fixed 
exchange rates had been discussed under the notion of the Mundell Holy 
Trinity since the s and were well known in the s (Mundell ).
70 This argument follows standard economic discussion on the explanation of 
unemployment in Europe. In the account of economists, the degree of ex-
ternal shocks and the response of wages to these shocks are the main ex-
planatory variables for unemployment, accounting for about half of the va-
riance in the model proposed by Layard et al. (). Wage equations are 
usually estimated by three sets of parameters: the change in prices, the level 
of unemployment, and a third set that includes all other parameters such as 
trade union bargaining power, workers militancy, the reservation wage and 
the like. For an excellent overview of the literature up to the mid-s see 
Bean ().
71 Despite the predictions of theories of rational expectations, disinflation by 
means of tight monetary policies always has negative effects on output and 
employment. A credible announcement of monetary restrictions has never 
been good enough to lower inflationary pressures without additional costs 
(Ball  and ).
72 In the economic literature, real wage rigidity (RWR) and the size of an exter-
nal shock are the two major explanatory factors for the persistence of unem-
ployment, explaining about  per cent of the variance of changes in unem-
ployment (Layard et al. ; more generally, Bean  and Layard ).
73 For a critical discussion of the central bank independence measure see 
Mangano () and Forder ().
74 The Grilli et al. index does not include Portugal, Finland and Sweden. Ho-
wever, it should also be pointed out that the observed negative relationship 
between central bank independence and government intervention that will 
be reported below is weaker with the Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini index 
(using only nine countries) and not significant.
75 Scores for individual countries have been disputed in the literature. The low 
score for Japan was seen by Iversen not to reflect the monetary policy prac-
tice of Japan. Iversen actually ranked Japan higher (Iversen ). Also, with 
regard to Austria, the high score of independence has been criticized since 
the Austrian social partners are influential in the appointments of the gover-
nors (Straumann ).
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76 Since both measures are not of a metrical scale and the Cukierman index is 
moreover time-invariant, no further statistical relationships could be reliably 
assessed.
77 The partial correlation coefficient for annual data changes from -.** to 
-.** when controlling for inflation.
78 The same is true when testing for the relationship between government in-
tervention and unemployment. Government intervention is positively cor-
related with the degree of unemployment. This relationship, however, disap-
pears when central bank independence is controlled for.
79 See for a sophisticated treatment of this very general point Immergut () 
and Tsebelis ().
80 For a comprehensive treatment of different types of democracies see Schmidt 
() and Lijphart ().
81 The most important contributions to the debate from the perspective of 
historical institutionalism can be found in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 
(), but also Immergut (), Tsebelis () and Schmidt ().
82 Immergut talks about veto points rather than veto players, since she iden-
tifies the mechanisms of blocking a political decision in the combination of 
political institutions and their locations of actors within these institutions 
rather than the number or position of specific actors (Immergut ). Ne-
vertheless, for the sake of brevity, veto points and veto players are here lum-
ped into one category.
83 Other measures of institutional constraints on governments, such as those com-
piled by Schmidt (), or of constitutional structures, as devised by Huber, 
Ragin and Stephens (), have not been pursued further because these cons-
traint measures were specially designed to explain diﬀ erences in public policy-
making and are therefore not directly relevant to the questions pursued here.
84 Similarly, there has also been the claim that corporatism and consociatio-
nalism show affinities. In particular, Gerhard Lehmbruch has claimed: “The 
European consociationalist democracies all have strong neo-corporatist ele-
ments, and the evolution of both is closely related” (Lehmbruch : -
). However, as Lane points out, with consensus democracies in general, 
not all consociationalist countries are corporatist (i.e. Switzerland) and not 
all corporatist countries are consociational. Nor do the two forms of power 
sharing have the same roots, because the one developed in response to the 
regulation of class conflict in the s and the other grew out of ethnic or 
religious fragmentation in deeply divided societies (Lane : ).
85 The Lijphart variable on the federalism–unitary dimension is in effect a veto-
player dimension (Schmidt ). Empirically, the executive dimension and 
the federalism dimension do not co-vary, but the combination of the two 
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dimensions presents different groups of democracies in which the degree 
of federalism (or other constraints in the political system) modifies the exe-
cutive power axis. In fact, central bank independence is one indicator of the 
federalism dimension along with federalism per se. As was shown in Chapter 
, central bank independence reduces the propensity of governments to in-
tervene in wage bargaining procedures rather than increases it. In the context 
of government intervention in wage bargaining, both dimensions have clearly 
opposing effects.
86 A similar argument has been made about the relationship between political 
institutions and the evolution of coordinated market economies by Hall and 
Soskice (). They argue that “political regimes characterized by coalition 
governments, multiple veto points, and parties that entrench the power of 
producer groups may be more conducive to co-specific assets than states that 
concentrate power in highly autonomous party leaders”.
87 Principal component analysis was employed using the average for the num-
ber of effective parties, -, and the share of minimal winning one-party 
cabinets, -, as shown in tables . and ..
88 See ‘Why French Communists have refused to join a new Government’, Fi-
nancial Times ().
89 Redondo resigned his parliamentary seat in January  in an argument 
over public sector pay (Financial Times a).
90 The special powers of government effectively allowed the new centre-right 
government to introduce by ‘decree’ a range of measures aimed at reviving 
the economy without having to submit them for normal parliamentary de-
bate (Financial Times a).
91 With the possible exception of a very flexible law on working hours enacted 
in .
92 For instance, the Schluter government in Denmark of - and the Lub-
bers government in the Netherlands, both of which were determined not to 
continue with the conflictual rounds of incomes policies that they inherited 
from their predecessors.
93 Important contributions are Hibbs () Hicks and Swank () Huber, 
Ragin et al. ().
94 There is, however, a short-term effect of partisanship on economic policy, as 
Alesina has shown using a ‘rational partisan model’. Since there is a time lag 
between a change in policy and a catch-up movement by wage bargainers, 
left-wing governments can and do try to exploit the short-term trade-off 
(Alesina and Rosenthal ; Alesina et al. ).
95 ‘Dutch centre-right coalition agrees austerity programme’, Financial Times 
(b), ‘Wim Kok: Trade unions’ uncrowned king’, Financial Times (c).
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 96 ‘Budget Sinks Irish Coalition’, Financial Times (a) and ‘Economy Res-
ponds To Haughey Treatment’, Financial Times (b).
 97 Conservative governments might also have had less of a reputation problem 
when engaging in incomes policy with trade unions (in accordance with the 
so-called Nixon-goes-to-China phenomenon). After the s had seen 
highly conflictual episodes of negotiations between social democratic go-
vernments and trade unions, the general public might have had severe reser-
vations about further tripartite negotiations between left-wing governments 
and trade unions.
 98 For a very broad literature see Calmfors () Flanagan ( and ) and 
Crouch (). For empirical tests see Traxler, Blaschke et al. () oecd 
() and Iversen ().
 99 This term was suggested by David Soskice (: ), who also discussed 
the role of local pushfulness in counteracting coordination. In the discussion 
here, the two are taken together.
100 On the economic effects of wage indexation see Braun () Gray ( and 
), Blanchard (), Ball (), Milesi-Ferretti () and Waller and 
VanHoose ().
101 See Western and Healy ( and ) for a discussion on the slowdown in 
real wage growth after the oil crisis.
102 See Appendix for further information on the wage equation.
103 Another factor that could be discussed here is the role of workplace trade 
union or workers’ representation and the legal regulation of wage bargai-
ning at the plant level. Workplace representation of trade unions can either 
support local wage assertiveness, as has been pointed out by David Soskice 
(), or plant-level representation can have beneficial effects on produc-
tivity enhancing measures. As has been pointed out many times with regard 
to the German model, the interaction between sectoral bargaining and com-
pany productivity pacts has contributed to wage restraint at the sectoral 
level and productivity increases locally, which have allowed for real wage 
increases (Streeck ). The legal regulation of wage bargaining as contai-
ning local wage assertiveness has been discussed by Traxler, Blaschke et al. 
().
104 In the literature, the role of dissenting factions between different trade union 
organizations is frequently incorporated into the measurement of centraliza-
tion or coordination, through the statement that wage bargaining institutions 
are less centralized or coordinated where local or sectoral factions are strong 
(see Crouch , Iversen , Traxler, Blaschke et al. , Traxler ). 
This can be misleading, however. For instance, Finnish wage bargaining pro-
cedures have always been considered as highly centralized, although they 
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were influenced by the communist split during the s. Dissenting factions 
do generally point, therefore, to competitive pressures within the trade uni-
ons, even though wage bargaining can be coordinated and comprehensive.
105 One important consequence of the coupling of wage bargaining for the shel-
tered service sectors is that wage increases in these sectors are frequently 
above the level of productivity increases in these sectors.
106 Union density rates in the public sector stand at roughly  per cent whereas 
overall union density has declined to less than  per cent (Ebbinghaus , 
).
107 On the institutional foundations of Austrian Keynesian economic policy see 
in detail Katzenstein () Scharpf () Guger and Polt () and Heme-
rijck, Unger et al (a); for more recent developments Pelinka ().
108 In , Austria was hit by the first general strike in  years over issues of 
pension reforms. This has however not affected the patterns of wage bargai-
ning (eirr ; eironline a).
109 At the same time, the employment crisis of the German welfare state had 
already been building up since the s. See Manow and Seils ().
110 See for a more detailed account of the negotiations between the German go-
vernment and trade unions over wages and social policy retrenchment Hassel 
() and Streeck and Trampusch ().
111 For an overview on the failed first attempt to create an Alliance for Jobs in 
/ see Bispinck (); for a more detailed account of the second 
Alliance for Jobs after  see Bispinck and Schulten (), Hassel (), 
Heinze () and Streeck and Hassel ().
112 Concession bargaining became a persistent feature in German industrial re-
lations from the early s onwards (Hassel and Rehder ; Rehder ; 
Streeck and Rehder ). The concessions by the unions made the call for 
more far-reaching reforms for business unnecessary.
113 The metal sector trade union had previously rejected early retirement poli-
cies and instead favoured a shorter working week for political reasons (Jacobs 
et al. ). The union therefore found it much more difficult to lobby for an 
extension of the existing part-time early retirement scheme.
114 Lorwin even described labour relations in Belgium as “over-institutionali-
zed” (Lorwin : ).
115 Up until ,  agreements had been declared binding.
116 Th e Dutch case has been thoroughly analysed by Jelle Visser and Anton 
Hemerijck. See in particular Hemerijck (), Visser and Hemerijck (), 
Hemerijck and Visser (), Hemerijck; Unger et al. (a), Hemerijck, Van 
der Meer (b), Visser (,  and b) and Van den Toren ().
117 See on Denmark Elvander (), Flanagan, Soskice et al. (), Scheuer 
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( and ), Boje and Madsen (), Due, Madsen et al. (), Iversen 
(), Benner and Bundgaard-Vad () and Lind ().
118 For a detailed account on the negotiations of tripartite pacts in Belgium see 
Spineux (), Hemerijck, Unger et al. (), Hemerijck and Visser (), 
Vilrox and Leemput (:  and ) and Arcq and Pochet (). For 
general information on labour relations in Belgium see also Molitor (), 
Lorwin () and Hancké ().
119 Nowadays, wages and salaries are automatically increased for around  per 
cent of public employees and workers across most sectors once the threshold 
or ‘spill index’ is reached. Wages are then automatically increased to keep up 
with the cost of living. In certain sectors there is an increase at fixed inter-
vals, for example every quarter or every six months (eironline ).
120 Following the evaluation, cnt/nar and cce/crb concluded that the “auspi-
cious climate in which the execution of the intersectoral agreement and the 
conclusion of sectoral agreements took off was a major contribution to the 
achievement of social peace, and by that very fact, to stability at the level of 
sectors (...) The agreement appears to be making good progress in terms of 
concretization; consequently, and on the basis of currently available infor-
mation, this first evaluation is positive” (Evaluation of trends in labour costs, 
employment and training efforts, Central Economic Council and National 
Labour Council, joint session,  September ). See eironline ().
121 An example of this dynamic can be seen in the discussion between the social 
partners on the issue of pay. For instance, Pieter Timmermans, director-ge-
neral of the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (feb/vbo), said in interviews 
in the run-up to the new central talks in  that if the current ‘pay norm’, 
setting the limit for wage increases, were to be abolished, automatic pay in-
dexation would have to be abolished as well: “If you break through the pay 
ceiling, why leave the floor as it is?” (eironline b).
122 On  March , eight unions and employers set up new procedure model-
led on coordination of Metall, sif und cf. They proposed mechanisms for 
elaborating a joint view and following new procedures (Martin ). See 
also Jochem ().
123 See National Mediation Office (). ‘Mission Statement of the Medlingsin-
stitutet – A Short Presentation of a New Swedish Agency’, Schulten ().
124 Elvander (a and b), Sheldon and Thornthwaite ().
125 See on Finland Arter (), Lilja (), Kauppinen () and () and 
Pochet (b).
126 The militant communist trade unions were supported by the Soviet ambas-
sador, who was asked to leave by the Finnish president in  (Kauppinen 
: ).
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127 Sectoral agreements were concluded in , , , ,  and 
 (Kauppinen : ).
128 See also on the French case Reynaud (), Hege () and Levy ().
129 There have been further attempts to reform collective bargaining recently. In 
April , the French parliament passed a law that aimed to strengthen bar-
gaining by requiring that agreements must have the support of the majority 
of either employees or unions in the firm and that company agreements can 
depart from sectoral agreements (eironline b).
130 See on the United Kingdom Scharpf (), Hall (), Flanagan, Soskice et 
al. (), Clegg (), Edwards et al. ( and ), Crouch ( and 
a).
131 Between  and , real wages in the United Kingdom grew by . per 
cent annually, compared to . on average in the other Western European 
countries. This figure was only matched by Denmark where real wages grew 
by . percent.
132 See on Italy Regini (), Lange and Regini (), Locke (), Ferner 
and Hyman (b), Regalia and Regini ( and ), Baccaro ( and 
), Ferrera and Gualmini (a and b).
133 For each percentage point increase in the rate of inflation, all wages were to 
be increased by a flat rate (punto unico di contigenza) (Ferrara and Gualmini 
b).
134 The Craxi government won the referendum with a majority of . per cent. 
The result was also seen as a success for the Government in general since it 
meant “the defeat of the unspoken veto that the Communist Party has always 
exercised over economic measures affecting the working class” (Financial 
Times ).
135 For details of the negotiation process behind the agreement see Regalia and 
Regini () and Baccaro ().
136 These were followed by further pacts in  (Pact for Employment) and 
 (Social Pact for Development). These, however, were no longer focused 
on the issue of wage formation. The fundamental restructuring in pay bargai-
ning took place in .
137 The instrument of tripartite agreements has therefore persisted. In Febru-
ary  another agreement was negotiated though not signed by the cgil, 
while a similar agreement was signed by all three main trade unions, a ran-
ge of employers’ associations and regional authorities in May  (eirr 
b).
138 See on the Irish case Browne (), Hardiman ( and ), von Prond-
zynski ( and ), Aust (), Visser (a), O’Donnell and O’Reardon 
( and ).
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139 The Employer-Labour Conference had  members,  from each side. It also 
had a steering committee with five members from each side (Hardiman : 
).
140 The National Understanding also failed because the government was no lon-
ger able to deliver on its promises in exchange for wage restraint (von Prond-
zynski : ).
141 ‘A Strategy for Development -’ (nesc ).
142 Therefore, the course of government sponsored wage settlements has been 
upheld. Until the end of , another two agreements were successfully ne-
gotiated, again including pay agreements and other labour market regulati-
ons (eirr a).
143 In contrast to the Portuguese case, tripartism in Spain is very well documen-
ted in the literature. For an overview see Hamann ( and ), Hamann 
and Lucio (), Royo (, and a and b), Perez (a and b). For 
Spanish industrial relations in general see Lucio ( and ). On the 
transition to democracy see Heywood () and Van der Meer ().
144 ‘Signs of wear and tear in Spanish Socialist Party clothes, Financial Times 
(b).
145 In the national election in , the psoe had lost its majority and formed 
an alliance with the centre-right Catalan nationalist Party. The Catalan party 
insisted on the devolution of bargaining to the regional level.
146 Information on Portugal is considerably rarer than on any other Western Eu-
ropean country. Good descriptions on concertation in Portugal are provided 
by Royo (a and b), Barreto (), Barreto and Naumann (), Pinto 
(). On Portuguese trade unions see Stoleroff () and Stoleroff and 
Naumann (), on collective bargaining see Menezes Leitào ().
147 The late Caetano regime granted trade unions some limited bargaining rights. 
Collective bargaining in the early s, although compulsory, was ineffec-
tive (Barreto and Naumann ).
148 ‘Portuguese Unions Protest at Reforms’, Financial Times (c); see also 
Royo (b: ).
149 The cgtp, however, remained part of the bargaining set-up and has since 
signed two sub-agreements on safety at work and training (Royo b, ).
150 ‘Public Sector Deal in Portugal’, Financial Times ().
151 Differences of the role of concertation and government-trade union interac-
tion in Western and Eastern Europe can be primarily explained by the diffe-
rent role of trade unions in the political economies in Eastern Europe. Union 
weakness leads to an instrumental and strategic use of union support by go-
vernments for reasons for legitimacy with largely meaningless processes of 
concertation (Hassel ; Ost ).
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152 ‘Europe’s painful inflation exorcism’, The Economist (b).
153 On the challenges of emu to national economic policy-making see Soskice 
and Iversen (), Calmfors (), Calmfors and Johansson (), Crouch 
() and Enderlein ().
154 See for further information on recent developments on the Netherlands eirr 
(b), Donaghey and Teague (: ), eirr (), on Denmark Do-
naghey and Teague (: ), on Belgium Donaghey and Teagaue (: 
), eirr (b and c), on Finland eirr (d) and on Ireland eirr 
(a). On social pacts in the post-Euro period see Donaghey and Teague 
(). 
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trade unions
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166-168, 181-183, 203, 229, 283-
284
 − exposed sector   164, 169-170, 
178, 182, 184, 188-189
 − membership   21-23, 49, 72, 
151, 189, 240, 244, 246
 − political affiliation   59, 133, 
136, 168
 − redistributional power   62-69, 
235-239
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relationship with inflation   38-
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tuc (Trade Union Congress), see 
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149, 276
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130-131
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130-132
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parties   134, 258
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ugt (General Workers’ Confed-
eration), see also Spain, trade 
unions   135, 137, 224-226
uil (Union of Italian Workers), see 
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160-161, 163-165, 167, 169-171, 
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142, 149, 238, 259
 − trade unions   135, 141, 149, 276
 − unemployment   217
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 − relationship with inflation   
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unified party system, see also party 
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union-party relations   132-138
United States, incomes policy   41
veto players   123-127
veto points   123-126, 253
vld (Flemish Liberals and Demo-
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wage
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 − bargaining, local bargaining   
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167, 174, 182-183, 194, 208, 216, 
218-223, 230
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Agreement of Wassenaar   73, 
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